1274 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Generals in both policy making and implementation during 1915-20,about 2,000 policemen-or nearly was absolute and nearly all of them were senior mili- one out of every 10 available policemen-were tary men-and Korea was not a very large country sternly disciplined every year for transgression of (again,for example,note the contrast with the role of police rules (Chen,1984,pp.236-239). the British in India).The Japanese,however,took This extensive and closely supervised police force additional actions2 For example,when confronted that penetrated every Korean village,performed with corrupt regional or local officials,the central numerous functions other than "normal"police duties authorities experimented-in line with"new"insti- of law and order maintenance.Powers granted to tutional cconomics -with paying these officials police included control over"politics,education,reli- higher salaries.especially "entertainment-allow- gion,morals,health and public welfare,and tax col- ance,"with the hope that,if more satisfied,they may lection"(Robinson in Eckert et al.,1990,p.259).The perform public tasks better.When this did not work. police,who presented themselves in military uni- or at least not fully,the colonial authorities further forms,again replete with swords.also had summary centralized,leading up to even less discretion,and powers to judge and punish minor offenders,includ- more rule-governed behavior for lower level officials ing the punishment of whipping.Even in production, These officials in the early colonial period were even local police were known to have"compelled villages required to wear crisp uniforms,replete with swords, to switch from existing food crops"to cash crops and so as to distinguish them sharply from an average citi- to adopt"new techniques"in rice production so as to zen -thus creating a state-society,or a public-pri- facilitate exports to Japan.Moreover,during land sur- vate,distinction through the use of symbolic politics veys (conducted during 1910-18;more on this as well as to convey the will of the state in the far below),as a result of which tenancy and conflicts over reaches of the society.When such efforts also failed to land increased,local police "always intervened in secure full compliance.Korean officials would be favor of landlords."23 It is thus not surprising that even replaced by the more socialized and complying a Japanese observer was led to conclude that Terauchi Japanese officials,at least until more suitable (the first Japanese Governor General of Korea.fol- Koreans,who were likely to comply,could be found lowing Ito and formal annexation)and his successors for the job. had transformed the "entire Korean peninsula into a military camp." (ii)The police force One final aspeet of the police role eoncerns the In addition to the civil bureaucracy,the other links between the police and local society via local essential arm of the new Korean state that the elites.The police successfully utilized the proverbial Japanese helped develop was a well-organized police carrot and stick to incorporate "village elders"and force.Once again,there is nothing unique about colo- others into a ruling "alliance."The police thus but- nial powers developing a police force;what is note- tressed their already extensive powers by working worthy here are both the extensive and the intensive with,rather than against,indigenous authority struc- nature of police supervision in colonial Korea.The tures.So armed,the police used the knowledge and colonial police force was designed on the lines of the influence of the local elites to mold the behavior of Meiji police force insofar as it was highly centralized, average citizens in such diverse matters as,"birth con- well disciplined and played an extensive role in social trol.types of crops grown,count and movement of and economic reforms.22 The police force in colonial people,prevention of spread of diseases,mobilization Korea grew rapidly:from some 6.222 gendarmes and of forced labor and to report on transgressions"(Chen. police in 1910 to 20,777 in 1922 and again to over 1984,p.226).The police and many local elites thus 60,000 in 1941 (Robinson in Eckert et al.,1990,p. came to be viewed and despised by Koreans at large as 259).One scholar suggests that at the height of the "collaborationists";unfortunately for Koreans,while colonial rule,there were enough police so that the many of the landed elite were indeed eventually elim- lowest level policeman knew "every man in the vil- inated as a political force (i.e.via land reforms follow- lage"(Chen.1984,p.225).While senior police offi- ing the Korean War),much of the colonial police force cers were normally Japanese,over half the police was incorporated directly into the new state structure force was made up of Koreans,often lower class of South Korea. Koreans.These Koreans were trained by the Japanese In sum,the personalized and factionalized Yi state in police academies,especially established within with a limited reach in society came to be replaced by Korea for the purpose.Records indicate that for every a colonial state with considerable capacity to penetrate Korean police position there were 10-20 applicants and control the society;this state was simultaneously (Chen.1984,p.236),suggesting a level of coopera- oppressive and efficacious.A highly centralised apex tion between Koreans and Japanese that probably with near absolute powers of legislation and exccution pains the modern Korean nationalist sentiments. -and thus of setting and implementing "national" Beyond formal training,the Japanese maintained very goals-and a pervasive,disciplined civil and police close supervision over their police force;for example, bureaucracies constituted the cores of the new state.1214 WORLD DEVELOPMENT Generals in both