74:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY countries,but once the Cold War developed,the CCP aligned with the Soviets.They would have liked formal contact and trade with the United States as well,but chose alliance with the Soviet Union in the face of an apparently hostile United States. The analysis that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s suggested that both Chinese and American leaders were interested in and groping toward accommodation.A consensus seemed to develop around the idea that the Chinese were interested in contacts with the West to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union.Chinese leaders had to move cautiously because of Stalin's suspicions of their loyalty.An alliance with the United States was inconceiv- able.China could not be weaned away from the Soviet Union.But a chance for civil political contacts and modest economic relations between the United States and China had existed-and was lost in 1949-50.Thomas J.Christen- sen develops this case neatly in a recent article.8 There may not have been a chance for friendship,but there was a chance for peaceful relations. The challenge to the consensus that seemed possible among American specialists on Chinese-American relations in the 1980s came from China.In 1986 Chinese and American scholars met at a conference in Beijing to discuss relations between their countries from 1945 to 1955.9 American participants were surprised to hear many (but not all)of the Chinese pres- ent,diplomats as well as scholars,dismiss the lost chance idea as fanciful. They had not been interested in friendship with the United States in 1949. Interviews that I conducted with men and women who had worked closely with Zhou Enlai in the 1940s sounded the same theme.10 The United States was perceived as an implacable enemy by 1946,if not earlier,and friendly overtures toward Ambassador J.Leighton Stuart and others had been tacti- cal,designed to avert a major military intervention by the Americans.It seemed clear that this was the party line in 1986,but was it true? Over the next decade,analysis of the Chinese side dominated the dis- course.The Chinese government released selected documents;a number of histories intended for internal distribution(neibu)were seen by American and European as well as Chinese scholars-many can be found in the United States.More recently a cascade of relevant documents has been poured upon us from the archives of the former Soviet Union,many telling stories conflicting with those put forth by the Chinese.Which of these documents is authentic?which representative?which reliable?In the 1990s,John Garver,Michael Hunt,Odd Arne Westad,and Chinese scholars,both those working in the United States,such as Chen Jian,Michael Sheng.Zhai 8.Thomas J.Christensen,"A 'Lost Chance'for What?Rethinking the Origins of the U.S.- PRC Confrontation,"burnal of American-East Asian Relations 4 (Fall 1995):249-78. 9.See the conference volume edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming.Sino-American Relations,1945-1955:A bint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington,DE.1989). 10.See my "Conversations with Chinese Friends:Zhou Enlai's Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War,"Diplomatic History 11 (Summer 1987):283-89.74 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y countries, but once the Cold War developed, the CCP aligned with the Soviets. They would have liked formal contact and trade with the United States as well, but chose alliance with the Soviet Union in the face of an apparently hostile United States. The analysis that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s suggested that both Chinese and American leaders were interested in and groping toward accommodation. A consensus seemed to develop around the idea that the Chinese were interested in contacts with theWest to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders had to move cautiously because of Stalin’s suspicions of theirloyalty. An alliance with the United States was inconceiv￾able. China could not be weaned away from the Soviet Union. But a chance for civil political contacts and modest economic relations between the United States and China had existed – and was lost in 1949–50. Thomas J. Christen￾sen develops this case neatly in a recent article.8 There may not have been a chance for friendship, but there was a chance for peaceful relations. The challenge to the consensus that seemed possible among American specialists on Chinese-American relations in the 1980s came from China. In 1986 Chinese and American scholars met at a conference in Beijing to discuss relations between their countries from 1945 to 1955.9 American participants were surprised to hear many (but not all) of the Chinese pres￾ent, diplomats as well as scholars, dismiss the lost chance idea as fanciful. They had not been interested in friendship with the United States in 1949. Interviews that I conducted with men and women who had worked closely with Zhou Enlai in the 1940s sounded the same theme.10 The United States was perceived as an implacable enemy by 1946, if not earlier, and friendly overtures toward Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and others had been tacti￾cal, designed to avert a major military intervention by the Americans. It seemed clear that this was the party line in 1986, but was it true? Over the next decade, analysis of the Chinese side dominated the dis￾course. The Chinese government released selected documents; a number of histories intended for internal distribution (neibu) were seen by American and European as well as Chinese scholars – many can be found in the United States. More recently a cascade of relevant documents has been poured upon us from the archives of the former Soviet Union, many telling stories conflicting with those put forth by the Chinese. Which of these documents is authentic? which representative? which reliable? In the 1990s, John Garver, Michael Hunt, Odd Arne Westad, and Chinese scholars, both those working in the United States, such as Chen Jian, Michael Sheng, Zhai 8. Thomas J. Christensen, “A ‘Lost Chance’ for What? Rethinking the Origins of the U.S.- PRC Confrontation,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 4 (Fall 1995): 249–78. 9. See the conference volume edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, DE, 1989). 10. See my “Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai’s Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War,” Diplomatic History 11 (Summer 1987): 283–89