2m- Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation:An Integrative Review of Implicit and Explicit Attitude Change entral theme ine distin n delibe de The pres icle pro des an Wherea re cha by picitandcpittedrangeofempice of. Contemporary mo odels of persuasion have been very successful in smd to e the roots in higl eview.see Visser&Cooper,2003).However,changes in implici on attitudes in which deliberate,.“explicit”attitudes 19g9 ct (e.g onk&Sch Petty&Cacioppo 2005 ald Mo hen g tas d Jac Dunton,&Williams,1995:Wit have demons els effectively account for the differ anges inc ated wit he othe kind of a change t long-term ization experien hology.Nor University. 1202 d Hu Tormala.Brinol.&Jarvi s.2006:Wilson et al.2000).Th is tha ski.W k20 Jim for helpful comm p for the ace cumulating number of st anges L:l (eg &Fazio.2006:for a rey s Blair,202).If implicit attitudes bgawrons@uwo.ca ndeed reflect highly stable evaluative representations that hav 692
Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation: An Integrative Review of Implicit and Explicit Attitude Change Bertram Gawronski University of Western Ontario Galen V. Bodenhausen Northwestern University A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, “explicit” attitudes and automatic, “implicit” attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change. Keywords: attitude change, cognitive consistency, dual-process models, evaluative conditioning, implicit measures If eras of psychological research can be characterized in terms of general ideas, a major theme of the current era is probably the notion of automaticity. Many aspects of human behavior that have previously been assumed to have their roots in higher order processes of deliberate reasoning are now viewed as resulting from automatic processes that may occur spontaneously and outside of people’s awareness or control (Bargh, 1997; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This perspective is also dominant in contemporary research on attitudes, in which deliberate, “explicit” attitudes are often contrasted with automatic, “implicit” attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, Fazio, & Brin˜ol, in press; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press). Whereas the former are usually equated with deliberative, self-reported evaluations, the latter are typically inferred from people’s performance on response latency measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Even though previous models effectively account for the differential impact of implicit and explicit attitudes on spontaneous and deliberate behavior (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000), theories of attitude change still face a considerable asymmetry in integrating the available evidence. Contemporary models of persuasion have been very successful in explaining the influence of different kinds of message cues on self-reported explicit evaluations (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999; for a review, see Visser & Cooper, 2003). However, changes in implicit attitudes are still largely unexplained. This shortfall has its roots in at least two conceptual issues. First, several models of attitude change do not distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes in the first place but treat attitudes as a unitary construct (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). As such, these models leave an explanatory gap for any dissociation that may emerge between explicit and implicit attitudes. For instance, some studies have demonstrated changes in explicit but not implicit attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004), whereas others found changes in implicit but not explicit attitudes (e.g., M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2006). If explicit and implicit attitudes indeed represent a unitary construct, changes in one kind of attitude should usually be associated with corresponding changes in the other kind of attitude. Second, most attitude change models that do distinguish between explicit and implicit attitudes consider implicit attitudes to be stable evaluative representations stemming from long-term socialization experiences. Explicit attitudes, in contrast, are conceived as more recently acquired attitudes that coexist with the old, presumptively stable, implicit attitude (e.g., Petty, Tormala, Brin˜ol, & Jarvis, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000). These models can explain patterns that involve changes in explicit but not implicit attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004). However, they leave an explanatory gap for the accumulating number of studies showing changes in implicit but not explicit attitudes (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2006; for a review, see Blair, 2002). If implicit attitudes indeed reflect highly stable evaluative representations that have Bertram Gawronski, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada; Galen V. Bodenhausen, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University. Preparation of this article was supported by Canada Research Chairs program Grant 202555, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant 410-2005-1339, and Academic Development Fund of the University of Western Ontario Grant 05-303 to Bertram Gawronski. We thank Andrew Becker, Riki Conrey, Julia Grafe, Wilhelm Hofmann, and Jim Olson for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bertram Gawronski, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, Social Science Centre, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada. E-mail: bgawrons@uwo.ca Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association 2006, Vol. 132, No. 5, 692–731 0033-2909/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692 692
