There are indeed risks involved, especially if the application to the court is regarded as a dilatory tactic, a way to get access to a biased forum or as a means to put pressure on the other party. Threatening to go to a public court with a dispute that should be solved confidentially can do this but such threats come from a party that does not ac in good faith. This kind of behaviour should not be taken as a reason to bar a good faith party from access to the most efficient remedy, especially if efficiency is decisive to secure assets without which the whole process of dispute settlement is rendered superfluous. Arbitration is there to serve the rights of the parties and is not an end in itself that needs to be protected at the expense of the bona fide party against attacks from the mala fide party. There are other means to prevent such attacks, for instance by stipulating that provisional remedies from courts in certain countries-the courts of which are deemed to be biased or bribable b are unavailable. Whether the courts will recognize such an opting-out of court protection is, however, doubtful English courts do(section 44, subsection 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996), German ones do not(LG Frankfurt). Further, it could be stipulated contractually that a party needs the arbitrator=s permission to apply to the courts. This can be regarded as a means to filter mala fide applications. But it could give rise to dispute concerning the stipulation and thereby hamper the whole process. The task to dismiss prima fa dilatory or tactical applications is best entrusted to experienced judges without imposing restraints on court access by the parties. The relationship between courts and arbitration should be one of mutual trust, respect and support. Modern trend is gradually moving in this direction. A centralization of arbitration matters at one court preferably a hierarchically higher one -would serve this goal 3.2 The arbitrator=s competence to order interim measures of protection The lex arbitri should also provide for the arbitrators competence to order interim measures of protection. It is not only necessary to ind icate that the state recognizes such a power, which is not yet the case in all countries, such as in Italy(article 818 Code of Civil Procedure), but it is also helpful to give the arbitrator explicit assurance of his power. This will especially be the case in institutional arbitrations because the contractual power conferred to them in the arbitration rules(e.g. article 23, paragraph I of the 1998 ICC Rules or rule 25(g) and rule 25 of the 1997 Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre-SIAC) is backed up in the lex arbitri of the seat of arbitration then there is no risk involved that the award will be set aside or will not be enforced on the ground that the >arbitral procedure[. was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place=(article V paragraph 1(d)of the New York Convention for non-enforcement ground; compare article 34, paragraph 2(a)(iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law for setting aside ground ) Arbitrators who are reluctant to grant provisional remed ies might find relief in such an assurance 3.3 The enforcement of arbitrator-granted remedies An arbitrator has no imperium, >the right [. to enforce the laws=(Black, 1891, p 594). Thus the state needs to step in with its enforcement machinery to lend the arbitrators= order the necessary authority to ensure compliance. Whether the enforcement machinery will be invoked is a different matter. Indeed Craig, Park and Paulsson point out that >parties do not ord inarily flout procedural orders made byThere are indeed risks involved, especially if the application to the court is regarded as a dilatory tactic, a way to get access to a biased forum or as a means to put pressure on the other party. Threatening to go to a public court with a dispute that should be solved confidentially can do this. But such threats come from a party that does not act in good faith. This kind of behaviour should not be taken as a reason to bar a good￾faith party from access to the most efficient remedy, especially if efficiency is decisive to secure assets without which the whole process of dispute settlement is rendered superfluous. Arbitration is there to serve the rights of the parties and is not an end in itself that needs to be protected at the expense of the bona fide party against attacks from the mala fide party. There are other means to prevent such attacks, for instance by stipulating that provisional remedies from courts in certain countries - the courts of which are deemed to be biased or bribable B are unavailable. Whether the courts will recognize such an opting-out of court protection is, however, doubtful: English courts do (section 44, subsection 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996), German ones do not (LG Frankfurt). Further, it could be stipulated contractually that a party needs the arbitrator=s permission to apply to the courts. This can be regarded as a means to filter mala fide applications. But it could give rise to dispute concerning the stipulation and thereby hamper the whole process. The task to dismiss prima facie dilatory or tactical applications is best entrusted to experienced judges without imposing restraints on court access by the parties. The relationship between courts and arbitration should be one of mutual trust, respect and support. Modern trend is gradually moving in this direction. A centralization of arbitration matters at one court - preferably a hierarchically higher one - would serve this goal. 3.2 The arbitrator=s competence to order interim measures of protection The lex arbitri should also provide for the arbitrator=s competence to order interim measures of protection. It is not only necessary to indicate that the state recognizes such a power, which is not yet the case in all countries, such as in Italy (article 818 Code of Civil Procedure), but it is also helpful to give the arbitrator explicit assurance of his power. This will especially be the case in institutional arbitrations because the contractual power conferred to them in the arbitration rules (e.g. article 23, paragraph 1 of the 1998 ICC Rules or rule 25 (g) and rule 25 (j) of the 1997 Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre - SIAC) is backed up in the lex arbitri of the seat of arbitration. Then there is no risk involved that the award will be set aside or will not be enforced on the ground that the >arbitral procedure [. . .] was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place= (article V, paragraph 1 (d) of the New York Convention for non-enforcement ground; compare article 34, paragraph 2 (a) (iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law for setting aside ground). Arbitrators who are reluctant to grant provisional remedies might find relief in such an assurance. 3.3 The enforcement of arbitrator-granted remedies An arbitrator has no imperium, >the right [. . .] to enforce the laws= (Black, 1891, p. 594). Thus the state needs to step in with its enforcement machinery to lend the arbitrators= order the necessary authority to ensure compliance. Whether the enforcement machinery will be invoked is a different matter. Indeed Craig, Park and Paulsson point out that >parties do not ordinarily flout procedural orders made by