One reaction here is that it isn't a matter of luck do you think it's just a matter of luck that you' ve never tortured someone? You've never been in the circumstances where it seemed even remotely the best solution to a problem. But even if you would never do such a thing, presumably those who are torturers, terrorists, etc, have become so partly as a result of luck ( they wouldnt have become so if they had grown up with the upbringing you hado). Should we blame them or not? The luck principle suggests not So luck does seem to play a role then in whether we" do the right thing "or not. Nagel mentions four quite distinct ways in which this happens ( 1)Constitutive luck: what sort of person we are("inclinations, capacities, and temperament" ); (2)Luck in one's circumstances: what situations and opportunities for good/bad action one faces in life The other two have to do with causes and effects of action () Luck in causes of action: upbringing, were you angry, sleepy, hungry. at the time (4)Luck in effects of action, in how things turn out: did the world cooperate with your dreams, or were you in the wrong place at the wrong time.revolution example, leaving the baby in the bath, turning off the baby monitor The upshot is that if we are really concerned to only attribute responsibility when the agent is the"sole author"of the action, then most of our ordinary attributions are misguided--some degree of good or bad luck is present in everything we do It's a matter of luck what family we were born into, what mental and physical capacities we have, what sorts of opportunities we have to help or harm others, how far our projects and plans are successful. It's a matter of luck(good or bad) whether the murderer succeeds in killing the victim; it's a matter of luck whether the charitable actions you perform have good consequences. So it seems that we should conclude that even if the compatibilist and libertarian are right and we have freewill, this still does not establish that we are right in our ordinary judgements of moral responsibility. We might have free will, but in any action what we will and the effects of our will are a result of luck, which absolves us of responsibility This is the characteristic form of a philosophical problem. There's a principle we hold dear, that luck shouldn' t play a role but it disagrees with the assessments we make in practice. Put it like this Moral principle: if the differences between my action and yours are attributable to luck, then our actions are morally on a par(equally good or equally bad) Moral practice: whether an action is counted as good or bad, right or wrong, can and does depend on luck Now this kind of tension between a principle that seems absolutely compelling considered in the abstract but far too demanding when we apply it to particular cases is characteristic of philosophy; some might say it,'s the essence of philosophy to look into these kinds of theory/practice disagreements. (Nagel compares the moral situation with the situation in epistemology. )What are we going to say in the case at hand? The best outcome obviously would be if we could resolve the tension in favor of one side or the other. Could we go with the principle alone and let the practice be damned? The result, as Nagel says, would be that it's not clear that's going to leave room for moral responsibility at all If the condition of control (i.e, no luck) is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments we find it natural to make. The things for which people are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at first realize by factors beyond their control. and when the seemingly natural requirement of fault or esponsibility is applied in light of these facts, it leaves few.. moral judgments intact. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control (530)One reaction here is that it isn't a matter of luck: do you think it's just a matter of luck that you've never tortured someone? (You've never been in the circumstances where it seemed even remotely the best solution to a problem.) But even if you would never do such a thing, presumably those who are torturers, terrorists, etc., have become so partly as a result of luck (they wouldn't have become so if they had grown up with the upbringing you hadÖ). Should we blame them or not? The luck principle suggests not. So luck does seem to play a role then in whether we "do the right thing" or not. Nagel mentions four quite distinct ways in which this happens. (1) Constitutive luck: what sort of person we are ("inclinations, capacities, and temperament"); (2) Luck in one's circumstances: what situations and opportunities for good/bad action one faces in life. The other two have to do with causes and effects of action: (3) Luck in causes of action: upbringing, were you angry, sleepy, hungry...at the time; (4) Luck in effects of action, in how things turn out: did the world cooperate with your dreams, or were you in the wrong place at the wrong time...revolution example, leaving the baby in the bath, turning off the baby monitor. The upshot is that if we are really concerned to only attribute responsibility when the agent is the "sole author" of the action, then most of our ordinary attributions are misguided--some degree of good or bad luck is present in everything we do. It's a matter of luck what family we were born into, what mental and physical capacities we have, what sorts of opportunities we have to help or harm others, how far our projects and plans are successful. It's a matter of luck (good or bad) whether the murderer succeeds in killing the victim; it's a matter of luck whether the charitable actions you perform have good consequences. So it seems that we should conclude that even if the compatibilist and libertarian are right and we have freewill, this still does not establish that we are right in our ordinary judgements of moral responsibility. We might have free will, but in any action what we will and the effects of our will are a result of luck, which absolves us of responsibility. This is the characteristic form of a philosophical problem. There's a principle we hold dear, that luck shouldn't play a role, but it disagrees with the assessments we make in practice. Put it like this: Moral principle: if the differences between my action and yours are attributable to luck, then our actions are morally on a par (equally good or equally bad). Moral practice: whether an action is counted as good or bad, right or wrong, can and does depend on luck. Now this kind of tension between a principle that seems absolutely compelling considered in the abstract but far too demanding when we apply it to particular cases is characteristic of philosophy; some might say it's the essence of philosophy to look into these kinds of theory/practice disagreements. (Nagel compares the moral situation with the situation in epistemology.) What are we going to say in the case at hand? The best outcome obviously would be if we could resolve the tension in favor of one side or the other. Could we go with the principle alone and let the practice be damned? The result, as Nagel says, would be that it's not clear that's going to leave room for moral responsibility at all: If the condition of control (i.e., no luck) is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments we find it natural to make. The things for which people are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at first realize by factors beyond their control. And when the seemingly natural requirement of fault or responsibility is applied in light of these facts, it leaves few...moral judgments intact. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control (530)