was inconceivable given the fact of imperialism in China.The opened up options for others.If Yuan Shih-k'ai had not had foreign presence,far from providing a solution,lay at the root the imperialists to turn to for his Reorganization Loan in of the problem.While the coexistence,claimed by the 1913,he would have had to come to terms with the apologists,of domestic and foreign industry in China was at Kuomintang and the reformist gentry leaders who had led the least theoretically possible,the coexistence of a strong fight against foreign railway loans in the spring of 1911,and sovereign China and a foreign presence over which she has no had guided the revolution which brought down the Ch'ing in jurisdiction or control was a logical impossibility. the fall.Foreign financial support allowed Yuan to by-pass and This conclusion proceeds from the very nature of ultimately overwhelm this province-based gentry nationalism sovereignty.To the extent that the foreign powers limited The imperialists'role during the warlord era was scarcely China's sovereignty,they inevitably weakened her politically more progressive.To be sure,the powers regretted the Every concession which the foreigners wrung from the disruption of trade which warlordism produced.One must also reluctant Ch'ing-from the rights of missionaries to spheres of admit that other than Japanese aid to Chang Tso-lin and Tuan influence-reduced the legitimacy of the dynasty in the eyes of Ch'i-jui the extent of imperialist support for particular the Chinese population.By the first decade of the twentieth warlords is still an open question.Nonetheless,by bestowing century,the Ch'ing was reduced to little more than a despised the legitimacy of diplomatic recognition and the revenues of tax-collecting agency for the foreign powers.Nearly one-half the Customs administration on anyone who succeeded in of the imperial government's revenue was devoted to loan capturing Peking,the powers encouraged the game of musical service and indemnity payments.63 Now if China had been chairs which the warlord governments played in Peking.The able to increase her import tariff,she might have been able economics of imperialism made it more profitable for a both to meet these obligations and assist indigenous economic warlord to capture Peking than to straighten out the finances development.(In the years between China's tariff autonomy in and develop the economy of the area which he controlled 1929 and the onset of the Sino-Japanese War,China's tariff When he did concern himself with his local base,the warlord receipts increased roughly five-fold in spite of the effects of demonstrated one of the clearest lessons learned from the world depression on foreign trade.)4 But in the nincteenth West:there is money in opium.The cultivation of "foreign and early twentieth centuries,the West set China's tariffs,and mud,"as it was called,was encouraged as a key source of China suffered accordingly,both politically and financially. many warlords'tax revenues.Imperialism,then,was an To turn from the macroscopic to the microscopic,one integral part of the process which led to China's political final example might illustrate how imperialism helped to make disintegration in the first half of the twentieth century.To the China ungovernable.The Sino-British Mackay Treaty of 1902 extent that political collapse intensified the effects of flood, provided that foreign firms be given three weeks notice of any drought and famine in the '20s,'30s,and '40s,imperialism prohibition of rice exports from one locality to another.The contributed to the impoverishment of the Chinese peasantry terms of this treaty were cited by the British in 1906 to prevent a prohibition of exports from Hunan,which Ch'ing This essay has mentioned a series of distinct economic, officials had desired during a flood-induced famine.Later social and political effects of imperialism in China.For when a major popular uprising occurred,the British Consul analytical purposes,it has been necessary to isolate the various explained that "much as I sympathize with any measure effects of the foreign presence.Now,however,it is necessary tending to alleviate the distress of the famine-stricken people, to tie the separate pieces together and to assess the total it was nevertheless my duty to see that Treaty stipulations impact of imperialism on China.Imperialism came to China as were compled with."s Four years later the same situation an unwelcome intruder:pushing opium,Christianity and arose again:the British insisted that three weeks of exports be cotton yarn.The opium enhanced political corruption and allowed,the price of rice soared,and the famous Changsha moral decay;the Christianity threatened the values and the rice riot of 1910 resulted,taking both foreign missions and status of the gentry;and the yarn deprived handicraft businesses and Chinese government offices and schools as its spinners of their livelihood.Many suffered,a few were helped, targets.Foreign restrictions on China's sovereignty were such and the people blamed the government for its failure to that the government was often totally powerless to prevent adequately deal with the intruders.The government,unable to such outbreaks of popular discontent. rid the country of the imperialists,ultimately found itself Just as the unequal treaties sometimes tied the hands of relying on them to collect Customs revenues,help suppress the the Chinese government,so the knowledge and fear of the Taiping and lesser rebellions,and provide financial assistance foreign threat often severely limited the options open to the in the form of loans.The imperialist powers,for their part, Chinese government.In the nineteenth century,such officials were willing to offer sufficient support to conservative as Li Hung-chang,a man fully committed to economic and governments to maintain the status quo with a modicum of military self-strengthening,objected to the construction of political stability,but were quite unwilling (and unable)to aid railways not on the superstitious grounds that they would in the creation of a political regime capable of restoring full disturb feng-sbui,but on the very realistic grounds that they sovereignty to China.In the realm of economics,the energies would provide the means for foreign military invasion.66 of imperialism were directed toward the profitable Turning to politics in the twentieth century,there can be no development of China's foreign trade and such ancillary doubt that the leaders of the 1911 Revolution felt compelled industries as seemed to serve that general end.While they were to make their revolution acceptable to the foreign powers in hardly successful in fundamentally restructuring China's order to prevent intervention or even partition by the massive agrarian economy in the direction of foreign trade, imperialists.Inevitably this meant tempering whatever radical they skewed the modern sector of the economy in that nationalism was present in the revolutionary movement. direction and in so doing produced a type of "false If the imperialists closed options for some,they also modernization"which had little or no hope of producing 14was inconceivable given the fact of imperialism in China. The foreign presence, far from providing a solution, lay at the root of the problem. While the coexistence, claimed by the apologists, of domestic and foreign industry in China was at least theoretically possible, the coexistence of a strong sovereign China and a foreign presence over which she has no jurisdiction or control was a logical impossibility. This conclusion proceeds from the very nature of sovereignty. To the extent that the foreign powers limited China's sovereignty, they inevitably weakened her politically. Every concession which the foreigners wrung from the reluctant Ch'ing-from the rights of missionaries to spheres of influence-reduced the legitimacy of the dynasty in the eyes of the Chinese population. