Article ology Review "Because I Am Worth It":A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Review of a Justification-Based Account of Self- Regulation Failure SAGE Jessie C.De Witt Huberts,Catharine Evers', and Denise T.D.De Ridder Abstract Sef-regulation failure is ofen explained as being overwhelmed by impulse.The present article proposes a novel pathwa mework an empiri eview of a justificati d account of self-regulatio failure.With n w ng pa ng a se on of the oa they endorse.Accordingly rather than inhibiti the reflective system can also facilitate them,leading to self-regulation failure.We bring together empirical evidenc e from ins de ng that regul lure and rule out alt ative accounts Having fuel the effect.finally s for future arch and ons of these self-regulation are discussed. Ciregrionsheaionproceses.sefregthionfhilre,eficening rds Meet Sally mark and marey The unable The newly wed c best man Mark will propose a toast and the real gest that an impulsive breakdown of the self-control system an b d by the we dding cake,but only route to self Despite ving in d ies. oes not s-r avert ind ingly nervous about the speech he is about to give.not sure on a justification.These examples ilustrate that sometime whether his jokes are indeed funny.The nerves make him people actively relent their tha crave n cotine is off-limits since he qui e sel g on justif tions to permit them all night.While she 、her friends ntheir drinks While this notior has a al to many of u she regrets her offer to be the designated driver surprisingly,the role of justifications has been afforded rdly any attention as an explanation for self-regulation piece:I ure on that he is allo to have cigarettes in er cies and h sires as an nlanation for Finally,when everybody abandoning long-term goals.While we acknowledge the raises the as falls o he ban t having 'Utrecht University.the Netherlands Most contemporary self-regulation theories would explain ity.Heidelberglaan I.P.O.Box failure to act in accordance with one's long-term goals as the esult of our impulses taking precedence ove reflective Emwitthubuni-potsdam.de 304
Personality and Social Psychology Review 2014, Vol. 18(2) 119–138 © 2013 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1088868313507533 pspr.sagepub.com Article Meet Sally, Mark, and Marcy. They are at a wedding party. The newly wed couple is about to cut the cake after which best man Mark will propose a toast and the real celebrations can begin. Sally is mesmerized by the wedding cake, but is in doubt as she is on a weight-loss diet that does not allow such tasty but unhealthy delicacies. Mark is getting increasingly nervous about the speech he is about to give, not sure whether his jokes are indeed funny. The nerves make him crave nicotine, but a cigarette is off-limits since he quit smoking 6 weeks ago. Marcy has been sipping soda water all night. While she sees her friends enjoying their drinks, she regrets her offer to be the designated driver. When the cake is cut, Sally decides that she will have a piece: It is a celebratory occasion after all. Mark also finally caves in and asks his friend for a cigarette, telling himself that he is allowed to have cigarettes in emergencies and, according to Mark, this is one. Finally, when everybody raises their glass for the toast, Marcy also falls of the bandwagon and has a glass of champagne, reasoning that having just one glass will not interfere with her ability to drive. Most contemporary self-regulation theories would explain failure to act in accordance with one’s long-term goals as the result of our impulses taking precedence over reflective considerations, rendering us unable to resist the lure of immediate temptations. However, the above examples suggest that an impulsive breakdown of the self-control system is not the only route to self-regulation failure. Despite having the self-regulation capacity to avert indulgence, Marcy, Sally, and Mark abandoned their long-term goals by relying on a justification. These examples illustrate that sometimes people actively relent their self-regulation efforts, rather than lose self-control, by relying on justifications to permit themselves an otherwise forbidden pleasure. While this notion has a familiar appeal to many of us, surprisingly, the role of justifications has been afforded hardly any attention as an explanation for self-regulation failure. Instead, research on self-regulation failure has, to date, mainly focused on the relative strength of impulses for the gratification of immediate desires as an explanation for abandoning long-term goals. While we acknowledge the 507533 PSRXXX10.1177/1088868313507533Personality and Social Psychology ReviewDe Witt Huberts et al. research-article2013 1 Utrecht University, the Netherlands Corresponding Author: Jessie C. de Witt Huberts, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, P.O. Box 80140, Utrecht, 3508 TC, the Netherlands. Email: witthub@uni-potsdam.de “Because I Am Worth It”: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Review of a Justification-Based Account of SelfRegulation Failure Jessie C. De Witt Huberts1 , Catharine Evers1 , and Denise T. D. De Ridder1 Abstract Self-regulation failure is often explained as being overwhelmed by impulse. The present article proposes a novel pathway, presenting a theoretical framework and empirical review of a justification-based account of self-regulation failure. With justification we refer to making excuses for one’s discrepant behavior, so that when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, people resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifications that allow violations of the goal they endorse. Accordingly, rather than inhibiting motivations from the impulsive system, the reflective system can also facilitate them, leading to self-regulation failure. We bring together empirical evidence from various domains demonstrating that justifications can instigate self-regulation failure and rule out alternative accounts. Having established that justification processes contribute to self-regulation failure, we then propose several mechanisms that may fuel the effect. Finally, routes for future research and the conceptual and practical implications of these novel insights for self-regulation are discussed. Keywords self-regulation, justification processes, self-regulation failure, self-licensing Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) our self-contr (Strack De sch.2004)These labels char izo the cesses underlving self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate,slow,and rational system and an impulsive, throug fast,and emotion system (Metcalfe Mischel.1999 theyorTherefore determined by the interplay of ahot"system and a we postulate that reflective processes,in addition to impu system.The hot system is activated in response to hedon sive forees,can play a su antial role in s With cally appealing d.unless counteracte d by the co ve refer to the str s for self-reo active long-term considerations will have room to facilitate ulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is esistance of temptations.Along the same lines,the refle made tive-impulsiv Deutsch,200 n neg 24 Verth odel of behavior(Strack ngu d in othat int In the present article.we present a theoretical analysis and resources are limited.behaviorill be predomi- empirical review of justific ation processes in self-regulation mantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on failure exploring deeper r the observation that failre is mplicit automat However vell We will fir owing for and short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-reg Although these models do not have explicit predictions ation and specify the roe of reflective processe s in them.I for the outc me of the processes in terms of self-regulator v the nom that fuel the effect.Finally,we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for 0 ,whereas the】 reflective system hol des an Self-Regulation as We Know It failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in ine with one's (e.g. At the he self-regulat tion lies long-goals 2005 e such self n din th vat the rty to ch between incompatible motivations, where on one hand the soda water (followngher intention)over the champagn on the The 20 to cont ofhis intention to quit smoking.As such.self-regulation fail this is reflected by the inc sing prevalence of societal prob ure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inabil 02 such as obesity(Fl Carroll,Ogde ty of the system t ula the echsler,Lee edomi the like.To explain why people so frequently seem unable to determinants of failure stemming either from an veractive act as they intend,many models of self gulation hav impulsive system (e.g.. ,emotional and visceral influ nces al-p ew t as gained prom cy, Chaike of indicator &To 100G in 1994:Smith Decoster 20001 ive load Although each dual-pro ess model has its own unique con For example,the limited resource model (Muraven& tentions they share that self-regulation is neister, 000)postulates that our self by pro ted,the imp have been desc ibed ue a variety of term such as reflex state ter d eo ive versus reflective (Lieberman,2007).hot versus reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influ (Metcalfe&Mischel,1999),and impulsive versus reflective ence of impulses,effort and control are needed.As a result
120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) power of impulses in impairing our self-control capacities, we contend that the implicit assumption that the impulsive system is solely responsible for failing to carry through longterm goals is incomplete. People often fail to follow through on their long-term goals not merely because of lack of willpower or being overwhelmed by impulse, but rather because they generate reasons for giving in to temptations. Therefore, we postulate that reflective processes, in addition to impulsive forces, can play a substantial role in self-regulation failure by relying on justification processes. With justification, we refer to the strategic employment of reasons for self-regulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is made acceptable to oneself. Thus far, this route to self-regulation failure has been neglected in both the self-regulation literature and in dual-process theories. In the present article, we present a theoretical analysis and empirical review of justification processes in self-regulation failure, exploring deeper the observation that failure is not solely the consequence of impulsive factors, but that reflective processes can contribute as well. We will first give a short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-regulation and specify the role of reflective processes in them. In the following section, we review the empirical evidence for justification processes in self-regulation and kindred phenomena, followed by an analysis of potential mechanisms that fuel the effect. Finally, we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for future research. Self-Regulation