12 ular,is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat.It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to pro- duce a long-term response.Klaus Knorr notes that'[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant(especially the recent)past5 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of North- east Asia.It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling elites in South Korea and Taiwan,and, therefore,shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states.This geopolitics- focused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example,according to the latter,expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia.While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia,this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region.For instance,the strategic approach made by the us to China in the early 197os generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia,but it actually heightened Taiwan's perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War,which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War.Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region's geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan,and later its invasion of China.In particular,he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local elites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration,and that many of these elites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945.In this way,the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan.In fact,Cummings'argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However,this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings.First,unlike Korea,Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese.The Kuomintang (KMT)government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 12 ular, is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat. It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to pro￾duce a long-term response. Klaus Knorr notes that ‘[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant (especially the recent) past’.25 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of North￾east Asia. It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling élites in South Korea and Taiwan, and, therefore, shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states. This geopolitics￾focused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example, according to the latter, expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia. While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia, this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region. For instance, the strategic approach made by the  to China in the early 1970s generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia, but it actually heightened Taiwan’s perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War, which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War. Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region’s geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan, and later its invasion of China.26 In particular, he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local élites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration, and that many of these élites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945. In this way, the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan. In fact, Cummings’ argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However, this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings. First, unlike Korea, Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese. The Kuomintang () government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949