《社会工作伦理》课程重要文献（英文）：Ethics with Character：Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker

Ethics with character Virtues and the ethical social worker PAUL ADAMS University of Hawaii at Manoa Myron B. Thompson School of Social Work This article explores the relevance to social work of those as- pects of applied ethics that are not primarily about identify ng and resolving dilemmas. It examines the potential of the ethical tradition rooted in the virtues and character of the ractitioner-from Aristotle and Hippocrates to contempo- rary virtue-based ethics in medicine-to guide and enrich inderstanding of the social work profession and the disposi tions or qualities of character its practice requires and develops In its emphasis on obligation, derived from values, pri In- ciples and standards of conduct, social work ethics focuses on the behavior required or expected of members of a profes- sion(e. g, Congress, 1999; Dolgoff, Loewenberg Harrington 2008; Reamer, 2006a, 2006b). "Ethics"-in Strom-Gottfried's (2007) succinct definition-"refers to the embodiment of values nto guidelines for behavior"(p. 1).[Here, it is clear from the context, she means the applied ethics of a profession, not ethics as that branch of philosophy also known as moral philosophy. I Social works literature on ethics, like its curricula, emphasizes principles, rules, obligations, and dilemmas; it offers guide ines for professional conduct and for identifying and resolving conflicts of principles and the dilemmas that arise from them Journal of Sociology Social Welfare, September 2009, Volume XXXVI, Number 3

Ethics with Character: Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker PAUL ADAMS University of Hawaii at Manoa Myron B. Thompson School of Social Work This article explores the relevance to social work of those as￾pects of applied ethics that are not primarily about identify￾ing and resolving dilemmas. It examines the potential of the ethical tradition rooted in the virtues and character of the practitioner^from Aristotle and Hippocrates to contempo￾rary virtue-based ethics in medicine—to guide and enrich our understanding of the social work profession and the disposi￾tions or qualities of character its practice requires and develops. Key words: ethics, professional ethics, social work ethics, virtue ethics, Aristotelian ethics In its emphasis on obligation, derived from values, prin￾ciples, and standards of conduct, social w^ork ethics focuses on the behavior required or expected of members of a profes￾sion (e.g.. Congress, 1999; Dolgoff, Loewenberg, & Harrington, 2008; Reamer, 2006a, 2006b). "Ethics"—in Strom-Gottfried's (2007) succinct definition—"refers to the embodiment of values into guidelines for behavior" (p. 1). [Here, it is clear from the context, she means the applied ethics of a profession, not ethics as that branch of philosophy also known as moral philosophy] Social work's literature on ethics, like its curricula, emphasizes principles, rules, obligations, and dilemmas; it offers guide￾lines for professional conduct and for identifying and resolving conflicts of principles and the dilemmas that arise from them. Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, September 2009, Volume XXXVI, Number 3 83

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare It is about making the right decision and doing the right thing The NasW Code of Ethics, like the deontological codes(or codes of duty)of other professions, is an important tool for identify ing social work's core values, summarizing broad principles, and establishing specific ethical standards to guide practice These are standards to which NASW expects the general public to hold the profession accountable and to which, in principle, it holds its own members accountable--helping profession als identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, and socializing new practitioners(NASW, 1999) So much is this approach to professional ethics taken for granted that it is easy to overlook how different it is from the traditional understanding of ethics, no less in the classical and Christian West from Aristotle to Aquinas than in the east in he other main religions and ethical traditions of the world (Peterson Seligman, 2004). In that older view, ethics is fun damentally about happiness rather than obligation, and about character and the virtues rather than about resolving moral dilemmas(MacIntyre, 2006; Pinckaers, 1995). This is as true for applied professional ethics, such as those of Hippocrates in medicine, as of general philosophical ethics(Pellegrino Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008) This article draws on classical, medieval, and contempo- rary virtue-oriented ethics to address those habits of heart and mind(Tocqueville, 2000)critical for ethical practice. It analy- es the potential of what has come to be called virtue ethics, and in particular the classical Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of ethics(Aristotle, 2002; Aquinas, 1981, 2005)as developed by MacIntyre (1984, 1990)and other contemporary nec Aristotelian or virtue-ethicists( Crisp Slote, 1997; Darway 2003), to guide our understanding of the social work profession and the dispositions that its practice requires and develops Ethics' Loss of Character After the death of Aquinas in 1274, both philosophical ethics and moral theology underwent a fundamental shift away from character, virtues, and habits of the heart to a na rower focus on the rightness or wrongness of specific actions (Pinckaers, 1995). The result in modern professional as well