as We Know It At the heart of self-regulation lies the ability to transcend immediate temptations in the service of long-term goals. As such, self-regulation dilemmas typically involve a conflict between incompatible motivations, where on one hand hedonic attraction pulls toward indulgence, while on the other hand rational norms concerning the conflicting longterm goal dictate to resist the hedonic urge (e.g., Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). That people often fail at this is reflected by the increasing prevalence of societal problems such as obesity (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Johnson, 2002), credit card debt (Bird, Hagstrom, & Wild, 1999), binge drinking (Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, & Kuo, 2002), and the like. To explain why people so frequently seem unable to act as they intend, many models of self-regulation have adopted the dual-process view that has gained prominence in explaining all types of psychological processes (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Although each dual-process model has its own unique contentions, they share the postulation that self-regulation is determined by two fundamentally different processes that compete for control over behavior. These differing processes have been described using a variety of terms, such as reflexive versus reflective (Lieberman, 2007), hot versus cool (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), and impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These labels characterize the processes underlying self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate, slow, and rational system and an impulsive, fast, and emotional system. To illustrate, the hot/cool systems theory (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) proposes that self-regulatory behavior is determined by the interplay of a “hot” system and a “cool” system. The hot system is activated in response to hedonically appealing stimuli, and, unless counteracted by the cool system, will stimulate indulgence. When the cool system is active, long-term considerations will have room to facilitate resistance of temptations. Along the same lines, the reflective-impulsive model of behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006) distinguishes a rational and an impulsive route that interact to determine behavior; when cognitive resources are limited, behavior will be predominantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on implicit automatic preferences. However, when cognitive resources are available, the reflective system will take over, allowing for rational choices and explicit intentions. Although these models do not have explicit predictions for the outcome of the processes in terms of self-regulatory success or failure, and thus leave open the possibility of a reflective pathway to self-regulation failure, this has hardly been followed up in the literature. Instead, the contention that the impulsive system hosts automatic affective reactions, whereas the reflective system holds a person’s explicit attitudes and standards, has led to the interpretation that the impulsive system is mainly responsible for self-regulation failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in line with one’s long-term goals (e.g., Bechara, 2005; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2008). Accordingly, the reflective system would lead Marcy at the wedding party to choose the soda water (following her intention) over the champagne (what she longs for at that moment). The impulsive system on the other hand would leave Mark unable to control his cigarette craving before his speech (his impulse), losing sight of his intention to quit smoking. As such, self-regulation failure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inability of the reflective system to modulate the effects of impulsive processes. Consequently, the extensive literature on self-regulation failure now consists predominantly of determinants of failure stemming either from an overactive impulsive system (e.g., emotional and visceral influences, reward saliency, habitualness), or of indicators of a deficient reflective system (e.g., after alcohol consumption or under high cognitive load). For example, the limited resource model (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) postulates that our self-control resources are limited and when those resources are depleted, the impulsive system takes over leaving us unable to control our impulses, a state termed ego-depletion. Conversely, for the reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influence of impulses, effort and control are needed. As a result, Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption resources are availab an idea that is supported by findings that reflective processes would lead to the enact ment of our demonstrating that higher working memory another perspective.Although chm and in 2004)it has not h &Wiers.2009:Wiers.Beckers.Houben.&Hofmann.2009) tematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or weaken the impact ofimpulsive process d thus strengthen reflected in the self-regulation lite ture (see Kivetz elf-control (s ofmann, g,200 oulsive and reflective proc sses the metanhor of a horse failure in re ition of the idea that rather than reig ino in and rider is often used to describe self-regulation,where the the horse,the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away horse symbolizes t impulsive system that has to be reignec from our long-term goals in by a reflectve rally inferred fom dual process models bet reen the impulsive system being mainly Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure avior,is bog cha industrilized society are pres ehe adant ive to the s behavior may produce bad outcomes.For example,counter ously faced with temntations thre ning thes theory (Fishba ch,Friedman,Kruglansk Sally for example experiences a conflict bet en what sh ）rg of te wants at th ent(the ad).st-term failure but instead can bo st self-regulation by automatically ing to resist her urge to indulge in the cake.an effortful pr aw Vohs (01 cess that leads to effective self-regulation.Altematively,she the t ct h he ed out as a strategie means of reaching a goal for s tha hy their slow a teenager nave to self-control to over- lytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the s of ni the reflective system in the tradition dual-pre ess model In othe wh dua for one's diserenant behavior hefore actual enactment such e routet that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself.In we will othe words regulatio dilemma goal defving hehs Sne that by relying on justifications to set a side long-term Afte can play asu al role all,wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not es to self ulation filur tification 11 could contribute to a more compreher sive picture of the he one's de e to act on one's imnulses is in nflict with ous ways people fail to act as they intend. one's desire to achieve a long-term goal.iustifications can can contribu .o gger action by liberating people toact on their short-term Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon.1982)but rea self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger ustification oning suboptima esse Without motivations arising from our impulsive ).Mo (e.g.,W Sch system that interfere with ou by our motivations and desires (Hsee.1995:Kunda.1990) she ted h ch As such,reflective processes can also contribute to"irratic decorated wedding cake,removing the need for justifica tions. Likewise,if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal,she has no reason to try to resist the urge
De Witt Huberts et al. 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient resources are available, an idea that is supported by findings demonstrating that higher working memory capacity (Grenard et al., 2008; Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008), and interference control capacity (Houben & Wiers, 2009; Wiers, Beckers, Houben, & Hofmann, 2009) weaken the impact of impulsive processes and thus strengthen self-control (see Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012, for an overview). To describe this delicate interplay between impulsive and reflective processes the metaphor of a horse and rider is often used to describe self-regulation, where the horse symbolizes the impulsive system that has to be reigned in by a reflective rider. However, the distinction generally inferred from dualprocess models between the impulsive system being mainly responsible for bad behavior and the reflective system being the producer of good behavior, is increasingly being challenged. Recent theorizing suggests that impulsive behavior can sometimes be adaptive to the same extent that reflective behavior may produce bad outcomes. For example, counteractive control theory (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003) argues that resistance of temptations can be the result of automatic processes, demonstrating that confrontation with a temptation does not impulsively lead to self-regulation failure but instead can boost self-regulation by automatically activating long-term goals. Likewise, Rawn and Vohs (2011) recently argued that some actions commonly labeled as selfregulation failure such as smoking and drinking alcohol may be carried out as a strategic means of reaching a goal. For instance, a teenager may have to exert self-control to overcome the initial aversive effects of nicotine in order to belong to his peers, in which case smoking can be defined as an act of self-regulation. In other words, whereas dual-process models of self-regulation mostly focus on a reflective route toward effective self-regulation and an impulsive route to failure, alternative routes are possible. In this article, we will focus on the role of the reflective system in facilitating longterm goal defying behavior more closely. Specifically, we posit that by relying on justifications to set aside long-term goals, reflective processes can play a substantial role in selfregulation failure. Together with the already established routes to self-regulation failure, justifications processes could contribute to a more comprehensive picture of the various ways people fail to act as they intend. The observation that the reflective system can contribute to self-regulation failure is in fact not surprising when the limitations of our reasoning capacities are taken into account. Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon, 1982) but reasoning can even lead to suboptimal outcomes or outcomes not in line with our self-interests (e.g., Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Moreover, our reasoning processes are often guided by our motivations and desires (Hsee, 1995; Kunda, 1990). As such, reflective processes can also contribute to “irrational” choices (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simon, 1990, 1992). Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption that reflective processes would lead to the enactment of our explicit goals in another perspective. Although this notion has been recognized in some dual-process models of selfregulation (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004), it has not been systematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or reflected in the self-regulation literature (see Kivetz & Zheng, 2006, for an exception). In this article, we will consider the evidence for this additional route to self-regulation failure, in recognition of the idea that rather than reigning in the horse, the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away from our long-term goals. Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure More than ever, people in Western industrialized society are confronted with conflicting motivational pressures. People hold goals to be thin, athletic, productive or successful but are continuously faced with temptations threatening these goals. Sally for example experiences a conflict between what she wants at that moment (the wedding cake) and what she should do to reach her long-term aims (skip the cake and go for the crudités instead). She could resolve this conflict by attempting to resist her urge to indulge in the cake, an effortful process that leads to effective self-regulation. Alternatively, she could resolve the motivational conflict by creating or activating justifications that allow her to indulge in the chocolate cake. As such, justification processes that by their slow, analytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the reflective system in the traditional dual-process model distinction, can contribute to self-regulation failure. With justification, we refer to the act of making excuses for one’s discrepant behavior before actual enactment, such that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself. In other words, when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, people resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifications that allow violations of the goal they endorse. After all, wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not sufficient for action; “one must also feel licensed to do it” (Miller & Effron, 2010, p. 115). As such, in self-regulation conflicts where one’s desire to act on one’s impulses is in conflict with one’s desire to achieve a long-term goal, justifications can trigger action by liberating people to act on their short-term motivations (Miller & Effron, 2010). Please note that in the present account, the involvement of a self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger justification processes. Without motivations arising from our impulsive system that interfere with our long-term goals, justification processes are unnecessary. After all, if Sally would dislike chocolate, she is unlikely to be tempted by the chocolatedecorated wedding cake, removing the need for justifications. Likewise, if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal, she has no reason to try to resist the urge Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the r nect of tasting the delicious looking Evidence for iustification as a facilitator of behavic ding cake.making the need for justifications obsolete. ginates in the iudgment and decision-making literature ndicating that people are more likely to choose the option failure self-regulation hat they can justify (S 1993).As the need to and reflective p ons in order ve the the reflective system was limited to protecting one's long- choice (es Kivetz 1999:Shafir et al.1993:Simonsor term goals from our impulses,the current account propose 1989).As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying jus the pursuit of long-term contribute to failure particularly relevant for underst Consequently,a justification is not a fixed belief that ing self-regulation failure.Applying these principles to the leads people to i lulge.In the absence of a motivationa ns ar ster rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allov oals should be a compelling justification.However. oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control noted by Shafir t al.(1993).having a rease seems to b that is experienced.As nore important th hat is,dec to the se and the g end to be d experiencing.In that sense,anything can count as a justifi- "shallow but nice soundn cation and the number of justifications can be infinite,as people eem to focus ons th the term goal stify feelings fe g M rcier&Sperber 2011 Nishett To date,the use of justifications for discordant behavior Wilson ,1977). such,a justification-based mechanisn has mainly been stud in th contex of cognitive diss vhe confronted with -regulat 0 ger, or the pos ing for how ople rely on justifications to ationalize p that will allow them to iustify it Thi In this review mplies that when people find the nselves in a situat justificati ot gnitive of go out of capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to agne realiz on the e of justificatio ifies her past behavior by reasoning tha t.for example cannot he beneficial to self-regula oeglhswoatinterteewihherabiliytodieanvayAs ion as well.In fact, most dual-process models of self sgre pro yst 1004hH izing that she is the designated driver. To this sses may be less explicit or novel in successful self ision nflict,she ger r wish to joi explanation n lin with ou is already a valid rms and triggers self-regulation failure Thus while in and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifica- both Marcy was ted to have glass of char Therefore,while acknov ging the importance of and the J used wer d p is on th ome other factor s in xplaining self-tegulation failure the current account the iustifications generate transgressive Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior behavior. that is not in line with one's explicit standards come from a
122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the prospect of tasting the delicious looking wedding cake, making the need for justifications obsolete. Therefore, a justification-based pathway of self-regulation failure, like other accounts of self-regulation failure, is assumed to be the result of an interplay between impulsive and reflective processes. However, while hitherto the role of the reflective system was limited to protecting one’s longterm goals from our impulses, the current account proposes that the reflective system, by seeking and constructing justifications for one’s impulsive inclinations, can also actively contribute to failure. Consequently, a justification is not a fixed belief that leads people to indulge. In the absence of a motivational conflict, justifications are not needed to foster indulgence and may not even arise. Instead, a justification seems to rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allow oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control dilemma that is experienced. As a result, justifications are most likely to be idiosyncratically determined and may vary according to the self-regulation dilemma a person is experiencing. In that sense, anything can count as a justification and the number of justifications can be infinite, as long as it is generated during a self-regulation dilemma and as long as it forms an allowance to violate one’s longterm goal. To date, the use of justifications for discordant behavior has mainly been studied in the context of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, because of the post hoc etiology, cognitive dissonance is not useful in accounting for how people rely on justifications to rationalize prospective deviances of goal-directed behavior. In this review, we focus on situations in which justifications are the cause rather than the consequence of goal transgressions. To illustrate, whereas a cognitive dissonance account would predict that when Marcy, after joining everybody in the toast out of habit and is enjoying her glass of champagne realizes that she has inadvertently violated her own norms, will feel uncomfortable. To get rid of this uncomfortable state, she justifies her past behavior by reasoning that, for example, one glass won’t interfere with her ability to drive anyway. As such, transgressive behaviors can fuel justification processes. In the present account, however, Marcy may have anticipated the upcoming toast and her desire to join in while realizing that she is the designated driver. To resolve this predecisional conflict, she generates arguments beforehand that allow her to act on her wish to join her friends, telling herself that one glass of champagne won’t hurt. As such, the generation of justifications leads her to violate her own norms and triggers self-regulation failure. Thus, while in both cases Marcy was motivated to have a glass of champagne and the justifications she used were similar, in cognitive dissonance, the dissonant behavior, which was elicited by some other factor, generated the justifications, whereas in the current account the justifications generate transgressive behavior. Evidence for justifications as a facilitator of behavior originates in the judgment and decision-making literature, indicating that people are more likely to choose the option that they can justify (Shafir et al., 1993). As the need to choose often creates conflict, decision makers seek and construct reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choice (e.g., Kivetz, 1999; Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989). As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying immediate desires versus the pursuit of long-term benefits by definition entails a conflict between opposing goals, justification processes seem particularly relevant for understanding self-regulation failure. Applying these principles to the context of self-regulation, one would assume that a justification-based mechanism will favor behavior in line with our intentions simply because corresponding with our long-term goals should be a compelling justification. However, as noted by Shafir et al. (1993), having a reason seems to be more important than the quality of the reason. That is, decisions are based on the mere availability of reasons, the nature and the quality of the reason tend to be disregarded: People appear to prefer “shallow but nice sounding” justifications (Simonson, 1989, p. 170). Moreover, people seem to focus on justifications that are consistent with their initial attitude to justify how they feel, constructing reasons for their present feelings (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As such, a justification-based mechanism would predict that when confronted with a self-regulation dilemma where people might be more inclined to pursue the hedonic option (cf. Elliot, 2006), people will seek or construct justifications that will allow them to justify it. This implies that when people find themselves in a situation where they are tempted by something they know they really should not do, they might be successful in constraining themselves, unless they find a reason, any reason, to give in. As such our capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to self-regulation failure. While the focus of this article is on the role of justification processes in self-regulation failure, this is not to suggest that reasoned processes cannot be very beneficial to self-regulation as well. In fact, most dual-process models of self-regulation assume that the reflective system is responsible for effective goal striving because of its reliance on rule-based reasoning (cf. Epstein, 1994). However, the role of reasoned processes may be less explicit or novel in successful selfregulation. After all, acting in line with one’s intentions does not require reasoned explanations as much as breaching one’s intentions: The fact that a certain choice or behavior is in line with our intention is already a valid reason in itself and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifications. Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of reasoned processes in successful self-regulation, the focus in this article is on the lesser known role of justifications in explaining self-regulation failure. Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior that is not in line with one’s explicit standards come from a Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 123 variety of fields.such as health behavior.moral behavior and eral.the purchase or consumption of such luxury goods is consumer choice.Yet,these various empirical demonstra- harder to justify than the consumption of utilitarian products tons have never led to should incre the likel 0a0 tification-based echa the backbo of the con sumer loyalty programs.Kivetz and Simonson (2002) ducted within this frame ork but that nevertheless seems to demonstrated that participants preferred a luxury award over rely on justific To he included as ey orting a iustification greater effort presumably served as a justification for the purchase of luxuries.A justification-based mechanism is ence of justifications on be cision making ed yngheavalabiyofa es. (1008)den post hoc iustification n esses:(b)including a control group more effective in promoting luxury than utilitarian consumr that was not provide The donation to charity tha e to f a justif s is th ought to re dile such that 's im impulses interfere with one's long-term intentions,as in the justifications on consumer indulgence. Typically partici of a motivational conflict,Justi cation were pres on afte llegedly in d-(d il istently de rated that articip nts with justification (e.g..effort,excellence feedback contributing Empirical Evidence for Justification hoice of cesses in Self-Re lation faily (e.g The role of justifications was first studied in the context of roduct (e.g.. cleaner.Khan Dhar.2006:healthy Zheng.2006)compared with partic ate s mo as exh an Ha 2010.for a revi nle Mor nd1er/2001 e but als showed that choosing an African American who was the ing unealthy snacks (De Witt Huberts,Evers&De Ridde the dc vers.& De Ridder at p yne 2011 gge with narticinan who hased on similar des tions. ses that are under the influence of visceral drives tially chose a White applicant as best suited for the job hunger)and that involve actively regulating one's desires This and simila g were attribut the fac er tha me kind of orthat countera can facilitat it inte dentials"that licensed them to subsequently behave in a and values,with empirical evidence demonstrating that justi way that violated these principles (e.g., fications play a subs antial role in the self-regulation contex Effro and Mille 0 moral self-licensing loyed the 9) gratifying immediate needs versus pursuing long-term Having established that iustifications play a role in self Further evidence for a justification-based mechanism regulation failure,the question rises what kind of justifica- underlying beha vior disc pant with one's long-term goals othe As m ny pur the ev liet of functional considerations,such as spending on luxuries ver- would like to note that the cate izations are ours.and lim sus saving up or spending on necessary items,they often ited only to the justifications that have actually been studied encompass Se regulation dilemm bet e rely on may ons and lo 304
De Witt Huberts et al. 123 variety of fields, such as health behavior, moral behavior and consumer choice. Yet, these various empirical demonstrations have never been assembled to substantiate a justificationbased account of self-regulation failure. In the following section, we aggregate evidence for a justification-based mechanism. This includes work that was not explicitly conducted within this framework but that nevertheless seems to capture the phenomenon that we sometimes rely on justifications to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure. To be included as evidence supporting a justificationbased account the studies had to establish the causal influence of justifications on behavior, including decision making, by (a) manipulating the availability of a justification before self-regulatory behavior was measured in order to rule out post hoc justification processes; (b) including a control group that was not provided with a justification before the outcome measure to establish whether the availability of a justification systematically influenced subsequent behavior; (c) entailing a self-control dilemma, such that one’s immediate impulses interfere with one’s long-term intentions, as in the absence of a motivational conflict, justifications are not needed to foster indulgence and consequently are unlikely to affect behavior and; (d) having ruled out most prominent alternative explanations for the observed findings. Empirical Evidence for Justification Processes in Self-Regulation Failure The role of justifications was first studied in the context of moral behavior where justifications could lead one to violate one’s moral principles such as exhibiting prejudiced, sexist, or selfish behavior (see Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010, for a review). For example, Monin and Miller (2001) showed that choosing an African American—who was the most qualified applicant—for a hypothetical job, increased the likelihood that participants would describe a subsequent job as better suited for White applicants compared with participants who, based on similar descriptions, initially chose a White applicant as best suited for the job. This and similar findings were attributed to the fact that people whose past behavior (e.g., acting in a non-prejudiced way) provided them with some kind of “moral credentials” that licensed them to subsequently behave in a way that violated these principles (e.g., voicing prejudiced opinions; Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). To describe this phenomenon, Monin and Miller employed the term moral self-licensing. Further evidence for a justification-based mechanism underlying behavior discrepant with one’s long-term goals comes from studies on consumer choice. As many purchasing decisions are tinged with a conflict between hedonic and functional considerations, such as spending on luxuries versus saving up or spending on necessary items, they often encompass a typical self-regulation dilemma between immediate gratifications and long-term considerations. As in general, the purchase or consumption of such luxury goods is harder to justify than the consumption of utilitarian products, having a justification should increase the likelihood of indulging in luxury consumption. Indeed, a justificationbased mechanism appears to be the backbone of the popular consumer loyalty programs. Kivetz and Simonson (2002) demonstrated that participants preferred a luxury award over a utilitarian reward of equal value when the program requirements (e.g., frequency of purchase) were high (vs. low). The greater effort presumably served as a justification for the purchase of luxuries. A justification-based mechanism is also thought to underlie charity incentives where people can contribute to charity by purchasing luxuries. Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) demonstrated that such charity incentives are more effective in promoting luxury than utilitarian consumption. The donation to charity that the luxury consumption encompasses is thought to reduce the guilt normally associated with the purchase of luxury items. Other studies further demonstrated the facilitating role of justifications on consumer indulgence. Typically, participants in these studies were presented with a justification after which, allegedly in the context of another study, they could choose between a utilitarian and a luxury item. These studies consistently demonstrated that providing participants with a justification (e.g., effort, excellence feedback, contributing to charity or volunteering) increased choice of a luxury product (e.g., designer jeans, Khan & Dhar, 2006; indulgent chocolate cake, Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) over a utilitarian product (e.g., vacuum cleaner, Khan & Dhar, 2006; healthy fruit salad, Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) compared with participants not provided with a justification. Having a justification not only increases preference for hedonic over functional choice but also increases hedonic consumption, such as eating unhealthy snacks (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012a; De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012c; Werle, Wansink, & Payne, 2011), suggesting that justification processes also play an important role in self-regulatory processes that are under the influence of visceral drives (e.g., hunger) and that involve actively regulating one’s desires rather than choosing. As outlined above, having a justification can facilitate behavior that counteracts one’s explicit intentions, norms, and values, with empirical evidence demonstrating that justifications play a substantial role in the self-regulation context of gratifying immediate needs versus pursuing long-term goals. Having established that justifications play a role in selfregulation failure, the question rises what kind of justifications people rely on to allow themselves an otherwise forbidden pleasure. A review of the empirical evidence reveals the following list of common justifications. We would like to note that the categorizations are ours, and limited only to the justifications that have actually been studied. As the justifications people rely on may be idiosyncratically determined and influenced by situational factors, the list of Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
