SCIENCE AND ETHICS Bertrand Russell Different philosophers have formed different conceptions of the Good. Some hold that it consists in the knowled ge and love of god: others in universal love others in the enjoyment of beauty, and yet others in pleasure. The good once defined the rest of ethics follows we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as l ittle as possible of its correlative evil. The framing of moral rules, so long as the ultimate Good is supposed known, is matter for science, For example: should capital punishment be inflicted for theft, or only for murder, or not at all? Jeremy Bentham, who considered pleasure to be the good, devoted himself to working out what criminal code would most promote pleasure, and concluded it ought to be much less severe than that prevalling in his day. All this, except the proposition that pleasure is the Good, comes within the sphere of science But when we try to be definite as to what we mean when we say that this or that is"the Good, "we find ourselves involved in very great difficulties. Bentham's creed that pleasure is the Good roused furious opposition, and was said to be a pig s philosophy. Neither he nor his opponents could advance any argument. In a scientific question, evidence can be adduced on both sides, and in the end one side is seen to have the better case-or, if this does not happen, the question is left undecided. But in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate Good there is no evidence either ay:each disputant can only appeal to his own emotions, and employ such rhetorical devices as shall rouse similar emotions in others Take, for example, a question which has come to be important in practical politics. Bentham held that one man's pleasure has the same ethical importance as another man's, provided the quantities are equal; and on this ground he was led to advocate democracy. Nietzsche, on the contrary, held that only the great man can be regarded as important on his own account, and that the bulk of mankind are only means to his well-being. He viewed ordinary men as many people view animals: he thought it justifiable to make use of them, not for their own good, but for that of the superman, and this view has since been adopted to justify the abandonment of democracy. We have here a sharp disagreement of great practical importance, but we have absolutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual kind, by which to persuade either party that the other is in the right. There are, it is true, ways of altering men's opinions on such subjects, but they are all emotional, not intellectual Questions as to"values" that is to say, as to what is good or bad on its own account, independently of its effects lie outside the domain of science, as the defenders of religion emphatically assert. I think that in this they are right, but I draw the further conclusion, which they do not draw, that questions as to"values"I wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has"value, "we are giv ing expression to our own emotions, not to a fact whichSCIENCE AND ETHICS Bertrand Russell Different philosophers have formed different conceptions of the Good. Some hold that it consists in the knowledge and love of God ; others in universal love, others in the enjoyment of beauty, and yet others in pleasure. The Good once defined, the rest of ethics follows: we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as 1ittle as possible of its correlative evil. The framing of moral ru1es, so long as the ultimate Good is supposed known, is matter for science, For example: should capital punishment be inflicted for theft, or only for murder, or not at all? Jeremy Bentham, who considered pleasure to be the Good, devoted himself to working out what criminal code would most promote pleasure, and conc1uded that it ought to be much less severe than that prevalling in his day. All this, except the proposition that pleasure is the Good, comes within the sphere of science. But when we try to be definite as to what we mean when we say that this or that is "the Good," we find ourselves involved in very great difficulties. Bentham's creed that pleasure is the Good roused furious opposition, and was said to be a pig's philosophy. Neither he nor his opponents could advance any argument. In a scientific question, evidence can be adduced on both sides, and in the end one side is seen to have the better case -- or, if this does not happen, the question is left undecided. But in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate Good, there is no evidence either way: each disputant can only appeal to his own emotions, and employ such rhetorical devices as shall rouse similar emotions in others. Take, for example, a question which has come to be important in practical politics. Bentham held that one man's pleasure has the same ethical importance as another man's, provided the quantities are equal; and on this ground he was led to advocate democracy. Nietzsche, on the contrary, held that only the great man can be regarded as important on his own account, and that the bulk of mankind are only means to his well-being. He viewed ordinary men as many people view animals: he thought it justifiable to make use of them, not for their own good, but for that of the superman, and this view has since been adopted to justify the abandonment of democracy. We have here a sharp disagreement of great practical importance, but we have absolutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual kind, by which to persuade either party that the other is in the right. There are, it is true, ways of altering men's opinions on such subjects, but they are all emotional, not intellectual. Questions as to "values" __ that is to say, as to what is good or bad on its own account, independently of its effects __lie outside the domain of science, as the defenders of religion emphatically assert. I think that in this they are right, but I draw the further conclusion, which they do not draw, that questions as to "values" lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has "value," we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which