from the spouse to the master or trustee. In terms of section 21, the solvent spouse=s property will vest in the master or trustee of the insolvent estate even if it is clear and accepted by the master or trustee that the property in question belongs to the solvent spouse, that the insolvent estate has no claim to it and that there is no question of collusion between the spouses with regard to ownership of the property. Sections 64(2)and 65(1)respectively provide that the officer presid ing at meetings of the cred itors of the insolvent estate can summon all persons who may be able to provide information relating to the business, affairs or property of the insolvent or of the solvent spouse, and that the presiding officer at such a meeting, as well as the trustee and the creditors of the insolvent estate, may interrogate persons so summoned concerning all matters relating to the business, affairs and property of the insolvent and of the solvent spouse. I6 attached by the trustees of the insolvent estate, and she was summoned to appear andbo ty was The applicant=s husband=s estate was sequestrated, and subsequently her prop interrogated at a meeting of her husband=s creditors. The applicant challenged the constitutional valid ity of sections 21, 64 and 65 of the Act to the extent that they affect the property and affairs of the solvent spouse. She claimed that section 21 is in conflict with section 28 (3)of the 1993 Constitution in that it effects an expropriation of her property without compensation; that section 21 is in conflict with section 8 of the 1993 Constitution in that it subjects her to interference and loss of property and that in doing so it violates the equality guarantee an nd amounts to unfair discrimination; and that sections 64 and 65 are unconstitutional for related reasons. The Cape Supreme Courtreferred the constitutional challenge to the Constitutional Court, where the Section 2 1 provides certa in safeguards to protect the solvent spouse, amongst others that the solvent spouse can reclaim the property upon providing proof of ownership of the property in question, but this cannot occur without action(and often litigation) from the side of the solvent spouse, regardless of the nature of the property in question and the actual position of the insolvent spouse with regard to such property In her minority judgment, O=Regan J conducted an excellent comparative overview(at paras[ 1051-11oD to indicate that a similar procedure to the vesting provision in s 21 is used only in the Netherlands. In the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand the corresponding law employs prov ision for a series of voida ble or reviewable transactions to protect the interests of innocent creditors of the insolvent. A provision in German law that creates a presumption that movable property in the possession of the insolvent spouse(or in the possession of both spouses)at the time of insolvency belongs to the insolvent spouse is of farmore lim ited scope, even though it resembles the South African provision in some respects. The fact that provision for voidable transactions offers a less burdensome and better altemative is underlined by the fact that this approach has already been recommended by the South African Law Commission for implementation in South African law. O=Regan J concurred in the majority judgment on the property issue in Harksen, and used the comparative analysis only for purposes of the eq uality issue(to indicate that a less burdensome alternative is available, which makes it possible to argue that the differentiation between solvent spouses and others who had dealings with the insolvent amounts to unfa ir discrimination) The majority(and the minority judgments did not raise any objections on this point)held that the attack on sS 64 and 65 are unfounded, since it is clear that the kind of questions that are allowed in the procedure foreseen by these articles cannot infringe on the solvent spouse=s rights in any way: a question that would infringe the constitutional rights of the solvent spouse cannot be >lawfully put= in terms of the Act(at paras 69}-76] Now the Cape High Court; see note 116 from the spouse to the master or trustee.14 In terms of section 21, the solvent spouse=s property will vest in the master or trustee of the insolvent estate even if it is clear and accepted by the master or trustee that the property in question belongs to the solvent spouse, that the insolvent estate has no claim to it and that there is no question of collusion between the spouses with regard to ownership of the property.15 Sections 64(2) and 65(1) respectively provide that the officer presiding at meetings of the creditors of the insolvent estate can summon all persons who may be able to provide information relating to the business, affairs or property of the insolvent or of the solvent spouse, and that the presiding officer at such a meeting, as well as the trustee and the creditors of the insolvent estate, may interrogate persons so summoned concerning all matters relating to the business, affairs and property of the insolvent and of the solvent spouse.16 The applicant=s husband=s estate was sequestrated, and subsequently her property was attached by the trustees of the insolvent estate, and she was summoned to appear and be interrogated at a meeting of her husband=s creditors. The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of sections 21, 64 and 65 of the Act to the extent that they affect the property and affairs of the solvent spouse. She claimed that section 21 is in conflict with section 28(3) of the 1993 Constitution in that it effects an expropriation of her property without compensation; that section 21 is in conflict with section 8 of the 1993 Constitution in that it subjects her to interference and loss of property and that in doing so it violates the equality guarantee and amounts to unfair discrimination; and that sections 64 and 65 are unconstitutional for related reasons. The Cape Supreme Court17 referred the constitutional challenge to the Constitutional Court, where the 14 Section 21 provides certain safeguards to protect the solvent spouse, amongst others that the solvent spouse can reclaim the property upon providing proof of ownership of the property in question, but this cannot occur without action (and often litigation) from the side of the solvent spouse, regardless of the nature of the property in question and the actual position of the insolvent spouse with regard to such property. 15 In her minority judgment, O=Regan J conducted an excellent comparative overview (at paras [105]- [110]) to indicate that a similar procedure to the vesting provision in s 21 is used only in the Netherlands. In the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand the corresponding law employs provision for a series of voidable or reviewable transactions to protect the interests of innocent creditors of the insolvent. A provision in German law that creates a presumption that movable property in the possession of the insolvent spouse (or in the possession of both spouses) at the time of insolvency belongs to the insolvent spouse is of far more limited scope, even though it resembles the South African provision in some respects. The fact that provision for voidable transactions offers a less burdensome and better alternative is underlined by the fact that this approach has already been recommended by the South African Law Commissio n for implementation in South African law. O=Regan J concurred in the majority judgment on the property issue in Harksen, and used the comparative analysis only for purposes of the equality issue (to indicate that a less burdensome alternative is available, which makes it possible to argue that the differentiation between solvent spouses and others who had dealings with the insolvent amounts to unfair discrimination). 16 The majority (and the minority judgments did not raise any objections on this point) held that the attack on ss 64 and 65 are unfounded, since it is clear that the kind of questions that are allowed in the procedure foreseen by these articles cannot infringe on the solvent spouse=s rights in any way: a question that would infringe the constitutional rights of the solvent spouse cannot be >lawfully put= in terms of the Act (at paras [69]-[76]). 17 Now the Cape High Court; see note 11