Virtues and the Ethical Social worker In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances--is not thereby obliged to dis regard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse(1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obliga tions, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life(Finnis, 2005). For Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor(and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings)was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it(Finnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the 2e> irtues tend to empha did ac A related concern is with the apparent circularity of virtue ethics--virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agree ment on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin nd often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjec tive and relativistic (e.g, Hursthouse, 1991), to consequen tialism in anscombe's sense-Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right(Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself(1958)argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and theVirtues and the Ethical Social Worker 89 In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)—to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances—is not thereby obliged to dis￾regard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse (1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obliga￾tions, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life (Einnis, 2005). Eor Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor (and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings) was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it (Einnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the virtues tend to emphasize, as did Aquinas, the complemen￾tarity and mutual necessity of principles, duties, and virtues (Ereeman, 2000; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008). A related concern is v/ith the apparent circularity of virtue ethics—virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place? This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agree￾ment on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin and often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjec￾tive and relativistic (e.g., Hursthouse, 1991), to consequen￾tialism in Anscombe's sense—Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right (Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself (1958) argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and the