84 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare It is about making the right decision and doing the right thing. The NASWCode of Ethics, like the deontological codes (or codes of duty) of other professions, is an important tool for identify￾ing social work's core values, summarizing broad principles, and establishing specific ethical standards to guide practice. These are standards to which NASW expects the general public to hold the profession accountable and to which, in principle, it holds its own members accountable—helping profession￾als identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, and socializing new practitioners (NASW, 1999). So much is this approach to professional ethics taken for granted that it is easy to overlook how different it is from the traditional understanding of ethics, no less in the classical and Christian West from Aristotle to Aquinas than in the East in the other main religions and ethical traditions of the world (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In that older view, ethics is fun￾damentally about happiness rather than obligation, and about character and the virtues rather than about resolving moral dilemmas (Maclntyre, 2006; Pinckaers, 1995). This is as true for applied professional ethics, such as those of Hippocrates in medicine, as of general philosophical ethics (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008). This article draws on classical, medieval, and contempo￾rary virtue-oriented ethics to address those habits of heart and mind (Tocqueville, 2000) critical for ethical practice. It analy￾ses the potential of what has come to be called virtue ethics, and in particular the classical Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of ethics (Aristotle, 2002; Aquinas, 1981, 2005) as developed by Maclntyre (1984, 1990) and other contemporary neo￾Aristotelian or virtue-ethicists (Crisp & Slote, 1997; Darwall, 2003), to guide our understanding of the social work profession and the dispositions that its practice requires and develops. Ethics' Loss of Character After the death of Aquinas in 1274, both philosophical ethics and moral theology underwent a fundamental shift away from character, virtues, and habits of the heart to a nar￾rower focus on the rightness or wrongness of specific actions (Pinckaers, 1995). The result in modern professional as well

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker as general ethics, descending from Kant(1724-1804)and to a lesser extent Mill( 1806-1873), is that ethical decision-making activity tends to be abstracted from the life, developmen and character of the decision-maker. The older tradition and modern virtue ethics, in contrast, conceive a human life as a history in which each choice we make disposes us to make similar choices in the future so that ethical conduct becomes a matter of dispositions or character-virtues and vices acquired by practice and lost by. disuse--rather than of episodic, purely rational choices The weakness of abstracting ethics as a decision-making activity from moral development and the character of the agent making the decision is sometimes recognized( Cohen Cohen 1998; Freeman, 2000; McBeath Webb, 2002)or implied in the professional literature. Corey, Corey, and Callanan(2003), for example, assert that, " Ethical conduct grows out of sound character that leads you to respond with maturity, judgment, discretion, wisdom, and prudence"(p. 11). That is, it requires the master virtue of phronesis(prudentia), which all those terms denote. The Council on Social Work Educations(CSWE)2001 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards(epas)required as its second foundation program objective that graduates un derstand the professions values, standards, and principles, and that they practice accordingly; but the relation between understanding and practice is not specified. The link between understanding and action-that is, the character and virtues of the practitioner that are needed reliably to translate one into the other-is missing The psychoanalytic concept "professional use of self directed attention to qualities of the practitioner in linking knowledge and skills to practice. It was a required program objective for student learning under the previous accreditation standards. EPAS(CSWE, 2001), however, dropped this objec tive, presumably because there was no longer a shared unde standing of what it meant or how to achieve it. No comparable focus on the practitioner has replaced it

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 85 as general ethics, descending from Kant (1724-1804) and to a lesser extent Mill (1806-1873), is that ethical decision-making activity tends to be abstracted from the life, development, and character of the decision-maker. The older tradition and modem virtue ethics, in contrast, conceive a human life as a history in which each choice we make disposes us to make similar choices in the future, so that ethical conduct becomes a matter of dispositions or character—virtues and vices acquired by practice and lost by disuse—rather than of episodic, purely rational choices. The weakness of abstracting ethics as a decision-making activity from moral development and the character of the agent making the decision is sometimes recognized (Gohen & Gohen, 1998; Freeman, 2000; McBeath & Webb, 2002) or implied in the professional literature. Gorey, Gorey, and Gallanan (2003), for example, assert that, "Ethical conduct grows out of sound character that leads you to respond with maturity, judgment, discretion, wisdom, and prudence" (p. 11). That is, it requires the master virtue of phronesis (prudentia), which all those terms denote. The Gouncil on Social Work Education's (GSWE) 2001 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards (EPAS) required as its second foundation program objective that graduates un￾derstand the profession's values, standards, and principles, and that they practice accordingly; but the relation between understanding and practice is not specified. The link between understanding and action—that is, the character and virtues of the practitioner that are needed reliably to translate one into the other—is missing. The psychoanalytic concept "professional use of self" directed attention to qualities of the practitioner in linking knowledge and skills to practice. It was a required program objective for student learning under the previous accreditation standards. EPAS (GSWE, 2001), however, dropped this objec￾tive, presumably because there was no longer a shared under￾standing of what it meant or how to achieve it. No comparable focus on the practitioner has replaced it

