does not really fit into the framework of this discussion because it concerns all the property of the applicant and not just her(individually held)intangible assets. However, patriotism demands that i should start off with a discussion of a South african case. and besides the harksen decision offers an opportunity to segue into a discussion of a number of decisions of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court that do satisfy my selection criteria, and that illustrate the problem I had in mind when selecting this topic In the next section of this paper i discuss the Harksen decision by way of a case study that highlights some of the problems raised by the regulation of intangible commercial property and the case law on that topic. In the case study, I propose that the problems raised by the regulation of intangible commercial property are often exacerbated by the fact that precedent in this area is considered and used very loosely, and not in terms of the distinctive context of different issues and problems. The case study is followed by an analysis of cases in a number of categories that I propose for this purpose: cases dealing with the cancellation of state debts regulation that creates state monopolies; regulation that interferes with the management of a business enterprise; regulation by way of licences, permits and quotas; and the regulation of immaterial property rights. In each category, I consider a number of cases that may be classified under that head ing, and the effect of the classification for the problems and solutions on offer Finally, I consider the implications and possible value of the classification for the problem of regulation of intangible commercial property as a whole 2. A South African case study Harksen v Lane no and Others concerns an attack on the valid ity of section 21 0 of the South African Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Section 21(1)of the Insolvency Act provides that, upon the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent spouse, the property of the solvent spouse shall vest in the master of the Supreme Courtand, once one has been appointed, in the trustee of the insolvent estate, and that the solvent spouse=s property shall be dealt with by the master and trustee as if it were property of the sequestrated estate In De villiers NO v Delta Cables(Pry) Ltd2 the former Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated obiter that the effect of the vesting of the solvent spouse=s property is to transfer full ownership(dominium)of the propert 1997(11)BCLR 1489(CC): 1998(1)SA 300(CC). References to this case below cite the relevant paragraph number in the decision. The discussion of this case below is based partly on sections of AJ van der WaIt h Botha >Getting to grips with the new constitutionalorder: Crit ical comments on Harksen Lane NO=(forthcoming 1998)13 SA Public law The applicant also attacked ss 64 and 65, but for present purposes this a spect is ignored Now the High Court; see the 1996 Constitution s 166(c) 12 1992(1)SA9(A)at151J Now the Supreme Court of Appeal; see the 1996 Constitution s 166(b)5 does not really fit into the framework of this discussion because it concerns all the property of the applicant and not just her (individually held) intangible assets. However, patriotism demands that I should start off with a discussion of a South African case, and besides, the Harksen decision offers an opportunity to segue into a discussion of a number of decisions of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court that do satisfy my selection criteria, and that illustrate the problem I had in mind when selecting this topic. In the next section of this paper I discuss the Harksen decision by way of a case study that highlights some of the problems raised by the regulation of intangible commercial property and the case law on that topic. In the case study, I propose that the problems raised by the regulation of intangible commercial property are often exacerbated by the fact that precedent in this area is considered and used very loosely, and not in terms of the distinctive context of different issues and problems. The case study is followed by an analysis of cases in a number of categories that I propose for this purpose: cases dealing with the cancellation of state debts; regulation that creates state monopolies; regulation that interferes with the management of a business enterprise; regulation by way of licences, permits and quotas; and the regulation of immaterial property rights. In each category, I consider a number of cases that may be classified under that heading, and the effect of the classification for the problems and solutions on offer. Finally, I consider the implications and possible value of the classification for the problem of regulation of intangible commercial property as a whole. 2. A South African case study Harksen v Lane NO and Others9 concerns an attack on the validity of section 2110 of the South African Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act provides that, upon the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent spouse, the property of the solvent spouse shall vest in the master of the Supreme Court11 and, once one has been appointed, in the trustee of the insolvent estate; and that the solvent spouse=s property shall be dealt with by the master and trustee as if it were property of the sequestrated estate. In De Villiers NO v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd12 the former Appellate Division of the Supreme Court13 stated obiter that the effect of the vesting of the solvent spouse=s property is to transfer full ownership (dominium) of the property 9 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). References to this case below cite the relevant paragraph number in the decision. The discussion of this case below is based partly on sections of AJ van der Walt & H Botha >Getting to grips with the new constitutional order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO= (forthcoming 1998) 13 SA Public Law. 10 The applicant also attacked ss 64 and 65, but for present purposes this a spect is ignored. 11 Now the High Court; see the 1996 Constitution s 166(c). 12 1992 (1) SA 9 (A) at 15I-J. 13 Now the Supreme Court of Appeal; see the 1996 Constitution s 166(b)