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 693 Associative Processes Wilson et).implicit attitudes should generally be more The first t anticle is twofold.The first obie ciative ev e isto propose a new neoretical model for the study of ex tions tha maticall whe ters ative,exhaustive review of the ilable evidence regarding attitude change th ham.Ray .&Johnson.2004).The e,the first ever,s Tha a person ce egard these ocia in the sense that the 、not ne han This section spe ifies auses of implicit and explicit enc Instead,the prin de ange and ho changes in oral contiguity (Bassili&Brown.2005:Smith&DeCoster. discusse s the of our model to other the of ass s th nge,the re 1996).p related to the application of the proposed n (a)the in memory and (b)the parti cular set of e Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation include such as were parti othe G ald Bana but not" 1995.Rc ch on as the Imphcit Ass on the the semantic priming(Wittenbrink et 1997 the go Simon task (De Houwe s different a ive reactions depe paradigm (Payne.Cheng.Govorun.&S wart.2005) affective reactions are not purely ontext driven.a 2003b:Fazio Olson.2003: atter acti 5( on of of the extemal input stimuli. the organ ing frat work of this rev APE Propositional Processes Wad comes from prop e basis for what many research 2002-Sloman 1906:Smith Dec 2000:Sr For the view part of this article.we sed th eral inclus which can be described as a to evaluate APE view in that ay be nsidered as attitude shifts rathe this de se.Fo er.w ation wo kir
their roots in long-term socialization experiences (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001; Petty et al., 2006; Rudman, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000), implicit attitudes should generally be more robust than explicit attitudes. The main goal of the present article is twofold. The first objective is to propose a new theoretical model for the study of explicit and implicit attitude change. The second objective is to provide an integrative, exhaustive review of the available evidence regarding implicit and explicit attitude change that is organized according to the implications of the proposed model (for a list of the reviewed studies, see the Appendix).1 For this purpose, the first section of this article outlines our theoretical conceptualization of implicit and explicit attitudes. In particular, we argue that implicit and explicit attitudes should be understood in terms of their underlying mental processes, which are associative and propositional processes. The second section uses the proposed associative– propositional evaluation (APE) model as an organizing framework to review the available evidence on explicit and implicit attitude change. This section specifies causes of implicit and explicit attitude change and how changes in one kind of evaluation may or may not be associated with changes in the other. Finally, the last section discusses the relation of our model to other theories of attitude change, the relative stability of attitude changes, limits of a single-process approach, directions for future research, and some methodological issues related to the application of the proposed model. Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation The systematic investigation of implicit and explicit attitudes began with the development of measures that were particularly designed to assess individual differences in automatic evaluations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Research on implicit attitudes relies on a large variety of measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998), affective priming (Fazio et al., 1995), semantic priming (Wittenbrink et al., 1997), the go/no-go association task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the extrinsic affective Simon task (De Houwer, 2003a), and the affect misattribution paradigm (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). These measures have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (De Houwer, 2003b; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press), and thus we refrain from an elaborate discussion of them. Instead, we focus on a more detailed discussion of the proposed model that is used as the organizing framework of this review. The APE model builds on earlier dual-process theories of cognitive functioning that distinguish between two qualitatively different kinds of mental processes (e.g., Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & WadeBenzoni, 1998; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In particular, we argue that implicit and explicit attitudes should be understood in terms of their underlying processes, which can be described as associative processes for implicit attitudes and propositional processes for explicit attitudes. This conceptualization adopts the widespread definition of attitude as a psychological tendency to evaluate a given entity with some degree of favor or disfavor (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). However, the APE model goes beyond this definition by arguing that such evaluative tendencies can be rooted in two kinds of mental processes. Associative Processes The first source of evaluative tendencies resides in associative processes, which build the basis for what many researchers call implicit attitudes. Associative evaluations are best characterized as automatic affective reactions resulting from the particular associations that are activated automatically when one encounters a relevant stimulus. Such activation processes do not require much cognitive capacity or an intention to evaluate an object (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004). The most important feature, however, is that associative evaluations are independent of the assignment of truth values. That is, associative evaluations can be activated irrespective of whether a person considers these evaluations as accurate or inaccurate. For example, the activation level of negative associations regarding African Americans may be high even though an individual may regard these associations as inadequate or false (Devine, 1989). Thus, associative evaluations are not personal in the sense that they are not necessarily personally endorsed (cf. Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). Instead, the primary determinants of association activation are feature similarity and spatiotemporal contiguity (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Another important aspect of associative processes is the notion of pattern activation (see Smith, 1996). Pattern activation refers to the idea that the activation of particular associations in memory is determined by the relative fit between (a) the preexisting structure of associations in memory and (b) the particular set of external input stimuli. For example, the associative pattern activated by the stimuli basketball and gym may include concepts such as “bouncing” but not concepts such as “floating.” However, the associative pattern activated by the stimuli basketball and water may include concepts such as “floating” but not “bouncing.” In other words, even though the concept “basketball” is associated with both “bouncing” and “floating” in memory, which of the two becomes activated depends on the particular context in which the stimulus basketball is encountered (see Barsalou, 1982). Thus, applied to attitudes, the same object may activate different associative patterns and thus different automatic affective reactions depending on the particular context in which the object is encountered. Still, automatic affective reactions are not purely context driven, as pattern activation generally depends on both (a) the preexisting structure of associations in memory and (b) the particular set of external input stimuli. Propositional Processes The second source of evaluative tendencies comes from propositional processes, which build the basis for what many research- 1 For the review part of this article, we used three general inclusion criteria: (a) A study must include at least one implicit attitude measure, (b) the implicit measure must tap a general evaluation rather than a semantic association, and (c) the study must include at least one experimental manipulation. Thus, the present review covers not only evidence on attitude change but also studies on attitude formation. In addition, the present review includes findings that may be considered as attitude shifts rather than attitude change. For the sake of simplicity, however, we generally use the term attitude change to refer to attitude formation, attitude change, and attitude shifts. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 693
GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN Another important aspect of kind of m the r can be des nbed as propositions that are a sumed to occur ina reflective syst em that is superordinate to an is,the ause of something special about its content.This view has mat (e.g..a neg h rely entertaining a particular proposition increase most important feature that distinguishes propositional from ass propositional thinking is an affirmation of momentaril (for a review.see K ehler.1991).Similar con an be tion i pends on f th on.F of n which a person bout ndors by othe ng this to attitudes we argue that people usu people irespective r this person ers this propos 1 propos ective of the tripartite model of attitude (see Zanna of the sitional implication of an au ent at uted to a n (e.g dis! nts.with their re independent of au natic affective 002 that such other (evaluative c ived validity d thus of the based on of th that nentarly consid relevant for the uth or falsity of Iv in luative pr on. of a p ith othe of a p mos ered alid a match npli ati of an ffectiv th prev mode the it is ithon't lik other attitud Henc L.However.the may b th xplicitly ing the ion of di cans are not a disad antaged minorit y group") ronski Pcters.Brochu
ers call explicit attitudes. Evaluations resulting from propositional processes can be characterized as evaluative judgments that are based on syllogistic inferences derived from any kind of propositional information that is considered relevant for a given judgment. Drawing on Strack and Deutsch (2004), such inferences are assumed to occur in a reflective system that is superordinate to an associative store. That is, the reflective system is assumed to transform inputs from the associative store into propositional format (e.g., a negative affective reaction is transformed into the proposition “I dislike X”). The resulting propositions are then subject to syllogistic inferences that assess their validity. Thus, the most important feature that distinguishes propositional from associative processes is their dependency on truth values. Whereas the activation of associations can occur regardless of whether a person considers the associations to be true or false, processes of propositional reasoning are generally concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. Moreover, whether a given proposition is explicitly endorsed depends on its subjective validity, as determined by processes of propositional reasoning. Applying this reasoning to attitudes, we argue that people usually use their automatic affective reactions toward an object as a basis for evaluative judgments about this object. In other words, the default mode of propositional reasoning is affirmation of validity (Gilbert, 1991; see also Albarracı´n & Wyer, 2001), in this case the validity of the propositional implication of an automatic affective reaction (e.g., the proposition “I dislike X” implied by a negative affective reaction toward X). However, evaluative judgments can also be independent of automatic affective reactions, when the propositional implications of these reactions are rejected as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment (see Strack, 1992).2 Perceived validity of a