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Ch'ing was reduced to little more than a despised tax-collecting agency for the foreign powers. Nearly one-half of the imperial government's revenue was devoted to loan service and indemnity payments. 63 Now if China had been able to increase her import tariff, she might have been able both to meet these obligations and assist indigenous economic development. (In the years between China's tariff autonomy in 1929 and the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, China's tariff receipts increased roughly five-fold in spite of the effects of world depression on foreign trade.)64 But in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the West set China's tariffs, and China suffered accordingly, both politically and financially. To turn from the macroscopic to the microscopic, one final example might illustrate how imperialism helped to make China ungovernable. The Sino-British Mackay Treaty of 1902 provided that foreign firms be given three weeks notice of any prohibition of rice exports from one locality to another. The terms of this treaty were cited by the British in 1906 to prevent a prohibition of exports from Hunan, which Ch'ing officials had desired during a flood-induced famine. Later when a major popular uprising occurred, the British Consul explained that "much as I sympathize with any measure tending to alleviate the distress of the famine-stricken people, it was nevertheless my duty to see that Treaty stipulations were compled with."65 Four years later the same situation arose again: the British insisted that three weeks of exports be allowed, the price of rice soared, and the famous Changsha rice riot of 1910 resulted, taking both foreign missions and businesses and Chinese government offices and schools as its targets. Foreign restrictions on China's sovereignty were such that the government was often totally powerless to prevent such outbreaks of popular discontent. Just as the unequal treaties sometimes tied the hands of the Chinese government, so the knowledge and fear of the foreign threat often severely limited the options open to the Chinese government. In the nineteenth century, such officials as Li Hung-chang, a man fully committed to economic and military self-strengthening, objected to the construction of railways not on the superstitious grounds that they would disturb [eng-shui, but on the very realistic grounds that they would provide the means for foreign military invasion. 66 Turning to politics in the twentieth century, there can be no doubt that the leaders of the 1911 Revolution felt compelled to make their revolution acceptable to the foreign powers in order to prevent intervention or even partition by the imperialists. Inevitably this meant tempering whatever radical nationalism was present in the revolutionary movement. If the imperialists closed options for some, they also opened up options for others. If Yuan Shih-k'ai had not had the imperialists to turn to for his Reorganization Loan in 1913, he would have had to come to terms with the Kuomintang and the reformist gentry leaders who had led the figh t against foreign railway loans in the spring of 1911, and had guided the revolution which brought down the Ch'ing in the fall. Foreign financial support allowed Yuan to by-pass and ultimately overwhelm this province-based gentry nationalism. The imperialists' role during the warlord era was scarcely more progressive. To be sure, the powers regretted the disruption of trade which warlord ism produced. One must also admit that other than Japanese aid to Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui the extent of imperialist support for particular warlords is still an open question. Nonetheless, by bestowing the legitimacy of diplomatic recognition and the revenues of the Customs administration on anyone who succeeded in capturing Peking, the powers encouraged the game of musical chairs which the warlord governments played in Peking. The economics of imperialism made it more profitable for a warlord to capture Peking than to straighten out the finances and develop the economy of the area which he controlled. When he did concern himself with his local base, the warlord demonstrated one of the clearest lessons learned from the West: there is money in opium. The cultivation of "foreign mud," as it was called, was encouraged as a key source of many warlords' tax revenues. Imperialism, then, was an integral part of the process which led to China's political disintegration in the first half of the twentieth century. To the extent that political collapse intensified the effects of flood, drought and famine in the '20s, '30s, and '40s, imperialism contributed to the impoverishment of the Chinese peasantry. * * * This essay has mentioned a series of distinct economic, social and political effects of imperialism in China. For analytical purposes, it has been necessary to isolate the various effects of the foreign presence. Now, however, it is necessary to tie the separate pieces together and to assess the total impact of imperialism on China. Imperialism came to China as an unwelcome intruder: pushing opium, Christianity and cotton yarn. The opium enhanced political corruption and moral decay; the Christianity threatened the values and the status of the gentry; and the yarn deprived handicraft spinners of their livelihood. Many suffered, a few were helped, and the people blamed the government for its failure to adequately deal with the intruders. The government, unable to rid the country of the imperialists, ultimately found itself relying on them to collect Customs revenues, help suppress the Taiping and lesser rebellions, and provide financial assistance in the form of loans. The imperialist powers, for their part, were willing to offer sufficient support to conservative governments to maintain the status quo with a modicum of political stability, but were quite unwilling (and unable) to aid in the creation of a political regime capable of restoring full sovereignty to China. In the realm of economics, the energies of imperialism were directed toward the profitable development of China's foreign trade and such ancillary industries as seemed to serve that general end. While they were hardly successful in fundamentally restructuring Cll-ina's massive agrarian economy in the direction of foreign trade, they skewed the modern sector of the economy in that direction and in so doing produced a type of "false modernization" which had little or no hope of producing 14