stracting from the effects of competition is that much more prone to lead one in a misleading direction As the reader can see. i do not think this is mancur's best. but it is still very much worth reading. Among the parts I found most thought provoking, I would pick the concept of market-augmenting government, and the placing of power front and center in the analysis of economic processes. And there is much to agree with as well, in the analysis of bureaucratic competition under the Soviet system(a welcome exception to his general disregard of competition), the kinds of markets needed for prosperity, and the importance of proper governance for economic growth. Mancur once said to me that he had had only one big idea in his life. That is only half true, as the reader of any of his books knows. And in any case, he played it like a Stradivarius. We will all miss his music RONALD WINTROBE, Economics, University of Western Ontario, London Ontario Canada N6A 5C2 Note 1. I am grateful to Roger Congleton, Gianluigi Galeotti and Pierre Salmon for helpful comments on this review. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility References Olson, M, Jr (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press Olson, M, Jr (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven and London: Yale University Wintrobe, R (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press Public Choice 106: 395-399. 2001 Gunther G. Schulze, The political economy of capital controls. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2000. Xiv 282 pages. $64.95/f40.00(cloth) This books consists of three parts, each of deals with a particular aspect of capital controls or international movements. In Part I a political economic model of capital controls is developed. The evasion of capital controls is modeled in Part Il, while Part Ill contains empirical work aimed at determining the extent of international capital mobility. Each395 stracting from the effects of competition is that much more prone to lead one in a misleading direction. As the reader can see, I do not think this is Mancur’s best. But it is still very much worth reading. Among the parts I found most thought provoking, I would pick the concept of “market-augmenting government”, and the placing of power front and center in the analysis of economic processes. And there is much to agree with as well, in the analysis of bureaucratic competition under the Soviet system (a welcome exception to his general disregard of competition), the kinds of markets needed for prosperity, and the importance of proper governance for economic growth. Mancur once said to me that he had had only one big idea in his life. That is only half true, as the reader of any of his books knows. And in any case, he played it like a Stradivarius. We will all miss his music. RONALD WINTROBE, Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2 Note 1. I am grateful to Roger Congleton, Gianluigi Galeotti and Pierre Salmon for helpful comments on this review. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. References Olson, M., Jr. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Olson, M., Jr. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven and London: Yale University press. Wintrobe, R. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. Public Choice 106: 395–399, 2001 Günther G. Schulze, The political economy of capital controls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xiv + 282 pages. $64.95/£40.00 (cloth). This books consists of three parts, each of which deals with a particular aspect of capital controls or international capital movements. In Part I, a political economic model of capital controls is developed. The evasion of capital controls is modeled in Part II, while Part III contains empirical work aimed at determining the extent of international capital mobility. Each