320 Personality and Social Psychology Review 1(4) .the Disre rd condition effectively Table 1.For the ertainty analysis 100 additional were made in each of the 16 conditions.with parameter val- communicated impression(5.0)will be too discrepant from ues for each individual run drawn randomly from a rectangu most observers'impressions and will be ignored stribution with th ange shown in the l st column of th 、fta ticipants in groups of four play multiple rounds of a public sion function might be-343.Graphical summaries of the goods game.In this game,the group benefits most when all players contrbute ther resources to but each individual player benefits most by hold for parameter values randomly varying within a fairly resources while hoping to benefit from others'contributions. broad range,and are not unique to a specific set of fixed values. ers' game ns for One minc on of the t ae new grot uns with a co mpletely different set of players.In some conditions,at the time of reassignment,participants from whom.This would allow a different strategy for enced by ous gossip uld othe strategy would be ineffective under several circumstances conditions, after receiving the gossip, participants example. several malicious observers might be in their ots,agre ing to de ne target Even with tion of gossip and the ability to eclude membership that leads them all to evaluate par eribed as selfish and uncooperative led to the highes ticular targets negatively,through the operation of typical evel of contributions sparallels the model re 10W ngroup-outgroup dyna mics.And as argued in the introduc being abl decid The feinbere et al study differs from our model in imr Ever n information heard from multiple sources might not be ways Their players acted in groups of I truly independent,and the recipient is rarely in a position to u game an I now this e their Their playe opr be del Both cha na th the receint of gossin and the vote on ex eluding player Smith&Collins,2009)the observers and targets are the any l interac individuals,rather than using the simpler specification are not just of others as individuals.but of their clusions may have some generality. The social cognition of others'relat 99 Limitations and Future Directions of in Uncertainty analysis.One important limitation is that becaus you about their friends and enemies.or you may be able to this model is highly abstract,most parameter values are rve who hangs out with whom,and who avoids or argues re is no timate mos hon rvers can g a for in That is if A tells yor nderful thing B(whom you know to be A's best friend)or terrible thing impression-formation experime To addres bout C (whom you know to be A's worst enemy),you ca non,it is nver A a an ach termed uncertainty analysis (Railsback ven extra weight.If the mode is extended ton Grimm,201).The main rus of the model(results shownin mpressions of relationships,it should probably also include the figures)used fixed values of the parameters,as shown in he possibility that gossip can be about relationships rathe320 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(4) spread. In contrast, the Disregard condition effectively blocks any influence from the malicious gossip, because the communicated impression (−5.0) will be too discrepant from most observers’ impressions and will be ignored. One empirical study recently confirmed some predictions of this model. Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz (2014) had par￾ticipants in groups of four play multiple rounds of a public￾goods game. In this game, the group benefits most when all players contribute their resources to a common fund that is then multiplied and returned in equal shares to all players, but each individual player benefits most by keeping their resources while hoping to benefit from others’ contributions. So a selfish or uncooperative player reduces all other play￾ers’ earnings from the game. Each group of four played a series of games, and participants were then reassigned to new groups with a completely different set of players. In some conditions, at the time of reassignment, participants were allowed to gossip by writing a note about one of their former group members, to be shared with that individual’s new partners (who would otherwise have no way of knowing about the individual’s level of cooperativeness). Finally, in some conditions, after receiving the gossip, participants could vote to exclude a specific player from their group before game play began. Results showed that the combina￾tion of gossip and the ability to exclude a player who was described as selfish and uncooperative led to the highest level of contributions. This parallels the model results show￾ing that using gossip and being able to decide whether to interact with a target produce generally favorable outcomes. The Feinberg et al. study differs from our model in important ways. Their players interacted in groups of four to play a public-goods game (rather than interacting in dyads with a potentially negative target). Their players had no opportunity to integrate their personal experiences with gossip, because the receipt of gossip and the vote on excluding players occurred before any personal interaction with new players. Finally, Feinberg et al. did not consider the possibility of false and malicious gossip. Still, the convergence of their findings with the model predictions suggests that these con￾clusions may have some generality. Limitations and Future Directions Uncertainty analysis. One important limitation is that because this model is highly abstract, most parameter values are somewhat arbitrary. There is no clear way to estimate most parameters from data, the one exception being the basic for￾mula for updating impressions using new behavioral obser￾vations, which Denrell (2005) validated using data from impression-formation experiments. To address this limita￾tion, it is important to show that the model’s behavior is not highly sensitive to the specific values of the parameters, using an approach termed uncertainty analysis (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). The main runs of the model (results shown in the figures) used fixed values of the parameters, as shown in Table 1. For the uncertainty analysis, 100 additional runs were made in each of the 16 conditions, with parameter val￾ues for each individual run drawn randomly from a rectangu￾lar distribution with the range shown in the last column of the table. Thus, for example, in one run the overall mean valence of targets’ acts might be .782, and the constant in the deci￾sion function might be −.343. Graphical summaries of the results of these runs are qualitatively similar to (indeed, vir￾tually indistinguishable by eye from) the figures depicting the main runs. Thus, the meaningful patterns in the results hold for parameter values randomly varying within a fairly broad range, and are not unique to a specific set of fixed values. Directions for modeling. One minor extension of the model would have observers keep track of what gossip they hear from whom. This would allow a different strategy for attempting to avoid being influenced by malicious gossip: using discrepant gossip only when similar information is heard from two or more different sources. Of course, this strategy would be ineffective under several circumstances. For example, several malicious observers might be in cahoots, agreeing to defame the same targets. Even without conspiracy or prearranged agreement, several observers may share a group membership that leads them all to evaluate par￾ticular targets negatively, through the operation of typical ingroup–outgroup dynamics. And as argued in the introduc￾tion, several sources who communicate similar information might have all originally gotten it from the same person. Even information heard from multiple sources might not be truly independent, and the recipient is rarely in a position to know this. There are two other directions for future extension of the model. Both would require changing the model so that (as in Smith & Collins, 2009) the observers and targets are the same individuals, rather than using the simpler specification that they are separate sets of people. The first direction is to have observers form impressions not just of others as individuals, but of their relationships. The social cognition of others’ relationships is an understud￾ied topic (see Frey & Smith, 1993; Kenny, Mohr, Bond, & Horn, 1996; Krackhardt, 1987), and it will often be limited by the availability of information. However, people may tell you about their friends and enemies, or you may be able to observe who hangs out with whom, and who avoids or argues with whom. If observers can gather information about rela￾tionships, it should help them calibrate how much reliance to place on gossip. That is, if A tells you wonderful things about B (whom you know to be A’s best friend) or terrible things about C (whom you know to be A’s worst enemy), you can discount or ignore the gossip. Conversely, negative gossip from A about B or positive gossip from A about C should be given extra weight. If the model is extended to incorporate impressions of relationships, it should probably also include the possibility that gossip can be about relationships rather Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015