Introduction:the nature of science 13 credible inductive argument,as many outrageous inductions as we like.So not only can we argue that all emeralds are green and argue that they are grue,we can also argue that they are gred and that they are grellow.A standard induction would suggest that water at atmospheric pressure boils at 100C.But we can form a Goodmanesque induction the conclusion of which is that water breezes at 100C (where the definition of "breezes" implies that water observed for the first time in the next millennium will freeze at 100C).In addition there are arguments that children born in the next century will be immortal and that the Earth's rotation will reverse so that the Sun will rise in the west. The problem with this is not merely that these conclusions seem thoroughly implausible.Rather,it looks as if any claim about the future can be made to be a conclusion of an inductive argument from any premises about the past,as long as we use a strange enough grue-like predicate.And,if anything can be made out to be the conclusion of an inductive argument,then the very notion of inductive argument becomes trivial.So how do we characterize the reasoning processes of science if their central notion is trivial? Philosophers have proposed a wide range of answers and responses to Goodman's problem,and I will myself make a suggestion in Chapter 3.But one response that will not do is to dismiss the problem as contrived.First,this begs the question:Why is it contrived?What distinguishes pseudo-inductive arguments with contrived concepts like "grue"from genuine inductions using "green"?Secondly,we can think of cases that are less contrived.Take someone who knows about trees only that some are evergreens and some are deciduous.If they were to observe beech trees every day over one summer they would have evidence that seems to support both the hypothesis that beech trees are deciduous and the hypothesis that they are evergreens.Here neither option is contrived. But we know this only because we have experienced both.(The idea of deciduousness might appear contrived to someone who had lived all their lives in pine forests.) Goodman's problem appears to be at least as fundamental as Hume's,in the following sense.Even if we had a solution to Hume's problem,Goodman's problem would appear to remain.Hume argues that no conclusion to an inductive argument can ever amount to knowledge.Say we thought that there were an error in Hume's reasoning.and that knowledge from inductive arguments is not ruled out.It seems we would still be at a loss to say which arguments these are,as nothing said so far could distinguish between a genuine inductive one and a spurious one involving bent predicates. Representation and reason When discussing Judge Overton's opinion regarding creationism,I stressed that he was not trying to judge whether creationism,or evolution,or something else is true,let alone whether anyone could rightly claim to know which of these is true.Rather,he was,in part,trying to judge what it is that makes a claim to be scientific.Roughly speaking,there were two sorts of relevant answer.The first dealt with the subject matter of science:laws of nature,natural explanation,natural kinds (if any).The second concerned the sorts of attitude and approach a scientist has towards a scientific theory:proportioning belief to the strength of evidence,avoiding dogma,being open to the falsifiability of a theory.credible inductive argument, as many outrageous inductions as we like. So not only can we argue that all emeralds are green and argue that they are grue, we can also argue that they are gred and that they are grellow. A standard induction would suggest that water at atmospheric pressure boils at 100°C. But we can form a Goodmanesque induction the conclusion of which is that water breezes at 100°C (where the definition of “breezes” implies that water observed for the first time in the next millennium will freeze at 100°C). In addition there are arguments that children born in the next century will be immortal and that the Earth’s rotation will reverse so that the Sun will rise in the west. The problem with this is not merely that these conclusions seem thoroughly implausible. Rather, it looks as if any claim about the future can be made to be a conclusion of an inductive argument from any premises about the past, as long as we use a strange enough grue-like predicate. And, if anything can be made out to be the conclusion of an inductive argument, then the very notion of inductive argument becomes trivial. So how do we characterize the reasoning processes of science if their central notion is trivial? Philosophers have proposed a wide range of answers and responses to Goodman’s problem, and I will myself make a suggestion in Chapter 3. But one response that will not do is to dismiss the problem as contrived. First, this begs the question: Why is it contrived? What distinguishes pseudo-inductive arguments with contrived concepts like “grue” from genuine inductions using “green”? Secondly, we can think of cases that are less contrived. Take someone who knows about trees only that some are evergreens and some are deciduous. If they were to observe beech trees every day over one summer they would have evidence that seems to support both the hypothesis that beech trees are deciduous and the hypothesis that they are evergreens. Here neither option is contrived. But we know this only because we have experienced both. (The idea of deciduousness might appear contrived to someone who had lived all their lives in pine forests.) Goodman’s problem appears to be at least as fundamental as Hume’s, in the following sense. Even if we had a solution to Hume’s problem, Goodman’s problem would appear to remain. Hume argues that no conclusion to an inductive argument can ever amount to knowledge. Say we thought that there were an error in Hume’s reasoning, and that knowledge from inductive arguments is not ruled out. It seems we would still be at a loss to say which arguments these are, as nothing said so far could distinguish between a genuine inductive one and a spurious one involving bent predicates. Representation and reason When discussing Judge Overton’s opinion regarding creationism, I stressed that he was not trying to judge whether creationism, or evolution, or something else is true, let alone whether anyone could rightly claim to know which of these is true. Rather, he was, in part, trying to judge what it is that makes a claim to be scientific. Roughly speaking, there were two sorts of relevant answer. The first dealt with the subject matter of science: laws of nature, natural explanation, natural kinds (if any). The second concerned the sorts of attitude and approach a scientist has towards a scientific theory: proportioning belief to the strength of evidence, avoiding dogma, being open to the falsifiability of a theory. Introduction: the nature of science 13