Convention >forbids the courts of a contracting state from entertaining a suit which violates an agreement to arbitrate. Thus the contention that arbitration is merely another method of trial, to which state provisional remedies should equally apply, is unavailable [.]=. The reasoning of McCreary is, however, not followed by all American courts. In Carolina Power& Light Company v. Uranex it was held: >There is no indication in either the text or the apparent policies of the [New York Convention that resort to prejud gment attachment was to be precluded[. = As the Supreme Court had not yet an opportunity to rule on the question, American jurisprudence differs on the availability of interim measures of protection from the courts(see Born, 1994, pp. 772-773). A provision provid ing for both access to courts and the compatibility of court-ordered interim relief with arbitration is essential to do justice to the arbitration parties= cause and to prevent uncertainty If an arbitrator could equally efficiently order all measures of interim relief that the court provides, there would hardly arise any need and be any justification for court applications by arbitration parties. But as the arbitrator=s jurisdiction is limited, the court=s assistance is needed The first limitation of the arbitrator=s jurisdiction inherent in the arbitral process The arbitrator derives his power from the arbitratio agreement. The arbitration agreement is a contract that only binds the parties who entered into it. It has no effect on third parties. A Mareva injunction ordered by an arbitrator could thus only bind the arbitration parties, not their banks where the assets are held. Secondly, an arbitrator lacks any enforcement power. As a consequence, the Mareva injunction ordered by him would not be fortified with the threat of contempt of court, but would only have contractual effect between the parties. Taking these two limitations into account, it becomes evident how important access to the courts is fo certain kinds of interim relief in arbitration. Even if enforcement of arbitrator-granted interim relief is provided for, there will always be one step added to the procedure if enforcement is at stake. A court needs to step in to grant permission to enforce the arbitrator-granted order. This causes delay But it is not only the need for efficiency and speed that demands access to the courts for arbitration parties, it is also administrative peculiarities of arbitration. There is no permanent arbitral tribunal to which international commercial arbitrations are submitted. a tribunal has to be established for each requested arbitration This takes time. As long as the file has not been transferred to the arb itrator, there is no one available to grant interim measures of protection. Litigation practice shows that interim measures of protection are regularly in the highest demand before the case proceeds to trial. This observation is equally valid for arbitration. The greatest need for provisional remedies arises at a point when the tribunal has not yet been established. Arbitral institutions try to remedy this problem. An attempt undertaken by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1990 with its >Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure= is, however, not successful (Schwartz, 1993, p. 64). Other institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization(WIPO)with its progressive draft >WIPO Emergency Relief Rules= look for alternatives. The London Court of International Arbitration (LCia)dropped its proposal in 1997 The above shows how essential court involvement is under certain circumstances but there are also voices against it. For instance, Boesch(1989, p. 8 )warns vehemently about the risks plication for interim relief to the courts can carry for arbitrationConvention >forbids the courts of a contracting state from entertaining a suit which violates an agreement to arbitrate. Thus the contention that arbitration is merely another method of trial, to which state provisional remedies should equally apply, is unavailable [. . .]=. The reasoning of McCreary is, however, not followed by all American courts. In Carolina Power & Light Company v. Uranex it was held: >There is no indication in either the text or the apparent policies of the [New York] Convention that resort to prejudgment attachment was to be precluded [. . .].= As the Supreme Court had not yet an opportunity to rule on the question, American jurisprudence differs on the availability of interim measures of protection from the courts (see Born, 1994, pp. 772-773). A provision providing for both access to courts and the compatibility of court-ordered interim relief with arbitration is essential to do justice to the arbitration parties= cause and to prevent uncertainty. If an arbitrator could equally efficiently order all measures of interim relief that the court provides, there would hardly arise any need and be any justification for court applications by arbitration parties. But as the arbitrator=s jurisdiction is limited, the court=s assistance is needed. The first limitation of the arbitrator=s jurisdiction is inherent in the arbitral process. The arbitrator derives his power from the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement is a contract that only binds the parties who entered into it. It has no effect on third parties. A Mareva injunction ordered by an arbitrator could thus only bind the arbitration parties, not their banks where the assets are held. Secondly, an arbitrator lacks any enforcement power. As a consequence, the Mareva injunction ordered by him would not be fortified with the threat of contempt of court, but would only have contractual effect between the parties. Taking these two limitations into account, it becomes evident how important access to the courts is for certain kinds of interim relief in arbitration. Even if enforcement of arbitrator-granted interim relief is provided for, there will always be one step added to the procedure if enforcement is at stake. A court needs to step in to grant permission to enforce the arbitrator-granted order. This causes delay. But it is not only the need for efficiency and speed that demands access to the courts for arbitration parties, it is also administrative peculiarities of arbitration. There is no permanent arbitral tribunal to which international commercial arbitrations are submitted. A tribunal has to be established for each requested arbitration. This takes time. As long as the file has not been transferred to the arbitrator, there is no one available to grant interim measures of protection. Litigation practice shows that interim measures of protection are regularly in the highest demand before the case proceeds to trial. This observation is equally valid for arbitration. The greatest need for provisional remedies arises at a point when the tribunal has not yet been established. Arbitral institutions try to remedy this problem. An attempt undertaken by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1990 with its >Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure= is, however, not successful (Schwartz, 1993, p. 64). Other institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with its progressive draft >WIPO Emergency Relief Rules= look for alternatives. The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) dropped its proposal in 1997. The above shows how essential court involvement is under certain circumstances. But there are also voices against it. For instance, Boesch (1989, p. 8) warns vehemently about the risks an application for interim relief to the courts can carry for arbitration