The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception. 11 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the international- relations field,2threat perception,as used in this study,is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state.Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capa- bility of the threatening state and friendly state.Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending,the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state.But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain.For example,leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent.Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat mis- perception.In some cases,though,intentions are relatively easy to determine,based on past and recent experience of the relevant state."For instance,threatened countries,especially weak nations,find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they 'have been subject to repeated attack and mili- tary pressure4 Outside support may provide real security,but it also induces real anxiety:the more one relies on external assistance,the greater the cost if that support is with- drawn.This again involves uncertainty about an ally's intentions.Enemy intentions also require more discussion.Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state,estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat,but also the intensity of the threat.Repeated aggressive action,threatening statements, past experience of conflict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat.Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived,the response options are varied.International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses,suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction.In fact,very few external threats inspire such a commitment(this probably explains why the inter- national-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue).This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term.Only an extremely intense threat will suffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state,and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response.Industrial- isation,the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 11Analysis The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception.21 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the international￾relations field,22 threat perception, as used in this study, is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state. Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capa￾bility of the threatening state and friendly state. Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending, the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state. But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain. For example, leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent. Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat mis￾perception. In some cases, though, intentions are relatively easy to determine, based on past and recent experience of the relevant state.23 For instance, threatened countries, especially weak nations, find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they ‘have been subject to repeated attack and mili￾tary pressure’.24 Outside support may provide real security, but it also induces real anxiety: the more one relies on external assistance, the greater the cost if that support is with￾drawn. This again involves uncertainty about an ally’s intentions. Enemy intentions also require more discussion. Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state, estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat, but also the intensity of the threat. Repeated aggressive action, threatening statements, past experience of con flict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat. Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived, the response options are varied. International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses, suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction. In fact, very few external threats inspire such a commitment (this probably explains why the inter￾national-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue). This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term. Only an extremely intense threat will su ffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state, and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response. Industrial￾isation, the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-