policy making and implementation was absolute and nearly all of them were senior mili￾tary men - and Korea was not a very large country (again, for example, note the contrast with the role of the British in India). The Japanese, however, took additional actions.” For example, when confronted with corrupt regional or local officials, the central authorities experimented - in line with “new” insti￾tutional economics - with paying these officials higher salaries, especially “entertainment-allow￾ance,” with the hope that, if more satisfied, they may perform public tasks better. When this did not work, or at least not fully, the colonial authorities further centralized, leading up to even less discretion, and more rule-governed behavior for lower level officials. These officials in the early colonial period were even required to wear crisp uniforms, replete with swords, so as to distinguish them sharply from an average citi￾zen - thus creating a state-society, or a public-pri￾vate, distinction through the use of symbolic politics - as well as to convey the will of the state in the far reaches of the society. When such efforts also failed to secure full compliance, Korean officials would be replaced by the more socialized and complying Japanese officials, at least until more suitable Koreans, who were likely to comply, could be found for the job. (ii) The poiicr jbrce In addition to the civil bureaucracy, the other essential arm of the new Korean state that the Japanese helped develop was a well-organized police force. Once again, there is nothing unique about colo￾nial powers developing a police force; what is note￾worthy here are both the extensive and the intensive nature of police supervision in colonial Korea. The colonial police force was designed on the lines of the Meiji police force insofar as it was highly centralized, well disciplined and played an extensive role in social and economic reforms.-?2 The police force in colonial Korea grew rapidly: from some 6,222 gendarmes and police in I9 IO to 20,777 in 1922 and again to over 60,000 in 1941 (Robinson in Eckert et al., 1990, p. 259). One scholar suggests that at the height of the colonial rule, there were enough police so that the lowest level policeman knew “every man in the vil￾lage” (Chen, 1984, p. 225). While senior police offi￾cers were normally Japanese, over half the police force was made up of Koreans, often lower class Koreans. These Koreans were trained by the Japanese in police academies, especially established within Korea for the purpose. Records indicate that for every Korean police position there were 30-20 applicants (Chen, 1984, p. 236), suggesting a level of coopera￾tion between Koreans and Japanese that probably pains the modern Korean nationalist sentiments. Beyond formal training, the Japanese maintained very close supervision over their police force; for example, during 19 15-20, about 2,000 policemen - or nearly one out of every 10 available policemen - were sternly disciplined every year for transgression of police rules (Chen, 1984, pp. 236-239). This extensive and closely supervised police force, that penetrated every Korean village, performed numerous functions other than “normal” police duties of law and order maintenance. Powers granted to police included control over “politics, education, reli￾gion, morals, health and public welfare, and tax col￾lection” (Robinson in Eckert et cd., 1990, p. 259). The police, who presented themselves in military uni￾forms, again replete with swords, also had summary powers to judge and punish minor offenders, includ￾ing the punishment of whipping. Even in production, local police were known to have “compelled villages to switch from existing food crops” to cash crops and to adopt “new techniques” in rice production so as to facilitate exports to Japan. Moreover, during land sur￾veys (conducted during 1910&l 8; more on this below), as a result of which tenancy and conflicts over land increased, local police “always intervened in favor of landlords.“” It is thus not surprising that even a Japanese observer was led to conclude that Terauchi (the first Japanese Governor General of Korea, fol￾lowing Ito and formal annexation) and his successors had transformed the “entire Korean peninsula into a military camp.“‘” One final aspect of the police role concerns the links between the police and local society via local elites. The police successfully utilized the proverbial carrot and stick to incorporate “village elders” and others into a ruling “alliance.” The police thus but￾tressed their already extensive powers by working with, rather than against, indigenous authority struc￾tures. So armed, the police used the knowledge and influence of the local elites to mold the behavior of average citizens in such diverse matters as, “birth con￾trol. types of crops grown, count and movement of people, prevention of spread of diseases, mobilization of forced labor and to report on transgressions” (Chen. 1984, p. 226). The police and many local elites thus came to be viewed and despised by Koreans at large as “collaborationists”; unfortunately for Koreans, while many of the landed elite were indeed eventually elim￾inated as a political force (i.e. via land reforms follow￾ing the Korean War), much of the colonial police force was incorporated directly into the new state structure of South Korea. In sum, the personalized and factionalized Yi state with a limited reach in society came to be replaced by a colonial state with considerable capacity to penetrate and control the society; this state was simultaneously oppressive and efficacious. A highly centralised apex with near absolute powers of legislation and execution - and thus of setting and implementing “national” goals - and a pervasive, disciplined civil and police bureaucracies constituted the cores of the new state