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures ahighlyinfluentialarticleon"Modern Moral Philosophy, Anscombe(1958)argued that the "law conception of ethics was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawin on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill,s Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontol- ogy(or duty-based ethics)and Mills utilitarianism is an un- helpfully inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral"musts"and shoulds"of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoret ical justification. At the same time, Kupperman( 1991)argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness--understood as pleasure--to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse(Anscombe, 1958) With their focus on making decisions about how to act y applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the de- cision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individuals life(see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg,& Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a rogram for deciding moral questions(Kupperman, 1991).But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sen- sitivity, training, and experience-in short, on their character Traits of character not only suit us for life, " but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what

86 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures In a highly influential article on "Modern Moral Philosophy, " Anscombe (1958) argued that the "law conception of ethics" was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawing on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill's Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontol￾ogy (or duty-based ethics) and Mill's utilitarianism is an im￾helpfuUy inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral "musts" and "shoulds" of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoret￾ical justification. At the same time, Kupperman (1991) argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness—understood as pleasure—to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse (Anscombe, 1958). With their focus on making decisions about how to act by applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the de￾cision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individual's life (see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg, & Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a program for deciding moral questions (Kupperman, 1991). But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient, as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sen￾sitivity, training, and experience—in short, on their character. Traits of character not only suit us for life, "but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker world we see, "as Meilaender (1984, p. 11)puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle(2002)warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experi- ence. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or prac ical wisdom (phronesis), which develops only with maturity and cannot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or"ethical issues, "and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved Virtue ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last half- century of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos(a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of char- acter)and the virtues that are necessar for flourishing and well-being or happiness(eudaimonia) of individuals and com munities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm disposi- tions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judg ment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage(fortitude), moderation(temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or"hinge"virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. a virtue in this sense is a character trait--that is, a disposition that in volves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one s seat belt in a car However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single(even conscious or rational)tendency

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 87 world we see," as Meilaender (1984, p. 11) puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle (2002) warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experi￾ence. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or prac￾tical wisdom {phronesis), which develops orily with maturity and carmot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old. The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or "ethical issues," and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved. Virtue Ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last half￾century of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos (a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of char￾acter) and the virtues that are necessary for flourishing and well-being or happiness {eudaimonia) of individuals and com￾munities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm disposi￾tions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judg￾ment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage (fortitude), moderafion (temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or "hinge" virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. A virtue in this sense is a character trait—that is, a disposition that in￾volves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one's seat belt in a car. However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single (even conscious or rational) tendency

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare o do, for example, courageous or wise thi It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, in terests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset Hursthouse, 2008). Neither traits"nor"dispositions"cap- tures the full or classical meaning of virtues as an intercon ected whole. The "virtues talk to each other, " as McCloskey says(2006, p. 171). So, for example, courage, as distinct from recklessness, is balanced and completed by temperance and prudence. Social work is a field for the exercise of all the virtues The concept of virtues, understood as positive and stable character traits, gets at what matters to professional prac tice--not our opinions, but how well we act, as a matter of habit and will in the professional use of self, in ways required for and developed by practice within the profession of social work In professional ethics, virtue-based approaches, includ ing the Hippocratic ethics that prevailed in medicine for 2,500 years until well into the last century, look not simply to those virtues needed for the end of human well-being, but specifi cally to those virtues required for and developed by the profes- sion in question, given its mission and purpose. Unlike general ethics, it addresses the question of the character and virtues of ellent professional, whether physician, lawyer, worker(Oakley Cocking, 2001) Limitations of Virtue Ethics An objection frequently made to virtue ethics is its weak ness as a guide to action, in particular to resolving quandaries, widely seen as the central task of professional ethics. Virtue ethicists have responded by providing detailed but not always convincing examples of how to resolve a dilemma without resort to principles, duties, or rules( for example, Hursthouse, 1995). More pers rsuasively, they use a tu quoque (you too)ar gument, pointing to the large gap in principle-based ethics between ethical standards and concrete practice situations where precisely the master virtue of phronesis or prudence is most required(e.g, Hursthouse, 1991, 1995)

