JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE" 1275 (iii)The politics of the new state rated into the new system of colonial rule.Second,and The politics practiced by the new rulers added to relatedly,the colonial state forged numerous implicit the state's capacity to convey its will to the society. and explicit "alliances"with Korean propertied Except for a somewhat liberal interlude in the 1920s, classes.The nature of these turned out to be of critical for the most part,the political practices of the long-term significance.While I return to a detailed Japanese colonial state in Korea were brutally author- discussion of this issue below.it should be noted here itarian.For example,Korean newspapers were either that,on the whole,Korean monied groups-in both suspended or heavily censored,political protest was the city and the countryside-did not oppose colonial met with swift retribution,and political organizations rle.Most of them benefited from this rule and gener- and public gatherings were generally banned.Those ally went along-some even with enthusiasm-with professing Korean nationalist sentiments were thus the colonial project.Third,the Japanese undertook either exiled or remained fragmented:while there was considerable expansion of education,facilitating latent and scattered sympathy for nationalists and for propaganda and political resocialization.Whereas in communists all through the colonial period,a coherent 1910 nearly 10,000 students attended some sort of nationalist movement was never allowed to develop.25 school,by 1941 this number was up to 1.7 million and The Japanese used "thought police"to detect and the rate of literacy by 1945 was nearly 50%.The focus eliminate political dissidence,and also developed a was on primary education and the curricula was "spy system"to buttress the civil and police bureau- designed with the "objcct"of raising "practical men cracy that was "probably better developed in Korea able to meet the requirements of the state."27 than anywhere in the world"(Grajdanzev,1944,p. To conclude this subsection,the Japanese colo- 55). nialists in Korca replaced the decrepit Yi statc with a The colonial authorities were quite self-conscious centralized and powerful state.This was no liberal about their use of repression as a means to instill fear state;it was more statist vis-a-vis the Korean society, in the minds of Koreans and thus to minimize dissi- and considerably more repressive,than even the statist dence and reinforce bureaucratic control:in order to and illiberal Japanese political economy of the period. avoid"restlessness"in the "popular mind,"note gov- Central decision making was highly concentrated in ernment reports of the period,it was "essential"to the office of the Governor General.The Governor "maintain unshakable the dignity of the government" General's will,reflecting the imperial design and and"to impress the people with the weight of the new goals,was translated into implemented policies via regime"(Government-General of Chosen,1914,pp. the use of an extensive,well-designed and disciplined 2-3).When Koreans still resisted.Governor General bureaucracy.The new state also achieved consider- Terauchi Masatake supposedly responded,"I will able downward penetration:both the civil and police whip you with scorpions"(quoted in Peattie,1984,p. bureaucracies reached into the nooks and crannies of 18).and when eventually the Koreans succumbed,the the society,while continuing to respond to central gloating satisfaction is also obvious in official docu- directives:Korean elites in the localities were incor- ments:"they have gradually yielded their obstinate porated into the ruling "alliance";and,when all else prejudices and their disdainful attitude” failed in the Japanese efforts to control and transform (Government-General of Chosen,1935,p.81). Korea,there existed a well-functioning intelligence In spite of the awesome state that the Japanese cre- service to buttress the state's supervisory role.While a ated,it would be a mistake to believe that a thorough fuller understanding of how power was generated in bureaucratic penetration and politics of fear were the this system.and the uses to which it was put,will only ruling instruments in the hands of the colonial- emerge in due course,it should already be evident as ists.There is no doubt that bureaucratic growth to how the precolonial,ineffective state was trans- enabled the new state to undertake many more eco- formed into a state that-for better or for worse- nomic activities that contributed to economic growth could get things done. (more on this below),and that repression enabled the establishment of order,freeing the state elite to focus on other "developmental"matters.Nevertheless, 3.THE COLONIAL STATE,PROPERTIED bureaucratic and repressive power are seldom enough CLASSES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE to elicit a measure of cooperation--from,at least. some groups in society-that is essential for gener- The colonial state in Korea was a busy state.While ating economic dynamism.We must thus also take pursuing the imperial interests of Japan,it evolved a note of some other,nonrepressive ruling instruments full policy agenda,including the goal of economic that the new colonial state put to use. transformation of Korea.The broad strategy of trans- First,a segment of the Korean political elite in the formation was two pronged:the state utilized its precolonial period was quite favourably inclined bureaucratic capacities to directly undertake quitc a toward Japan.26 These Koreans from the political few economic tasks;and,more important,the state class were both officially and unofficially incorpo- involved propertied groups-both in the countrysideJAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1215 (iii) The politics ofthe new state The politics practiced by the new rulers added to the state’s capacity to convey its will to the society. Except for a somewhat liberal interlude in the 1920s for the most part, the political practices of the Japanese colonial state in Korea were brutally author￾itarian. For example, Korean newspapers were either suspended or heavily censored, political protest was met with swift retribution, and political organizations and public gatherings were generally banned. Those professing Korean nationalist sentiments were thus either exiled or remained fragmented; while there was latent and scattered sympathy for nationalists and for communists all through the colonial period, a coherent nationalist movement was never allowed to develop.25 The Japanese used “thought police” to detect and eliminate political dissidence, and also developed a “spy system” to buttress the civil and police bureau￾cracy that was “probably better developed in Korea than anywhere in the world” (Grajdanzev, 1944, p. 55). The colonial authorities were quite self-conscious about their use of repression as a means to instill fear in the minds of Koreans and thus to minimize dissi￾dence and reinforce bureaucratic control: in order to avoid “restlessness” in the “popular mind,” note gov￾ernment reports of the period, it was “essential” to “maintain unshakable the dignity of the government” and “to impress the people with the weight of the new regime” (Government-General of Chosen, 1914, pp. 2-3). When Koreans still resisted, Governor General Terauchi Masatake supposedly responded, “I will whip you with scorpions” (quoted in Peattie, 1984, p. 18), and when eventually the Koreans succumbed, the gloating satisfaction is also obvious in official docu￾ments: “they have gradually yielded their obstinate prejudices and their disdainful attitude” (Government-General of Chosen, 1935, p. 8 1). In spite of the awesome state that the Japanese cre￾ated, it would be a mistake to believe that a thorough bureaucratic penetration and politics of fear were the only ruling instruments in the hands of the colonial￾ists. There is no doubt that bureaucratic growth enabled the new state to undertake many more eco￾nomic activities that contributed to economic growth (more on this below), and that repression enabled the establishment of order, freeing the state elite to focus on other “developmental” matters. Nevertheless, bureaucratic and repressive power are seldom enough to elicit a measure of cooperation - from, at least, some groups in society -that is essential for gener￾ating economic dynamism. We must thus also take note of some other, nonrepressive ruling instruments that the new colonial state put to use. First, a segment of the Korean political elite in the precolonial period was quite favourably inclined toward Japan.26 These Koreans from the political class were both officially and unofficially incorpo￾rated into the new system of colonial rule. Second, and relatedly, the colonial state forged numerous implicit and explicit “alliances” with Korean propertied classes. The nature of these turned out to be of critical long-term significance. While I return to a detailed discussion of this issue below, it should be noted here that, on the whole, Korean monied groups - in both the city and the countryside-did not oppose colonial rule. Most of them benefited from this rule and gener￾ally went along - some even with enthusiasm-with the colonial project. Third, the Japanese undertook considerable expansion of education, facilitating propaganda and political resocialization. Whereas in 1910 nearly 10,000 students attended some sort of school, by 1941 this number was up to 1.7 million and the rate of literacy by 1945 was nearly 50%. The focus was on primary education and the curricula was designed with the “object” of raising “practical men able to meet the requirements of the state.” 27 To conclude this subsection, the Japanese colo￾nialists in Korea replaced the decrepit Yi state with a centralized and powerful state. This was no liberal state; it was more statist vis-&vis the Korean society, and considerably more repressive, than even the statist and illiberal Japanese political economy of the period. Central decision making was highly concentrated in the office of the Governor General. The Governor General’s will, reflecting the imperial design and goals, was translated into implemented policies via the use of an extensive, well-designed and disciplined bureaucracy. The new state also achieved consider￾able downward penetration: both the civil and police bureaucracies reached into the nooks and crannies of the society, while continuing to respond to central directives: Korean elites in the localities were incor￾porated into the ruling “alliance”; and, when all else failed in the Japanese efforts to control and transform Korea, there existed a well-functioning intelligence service to buttress the state’s supervisory role. While a fuller understanding of how power was generated in this system, and the uses to which it was put, will emerge in due course, it should already be evident as to how the precolonial, ineffective state was trans￾formed into a state that - for better or for worse - could get things done. 3. THE COLONIAL STATE, PROPERTIED CLASSES AND ECONOMIC CHANGE The colonial state in Korea was a busy state. While pursuing the imperial interests of Japan, it evolved a full policy agenda, including the goal of economic transformation of Korea. The broad strategy of trans￾formation was two pronged: the state utilized its bureaucratic capacities to directly undertake quite a few economic tasks; and, more important, the state involved propertied groups -both in the countryside