INTRODUCTION Thrasymachus, intervening brutally($S6 B), affirms alist thesis that lly the advanta of the (politically) stronger, and with dramatic touch silenced(350 c-D), much as Callicles is refuted in the Gorgias. The conclusion, in the manner of the minor dialogues, is that Socrates knows nothing($+ c) For since he does not know what justice is, he cannot a fortiori determine the larger question raised by just life or the unjust life is the happie ither the first half or the whole of this book detached would be a plausible companion to such dialogues as the Charides and Laches, which deal in similar manner with two other cardinal virtues temperance and bravery. It is an easy but idle and unverifiable conjecture that it was in Plato's original intention composed as a separate we perhaps a discarded sketch for the Gorgias, and onl by an afterthought became an introduction for the not, in view of the extent of the Republic, dis- proportionate in length, That is all we know or can know The second book opens with what Mill as a monument of the essential fairness of Plato rful restatement of the th Thrasymachus by the brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus. They are not content with the dialectic that reduced Thrasymachus to silence (358 B) They demand a demonstration which will convince the youth hesitating at the cross-roads of virtue and xxV, note 6 b Cf. Dissertations and Discussions, vol iv. p. 311INTRODUCTION Thrasymachus, intervening brutally (336 b), affirms the immoralist thesis that j ustice is only the advantage of the (politically) stronger, and with humorous dramatic touches of character-portrayal is finally silenced (350 c-d), much as Callicles is refuted in the Gorgias. The conclusion, in the manner of the minor dialogues, is that Socrates knows nothing (354 c). For since he does not know what justice is, he cannot a fortiori determine the larger question raised by Thrasymachus 's later contention (352 d), whether the just life or the unjust life is the happier. Either the first half or the whole of this book detached would be a plausible companion to such dialogues as the Charmides and Laches, which deal in similar manner with two other cardinal virtues, temperance and bravery. It is an easy but idle and unverifiable conjecture that it was in Plato's original intention composed as a separate work, perhaps a discarded sketch for the Gorgias, and only by an afterthought became an introduction for the Republic.'* It is now an excellent introduction and not, in view of the extent of the Republic, dis- proportionate in length. That is all we know or can know. The second book opens with what Mill describes as a " monument of the essential fairness of Plato's mind " ^—a powerful restatement of the theory of Thrasymachus by the brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus. They are not content with the dialectic that reduced Thrasymachus to silence (358 b). They demand a demonstration which will convince the youth hesitating at the cross-roads of virtue and " Cf. infra, p. xxv, note 6. ' Cf. Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iv. p. 311