Was There a "Lost Chance"?75 Qiang,and Zhang Shuguang,and mainland specialists,such as He Di and Niu Jun,have worked with many of the new documents-and come to interesting conclusions,some of which are presented in this symposium. All of the essays that follow dismiss the lost chance thesis,although each conceptualizes that chance differently.Westad,a Norwegian scholar,com- plains that the whole argument over the lost chance is too U.S.-centered. Sheng vehemently rejects the idea of a Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union.Chen and Garver focus on the presumably more reason- able chance for diplomatic relations and trade-positions argued forcefully by Tucker and Hunt-and reject even the possibility of these limited con- tacts.Chen insists that anti-Americanism was integral to Mao's plans to transform China's state and society.He,Sheng,and Westad stress the close relationship between Mao and Stalin.All agree that Mao did not want an American connection in 1949.Garver contends that the Chinese knew that the United States was seeking accommodation and rejected American over- tures.He also accepts the Tucker-Cohen thesis implicitly,noting that the U.S.archives reveal that the Truman administration did precisely what lost chance critics wanted it to do,to no avail. As I write in February 1996,the lost chance idea seems to have been buried by recently released Chinese and Soviet documents,but I doubt that the debate is over.Hunt and Tucker are unconvinced.Someday scholars may gain access to Chinese and Russian archives comparable to that they enjoy (or complain about)in the United States and Great Britain and we all may feel a little surer then that we have learned the truth.For now,the new evidence,used carefully,critically,has given us more knowledge and a greater understanding of what was going on in Beijing and Moscow.as well as in Washington,in the 1940s and early 1950s.I,at least,am persuaded,as I have been for nearly twenty years,that the Americans tried to reach an accommodation with Mao's China in 1949 and 1950.There is general agree- ment that Mao was suspicious of the United States and hostile,both for ideological reasons and because of American efforts to prevent his victory from 1945 to 1948.Returning to the point made most recently by Thomas Christensen,I continue to believe there was room for a modest level of diplomatic and economic contact,as the United States had with Hitler's Germany in the 1930s and with Stalin's Soviet Union in the 1940s,a position with which I believe He Di and Niu Jun would be comfortable. But the idea that such contact would have developed into warmer,friendlier relations is belied by the current state of Chinese-American relations.Ideol- ogy matters now.It mattered in the 1940s.Americans would never be comfortable with a major power hostile to their political values.Chinese Communists would never trust American imperialists.This ideological dif- ference was central to Cold War tensions generally-and certainly bodes ill for the future of Chinese-American relations.My greatest fear is that fifty years from now another generation of scholars will be arguing about how Beijing and Washington lost a chance for peace in the 1990s.Was There a “Lost Chance”? : 75 Qiang, and Zhang Shuguang, and mainland specialists, such as He Di and Niu Jun, have worked with many of the new documents – and come to interesting conclusions, some of which are presented in this symposium. All of the essays that follow dismiss the lost chance thesis, although each conceptualizes that chance differently. Westad, a Norwegian scholar, com￾plains that the whole argument over the lost chance is too U.S.-centered. Sheng vehemently rejects the idea of a Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union. Chen and Garver focus on the presumably more reason￾able chance for diplomatic relations and trade – positions argued forcefully by Tucker and Hunt – and reject even the possibility of these limited con￾tacts. Chen insists that anti-Americanism was integral to Mao’s plans to transform China’s state and society. He, Sheng, and Westad stress the close relationship between Mao and Stalin. All agree that Mao did not want an American connection in 1949. Garver contends that the Chinese knew that the United States was seeking accommodation and rejected American over￾tures. He also accepts the Tucker-Cohen thesis implicitly, noting that the U.S. archives reveal that the Truman administration did precisely what lost chance critics wanted it to do, to no avail. As I write in February 1996, the lost chance idea seems to have been buried by recently released Chinese and Soviet documents, but I doubt that the debate is over. Hunt and Tucker are unconvinced. Someday scholars may gain access to Chinese and Russian archives comparable to that they enjoy (or complain about) in the United States and Great Britain and we all may feel a little surer then that we have learned the truth. For now, the new evidence, used carefully, critically, has given us more knowledge and a greater understanding of what was going on in Beijing and Moscow, as well as in Washington, in the 1940s and early 1950s. I, at least, am persuaded, as I have been for nearly twenty years, that the Americans tried to reach an accommodation with Mao’s China in 1949 and 1950. There is general agree￾ment that Mao was suspicious of the United States and hostile, both for ideological reasons and because of American efforts to prevent his victory from 1945 to 1948. Returning to the point made most recently by Thomas Christensen, I continue to believe there was room for a modest level of diplomatic and economic contact, as the United States had with Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s and with Stalin’s Soviet Union in the 1940s, a position with which I believe He Di and Niu Jun would be comfortable. But the idea that such contact would have developed into warmer, friendlier relations is belied by the current state of Chinese-American relations. Ideol￾ogy matters now. It mattered in the 1940s. Americans would never be comfortable with a major power hostile to their political values. Chinese Communists would never trust American imperialists. This ideological dif￾ference was central to Cold War tensions generally – and certainly bodes ill for the future of Chinese-American relations. My greatest fear is that fifty years from now another generation of scholars will be arguing about how Beijing and Washington lost a chance for peace in the 1990s