proposition—and thus of the propositional implication of an automatic affective reaction—depends on the consistency of this proposition with other propositions that are momentarily considered to be relevant for the respective judgment. In the case of evaluative judgments, such propositions may include nonevaluative propositions referring to general beliefs about the world or propositional evaluations of other attitude objects (Bem, 1970; Jones & Gerard, 1967).3 If the propositional implication of an automatic affective reaction is consistent with other relevant propositions, it will most likely be considered as valid and thus serve as the basis for an evaluative judgment. If, however, the propositional implication of an automatic affective reaction is inconsistent with other relevant propositions, it may be considered invalid.4 For example, the propositional implication of a negative affective reaction to a minority member (e.g., “I don’t like this African American person”) may be inconsistent with the propositional evaluation of another attitude object (e.g., “It is bad to evaluate members of disadvantaged minority groups negatively”) and nonevaluative propositions about the world (e.g., “African Americans are a disadvantaged minority group”). Hence, the resulting inconsistency among the three propositions may lead to a rejection of the negative affective reaction as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. However, the negative affective reaction may still serve as basis for an evaluative judgment if either the nonevaluative proposition about the world is considered invalid (e.g., “African Americans are not a disadvantaged minority group”) or the propositional evaluation of another relevant attitude object is rejected (e.g., “Negative evaluations of disadvantaged minority members are okay”).5 Another important aspect of propositional reasoning concerns hypothetical propositions and mere knowledge of propositions. From the perspective of the APE model, hypothetical propositions can be described as propositions that are assigned truth values with a preliminary character. That is, a proposition becomes hypothetical because of the tentative character of its truth value rather than because of something special about its content. This view has important implications for how hypothetical propositions affect information processing. Consistent with previous research, we argue that merely entertaining a particular proposition increases the momentary activation level of corresponding associations in memory (e.g., Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). Because the default mode of propositional thinking is an affirmation of momentarily activated associations (see Gilbert, 1991), mere supposition should, in turn, increase the perceived validity of this proposition (for a review, see Koehler, 1991). Similar considerations can be applied to mere knowledge of a proposition. From the perspective of the APE model, mere knowledge of a proposition reflects cases in which a person knows about a proposition endorsed by other people irrespective of whether this person considers this proposi- 2 From the perspective of the tripartite model of attitudes (see Zanna & Rempel, 1988), one could argue that implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic affective reactions) represent the affective component attributed to attitudes, whereas explicit attitudes (i.e., evaluative judgments) are typically a joint product of both affective and cognitive components, with their relative influence depending on factors such as cognitive elaboration (e.g., Shiv & Nowlis, 2004) and propositional consistency (e.g., Judd & Lusk, 1984). 3 It is important to note that such other (evaluative or nonevaluative) propositions are also based on inputs from the associative store. The present model implies no independent storage of propositions in long-term memory (see also Deutsch & Strack, in press). 4 Wyer and Radvansky (1999) recently argued that people sometimes recognize the truth or falsity of a proposition spontaneously in the course of comprehending a proposition. In particular, these researchers argued that people spontaneously construct mental models of a proposition in the course of comprehending that proposition. If the constructed model is redundant with the content of a previously formed model, people spontaneously recognize the corresponding proposition as true. Moreover, if the constructed model does not match with a previously formed model, people assess the validity of the proposition by comparing the similarity of its mental model with previously formed models of the same predicate. Applied to the present question, it is important to note that Wyer and Radvansky postulated such spontaneous validation processes only for declarative propositions (e.g., events, episodes), not for evaluative propositions. Moreover, given that automatic affective reactions have their roots in spontaneously activated associations, these associations—by definition—represent a previously constructed model. As such, associative evaluations should spontaneously be considered as true, which is consistent with our assumption that people, by default, base their evaluative judgments on their automatic affective reactions, unless higher order processes of propositional reasoning lead to a rejection of the propositional implications of an associative evaluation (see also Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, in press; Gilbert, 1991). 5 These two cases are also reflected in contemporary theories of (explicit) prejudice, such that explicitly accepting the derogation of disadvantaged groups is considered a traditional form of prejudice, whereas denying discrimination is considered a modern form of prejudice (e.g., McConahay, 1986; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; for a more detailed discussion, see Gawronski, Peters, & Brochu, 2005). 