Was There a "Lost Chance"?73 doomed and had sought accommodation with the Chinese Communists, even to the point of persuading Truman to abandon Taiwan to avoid conflict with Mao's regime.The turning point had come in November 1948,when George Marshall and his advisers concluded that a Communist victory in China was inevitable and that the goal of the United States should be to prevent China from becoming"an adjunct of Soviet power."I presented my findings in an essay in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs,eds.,Uncertain Years:Chinese-American Relations,1947-1950.3 A few years later,a more so- phisticated and better documented argument of similar purport was pre- sented by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker in Patterns in the Dust:Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy,1949-19504 giving rise to the notion of a"Tucker-Cohen thesis."5 But a major question remained unanswered. If,as many of us had come to believe,the CCP sought to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union and was open to relations with the United States,and if,as Tucker and I argued,the Truman administration had sought accommo- dation,why did the United States not come to terms with Mao's govern- ment?The most reasonable answer seemed to be domestic political re- straints in the United States,plus misperception and miscalculation in both Beijing and Washington.Neither side understood the political imperatives of the other;neither side anticipated the Korean War. In the Borg and Heinrichs volume,three leading students of Chinese foreign policy,Steven Goldstein,Michael Hunt,and Steven Levine,exam- ined the Chinese side.6 Goldstein concluded that the ideological convictions of CCP leaders and the hostility of rank-and-file Communists embittered by American aid to Jiang's forces precluded overtures from Beijing in 1940 and 1950.Hunt focused more sharply on Mao and argued that he was willing to suspend ideological judgments and respond rationally to the situation;that the real issue was the one Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai)posed for Marshall: How far the PRC tilted toward the Soviet Union depended on what the United States had to offer.7 Levine noted that despite Mao's mistrust of Stalin,he was not so alienated as to conceive of an alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union.CCP leaders had hoped to work with both 3.Warren I.Cohen."Acheson,His Advisers,and China,1949-1950,"in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations,1947-1950 ed.Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York, 1980).13-52.The essays in this volume derived from papers presented to a conference in June 1978. 4.Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,Patterns in the Dust:Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy.1949-1950 (New York,1983). 5.The notion was reinforced when Tucker and Cohen were married in 1988.Their critics were disappointed to learn that they had neither children nor pets named after Acheson. 6.Steven M.Goldstein."Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States:Opportuni- ties and Constraints,1944-1950."235-78;Michael H.Hunt,"Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States,1948-1950."185-233:Steven I.Levine."Notes on Soviet Policy in China and Chinese Communist Perceptions,1945-1950,"293-303. 7.In Hunt's recent The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York,1996).he finds Mao trying to demonstrate his loyalty to a mistrustful Stalin while simultaneously leaving room for relations with the United States.Was There a “Lost Chance”? : 73 doomed and had sought accommodation with the Chinese Communists, even to the point of persuading Truman to abandon Taiwan to avoid conflict with Mao’s regime. The turning point had come in November 1948, when George Marshall and his advisers concluded that a Communist victory in China was inevitable and that the goal of the United States should be to prevent China from becoming “an adjunct of Soviet power.” I presented my findings in an essay in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947–1950.3 A few years later, a more so￾phisticated and better documented argument of similar purport was pre￾sented by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker in Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950,4 giving rise to the notion of a “Tucker-Cohen thesis.”5 But a major question remained unanswered. If, as many of us had come to believe, the CCP sought to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union and was open to relations with the United States, and if, as Tucker and I argued, the Truman administration had sought accommo￾dation, why did the United States not come to terms with Mao’s govern￾ment? The most reasonable answer seemed to be domestic political re￾straints in the United States, plus misperception and miscalculation in both Beijing and Washington. Neither side understood the political imperatives of the other; neither side anticipated the Korean War. In the Borg and Heinrichs volume, three leading students of Chinese foreign policy, Steven Goldstein, Michael Hunt, and Steven Levine, exam￾ined the Chinese side.6 Goldstein concluded that the ideological convictions of CCP leaders and the hostility of rank-and-file Communists embittered by American aid to Jiang’s forces precluded overtures from Beijing in 1940 and 1950. Hunt focused more sharply on Mao and argued that he was willing to suspend ideological judgments and respond rationally to the situation; that the real issue was the one Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) posed for Marshall: How far the PRC tilted toward the Soviet Union depended on what the United States had to offer.7 Levine noted that despite Mao’s mistrust of Stalin, he was not so alienated as to conceive of an alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union. CCP leaders had hoped to work with both 3. Warren I. Cohen, “Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949–1950,” in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947–1950, ed. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York, 1980), 13–52. The essays in this volume derived from papers presented to a conference in June 1978. 4. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950 (New York, 1983). 5. The notion was reinforced when Tucker and Cohen were married in 1988. Their critics were disappointed to learn that they had neither children nor pets named after Acheson. 6. Steven M. Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States: Opportuni￾ties and Constraints, 1944–1950,” 235–78; Michael H. Hunt, “Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States, 1948–1950,” 185–233; Steven I. Levine, “Notes on Soviet Policy in China and Chinese Communist Perceptions, 1945–1950,” 293–303. 7. In Hunt’s recent The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York, 1996), he finds Mao trying to demonstrate his loyalty to a mistrustful Stalin while simultaneously leaving room for relations with the United States