88 Joumal of Sociology & Social Welfare to do, for example, courageous or wise things. "It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, in￾terests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset" (Hursthouse, 2008). Neither "traits" nor "disposifions" cap￾tures the full or classical meaning of virtues as an intercon￾nected whole. The "virtues talk to each other," as McCloskey says (2006, p. 171). So, for example, courage, as distinct from recklessness, is balanced and completed by temperance and prudence. Social work is a field for the exercise of all the virtues together. The concept of virtues, understood as positive and stable character traits, gets at what matters to professional prac￾tice—not our opinions, but how well we act, as a matter of habit and will in the professional use of self, in ways required for and developed by practice within the profession of social work. In professional ethics, virtue-based approaches, includ￾ing the Hippocrafic ethics that prevailed in medicine for 2,500 years until well into the last century, look not simply to those virtues needed for the end of human well-being, but specifi￾cally to those virtues required for and developed by the profes￾sion in question, given its mission and purpose. Unlike general ethics, it addresses the question of the character and virtues of an excellent professional, whether physician, lawyer, or social worker (Oakley & Cocking, 2001). Limitations of Virtue Ethics An objection frequently made to virtue ethics is its weak￾ness as a guide to action, in particular to resolving quandaries, widely seen as the central task of professional ethics. Virtue ethicists have responded by providing detailed but not always convincing examples of how to resolve a dilemma without resort to principles, duties, or rules (for example, Hursthouse, 1995). More persuasively, they use a tu quoque (you too) ar￾gument, pointing to the large gap in principle-based ethics between ethical standards and concrete practice situations where precisely the master virtue of phronesis or prudence is most required (e.g., Hursthouse, 1991,1995)

Virtues and the Ethical Social worker In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances--is not thereby obliged to dis regard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse(1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obliga tions, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life(Finnis, 2005). For Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor(and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings)was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it(Finnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the 2e> irtues tend to empha did ac A related concern is with the apparent circularity of virtue ethics--virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agree ment on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin nd often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjec tive and relativistic (e.g, Hursthouse, 1991), to consequen tialism in anscombe's sense-Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right(Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself(1958)argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and the

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 89 In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)—to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances—is not thereby obliged to dis￾regard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse (1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obliga￾tions, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life (Einnis, 2005). Eor Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor (and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings) was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it (Einnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the virtues tend to emphasize, as did Aquinas, the complemen￾tarity and mutual necessity of principles, duties, and virtues (Ereeman, 2000; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008). A related concern is v/ith the apparent circularity of virtue ethics—virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place? This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agree￾ment on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin and often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjec￾tive and relativistic (e.g., Hursthouse, 1991), to consequen￾tialism in Anscombe's sense—Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right (Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself (1958) argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and the

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare necessary tools for doing it were not available in the current state of philosophy One response to this problem is to point out that in terms of giving guidance for action, utilitarianism and Kantian de ontology are again in no better shape. As Hursthouse(1999) Act utilitarianism must specify what are to count as the best consequences, and deontology what is to count as a correct moral rule, producing a second premise, before ar idance is given. And, similarly, virtue ethics must specify who is to count as a virtuous age So far, the three are all in the same position. (p s/t Virtue ethics thus defines a virtuous agent as one who has and exercises certain character traits or virtues the virtues then being defined as those character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia-that is, to flourish and live well as a human being. As Peterson and Seligman(2004)found, there is a strong convergence across time, place, and cultures on what the main virtues are Another response to the circularity objection is to point out that seeking guidance from a virtuous agent, far from being a mystery, is an everyday experience, especially perhaps in the helping professions. If I am unsure how to act in a given situation or grey area and I want to act honestly (with integ rity), I will seek out someone I know to be honest, indeed more reliably honest than I (If I want a way out of what honesty I might look for som at fudging of this sort. I do not have to be a person of great probity myself to recognize such a friend or colleague, just as I do not have to be a carpenter to appreciate a well-made table(Boswell, 2008). Similarly, if I see the need for prudence or sound practical judgment, I will consult someone I respect for this virtue. If I am lucky, this may even be my supervisor Compared with utilitarianism or deontology, which reduce ethical questions to one or a few basic principles, virtue ethics draws on the rich human vocabulary that societies have de-e veloped to define an action, not only as right or wrong, but, in the case of the latter, more specifically as dishonest, cowardly