124 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) reality nevertheless focus group studies and the recent evidence for self-gener- ask steered participants preference toward the more indul ated justifications indicate that the justifications that partici ent options in subsequent choices,favoring low-brow ove pants came up witl were lated to one of the igh idy 1b);indulgent chocolate cake ove litical m dy 2)and ine ed the 2009). likelihood of subsequent participation in a fun study with no smen Altruistic and Laudable Acts tudy with id not par In a series of studies by Khan and Dhar(2006).imagining Zheng.2006).Similar results were obtained in a study oneself having contributed to a charitable cause,such as from our lab that demonstrated that not actual effort but pe teac hing children in a homeles center or improving the envi ceived effort increased hedonic con e) ent indu had aste test tael to people who did not have to think of benevolent deeds (Study 1).In the same line of studies,participants who imag way that they had to do the task again(thus doing the task fo ined having donated a part of ther tax refunds to min);in the control conditi were me ctical le sunglasses (Study 2).Likewise,when participants were asked to indicate their willingness to help a foreign studen with unders nding a cture,they were dona nes more in a tin d span of 10 ght they had only co mpleted a single task. pants in the control condition,who did an unrelated task In a recent study,it was demonstrat ted that actually exert being asked to donate money to c anty (Study 3). ing effort is not necessary to induce similar effects:Simply y by nay and aig ab by buving a chocolate bar.they preferred cake yho were instructed to think of that same 30-min walk as a er fruit salad in a sub ent choice tas (Study 3).The read about a te that 11 tim and effor or ind.. What is notable is that in most studiesin this contet participants did Prior Restraint 20 participants not intended to buy and either ended up buyin Effort and Achievement it or had resisted buying it.Those who had to remind them nce where they ha sed r n the role of justific in self-control fail nded ded t prefe stifications entailed either hard work or excellence feed hoice task,their prior restraint presumably serving as a jus vem ent can serve as a tion for thei indulgent choice.Along the same lin hopadhyay, gupta,and R an(20( dea that entitled to the ither had nhed to ed a food related t (Weber.1958)which is also reflected in findings from qual ation.Particinants who were instructed to think of p tative stu es wher re people indicate to only alloy resistance,ate more COO kies in a subsequent tas 00- Xu so they rene succu Empirical evidence for this notion comes from a line of ce exnressed weaker intentions to ther weight-os studies demonstrating that ustifications such as having goals and a week later indicated to have actually done less exerted (relatively)more effort in an unrelated task or and intended to do less to pursue their weight-loss goals
124 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) justifications may be more exhaustive in reality. Nevertheless, focus group studies and the recent evidence for self-generated justifications indicate that the justifications that participants came up with were mostly related to one of the categories outlined below (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012d; Mick & Demoss, 1990; Xu & Schwarz, 2009). Altruistic and Laudable Acts In a series of studies by Khan and Dhar (2006), imagining oneself having contributed to a charitable cause, such as teaching children in a homeless center or improving the environment, increased choice of a luxury product (designer jeans) over a utilitarian product (vacuum cleaner) compared to people who did not have to think of benevolent deeds (Study 1). In the same line of studies, participants who imagined having donated a part of their tax refunds to a charity were more likely to subsequently choose a pair of luxurious expensive sunglasses over a pair of practical, less expensive sunglasses (Study 2). Likewise, when participants were asked to indicate their willingness to help a foreign student with understanding a lecture, they were less likely to donate the money they earned by participating to a local charity and preferred to keep it for themselves, as compared to participants in the control condition, who did an unrelated task before being asked to donate money to charity (Study 3). In another study by Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009), it was found that if participants thought they contributed to charity by buying a chocolate bar, they preferred chocolate cake over fruit salad in a subsequent choice task (Study 3). These examples indicate that good behavior can be used to justify indulgent behavior regardless if the laudable behavior entails investing time and effort or indulging. What is particularly notable is that in most studies in this context participants did not actually have to perform the behavior. Even imagining laudable behavior in a vignette study or intending to help produced these results (Khan & Dhar, 2006). Effort and Achievement In a review on the role of justifications in self-control failure, Kivetz and Zheng (2006) concluded that the most common justifications entailed either hard work or excellence feedback, suggesting that effort and achievement can serve as a justification to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure. This phenomenon can presumably be traced back to the puritanical idea that one is entitled to the good life only after hard work (Weber, 1958), which is also reflected in findings from qualitative studies where people indicate to only allow themselves a pleasure when they feel they earned it (Mick & Demoss, 1990; Xu & Schwarz, 2009). Empirical evidence for this notion comes from a line of studies demonstrating that justifications such as having exerted (relatively) more effort in an unrelated task or receiving excellence feedback on an unrelated performance task steered participants’ preference toward the more indulgent options in subsequent choices, favoring low-brow over high-brow movies (Study 1b); indulgent chocolate cake over healthy fresh fruit salad (Study 1c); an entertainment magazine over a political magazine (Study 2); and increased the likelihood of subsequent participation in a fun study with no delayed benefits rather than in a painful self-assessment study with long-term benefits (Study 1a) compared with participants who did not dispose of these justifications (Kivetz & Zheng, 2006). Similar results were obtained in a study from our lab that demonstrated that not actual effort but perceived effort increased hedonic consumption in a subsequent indulgent taste test (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c). Participants had to complete a non-involving task on the computer. In the effort condition, participants were told halfway that they had to do the task again (thus doing the task for 2 × 5 min); in the control condition, participants received no such instruction (and thus completed the task as if it were a single task of 10 min), thereby manipulating perceived effort while keeping actual effort constant. Participants who were led to believe that they had completed two tasks consumed on average 130 calories more in a time span of 10 min than participants who actually performed the same task but thought they had only completed a single task. In a recent study, it was demonstrated that actually exerting effort is not necessary to induce similar effects: Simply reading about a 30-min walk as an exercise activity increased consumption of indulgent snacks compared to participants who were instructed to think of that same 30-min walk as a leisurely activity or a control group who had read about a non-exercise related activity (Werle et al., 2011). Prior Restraint Prior restraint can also justify subsequent indulgent choice. Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009) asked participants to remember an instance where they had seen a product on sale that they had not intended to buy and either ended up buying it or had resisted buying it. Those who had to remind themselves of a prior instance where they had exercised restraint by not buying an attractive product, tended to prefer the chocolate cake over the healthier fruit salad in a subsequent choice task, their prior restraint presumably serving as a justification for their indulgent choice. Along the same lines, Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan (2008) asked participants to recall an instance of past behavior where they either had succumbed to or had resisted a food-related temptation. Participants who were instructed to think of prior resistance, ate more cookies in a subsequent taste test than participants who recalled having succumbed. Similarly, dieters who were instructed to reflect on prior foregone indulgence expressed weaker intentions to pursue their weight-loss goals and a week later indicated to have actually done less and intended to do less to pursue their weight-loss goals Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint a later time presumably iustified peonle to act indulgently (Study 1;Effron,Monin,Miller,2013).Similar mecha- as the possibility to act in line with one's intentions in the nismshave beer bserved in the context of mo future served as a justification to break their rules in the ould ha related demonstration of how future plans and choices performed but did not,increased subsequent immoral behav can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negatiy gent behavior.car ing abo such ind Prior Success or Failure 26).when the weddin Sally may form compensatory intentions such as A justification relate will gox ing tomorro or"I will eat less tomorro progre As many egu (2010rev caled that part ticinants who were instructed to y from the other goal. mor e goa quent taste test than participar ted that actual h nle of the one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domair future intentions on current self-regulation that could be (e.g.losing weight vs.choosing a hedonic snack:studying explained by a justification-based account is the finding oing o cate died in a i tion context,having failed to attain one's oal could also oon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat Herman.Polivy.2002). the e hell effec Negative Emotional Events food intake to reach a certain weight.do not show a physio That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative ally ne rmal com pens tion effect after consuming a pre fect c also ve as justification to temporarily a ad (c an d ck,1975 regu 2012w demo ated in ou ab (I a to their n nal bodily signals r ving th their food intake after having the milkshake.Having broken pictures.The duration of exposure to the negative picture heir diet by consu or t as it is also kr having ereas found within other self regulation domains as well such as of having seen the negative nictures and thus could use the in abstinent alcoholics,s kers,and illicit drug users (e.g. tive affect as both g ed feel Future Choices and Intentions ing equally negative Similar findings have been observed in the context of s are future onal moral ling wrongee and Dhar (2007)parti nts had to cho a rela Leach 2010)Parti nts who w ucted to recall ar tively healthy or indulgent snack.Whereas the choice was occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likel framed as a single cho e opportunity for half ot the parti to refuse to help the experimenter ith a supplem tary tas pants,the f cipants w om snacks again in the following week.Participants believing lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch that they could choose again next week were more likely to in the program),they requested a more unfair money alloca anowingthatomewol avor the indulgent o choice.Me lon in tha 21 who lost the game ave again a reason(Study 3
