expropriation amounts to more than a >mere dispossession=, that it in fact requires the expropriator to appropriate or acquire or become the owner of the property or right in question. 29 On the basis of the considerations mentioned above goldstone j decided 30 that the effect of section 21 of the Act, even if it does amount to a transfer of ownership in the solvent spouse=s property to the master or trustee of the insolvent estate, is of a temporary nature and not permanent, and that the purpose is not for the state to acquire the property but to ensure that the olvent estate is not deprived of property that actually belongs to it, so that this vesting process cannot be described as an expropriation. Consequently it was decided that the effect of section 21 of the Act is not to constitute an expropriation and that the section is therefore not inconsistent with section 28( 3)of the Constitution One may or may not agree with this decision, and in a sense the main problem is not whether this find ing is correct, but rather that the constitutional valid ity of section 21 was tested with reference to section 28(3)only, and not with reference to the requirements for a deprivation of property in terms of section 28(2 )of the interim Constitution This is of course the result of the applicant=s rather limited attack, but that is not the focal point of my interest in the decision For purposes of this article, the interesting point is the Court=s assumption that the question whether section 21 constitutes an expropriation turns upon the further question whether the state acquired something, and the authority that is offered for this proposition. The assumption that the term >expropriation= in section 283)of the interim Constitution has to be interpreted witl reference to the actual acquisition by the state of the property is justified with reference to the Transvaal Beckenstrater decision and the Zimbabwean Hewlett and Davies decisions. In my iew, the Court=s reliance on these decisions+is problematic, since there are fundamental Hewlett v Minister of Finance and Another 1982(1)SA 490(ZSC)and Davies and Others v Ministero Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997(1)SA 228(ZSC) The Court=s reference to an Indian case, HD Vara v State of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 866(SC), is probably inappropriate in the circumstances, as this decision dealt with the distinction between expropriation or len pulsory acquisition and requisition of property the latter term being an old-fashioned reference to the porary dispossession of tangible property for use by the state or the armed forces during a war or an emergency situation. Although Goldstone J at par [34] found it unnecessary to consider the question, it is important to note that this distinction is not identical to the distinction at hand, namely between expropriation and deprivation, since a deprivation of property can be and often is permanent and not merely temporary, and it can involve the property or certa in rights in the property and not just the possession or use of the property. S of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for states of emergency, under which some of the rights in the Bill of Rights may be derogated. Property(s 25)is not included in the table of non deroga ble rights At paras 351-371 Beckenstraterv Sand River /rrigation Board 1964(4)SA 510(T)at515A-C Hewlett v Minister offinance and Another 1982(1)SA 490(ZSC) Davies and Others v Ministerof lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997(1)SA 228(ZSC) And especially the Zim bawean cases. The Beckenstrater case was decided by the Supreme Court(now the 88 expropriation amounts to more than a >mere dispossession=, that it in fact requires the expropriator to appropriate or acquire or become the owner of the property or right in question.29 On the basis of the considerations mentioned above, Goldstone J decided30 that the effect of section 21 of the Act, even if it does amount to a transfer of ownership in the solvent spouse=s property to the master or trustee of the insolvent estate, is of a temporary nature and not permanent, and that the purpose is not for the state to acquire the property but to ensure that the insolvent estate is not deprived of property that actually belongs to it, so that this vesting process cannot be described as an expropriation. Consequently it was decided that the effect of section 21 of the Act is not to constitute an expropriation and that the section is therefore not inconsistent with section 28(3) of the Constitution. One may or may not agree with this decision, and in a sense the main problem is not whether this finding is correct, but rather that the constitutional validity of section 21 was tested with reference to section 28(3) only, and not with reference to the requirements for a deprivation of property in terms of section 28(2) of the interim Constitution. This is of course the result of the applicant=s rather limited attack, but that is not the focal point of my interest in the decision. For purposes of this article, the interesting point is the Court=s assumption that the question whether section 21 constitutes an expropriation turns upon the further question whether the state acquired something, and the authority that is offered for this proposition. The assumption that the term >expropriation= in section 28(3) of the interim Constitution has to be interpreted with reference to the actual acquisition by the state of the property is justified with reference to the Transvaal Beckenstrater decision31 and the Zimbabwean Hewlett32 and Davies33 decisions. In my view, the Court=s reliance on these decisions34 is problematic, since there are fundamental 28 Hewlett v Minister of Finance and Another 1982 (1) SA 490 (ZSC) and Davies and Others v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 (1) SA 228 (ZSC). 29 The Court=s reference to an Indian case, HD Vara v State of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 866 (SC), is probably inappropriate in the circumstances, as this decision dealt with the distinction between expropriation or compulsory acquisition and requisition of property, the latter term being an old -fashioned reference to the temporary dispossession of tangible property for use by the state or the armed forces during a war or an emergency situation. Although Goldstone J at par [34] found it unnecessary to consider the question, it is important to note that this distinction is not identical to the distinction at hand, namely between expropriation and deprivation, since a deprivation of property can be and often is permanent and not merely temporary, and it can involve the property or certain rights in the property and not just the possession or use of the property. S 37 of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for states of emergency, under which some of the rights in the Bill of Rights may be derogated. Property (s 25) is not included in the table of non - derogable rights. 30 At paras [35]-[37]. 31 Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 (T) at 515A-C. 32 Hewlett v Minister of Finance and Another 1982 (1) SA 490 (ZSC). 33 Davies and Others v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 (1) SA 228 (ZSC). 34 And especially the Zimbabwean cases. The Beckenstrater case was decided by the Supreme Court (now the