Philosophy of science 14 These two kinds of answer correspond to the structure of this book,the remaining chapters of which are divided into two sections:representation and reason. The first part is called representation because (so I claim)the basic aim of science is to provide an accurate representation of the world-what sorts of things are in it,how they interact,what explains what,and so on.In the previous paragraph I mentioned certain very general concepts that are used in the scientific representation of the world, and I will ask what is meant by these.We start in Chapter 1 with the concept law of nature,and then move on in Chapter 2 to the notion of explanation,which will allow us also to look,albeit briefly,at causes.Chapter 3 deals with the contentious question of whether the concept of a natural kind is needed in science and,if so,how it should be understood.In Chapter 4 I will pause to consider whether I was right to claim that science aims at representation-as opposed merely to being a tool for prediction.One reason for taking the latter view is the claim that we cannot have knowledge of the unobservable parts of the world.In which case it would be unreasonable for science to aim at representing the world because it cannot achieve this. This leads to the subject matter of the second part of the book,reason.Here the question is how much can scientific reasoning tell us about the world.In Chapter 5 I start with the sceptical position that it can tell us nothing-scientific knowledge of a general kind is impossible.We will look at various proposals for solutions to Hume's problem.In particular,I will assess Popper's attempt to avoid the problem by giving an account of science that does not depend on induction.In Chapter 6 I look at the contribution made by probability to scientific reasoning,and whether some mathematical theory can provide an a priori basis for proportioning belief to the evidence.I do think that an answer to Hume's problem can be found,and I present this in Chapter 7.There we will look at developments in modern epistemology that have provided a fruitful way of addressing not only the problem of induction but also other problems in the philosophy of science, such as the so-called "theory-ladenness of observation".In the final chapter,I address the question of whether there is such a thing as the scientific method.I come to the conclusion that there is not,and consequently ask whether,without "the scientific method"we can explain the progress of science,and indeed whether there is any. Further reading An extract from Judge Overton's judgment is printed in Joel Feinberg (ed.),Reason and responsibility.The case for creationism is made by Henry Morris in Scientific creationism:and a philosopher's case against it is Philip Kitcher's Abusing science.An excellent discussion of what scientists do and why,which I recommend,even to scientists,is Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly's The many faces of science.Another readable book which discusses several case studies in the history of science is The golem by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch.David Hume spells out the problem for induction in his Enquiry concerning human understanding (especially Section IV and Section VII, Part ii),and Nelson Goodman introduces his puzzle about grue in Fact,fiction and forecast.These two kinds of answer correspond to the structure of this book, the remaining chapters of which are divided into two sections: representation and reason. The first part is called representation because (so I claim) the basic aim of science is to provide an accurate representation of the world—what sorts of things are in it, how they interact, what explains what, and so on. In the previous paragraph I mentioned certain very general concepts that are used in the scientific representation of the world, and I will ask what is meant by these. We start in Chapter 1 with the concept law of nature, and then move on in Chapter 2 to the notion of explanation, which will allow us also to look, albeit briefly, at causes. Chapter 3 deals with the contentious question of whether the concept of a natural kind is needed in science and, if so, how it should be understood. In Chapter 4 I will pause to consider whether I was right to claim that science aims at representation—as opposed merely to being a tool for prediction. One reason for taking the latter view is the claim that we cannot have knowledge of the unobservable parts of the world. In which case it would be unreasonable for science to aim at representing the world because it cannot achieve this. This leads to the subject matter of the second part of the book, reason. Here the question is how much can scientific reasoning tell us about the world. In Chapter 5 I start with the sceptical position that it can tell us nothing—scientific knowledge of a general kind is impossible. We will look at various proposals for solutions to Hume’s problem. In particular, I will assess Popper’s attempt to avoid the problem by giving an account of science that does not depend on induction. In Chapter 6 I look at the contribution made by probability to scientific reasoning, and whether some mathematical theory can provide an a priori basis for proportioning belief to the evidence. I do think that an answer to Hume’s problem can be found, and I present this in Chapter 7. There we will look at developments in modern epistemology that have provided a fruitful way of addressing not only the problem of induction but also other problems in the philosophy of science, such as the so-called “theory-ladenness of observation”. In the final chapter, I address the question of whether there is such a thing as the scientific method. I come to the conclusion that there is not, and consequently ask whether, without “the scientific method” we can explain the progress of science, and indeed whether there is any. Further reading An extract from Judge Overton’s judgment is printed in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Reason and responsibility. The case for creationism is made by Henry Morris in Scientific creationism; and a philosopher’s case against it is Philip Kitcher’s Abusing science. An excellent discussion of what scientists do and why, which I recommend, even to scientists, is Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly’s The many faces of science. Another readable book which discusses several case studies in the history of science is The golem by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch. David Hume spells out the problem for induction in his Enquiry concerning human understanding (especially Section IV and Section VII, Part ii), and Nelson Goodman introduces his puzzle about grue in Fact, fiction and forecast. Philosophy of science 14