purport to be comprehensive, but rather focus on one central aspect of human behavior. The models may turn out to be good approximations of behavior under certain conditions, and therefore of great value. But they are not universally and unconditionally correc They generate hypotheses, not conclusions Furthermore, it is important not to equate rationality with materialistic self- interest, or to regard strategic action as motivated solely by materialistic self-interest. To do so would be to equate rational choice theory with a crude philosophical materialism. Yet there is no necessary connection at all. a rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world 's media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of tear-gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks. A Elster says, the rational-choice theorist"can say that the person acts so as to maximize utility, as long as we keep in mind that this is nothing but a convenient way of saying that option might be one that gives pleasure to others and none to himself ng act, his preferred he does what he most prefers. There is no implication of hedonism. In I believe that political actors behave strategically, according to what James March and Johan Olsen call a"logic of consequences, most of the time, perhaps almost all of the time. Hence rational-choice analysis is essential for studying political interactions and the institutions that both shape such interactions and are created by them. But members of the mass public often do not act strategically- and in the theory of rational choice, often should not. If one has negligible influence over an outcome, the investments in information and calculation necessary to determine one s optimal strategy will not themselves be optimal, so it may make more sense to operate on the basis of a rule of thumb. Voters, for instance, may be"rationally ignorant. " Likewise, citizens may decide to uphold broad norms, such as defending human rights, or protecting life, even if they do not find it worthwhile to think-through the consequences of doing so They could, for instance, have favored the arrest, in Great Britain, of former President inochet of Chile without being required, by reason or interest, to calculate whether that action would advance or retard the protection of human rights in developing countries Making such a calculation in a definitive way would be impossible even for specialists since it would depend not only on correctly modeling the various interlocked games involved, now and in the future, but upon the values of certain parameters of these games Given this understanding of rationality and strategic action, I ask: what do the papers in this volume tell us about the contributions that theories based on the assumption of rationality-"rational-choice theories"-make to the study of international law? I do 7I am indebted to duncan Nidal for this formulation Elster, Nuts and Bolts, pp. 23-24 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. In Exploration and Contestation, pp 303-329 Shepsh ering work in this field was done in the late 1970s and the 1980s by Kenneth A Shepsle ce of "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, "in Political Science: The Scie Politics, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg(New York: Agathon), pp. 51-813 purport to be comprehensive, but rather focus on one central aspect of human behavior.7 The models may turn out to be good approximations of behavior under certain conditions, and therefore of great value. But they are not universally and unconditionally correct. They generate hypotheses, not conclusions. Furthermore, it is important not to equate rationality with materialistic self￾interest, or to regard strategic action as motivated solely by materialistic self-interest. To do so would be to equate rational choice theory with a crude philosophical materialism. Yet there is no necessary connection at all. A rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world’s media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of tear-gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks. As Elster says, the rational-choice theorist “can say that the person acts so as to maximize utility, as long as we keep in mind that this is nothing but a convenient way of saying that he does what he most prefers. There is no implication of hedonism. In fact, his preferred option might be one that gives pleasure to others and none to himself.”8 I believe that political actors behave strategically, according to what James March and Johan Olsen call a “logic of consequences,” most of the time, perhaps almost all of the time.9 Hence rational-choice analysis is essential for studying political interactions and the institutions that both shape such interactions and are created by them.10 But members of the mass public often do not act strategically – and in the theory of rational choice, often should not. If one has negligible influence over an outcome, the investments in information and calculation necessary to determine one’s optimal strategy will not themselves be optimal, so it may make more sense to operate on the basis of a “rule of thumb.” Voters, for instance, may be “rationally ignorant.” Likewise, citizens may decide to uphold broad norms, such as defending human rights, or protecting life, even if they do not find it worthwhile to think-through the consequences of doing so. They could, for instance, have favored the arrest, in Great Britain, of former President Pinochet of Chile without being required, by reason or interest, to calculate whether that action would advance or retard the protection of human rights in developing countries. Making such a calculation in a definitive way would be impossible even for specialists, since it would depend not only on correctly modeling the various interlocked games involved, now and in the future, but upon the values of certain parameters of these games. Given this understanding of rationality and strategic action, I ask: what do the papers in this volume tell us about the contributions that theories based on the assumption of rationality – “rational-choice theories” – make to the study of international law? I do 7 I am indebted to Duncan Snidal for this formulation. 8 Elster, Nuts and Bolts, pp. 23-24. 9 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” In Exploration and Contestation, pp. 303-329. 10 Pioneering work in this field was done in the late 1970s and the 1980s by Kenneth A. Shepsle. See Shepsle, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions,” in Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg (New York: Agathon), pp. 51-81