De Witt Huberts et al. 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint (Study 1; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2013). Similar mechanisms have been observed in the context of moral behavior, with recent evidence demonstrating that thoughts of foregone misdeeds by thinking of bad deeds that one could have performed but did not, increased subsequent immoral behavior compared with participants whose foregone misdeeds had not been made salient (Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012). Prior Success or Failure A justification related to prior restraint is perceived goal progress. As many self-regulation dilemmas often involve trade-off between two opposing goals (e.g., Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 2008), progress toward one goal often implies moving away from the other goal. A series of studies in the context of the goal progress model (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007) demonstrated that actual or perceived goal progress in one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domain (e.g., losing weight vs. choosing a hedonic snack; studying vs. going out with friends). Conversely, although not explicitly studied in a justification context, having failed to attain one’s goal could also serve as a justification to even further abandon one’s goal. Notorious in this regard is the “what the hell effect” in restrained eaters. Numerous studies demonstrated that restrained eaters, people who have the goal of restricting food intake to reach a certain weight, do not show a physiologically normal compensation effect after consuming a preload (cf. Herman & Mack, 1975). Whereas normal eaters decrease their food intake after a preload milkshake, listening to their normal bodily signals, restrained eaters increased their food intake after having the milkshake. Having broken their diet by consuming a milkshake apparently serves as a reason to completely abandon their diet for the day. This abstinence violation effect, as it is also known by, has been found within other self-regulation domains as well, such as in abstinent alcoholics, smokers, and illicit drug users (e.g., Collins & Lapp, 1991; Shiffman et al., 1996; Stephens & Curtin, 1994). Future Choices and Intentions Another type of frequently studied justifications are future choices and intentions. For example, in a study by Khan and Dhar (2007) participants had to choose between a relatively healthy or indulgent snack. Whereas the choice was framed as a single choice opportunity for half of the participants, the other half of the participants were informed that they would have the possibility to choose between the two snacks again in the following week. Participants believing that they could choose again next week were more likely to favor the indulgent option in the present choice. Merely knowing that one would have the option to choose again at a later time presumably justified people to act indulgently, as the possibility to act in line with one’s intentions in the future served as a justification to break their rules in the present. A related demonstration of how future plans and choices can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negative effect of the indulgent behavior, can bring about such indulgent behavior (also see Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). In other words, when confronted with the wedding cake, Sally may form compensatory intentions such as “I will go exercising tomorrow” or “I will eat less tomorrow,” which will allow her to violate her dieting rules now and indulge in the cake. Indeed, a study by Kronick and Knäuper (2010) revealed that participants who were instructed to make plans to exercise later that day consumed more M&Ms in a subsequent taste test than participants who had not been asked to make concrete plans for physical activity. Another compelling example of the detrimental effect of future intentions on current self-regulation that could be explained by a justification-based account is the finding that restrained eaters who plan to start a weight-loss diet will use that future intention as justification to indulge in the soon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat, Herman, & Polivy, 2002). Negative Emotional Events That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative affect can also serve as justification to temporarily abandon self-regulatory goals was demonstrated in our lab (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a). In three studies, a negative affective state was induced in participants by showing them aversive pictures. The duration of exposure to the negative pictures was manipulated such that one group was highly aware of having seen the pictures whereas the other group was only minimally aware. Only participants who were highly aware of having seen the negative pictures, and thus could use the negative affective triggers as justification, consumed more hedonic snack foods in a subsequent taste test. Importantly, the increase in hedonic consumption could not be attributed to differences in negative affect as both groups reported feeling equally negative. Similar findings have been observed in the context of emotional moral events, demonstrating that feeling wronged leads to more selfish behavior (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). Participants who were instructed to recall an occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likely to refuse to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than participants who had to recall a time when they were bored (Study 1; Zitek et al., 2010). Likewise, when participants lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch in the program), they requested a more unfair money allocation in a future task than did participants who lost the game for a fair reason (Study 3; Zitek et al., 2010). Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
126 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) Conclusion iews self-regulation failure as a trade-off bety competing goals (Dhar Simonson.1999:Fishbach& The most intriguing observation that emerges from the ove view of empirically studied justifications is the ease by which Dhar,2005;Louro et al,2007).Typically self-regulatior justification can propel self-regulation failure.Merely read involve two opposing goals tha ig a on in vig ds imagin e The to pursue the on poses that when a person believes sufficient process tov goal again later on can make people digress from their long one goal has been made (e.g.,by skipping the starter at e rela r,progressing to th n pu the go e goal negative effects of the indulgent behavior or perceived goal (2005)asked female dieters to indicate how far off they progress,but justifications vere from their ideal weight on a scale that either hac -51 that is ts cha PO an been studied to date have in mmon how is that the ficient prog ess since the same discrepancy from one's ideal weight would appear small on the wide scale but wider or edthat people onot m to be ver cale. re participants int ne wid thei ion ch over an app arting gif tions indicates how easily justification p s can becom However,as the reviewed justifications indicate,the effects of a justification-based mechanism are not limited to hat is b within th me do as the beha nder dif ere That is.for Sally to indulge in the decade wedding cake,it is no toward a facilitative role of justifications on nor necessary that her justification is related to successful dieting empts Inst according to a justification-based mech ta-d dulgent n is th erat ous behavior sion indeed in the maiority of studies that dem the6 ndings attribute n-based justification processes share many similaritic rated a justific with other mechanisms of self K on nitive tas regulation failure. native me for the ruled out bly as part of anothe study (De Witt Huberts et 012c for the come alter e int of choice (Dha Sim t Failur ernative Novemsky Dha,005).which extendst to a mor t le Theories and Explanations goal progre peopl Examining the wed abo hin at account within a sequence eof multiple choices pe term goal striv ing share many similarities with other ant fer to alterate outcomes which alloy s them to pursu cedents to self-n egulation failure an as we that an itial hedonic choic re indee yould lead to a pre eference for a more restrained option and mechanism contributing to self-regulation failure ce versa That the find me a c Goal Progress Model strated in a study by Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009 In line with the balancing account,they found that wher people had just bought chocolates as part of the experiment
126 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) Conclusion The most intriguing observation that emerges from the overview of empirically studied justifications is the ease by which justification can propel self-regulation failure. Merely reading about a potential justification in vignette studies, imagining a laudable act or effort, both goal achievement and failure, and considering or intending to pursue the long-term goal again later on can make people digress from their longterm goal. Moreover justifications can be related to the goal that they violate and in a sense constitute “rational” or logical justifications, such as justifications about undoing the negative effects of the indulgent behavior or perceived goal progress, but justifications can also be unrelated to the behavior that is being justified, and thereby appear to be rather arbitrary. What the various justifications that have been studied to date have in common, however, is that they seem to entail some kind of entitlement (cf. Kivetz & Zheng, 2006). It can be concluded that people do not seem to be very critical of the reasons they apply to violate their intentions. This apparent susceptibility of people to rely on justifications indicates how easily justification processes can become maladaptive, underlining their importance as an explanation for self-regulation failure. It seems that, although under different names, in the past decade quite some evidence has been gathered that points toward a facilitative role of justifications on norm-violating behavior, luxury choice and indulgent behavior, suggesting that a justification-based mechanism should be taken into account when explaining self-regulatory failure across various behavioral domains. However, the findings attributed to justification processes share many similarities with other mechanisms of self-regulation failure. To establish whether justification processes