not attempt a systematic evaluation of these highly varied papers, but rather use some of them to illustrate the points I want to make. In discussing the value of rational-choice theory, I will also refer to its limitations, of which it is particularly important for its practitioners to be aware My argument is that rational-choice theory is valuable in at least five ways: 1 )as a basis for skeptical interpretations of talk and action; 2)as a menu of causal mechanisms; 3) as an explanatory device for helping to resolve specific puzzles; 4 )as part-but only part-of an explanation of legal and political phenomena; and 5)as the basis for generating further puzzles for research. Different methods are associated with these different tasks Rational-Choice Skepticism ultimate skepticism, renouncing the possibility of stable knowledge. Rationalism can a In an age of doubt, skepticism is easy. In a sense, postmodernism constitutes th also be relentlessly skeptical, but in a way that is ultimately more constructive. By exposing the failures of superficial or inconsistent explanations, it can clear the way for positive theory, empirical testing, and a better understanding of social reality The paper in this volume by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner exemplifies the skepticism of rational-choice theory. Goldsmith and Posner quite elegantly demonstrate that moralistic and legalistic talk is not necessarily indicative of moralist and legalistic motivations by the speakers. Their method, quite appropriately, is conceptual rather than mpirical. Signalling theory indicates that cynically self-interested statesmen should sound as moralistic as truly moralistic statesmen in environments that reward such talk What Goldsmith and posner do not claim to establish is what the motivations of these statesmen in fact are. Since there are typically pooling equilibria, what the theory tells us is that we can't tell. The theory that leaders of some states are influenced by moral norms may under some conditions imply the same behavior as the theory that all leaders act on the basis of narrow self-interest Rational-choice theory is quite good at telling us what we don' t know. Another case in point is principal-agent theory, which makes the important methodological point that we should not attribute power to agents merely on the basis that they undertake important actions, without being contradicted by their principals. The theory of agent autonomy and that of perfect dominance by the principal are observationally equivalent It is important to know what we don't know. But we should remind ourselves that being aware of our ignorance is not equivalent to having made a valid inference about social reality II Jack Goldsmith and Eric A Posner. "Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, this volume, pp --- Mark A Pollack, "Learning from the Americanists(Again): Theory and method in the Study of Delegation, "West European Politics, January 204 not attempt a systematic evaluation of these highly varied papers, but rather use some of them to illustrate the points I want to make. In discussing the value of rational-choice theory, I will also refer to its limitations, of which it is particularly important for its practitioners to be aware. My argument is that rational-choice theory is valuable in at least five ways: 1) as a basis for skeptical interpretations of talk and action; 2) as a menu of causal mechanisms; 3) as an explanatory device for helping to resolve specific puzzles; 4) as part – but only part – of an explanation of legal and political phenomena; and 5) as the basis for generating further puzzles for research. Different methods are associated with these different tasks. Rational-Choice Skepticism In an age of doubt, skepticism is easy. In a sense, postmodernism constitutes the ultimate skepticism, renouncing the possibility of stable knowledge. Rationalism can also be relentlessly skeptical, but in a way that is ultimately more constructive. By exposing the failures of superficial or inconsistent explanations, it can clear the way for positive theory, empirical testing, and a better understanding of social reality. The paper in this volume by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner exemplifies the skepticism of rational-choice theory.11 Goldsmith and Posner quite elegantly demonstrate that moralistic and legalistic talk is not necessarily indicative of moralist and legalistic motivations by the speakers. Their method, quite appropriately, is conceptual rather than empirical. Signalling theory indicates that cynically self-interested statesmen should sound as moralistic as truly moralistic statesmen in environments that reward such talk. What Goldsmith and Posner do not claim to establish is what the motivations of these statesmen in fact are. Since there are typically pooling equilibria, what the theory tells us is that we can’t tell. The theory that leaders of some states are influenced by moral norms may under some conditions imply the same behavior as the theory that all leaders act on the basis of narrow self-interest. Rational-choice theory is quite good at telling us what we don’t know. Another case in point is principal-agent theory, which makes the important methodological point that we should not attribute power to agents merely on the basis that they undertake important actions, without being contradicted by their principals. The theory of agent autonomy and that of perfect dominance by the principal are observationally equivalent.12 It is important to know what we don’t know. But we should remind ourselves that being aware of our ignorance is not equivalent to having made a valid inference about social reality. 11 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,” this volume, pp --- . 12 Mark A. Pollack, “Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation,” West European Politics, January 2002