394 ate the constitution or destroy anything else which does not register positively in the autocrats preferences. In the same way, the arguments for the alleged superiority of democracy to dictatorship and of dictatorship to anarchy also vanish once this assumption is not made. It is odd, for a book which puts ower front and center, that the only way the predictions of the model make sense is with respect to those dictators who have no interest in power, only in money. And how can a model like that apply to dictators like Hitler or Pol Pot? One can debate whether they were motivated by power or by ideology but certainly not by money. Yet the real problem, I suspect, lies with the second assumption-the lack of emphasis on competition. Olson's dictator remains serenely in of- fice, blissfully untouched by competition for his position. Put differently, he is unaffected by what I have referred to as The dictators dilemma-the problem a dictator has of knowing how much support he really has or, con tersely, how much repression he has to use to stay in office (Wintrobe, 1998) However, once the struggle for power is assumed away, many of the most interesting aspects of the behavior of dictators become idiosyncratic features of their preferences, and hence largely unpredictable, instead of being derived from the principle of competition. Thus the wars among the monarchies are declared simply an aspect of princely consumption. And the same goes presumably, for Stalins war against the peasantry, Hitler's treatment of the Jews, and so on. On the bandit model, the only way to understand these forms of behavior is to take the line that dictators have some monopoly power, and that they use this power to implement their preferences, which happen to be weird preferences The neglect of competition has always been a problem in Olson's thought ginning with his analysis of interest groups in The Logic of collective Action, and later with The Rise and Decline of Nations. Indeed, Olsons view of political processes sometimes resembles Rousseaus"general will more than the public choice begun by Schumpeter and Downs. In their ap- proach, competition is the sine qua non of the economic approach to politics In Olson(and Rousseau), what is important is whether the incentives of decision-maker(s)lead them to act for the common good as opposed to their own narrow self interest, and competition among distributional coalitions (Olson)or factions"(Rousseau) tends to narrow rather than broadening their vision. Of course Olsons approach has yielded important insights. Mancur himself was one of the founders of public choice, and his distinct line of thought has profoundly influenced, not merely the discipline of public choice or the economics profession, but all of social science. It is just that when dealing with dictatorship, perhaps the most serious form of monopoly, ab-394 ate the constitution or destroy anything else which does not register positively in the autocrat’s preferences. In the same way, the arguments for the alleged superiority of democracy to dictatorship and of dictatorship to anarchy also vanish once this assumption is not made. It is odd, for a book which puts power front and center, that the only way the predictions of the model make sense is with respect to those dictators who have no interest in power, only in money. And how can a model like that apply to dictators like Hitler or Pol Pot? One can debate whether they were motivated by power or by ideology, but certainly not by money. Yet the real problem, I suspect, lies with the second assumption – the lack of emphasis on competition. Olson’s dictator remains serenely in of- fice, blissfully untouched by competition for his position. Put differently, he is unaffected by what I have referred to as “The dictator’s dilemma” – the problem a dictator has of knowing how much support he really has or, con￾versely, how much repression he has to use to stay in office (Wintrobe, 1998). However, once the struggle for power is assumed away, many of the most interesting aspects of the behavior of dictators become idiosyncratic features of their preferences, and hence largely unpredictable, instead of being derived from the principle of competition. Thus the wars among the monarchies are declared simply an aspect of “princely consumption.” And the same goes, presumably, for Stalin’s war against the peasantry, Hitler’s treatment of the Jews, and so on. On the bandit model, the only way to understand these forms of behavior is to take the line that dictators have some monopoly power, and that they use this power to implement their preferences, which happen to be weird preferences. The neglect of competition has always been a problem in Olson’s thought, beginning with his analysis of interest groups in The Logic of Collective Action, and later with The Rise and Decline of Nations. Indeed, Olson’s view of political processes sometimes resembles Rousseau’s “general will” more than the public choice begun by Schumpeter and Downs. In their ap￾proach, competition is the sine qua non of the economic approach to politics. In Olson (and Rousseau), what is important is whether the incentives of decision-maker(s) lead them to act for the common good as opposed to their own narrow self interest, and competition among “distributional coalitions” (Olson) or “factions” (Rousseau) tends to narrow rather than broadening their vision. Of course Olson’s approach has yielded important insights. Mancur himself was one of the founders of public choice, and his distinct line of thought has profoundly influenced, not merely the discipline of public choice or the economics profession, but all of social science. It is just that when dealing with dictatorship, perhaps the most serious form of monopoly, ab-