contribute to self-regulatory failure, alternative mechanisms for the presented findings need to be ruled out. Establishing Justification Processes as Independent Determinant of Self-Regulation Failure: Alternative Theories and Explanations Examining the evidence reviewed above suggests that the justifications that have been found to interfere with longterm goal striving share many similarities with other antecedents to self-regulation failure. In this section, we will review alternative accounts to establish whether justifications can be accounted for by these similar mechanisms or whether justification processes are indeed an additional mechanism contributing to self-regulation failure. Goal Progress Model An account that a justification-based mechanism shares many similarities with is the goal progress model, which views self-regulation failure as a trade-off between two competing goals (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Louro et al., 2007). Typically self-regulation dilemmas involve two opposing goals that people intend to pursue, where pursuing one goal means inhibiting the progress toward the other goal. The goal progress model proposes that when a person believes sufficient process toward one goal has been made (e.g., by skipping the starter at diner, progressing to the goal of a slim figure), he then pursues the opposing goal of enjoying culinary delights (by choosing a tasty dessert). To illustrate, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) asked female dieters to indicate how far off they were from their ideal weight on a scale that either had −5 lbs. (narrow scale) or −25 lbs. (wide scale) as its end-point. The wide scale would lead dieters to believe they had made sufficient progress since the same discrepancy from one’s ideal weight would appear small on the wide scale but wider on the narrow scale. Significantly more participants in the wide scale condition chose a chocolate bar over an apple as a parting gift. However, as the reviewed justifications indicate, the effects of a justification-based mechanism are not limited to justifications that are within the same domain as the behavior that is being justified as posited by the goal progress model. That is, for Sally to indulge in the wedding cake, it is not necessary that her justification is related to successful dieting attempts. Instead, according to a justification-based mechanism, any justification is valid to license gratification, so that Sally could justify her indulgence on the virtue of the celebratory occasion. Indeed, in the majority of studies that demonstrated a justification-based mechanism, justifications such as effort or excellence feedback on cognitive tasks or laudable acts, licensed indulgent behavior in an unrelated domain (eating, shopping behavior, luxury choice), ostensibly as part of another study (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Kivetz & Zheng, 2006). From consumer research comes a related alternative explanatory account for the observed effects based on the notion of balancing among choices (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Novemsky & Dhar, 2005), which extends to a more abstract level than the goal progress model in that people attempt to achieve balance between indulgence and restraint in general rather than within a specific domain. According to this account, within a sequence of multiple choices people prefer to alternate outcomes which allows them to pursue both utilitarian as well as hedonic goals. That is, preferences among alternatives can be affected systematically by consumers’ prior actions such that an initial hedonic choice would lead to a preference for a more restrained option and vice versa. That the findings attributed to a justificationbased mechanism cannot be accounted for by such a balancing mechanism among choices was convincingly demonstrated in a study by Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009). In line with the balancing account, they found that when people had just bought chocolates as part of the experiment, Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 127 they were more likely to subsequently choose fruit salad over resources to regulate this behavior remain intact,thereby ru colate cake,achieving a balance between healthy and ing out resource depletion as an altemative account for the fndulgentchoice ,however,this preference nding that pror restraint and ettort c ry subsequen ve thes had do still have th chocolates.That is.rather than stimulating a healthier choice ce,they may not always do so if they have the opportu in the subsequent self-regulation situation as predicted by a nity to justify it. ncing mechanism,the indulgent purch by hedonic consumption justified the subseque choice ofa Negative Affect hedonic snack,thereby supporting the notion that justifica- That negative affect is often related to self-regulation failure tion processes were involved in terms uch as reta Resource Depletion self-regulation failure (Heathertor Wagner 201 )and prior restraint (e.g Hse nts ean the limited resources model (e.g Baumeister,Bratslavsky a justification for self-regulation failure.Findings from our E,&Chatzisaran lab,however,reveal that negative emotional events can also 2000).n ting sel trol the eby limiting the ability to subsequent behavior.Failures of self-regulation incited by the direct effects of negative emotions on self-reg or as prior restraint or prior lure b exposure to aversive stimuli (De on ad of However,the findings that merely being reminded of or whereas in the high-awareness condition par magining a prior act of restraint ins ed chend the nega ng rela tive rathe han nism.Although the cedure in both s in self-regulation failure occurs without actually exerting self reported equal levels of negative affect only con resource deple ho vere more the uli aware of being exposed to nore in magining anothe despite being in a ne ative affective state did not iner erson exerting self- control depleted self-control resou their hedoni intake ompared to the neutral control group not ally e an er tful task upport o n-ba ed app imilar test to rule out this rival account was therefore needed to ent could use their emotional exper ce as a justification establish whether justification cues such as effort or restrain to indulge,a justification not available to participants wh There in iustification-hased required self of forbidden snacks but not of ources (De Witt Huberts et al,2012c).Results indicated healthy snacks.supporting the notion that a ness of the participants thinking they had exert d relat vely mor ve event serve as a justil ation to allo min ananan ame e who thought they had completed a single task of 10 min In the latter case one would predict that in order to alleviat while self-control resources,measured by a Stroop task,did one's negative affect,no differences would have beer rved and unhealth f-regula m that poin
De Witt Huberts et al. 127 they were more likely to subsequently choose fruit salad over chocolate cake, achieving a balance between healthy and indulgent choices. Crucially, however, this preference for fruit salad over chocolate cake was reversed when people were led to believe they had donated to charity by buying chocolates. That is, rather than stimulating a healthier choice in the subsequent self-regulation situation as predicted by a balancing mechanism, the indulgent purchase stimulated further hedonic consumption. Presumably donating to charity by hedonic consumption justified the subsequent choice of a hedonic snack, thereby supporting the notion that justification processes were involved. Resource Depletion Justifications such as effort (e.g., De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c; Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) and prior restraint (e.g., Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) reminisce of another important theoretical framework to explain self-regulation failure: the limited resources model (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In this model, selfcontrol is regarded as a limited resource that is depleted by exerting self-control, thereby limiting the ability to restrain subsequent behavior. Failures of self-regulation incited by justifications such as prior restraint or prior effort, which deplete self-control resources, could thus also be attributed to a loss of self-control instead of justification processes. However, the findings that merely being reminded of or imagining a prior act of restraint instead of actually exerting restraint, or manipulating relative rather than absolute effort, cast doubt on this alternative account as explanation for a justification mechanism. Although these studies suggest that self-regulation failure occurs without actually exerting selfcontrol, resource depletion could not be ruled out indefinitely as an explanation for the observed effects. For instance, Ackerman, Goldstein, Shapiro, and Bargh (2009) found evidence for vicarious resource depletion: imagining another person exerting self-control depleted self-control resources despite not actually engaging in an effortful task. It could be possible that having the impression of having exerted effort or restraining oneself produces similar results. A more direct test to rule out this rival account was therefore needed to establish whether justification cues such as effort or restraint worked through a justification-based mechanism. Therefore, two studies tested whether the justification cues commonly used in justification-based accounts required self-control resources (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c). Results indicated that participants thinking they had exerted relatively more effort by completing two tasks of 5 min consumed more snacks in a subsequent taste test compared to participants who thought they had completed a single task of 10 min while self-control resources, measured by a Stroop task, did not differ among participants. These findings confirm that justifications can instigate self-regulation failure whilst the resources to regulate this behavior remain intact, thereby ruling out resource depletion as an alternative account for the finding that prior restraint and effort can justify subsequent goal violations. These findings imply that although people may still have the self-regulation capacity to avert indulgence, they may not always do so if they have the opportunity to justify it. Negative Affect That negative affect is often related to self-regulation failure is reflected in terms such as “emotional eating” or “retail therapy.” Negative affective states are considered to be a prototypical “hot” factor in self-regulation models (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) that impulsively lead to self-regulation failure (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and therefore can provide an alternative account for the observation that negative emotional events can serve as a justification for self-regulation failure. Findings from our