90 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare necessary tools for doing it were not available in the current state of philosophy. One response to this problem is to point out that in terms of giving guidance for action, utilitarianism and Kantian de￾ontology are again in no better shape. As Hursthouse (1999) puts it: Act utilitarianism must specify what are to count as the best consequences, and deontology what is to count as a correct moral rule, producing a second premise, before any guidance is given. And, similarly, virtue ethics must specify who is to count as a virtuous agent. So far, the three are all in the same position, (p. 28) Virtue ethics thus defines a virtuous agent as one who has and exercises certain character traits or virtues, the virtues then being defined as those character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia—that is, to flourish and live well as a human being. As Peterson and Seligman (2004) foimd, there is a strong convergence across time, place, and cultures on what the main virtues are. Another response to the circularity objection is to point out that seeking guidance from a virtuous agent, far from being a mystery, is an everyday experience, especially perhaps in the helping professions. If I am unsure how to act in a given situation or grey area and I want to act honestly (with integ￾rity), I will seek out someone I know to be honest, indeed more reliably honest than I. (If I want a way out of what honesty may require, I might look for someone I know to be clever at fudging of this sort.) I do not have to be a person of great probity myself to recognize such a friend or colleague, just as I do not have to be a carpenter to appreciate a well-made table (Boswell, 2008). Similarly, if I see the need for prudence or sound practical judgment, I will consult someone I respect for this virtue. If I am lucky, this may even be my supervisor! Gompared with utilitarianism or deontology, which reduce ethical questions to one or a few basic principles, virtue ethics draws on the rich human vocabulary that societies have de￾veloped to define an action, not only as right or wrong, but, in the case of the latter, more specifically as dishonest, cowardly

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker less,unfaithful, arrogant, unjust, and so on(Anscombe, Hursthouse, 2003) It is thus false to claim that virtue ethics does not provide any rules for action. It supplies a great many. As Hursthouse (1999)says, Not only does each virtue generate a prescrip tion-do what is honest, charitable, generous-but each vice a prohibition-do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, mean (P.16) Even in a pluralist and culturally divided society like ours where there is wide disagreement about the application and force of moral judgments, the situation may be less desperate in the professions. Thus, Pellegrino(2008 )argues, a higher level of consensus, a more widely shared moral tradition, is avail- able to the professions and professional ethics than in society at large and this makes the virtues both possible and necessary to them Medicine and social work today may lack the classi cal and medieval understanding of the virtues as grounded in a philosophical anthropology based in natural law. But, as the NASW Code of Ethics(1999)puts it, "Professional ethics are at the core of social work. "Social work as a profession has a telos in that it serves primarily the good and well-being of the client, as the good of the patient is agreed to be the primary end and he importance of de gc professions--where the duties of practitioners are spelled out as part of the professions self-definition, and enforced by the profession on its members--reflects, among other things, the need for a common understanding within a profession of its agreed purpose and mission. Notwithstanding the limitations of such codes of duties and the deontological theory underlying them-if indeed it can be called a theory at all since the force of its moral"must"is unexplained( Coope, 2006)the common sense of purpose they reflect suggests that integration of the virtues has a better chance of success in professional than in general ethics. At the same time the collapse in the twentieth century of the most widely used and longest lasting virtue- based approach to professional ethics, that of Hippocrates, suggests both the difficulty of the task and the need to rebuild the moral philosophy of the professions on a different basis

