De Witt Huberts et al 127 they were more likely to subsequently choose fruit salad over resources to regulate this behavior remain intact,thereby ru colate cake,achieving a balance between healthy and ing out resource depletion as an altemative account for the fndulgentchoice ,however,this preference nding that pror restraint and ettort c ry subsequen ve thes had do still have th chocolates.That is.rather than stimulating a healthier choice ce,they may not always do so if they have the opportu in the subsequent self-regulation situation as predicted by a nity to justify it. ncing mechanism,the indulgent purch by hedonic consumption justified the subseque choice ofa Negative Affect hedonic snack,thereby supporting the notion that justifica- That negative affect is often related to self-regulation failure tion processes were involved in terms uch as reta Resource Depletion self-regulation failure (Heathertor Wagner 201 )and prior restraint (e.g Hse nts ean the limited resources model (e.g Baumeister,Bratslavsky a justification for self-regulation failure.Findings from our E,&Chatzisaran lab,however,reveal that negative emotional events can also 2000).n ting sel trol the eby limiting the ability to subsequent behavior.Failures of self-regulation incited by the direct effects of negative emotions on self-reg or as prior restraint or prior lure b exposure to aversive stimuli (De on ad of However,the findings that merely being reminded of or whereas in the high-awareness condition par magining a prior act of restraint ins ed chend the nega ng rela tive rathe han nism.Although the cedure in both s in self-regulation failure occurs without actually exerting self reported equal levels of negative affect only con resource deple ho vere more the uli aware of being exposed to nore in magining anothe despite being in a ne ative affective state did not iner erson exerting self- control depleted self-control resou their hedoni intake ompared to the neutral control group not ally e an er tful task upport o n-ba ed app imilar test to rule out this rival account was therefore needed to ent could use their emotional exper ce as a justification establish whether justification cues such as effort or restrain to indulge,a justification not available to participants wh There in iustification-hased required self of forbidden snacks but not of ources (De Witt Huberts et al,2012c).Results indicated healthy snacks.supporting the notion that a ness of the participants thinking they had exert d relat vely mor ve event serve as a justil ation to allo min ananan ame e who thought they had completed a single task of 10 min In the latter case one would predict that in order to alleviat while self-control resources,measured by a Stroop task,did one's negative affect,no differences would have beer rved and unhealth f-regula m that poin De Witt Huberts et al. 127 they were more likely to subsequently choose fruit salad over chocolate cake, achieving a balance between healthy and indulgent choices. Crucially, however, this preference for fruit salad over chocolate cake was reversed when people were led to believe they had donated to charity by buying chocolates. That is, rather than stimulating a healthier choice in the subsequent self-regulation situation as predicted by a balancing mechanism, the indulgent purchase stimulated fur￾ther hedonic consumption. Presumably donating to charity by hedonic consumption justified the subsequent choice of a hedonic snack, thereby supporting the notion that justifica￾tion processes were involved. Resource Depletion Justifications such as effort (e.g., De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c; Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) and prior restraint (e.g., Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) reminisce of another impor￾tant theoretical framework to explain self-regulation failure: the limited resources model (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In this model, self￾control is regarded as a limited resource that is depleted by exerting self-control, thereby limiting the ability to restrain subsequent behavior. Failures of self-regulation incited by justifications such as prior restraint or prior effort, which deplete self-control resources, could thus also be attributed to a loss of self-control instead of justification processes. However, the findings that merely being reminded of or imagining a prior act of restraint instead of actually exerting restraint, or manipulating relative rather than absolute effort, cast doubt on this alternative account as explanation for a justification mechanism. Although these studies suggest that self-regulation failure occurs without actually exerting self￾control, resource depletion could not be ruled out indefinitely as an explanation for the observed effects. For instance, Ackerman, Goldstein, Shapiro, and Bargh (2009) found evi￾dence for vicarious resource depletion: imagining another person exerting self-control depleted self-control resources despite not actually engaging in an effortful task. It could be possible that having the impression of having exerted effort or restraining oneself produces similar results. A more direct test to rule out this rival account was therefore needed to establish whether justification cues such as effort or restraint worked through a justification-based mechanism. Therefore, two studies tested whether the justification cues commonly used in justification-based accounts required self-control resources (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c). Results indicated that participants thinking they had exerted relatively more effort by completing two tasks of 5 min consumed more snacks in a subsequent taste test compared to participants who thought they had completed a single task of 10 min while self-control resources, measured by a Stroop task, did not differ among participants. These findings confirm that justifications can instigate self-regulation failure whilst the resources to regulate this behavior remain intact, thereby rul￾ing out resource depletion as an alternative account for the finding that prior restraint and effort can justify subsequent goal violations. These findings imply that although people may still have the self-regulation capacity to avert indul￾gence, they may not always do so if they have the opportu￾nity to justify it. Negative Affect That negative affect is often related to self-regulation failure is reflected in terms such as “emotional eating” or “retail therapy.” Negative affective states are considered to be a prototypical “hot” factor in self-regulation models (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) that impulsively lead to self-regulation failure (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and therefore can provide an alternative account for the observation that negative emotional events can serve as a justification for self-regulation failure. Findings from our lab, however, reveal that negative emotional events can also exert their detrimental influence on self-regulation via a justification-based pathway. In three studies, the use of emotions as a justification was investigated while ruling out the direct effects of negative emotions on self-regulation failure by varying the exposure to aversive stimuli (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a). In the low-awareness condition, par￾ticipants were exposed very briefly to negative stimuli, whereas in the high-awareness condition participants were exposed long enough to fully apprehend the negative stim￾uli. In a third, neutral, control condition, participants were exposed to neutral stimuli only. While after the priming pro￾cedure participants in both negative conditions indicated reported equal levels of negative affect only participants who were more aware of being exposed to the negative stimuli consumed more in a subsequent, ostensibly unre￾lated, taste test. Participants in the low-awareness condition, despite being in a negative affective state, did not increase their hedonic intake compared to the neutral control group. In support of a justification-based mechanism, it appeared that despite feeling equally negative, only participants who were highly aware of being confronted with an emotional event could use their emotional experience as a justification to indulge, a justification not available to participants who were minimally aware of the emotional stimuli. Importantly, participants in the high-awareness condition only consumed more of forbidden snacks but not of equally palatable but healthy snacks, supporting the notion that awareness of the negative event served as a justification to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure rather than an attempt to ameliorate one’s negative state (cf. Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). In the latter case, one would predict that in order to alleviate one’s negative affect, no differences would have been observed between the consumption of healthy and unhealthy snacks as they were rated equally palatable. 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