would still be true if our personal feelings were different, To make this clear, we must try to analyze the conception of the good It is obvious, to begin with, that the whole idea of good and bad has onnection with desire. Prima facie, anything that we all desire is "good anything that we all dread is"bad. "If we all agreed in our desires, the matter could be left there, but unfortunately our desires conflict. If I say what I want is good, "my neighbour will say No, what I want. Ethics is an attempt though not, I think, a successful one to escape from this subjectivity. I shall naturally try to show, in my dispute with my neighbour, that my desires have some quality which makes them more worthy of respect than his. IfI want to preserve a right of way, I shall appeal to the landless inhabitants of the district; but he, on his side, will appeal to the landowners. I shall say: What use is the beauty of the countryside if no one sees it! He will retort: What beauty will be left if trippers are allowed to spread devastation? Each tries to enlist all ies by showing that his own desires harmonize with those of other people. When this is obv iously impossible, as in the case of a burglar, the man is condemned by public opinion, and his ethical status is that of a sinner. Ethics is thus closely related to politics; it is an attempt to bring the collective desires of a group to bear upon individuals, or, conversely, it is an attempt by an individual to cause his desires to become those of his group. This latter is, of course, only possible if his desires are not too obviously opposed to the general interest: the burglar will hardly attempt to persuade people that he is doing them good, though plutocrats make similar attempts, and often succeed When our desires are for things which can enjoy in common, it seems not unreasonable to hope that others may concur; thus the philosopher who values Truth Goodness and Beauty seems, to himself to be not merely express ing his own desires, but pointing the way to the welfare of all mankind. Unlike the burglar, he is able to believe that his desires are for something that has value in an impersonal sense Ethics is an attempt to give universal, and not merely personal, importance to certain of our desires. I say"certain"of our desires, because in regard to some of them this is obviously impossible, as we saw in the case of the burglar. The man who makes money on the Stock Exchange by means of some secret knowledge does not wish others to be equally well informed Truth(in so far as he values it)is for him a private possession, not the general human good that it is for the philosopher. The philosophe may, it is true, sink to the level of the stockjobber, as when he claims priority for a discovery. But this is a lapse: in his purely philosophic capacity, he wants only to enjoy the contemplation of Truth, in doing which he in no way interferes with others who wish to do likewise (from Religion and Sciencewould still be true if our personal feelings were different, To make this clear, we must try to analyze the conception of the Good. It is obvious, to begin with, that the whole idea of good and bad has some connection with desire. Prima facie, anything that we all desire is "good," and anything that we all dread is' "bad." If we all agreed in our desires, the matter could be left there, but unfortunately our desires conflict. If I say "what I want is good," my neighbour will say "No, what I want." Ethics is an attempt__ though not, I think, a successful one __ to escape from this subjectivity. I shall naturally try to show, in my dispute with my neighbour, that my desires have some quality which makes them more worthy of respect than his. If I want to preserve a right of way, I shall appeal to the landless inhabitants of the district; but he, on his side, will appeal to the landowners. I shall say: "What use is the beauty of the countryside if no one sees it!'' He will retort: "What beauty will be left if trippers are allowed to spread devastation?" Each tries to enlist allies by showing that his own desires harmonize with those of other people. When this is obviously impossible, as in the case of a burglar, the man is condemned by public opinion, and his ethica1 status is that of a sinner. Ethics is thus closely related to politics; it is an attempt to bring the collective desires of a group to bear upon individuals; or, conversely, it is an attempt by an individual to cause his desires to become those of his group. This latter is, of course, only possible if his desires are not too obviously opposed to the general interest: the burglar will hardly attempt to persuade people that he is doing them good, though plutocrats make similar attempts, and often succeed. When our desires are for things which can enjoy in common, it seems not unreasonable to hope that others may concur; thus the philosopher who values Truth, Goodness and Beauty seems, to himself to be not merely expressing his own desires, but pointing the way to the welfare of all mankind. Unlike the burglar, he is able to believe that his desires are for something that has value in an impersonal sense. Ethics is an attempt to give universal, and not merely personal, importance to certain of our desires. I say "certain" of our desires, because in regard to some of them this is obviously impossible, as we saw in the case of the burglar. The man who makes money on the Stock Exchange by means of some secret knowledge does not wish others to be equally well informed: Truth (in so far as he values it) is for him a private possession, not the general human good that it is for the philosopher. The philosopher may, it is true, sink to the level of the stockjobber, as when he claims priority for a discovery. But this is a lapse: in his purely philosophic capacity, he wants only to enjoy the contemplation of Truth, in doing which he in no way interferes with others who wish to do likewise. (from Religion and Science)