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 91 reckless, unfaithful, arrogant, unjust, and so on (Anscombe, 1958; Hursthouse, 2003). It is thus false to claim that virtue ethics does not provide any rules for action. It supplies a great many. As Hursthouse (1999) says, "Not only does each virtue generate a prescrip￾tion—do what is honest, charitable, generous—^but each vice a prohibition—do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, mean" (p. 16). Even in a pluralist and culturally divided society like ours where there is wide disagreement about the application and force of moral judgments, the situation may be less desperate in the professions. Thus, Pellegrino (2008) argues, a higher level of consensus, a more widely shared moral tradition, is avail￾able to the professions and professional ethics than in society at large, and this makes the virtues both possible and necessary to them. Medicine and social work today may lack the classi￾cal and medieval understanding of the virtues as groxmded in a philosophical anthropology based in natural law. But, as the NASW Code of Ethics (1999) puts it, "Professional ethics are at the core of social work." Social work as a profession has a telos in that it serves primarily the good and well-being of the client, as the good of the patient is agreed to be the primary end and telos of medicine. The importance of deontological codes to all professions—where the duties of practitioners are spelled out as part of the profession's self-definition, and enforced by the profession on its members—reflects, among other things, the need for a common understanding within a profession of its agreed purpose and mission. Notwithstanding the limitations of such codes of duties and the deontological theory imderlying them—if indeed it can be called a theory at all since the force of its moral "must" is unexplained (Coope, 2006)—the common sense of purpose they reflect suggests that integration of the virtues has a better chance of success in professional than in general ethics. At the same time the collapse in the twentieth century of the most widely used and longest lasting virtue￾based approach to professional ethics, that of Hippocrates, suggests both the difficulty of the task and the need to rebuild the moral philosophy of the professions on a different basis

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare Why virtues? Like social work, virtue ethics is fundamentally conc with human well-being and suffering, about which the ethics of obligation and decision procedures has little or nothing to say In a profession where the character of the agent has long been understood as inseparable from the professional act or intervention performed, the virtues refocus attention on the character of the practitioner and the professional use of self This reorientation accords well with the growing body of re- ting the importance of the client-practitioner relationship as distinct from the specific theories or methods employed(Drisko, 2004; Graybeal, 2007; Wampold, 2001) As social work is challenged to do, the virtues cross cul tures and disciplines, despite the erosion of a common moral tradition in the West. They are not only central to the classical tradition in the West, but also have an apparently universal resonance, East and West, in Confucianism Hinduism, and Buddhism as well as in ancient Greek philosophy and me- dieval Jewish and Christian theology(Peterson Seligman 2004). In their study of these great cultural resources, Seligma and his associates in the field of positive psychology found a high degree of convergence across cultures and history which they distilled into six core virtues: courage, justice, human ty, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom(Peterson Seligman, 2004). For each virtue they identified a subcategory of strengths of character These researchers are developing a series of instrument and applications for assessing and building these strengths Just as virtue ethics has recovered for philosophy a sense of ethics as rooted in human flourishing and excellence of char acter, so Seligman's positive psychology seeks to develo an understanding of virtues and character strengths in the field of nality psychology, and specifically current trait theory. The project of Seligman and his associates is nothing less than to"reclaim the study of character and virtue as le- gitimate topics of psychological inquiry and informed societal discourse"(Peterson Seligman, 2004, p. 3). The impl plications of the ethics of virtue are being explored in many fields and professions, not only philosophy and psychology, but also

92 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Why Virtues? Like social work, virtue ethics is fundamentally concerned with human well-being and suffering, about which the ethics of obligation and decision procedures has little or nothing to say. In a profession where the character of the agent has long been understood as inseparable from the professional act or intervention performed, the virtues refocus attention on the character of the practitioner and the professional use of self. This reorientation accords well with the growing body of re￾search suggesting the importance of the client-practitioner relationship as distinct from the specific theories or methods employed (Drisko, 2004; Graybeal, 2007; Wampold, 2001). As social work is challenged to do, the virtues cross cul￾tures and disciplines, despite the erosion of a common moral tradition in the West. They are not only central to the classical tradition in the West, but also have an apparently universal resonance. East and West, in Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism as well as in ancient Greek philosophy and me￾dieval Jewish and Christian theology (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In their study of these great cultural resources, Seligman and his associates in the field of positive psychology found a high degree of convergence across cultures and history which they distilled into six core virtues: courage, justice, human￾ity, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). For each virtue they identified a subcategory of strengths of character. These researchers are developing a series of instruments and applications for assessing and building these strengths. Just as virtue ethics has recovered for philosophy a sense of ethics as rooted in human flourishing and excellence of char￾acter, so Seligman's positive psychology seeks to develop an understanding of virtues and character strengths in the field of personality psychology, and specifically current trait theory. The project of Seligman and his associates is nothing less than to "reclaim the study of character and virtue as le￾gitimate topics of psychological inquiry and informed societal discourse" (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 3). The implications of the ethics of virtue are being explored in many fields and professions, not only philosophy and psychology, but also