majority decided that the provisions of section 21 and the impugned parts of sections 64 and 65 of the Insolvency Act are not inconsistent with the interim Constitution of 1993. The minority agreed with the majority find ing on the property question- and part of the equality question, but disagreed with the majority decision on the main aspect of the equality issue 22 For present purposes we are interested in the propert the charge that section 21 of the Insolvency Act is inconsistent with section 28(3)of the 1993 Constitution-in that section 21 of the Act constitutes an expropriation of the property of the solvent spouse without provision for compensation as required by section 28 )of the interim Constitution. The basis for this transfer of the solvent spouse=s rights in property to the master and(upon appointment) thea argument is that the vesting of the solvent spouse=s property in terms of section 21 amounts trustee of the insolvent estate, while making no provision for compensation In his judgment for the majority Gold stone j pointed out that the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property, as set out in sections 28(2)and 28 3)of the interim Constitution,2is recognised in South African law and in many foreign jurisdictions. The main difference, as the Court described it, is that a deprivation falls short of the >acquisition of rights in property by a public authority for a public purpose=(and usually against compensation) that characterises an expropriation. The Court referred to a decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court and two decisions of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court2to support the statement that ar Per Goldstone J, with whom Chaskalson P, Langa DP, Ackerman j and Kriegler J concurred Per O=Regan J, with whom Madala Jand Mokgoro J concurred, and per Sachs J in a separate minority Judgment Thats 21 of the Act is not inconsistent with s 28(3)of the interim Constitution. That ss 64 and 65 are not inconsistent with s 8 of the interim Constitution Thats 21 is not inconsistent with s 8 of the interim Constitution This subsection corresponds with s 25(2)of the 1996 Constitution, and deals with the power to expropriate and the requirements for a valid expropriation; it has to be effected n terms of law of general application, be for a public purpose or in the public interest, and be subject to just and equita ble compensation as provided for As was pointed out earlier, the former Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated obiter n De villiers NO v Delta Cables(Pty) Ltd 1992(1)sa 9(A)that the effect of this provision was to transfer ownership (dominium) of the solvent spouse=s property to the master or trustee. The term >transfer= in this statement has to be read with circumspection, since the vesting of property in terms of s 21 (like expropriation in general) is obviously a case of original acquisition of property, which takes place without the consent or cooperation of the previous owner, thereby rendering the term >transfer= somewhat confusing Sections 25(1)and 25(2)of the final Constitution At par[32] Beckenstraterv Sand River rrigation Board 1964(4)SA 510(T)at515A-C7 majority18 decided that the provisions of section 21 and the impugned parts of sections 64 and 65 of the Insolvency Act are not inconsistent with the interim Constitution of 1993. The minority19 agreed with the majority finding on the property question20 and part of the equality question,21 but disagreed with the majority decision on the main aspect of the equality issue.22 For present purposes we are interested in the property issue: the charge that section 21 of the Insolvency Act is inconsistent with section 28(3) of the 1993 Constitution23 in that section 21 of the Act constitutes an expropriation of the property of the solvent spouse without provision for compensation as required by section 28(3) of the interim Constitution. The basis for this argument is that the vesting of the solvent spouse=s property in terms of section 21 amounts to a transfer of the solvent spouse=s rights in property to the master and (upon appointment) the trustee of the insolvent estate,24 while making no provision for compensation. In his judgment for the majority Goldstone J pointed out that the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property, as set out in sections 28(2) and 28(3) of the interim Constitution,25 is recognised in South African law and in many foreign jurisdictions. The main difference, as the Court described it,26 is that a deprivation falls short of the >acquisition of rights in property by a public authority for a public purpose= (and usually against compensation) that characterises an expropriation. The Court referred to a decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court27 and two decisions of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court28 to support the statement that an 18 Per Goldstone J, with whom Chaskalson P, Langa DP, Ackerman J and Kriegler J concurred. 19 Per O=Regan J, with whom Madala J and Mokgoro J concurred, and per Sachs J in a separate minority judgment. 20 That s 21 of the Act is not inconsistent with s 28(3) of the interim Constitution. 21 That ss 64 and 65 are not inconsistent with s 8 of the interim Constitution. 22 That s 21 is not inconsistent with s 8 of the interim Constitution. 23 This subsection corresponds with s 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution, and deals with the power to expropriate and the requirements for a valid expropriation: it has to be effected in terms of law of general application, be for a public purpose or in the public interest, and be subject to just and equitable compensation as provided for. 24 As was pointed out earlier, the former Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated obiterin De Villiers NO v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 9 (A) that the effect of this provision was to transfer ownership (dominium) of the solvent spouse=s property to the master or trustee. The term >transfer= in this statement has to be read with circumspection, since the vesting of property in terms of s 21 (like expropriation in general) is obviously a case of original acquisition of property, which takes place without the consent or cooperation of the previous owner, thereby rendering the term >transfer= somewhat confusing. 25 Sections 25(1) and 25(2) of the final Constitution. 26 At par [32]. 27 Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 (T) at 515A-C