lab, however, reveal that negative emotional events can also exert their detrimental influence on self-regulation via a justification-based pathway. In three studies, the use of emotions as a justification was investigated while ruling out the direct effects of negative emotions on self-regulation failure by varying the exposure to aversive stimuli (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a). In the low-awareness condition, participants were exposed very briefly to negative stimuli, whereas in the high-awareness condition participants were exposed long enough to fully apprehend the negative stimuli. In a third, neutral, control condition, participants were exposed to neutral stimuli only. While after the priming procedure participants in both negative conditions indicated reported equal levels of negative affect only participants who were more aware of being exposed to the negative stimuli consumed more in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated, taste test. Participants in the low-awareness condition, despite being in a negative affective state, did not increase their hedonic intake compared to the neutral control group. In support of a justification-based mechanism, it appeared that despite feeling equally negative, only participants who were highly aware of being confronted with an emotional event could use their emotional experience as a justification to indulge, a justification not available to participants who were minimally aware of the emotional stimuli. Importantly, participants in the high-awareness condition only consumed more of forbidden snacks but not of equally palatable but healthy snacks, supporting the notion that awareness of the negative event served as a justification to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure rather than an attempt to ameliorate one’s negative state (cf. Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). In the latter case, one would predict that in order to alleviate one’s negative affect, no differences would have been observed between the consumption of healthy and unhealthy snacks as they were rated equally palatable. From that point Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
128 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2 of view eati more of the healthy ontio an ine equal mood-lifting effects as eating from the unhealthy pendent accoun oruofailures that option.In fact,one would expect even stronger mood-lifting eannot be explained by other existing models of self-regu ation ided Ho use fee gsof guilt after ce could the questions rise the unde vided with a justific In the of the lore the evi snacks that needed to be justified.Likewise,as both nega dence for it. tive conditions were equally negative,it can be assumed th participant s in both neg d be 2 equal业 Underlying Mechanisms of Justification- out the possibility that the findings could be attributed toa Based Self-Regulation Failure difference in motivation to improve one's affective state as the alternative interpretation. This is further n this section,we will review several potential mechanism atin effe mood-lifting effects of eating. t in iustification hased se mlation fail Presumably.the widespread idea that emotions render ure (Khan Dhar,2006:Mukhopadhyay&Johar,2009),to e hardly any other studies that hav s a co our knowledge there ar .L ng me allo e.It has indeed ssions of one's moral standards are evaluated less harshly se several other p ntial underlying g from major psychological theories explaining humar emotional state compar to simila notivation, ing cognitive dissonance,anticipated mor 2003 in a ne (PI ed eati whole package of cookie despite being ona diet while fee ing s indic Prefactual Cognitive Dissonance d to fee responsibility. les t-breaking be mpagne despite he ences to their emotional state (De Witt Huberts et al.2012 cons Study 1). counterintuitive than one might e et.After all,behaving in s wishe Conclusion ratio of the Comparing the evidence for a justification-based mechanism sistent findings within psychological research is that per regulation failu 1057 uncomfortable lon may nger, in distinct mechanism which in addition to those other mecha. ined evidence com nisms,contributes to self-regulation failure. .Interestingly arison furt ctual transgression happens,while cognitive diss nance i he s that in justifications tha people may 1057 ex-pos accounted for by a justification-based mechanism We would with the broader set of psychological theories that focus on like to explicitly note,however,that the obs on that jus he eed for cogn sistency and its implications (e.g. tion pro ugge mize the d by hehavior in the it is in explaining self-regulation failure.Instead, tions might help people to resolve a conflict evoked by pro s are seen as an a xplar ation of self-regu ive behav failure tha he 1 abilityto of the and mstances self-regulatio failure is the result ofthes thinking allows to investigate the different con established mechanisms and when it is instigated by justifi experience dissonance betweer cation processes one's cognitions and the (future)behavior that one is
128 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) of view, eating more of the healthy option would produce equal mood-lifting effects as eating from the unhealthy option. In fact, one would expect even stronger mood-lifting effects because feelings of guilt after indulgence could be avoided. However, the data revealed that participants who were provided with a justification only ate more of the snacks that needed to be justified. Likewise, as both negative conditions were equally negative, it can be assumed that participants in both negative conditions would be equally motivated to ameliorate their current emotional state, ruling out the possibility that the findings could be attributed to a difference in motivation to improve one’s affective state as predicted by the alternative interpretation. This is further corroborated by the finding that the participants in both negative conditions did not differ in their expectations of the mood-lifting effects of eating. Presumably, the widespread idea that emotions render one powerless over one’s behavior is a compelling justification to behave more indulgently than one would otherwise allow oneself to behave. It has indeed been found that transgressions of one’s moral standards are evaluated less harshly when they occur in an emotional state compared to similar moral transgression in a neutral state (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). Similar results were found for violations of one’s dieting intentions: participants who imagined eating a whole package of cookies despite being on a diet while feeling sad, indicated to feel less responsibility, less guilt, and less blame for their diet-breaking behavior compared with participants who read the same description without any references to their emotional state (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a, Study 1). Conclusion Comparing the evidence for a justification-based mechanism with other accounts of self-regulation failure suggests that while a justification-based explanation may share many similarities with other established mechanisms, it seems to be a distinct mechanism, which, in addition to those other mechanisms, contributes to self-regulation failure. Interestingly, the comparison further reveals that instigators of self-regulation failure normally attributed to impulsive mechanisms, such as resource depletion or negative emotions, can also be accounted for by a justification-based mechanism. We would like to explicitly note, however, that the observation that justification processes can sometimes explain findings that have been attributed to other mechanisms does not negate or minimize the importance and usefulness of these other mechanisms in explaining self-regulation failure. Instead, justification processes are seen as an additional explanation of self-regulation failure that co-exists with these other mechanisms. Future research should investigate under what conditions and circumstances self-regulation failure is the result of these established mechanisms and when it is instigated by justification processes. Having established justification processes as an independent account for explaining self-regulation failures that cannot be explained by other existing models of self-regulation failure, the questions rises what the underlying mechanism of this phenomenon is. In the following section, we will explore several possibilities and review the evidence for it. Underlying Mechanisms of JustificationBased Self-Regulation Failure In this section, we will review several potential mechanisms by which justifications undermine self-regulation. Besides several studies investigating the mediating effect of a reinforced self-concept in justification-based self-regulation failure (Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009), to our knowledge there are hardly any other studies that have directly tested the underlying mechanism. Therefore, in addition to the evidence for a reinforced self-concept, we propose several other potential underlying processes borrowing from major psychological theories explaining human motivation, including cognitive dissonance, anticipated affect, and motivated reasoning. Prefactual Cognitive Dissonance Marcy’s decision to have a glass of champagne despite her strong intentions and full awareness of the possible negative consequences is, despite seemingly mundane, actually more counterintuitive than one might expect. After all, behaving in ways that run counter to one’s wishes, intentions, or principles, violates a fundamental human need for seeing oneself as a rational and consistent person. Yet, one of the most consistent findings within psychological research is that personal inconsistency is uncomfortable and threatening (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance in its purest sense cannot account for the findings reviewed above, as the outlined evidence concerned the use of justifications before an actual transgression happens, while cognitive dissonance is concerned with the justifications that people may use to rationalize self-gratification ex-post facto (Festinger, 1957). However, a justification-based mechanism does seem to fit with the broader set of psychological theories that focus on the need for cognitive consistency and its implications (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). We suggest that analogous to the reliance on justifications to resolve cognitive dissonance caused by behavior in the past, it is possible that justifications might help people to resolve a conflict evoked by prospective behavior. Human beings have the unique ability to imagine the consequences of their behavior in advance. This prefactual thinking allows people to investigate the different consequences, and potentially experience dissonance between one’s cognitions and the (future) behavior that one is Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
