24.00 Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally haslanger November 14. 2001 Moral luck One of the important themes in the freewill debate is the idea that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. In effect, if hard determinism is the correct view, then we should not hold ourselves or others morally responsible. Libertarians, in particular, seem to hold that in order to be responsible for an act, we must be its"sole author. " Here is the principle at Issue Control Principle: You are only responsible for what you have control over. If you steal an axe from my garage and use it to break into a gas station, there's no point in holding me responsible, I didnt have any control over what you did with the axe, I didn, t know about it. At most I could be blamed for leaving the axe out there in plain view where anyone could grab it. But one might askOwasn't it in my control to hide the axe away? Aren't I partly responsible? )Or suppose I had locked the garage door and you had broken it down with your car; nothing that was within my control could have prevented that, so surely in that case I'm not responsible There does then seem to be a strong intuitive correlation between control and responsibility. But now notice an important consequence of the control principle. a handy word for what I don t have control over is what happens as a matter of luck Luck Principle: You are not responsible for anything that is a matter of (good or bad) luck. This too has a good deal of intuitive appeal. Suppose there is a fire and I try to save an infant's life by throwing it off a balcony into the arms of a waiting firefighter. While the baby is falling a burning beam knocks the firefighter down and the infant falls to its death. Is that my fault? No, it was just bad luck, I can't be blamed. Or maybe I am trying to kidnap the baby from an apartment. Unbeknownst to me the apartment is on fire and so what i do saves its life. Should i get credit for this? No, it's a matter of luck that the apartment was on fire But having stated this very plausible- looking principle, we have to notice that as good as it sounds in principle, it doesn't correspond to the way we hand out praise and blame in practice. In effect, we judge people for what they actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had been different. Here is Nagel What has been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by external factors. However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-story window while trying to rescue him. Similarly there is a morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. (530) Another example Nagel gives is more gripping. Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an officer in a death camp if he hadn ' t left germany for business reasons in 1930. Unless mean to be rewarding people for their good fortune at moving out of a challenging situation, the Argentinean businessman ought to be considered just as blameworthy as the death camp officer24.00 Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 14, 2001 Moral Luck One of the important themes in the freewill debate is the idea that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. In effect, if hard determinism is the correct view, then we should not hold ourselves or others morally responsible. Libertarians, in particular, seem to hold that in order to be responsible for an act, we must be its "sole author." Here is the principle at issue: Control Principle: You are only responsible for what you have control over. If you steal an axe from my garage and use it to break into a gas station, there's no point in holding me responsible, I didn't have any control over what you did with the axe, I didn't know about it. At most I could be blamed for leaving the axe out there in plain view where anyone could grab it. (But one might askÖwasn't it in my control to hide the axe away? Aren't I partly responsible?) Or suppose I had locked the garage door and you had broken it down with your car; nothing that was within my control could have prevented that, so surely in that case I'm not responsible, There does then seem to be a strong intuitive correlation between control and responsibility. But now notice an important consequence of the control principle. A handy word for what I don't have control over is what happens as a matter of luck. So: Luck Principle: You are not responsible for anything that is a matter of (good or bad) luck. This too has a good deal of intuitive appeal. Suppose there is a fire and I try to save an infant's life by throwing it off a balcony into the arms of a waiting firefighter. While the baby is falling a burning beam knocks the firefighter down and the infant falls to its death. Is that my fault? No, it was just bad luck, I can't be blamed. Or maybe I am trying to kidnap the baby from an apartment. Unbeknownst to me the apartment is on fire and so what I do saves its life. Should I get credit for this? No, it's a matter of luck that the apartment was on fire. But having stated this very plausible-looking principle, we have to notice that as good as it sounds in principle, it doesn't correspond to the way we hand out praise and blame in practice. In effect, we judge people for what they actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had been different. Here is Nagel: What has been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by external factors. However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-story window while trying to rescue him. Similarly there is a morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. (530) Another example Nagel gives is more gripping. Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an officer in a death camp if he hadn't left Germany for business reasons in 1930. Unless we mean to be rewarding people for their good fortune at moving out of a challenging situation, the Argentinean businessman ought to be considered just as blameworthy as the death camp officer