World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe David M.Rowe Profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of international trade are now widely acknowledged to be a potent source of domestic political conflict.By altering the relative prices of goods available from world markets,these changes alter the rewards that flow to different factors of production from different economic activi- ties.These distributional consequences of changing levels of trade,in turn,alter the configuration of interests in the domestic political economy,strain existing political alignments,and enable the construction of new political coalitions.Thus,global changes in the economy,such as the transportation and telecommunications revolu- tions in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries or the collapse of international trade and finance during the interwar years,will have global consequences as they reverberate within and through the domestic politics of all countries that trade on world markets.! But surely such changes do more than influence countries'domestic politics.As scholars of international relations recognize,these changes occur within a system of sovereign states where concerns over national security are important determinants of state behavior.Consequently,should we not expect these changes to also systemati- cally and predictably affect the economic constraints within which states must formu- late and pursue their security interests?And,by affecting these constraints,to affect the broader stability of international relations? I thank David Bearce,Pamela Camerra-Rowe,Thomas Christensen,Albert Fishlow,Timothy Frye, John Garofano,Peter Gourevitch,Peter Katzenstein,Jonathan Kirshner,Judy Kullberg,David Lake,Ned Lebow,Edward Mansfield,Patrick McDonald,Joseph McGarvey,Patrick Morgan,James Morrow,Wayne Sandholtz Randall Schweller,David Skidmore,Andrew Sobel,Katherine Lawyer Sperling.Alec Stone Sweet,the participants in seminars at the Global Peace and Conflict Studies program of the University of California,Irvine,and the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University,and the anonymous reviewers for comments on previous drafts.I alone am responsible for any errors.I also thank Kenyon College for the gracious use of its library resources while I was an affiliated scholar at that institution.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation.grant no.SBR-9709556. 1.See Gourevitch 1978 and 1986;Rogowski 1987 and 1989:Frieden 1991:Keohane and Milner 1996: and Alt et al.1996. International Organization 53.2,Spring 1999,pp.195-231 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyWorld Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre–World War I Europe David M. Rowe Profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of international trade are now widely acknowledged to be a potentsource of domestic political con ict. By altering the relative prices of goods available from world markets, these changes alter the rewards that  ow to different factors of production from different economic activi￾ties. These distributional consequences of changing levels of trade, in turn, alter the conŽ guration of interests in the domestic political economy, strain existing political alignments, and enable the construction of new political coalitions. Thus, global changes in the economy, such as the transportation and telecommunicationsrevolu￾tions in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries or the collapse of international trade and Ž nance during the interwar years, will have global consequences as they reverberate within and through the domestic politics of all countries that trade on world markets.1 But surely such changes do more than in uence countries’ domestic politics. As scholars of international relationsrecognize, these changes occur within a system of sovereign states where concerns over nationalsecurity are important determinants of state behavior. Consequently,should we not expect these changes to also systemati￾cally and predictably affect the economic constraintswithin which states must formu￾late and pursue their security interests? And, by affecting these constraints, to affect the broader stability of international relations? I thank David Bearce, Pamela Camerra-Rowe, Thomas Christensen, Albert Fishlow, Timothy Frye, John Garofano, Peter Gourevitch, Peter Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Judy Kullberg, David Lake, Ned Lebow, Edward MansŽ eld, Patrick McDonald,Joseph McGarvey, Patrick Morgan,James Morrow,Wayne Sandholtz, Randall Schweller, David Skidmore, Andrew Sobel, Katherine Lawyer Sperling, Alec Stone Sweet, the participants in seminars at the Global Peace and Con ict Studies program of the University of California, Irvine, and the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University, and the anonymousreviewers for comments on previous drafts. I alone am responsible for any errors. I also thank Kenyon College for the gracious use of its library resources while I was an affiliated scholar at that institution.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, grant no. SBR–9709556. 1. See Gourevitch 1978 and 1986; Rogowski 1987 and 1989; Frieden 1991; Keohane and Milner 1996; and Alt et al. 1996. International Organization 53, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 195–231 r 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology