Smit 3引9 Interesting gossip (compared with directed gossip)does result in stronger effects of malicious gossip.However,dis Discussion decision)and who do not gossip are unable to detect them However,either making impression-based decisions about interaction (Decisionc)ingossipallow or the evi targets even in the No decision condition where directed gos sip leaves the observers vulnerable.The ability to make deci ions abo also greatly reduce the 0%20% Proportion of gossip obtaining the obs to a of thei targetsextremely negative actions. Figure3.Mean(clear)and ng cious gossip.Interestingly,the Disregard condition generally doe not weaker No Disregard Disregard 口 Overall therefore.the best strategy for an observer is to (a)decide on each occasion whether to interact with a target. nce of the cur sip one's information that is too discrepant from one's own current ant gossi ciou osers Butwhy do it tm ty to ut the e actual evil targets ver to another ine an oh who has a neutral to positive (+5)impression of an evil target and then experiences one of his rare,extremely nega ive acts )The ng impre on is the average who.Mean impr d sion to another observer who holds n imp on of are th -15,which is approximately the average impression held by vers who gossip (Figure I or 2, regard+Decisio would be similar.indicating that observers are uninfluenced dw Figures 3 and 4 (for directed and "interesting"gossin.respec recipient's impression more negative.-1.75.As this p tively)show largely similar patterns,as do the Decision and is repeated,it can be seen that repeated transmission of the impression from one person to anothe "filters nly observer gossip extreme negativity and Smith 319 would be similar, indicating that observers are uninfluenced. Figures 3 and 4 (for directed and “interesting” gossip, respec￾tively) show largely similar patterns, as do the Decision and No decision versions of the model. In the No disregard case, only the observer who does not gossip is uninfluenced. Interesting gossip (compared with directed gossip) does result in stronger effects of malicious gossip. However, dis￾regarding discrepant gossip eliminates influence by the mali￾cious gossiper. Discussion Summarizing the results with regard to detecting evil targets, observers who unconditionally interact with the targets (No decision) and who do not gossip are unable to detect them. However, either making impression-based decisions about interaction (Decision condition) or engaging in gossip allows discrimination of the evil targets. “Interesting” gossip is more effective than directed gossip, allowing detection of the targets even in the No decision condition where directed gos￾sip leaves the observers vulnerable. The ability to make deci￾sions about interaction also greatly reduces the cost of obtaining adequate information to form discriminating impressions, by subjecting the observers to a much smaller number of the evil targets’ extremely negative actions. Turning to the second problem we posed for our observ￾ers, avoiding influence by malicious negative gossip, we find that disregarding gossip that deviates too much from one’s current impression unconditionally protects against mali￾cious gossip. Interestingly, the Disregard condition generally does not weaken observers’ ability to discriminate the evil targets, except in one specific condition: No decision + Interesting gossip. Overall, therefore, the best strategy for an observer is to (a) decide on each occasion whether to interact with a target, based on the valence of the current impression; (b) gossip to draw on others’ impressions rather than relying completely on one’s personal observations; but (c) disregard gossip information that is too discrepant from one’s own current impression. If observers follow these recommendations (bot￾tom right panel of each set of four), the difference between directed and “interesting” gossip does not matter much. Disregarding discrepant gossip protects well against mali￾cious gossipers. But why does it not damage observers’ abil￾ity to learn (correctly) about the actual evil targets? The answer is that gossip is “filtered” and moderated as it is passed from one observer to another. Imagine an observer who has a neutral to positive (+0.5) impression of an evil target and then experiences one of his rare, extremely nega￾tive acts (−4.5). The resulting impression is the average of the two, −2.0. Suppose this observer then communicates that impression to another observer who holds an impression of −1.5, which is approximately the average impression held by observers who gossip (Figure 1 or 2, Disregard + Decision condition). The impression will be within the range (±1.0) so it will not be disregarded as discrepant, and will make the recipient’s impression more negative, −1.75. As this process is repeated, it can be seen that repeated transmission of the impression from one person to another “filters” it, reducing its initially extreme negativity and allowing its effects to No Disregard Disregard 0.0 0.2 0.4 −2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 No Decision Decision 0% 20% 45% 95% 0% 20% 45% 95% Proportion of gossip meanimpr Evil 0 1 Figure 3. Mean impression of normal targets (clear) and targets who are the subject of malicious gossip (shaded) under different conditions, with directed gossip. No Disregard Disregard −3 −2 −1 0 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 No Decision Decision 0% 20% 45% 95% 0% 20% 45% 95% Proportion of gossip meanimpr Evil 0 1 Figure 4. Mean impression of normal targets (clear) and targets who are the subject of malicious gossip (shaded) under different conditions, with interesting gossip. Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015