694 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 695 onding iati ons in memory cven en a person docs model als ople.mere k cial det negative reacti oward th eotype is co nsidered inac wing th me attitudes from m (1)showed that im lout-goptohcctcntthtTrcspondcntswc ions by others (cf. e analyses:see Cacioppo,Petty,Feinstein, Jarvis 96. recent ions of the in-group on the ass ative level but to m milar vein. lysis by Hofma ang spor neity in the co Cognitive Consistency According to the APe mode ing (Gawronski,Strack. the APE sults from tha the as and the appli n2003 tions a t with each other when both are and f th ositional thinking by in how many )It is imporant o o 99).More extensive elaboration generally impliesc nt that any of itions is inc he auto respons oration is likely that inconsistency (Gawronski. the ex member automatically activates valuative iudgm ts (e.g.Florack et al,2001:Hofmann et al. to a minority 2005:sce also Shiv&N wis.2004 itive elab not ine itabl yreduce the relation betwee Atrcan Ame only if additi ally c n the cSndcscrbcdsncegationGibe d)supp atter proces on (Fes 957)or man.003:Dovidi ingis the mediating ion.Moreover,if additio d evaluative outcome ns confirm th ubjective validity of one c affective reaction.the rela Cognitive Elaboration The term logical consistency is intended to refer more broadh Cognitive elaboration.or the degree of active thought devoted to to be ad
tion as true or false. We argue that mere knowledge of a proposition endorsed by other people can contribute to the activation of corresponding associations in memory even when a person does not believe in the validity of that proposition (Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003). For example, mere knowledge of a cultural stereotype may lead to automatic negative reactions toward the members of a disadvantaged minority group even when the stereotype is considered inaccurate (Devine, 1989). This assumption is supported by research showing that members of disadvantaged minority groups often exhibit automatic negative reactions toward their own in-group, particularly when they perceive the majority group to exhibit a high level of negativity against the minority group (e.g., Livingston, 2002). It is important to note that such automatic negativity against the in-group is often rejected on the propositional level, which leads to negative (rather than positive) correlations between personally endorsed evaluations and evaluations by others (cf. Heider, 1958). That is, higher levels of perceived negativity from out-groups lead to more negative evaluations of the in-group on the associative level but to more positive evaluations on the propositional level (Livingston, 2002). Cognitive Consistency According to the APE model, cognitive consistency is exclusively a concern of propositional reasoning (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press). In particular, we argue that consistency results from a propositional process of consistency assessment that is based on the assignment of truth values and the application of syllogistic rules and logical principles.6 From a general perspective, two propositions are consistent with each other when both are regarded as true and one does not imply the opposite of the other. In contrast, two propositions are inconsistent when both are regarded as true and one follows from the opposite of the other (see Festinger, 1957). It is important to note that, because (in)consistency between two propositions cannot even be defined without an assignment of truth values, people have to resolve inconsistency by means of propositional reasoning—that is, either by changing the truth value of one proposition or by finding an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press; Kruglanski, 1989). For example, if exposure to a minority member automatically activates negative associations, people either may reject the propositional implication of these associations because of its inconsistency with other accepted propositions (see above) or may find an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (e.g., “This African American person was unfriendly”). Whereas the former process refers to what has been described as negation (Gilbert, 1991), suppression (Wegner, 1994), and hierarchical inhibition (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998), the latter process may be described as rationalization (Festinger, 1957) or justification (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). The important point is that whenever cognitive consistency issues arise, propositional reasoning is the mediating mechanism underlying the obtained evaluative outcomes. Cognitive Elaboration Cognitive elaboration, or the degree of active thought devoted to an attitude object, has long been assumed to be of paramount importance in attitude change (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). As with other models of implicit and explicit attitudes (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000), the APE model also implies a crucial role of cognitive elaboration. Fazio and Olson (2003), for example, argued that cognitive elaboration is a crucial determinant of people’s success in suppressing the influence of automatic attitudes on evaluative judgments. In a similar vein, Wilson et al. (2000) argued that cognitive elaboration is a crucial determinant of people’s success in retrieving their explicit attitudes from memory. Thus, both models imply that the correlation between implicit and explicit evaluations should decrease as a function of increasing cognitive elaboration. Consistent with this assumption, Florack, Scarabis, and Bless (2001) showed that implicit racial prejudice as measured by the IAT was more strongly related to deliberative judgments about members of the relevant racial out-group to the extent that respondents were low in need for cognition (i.e., had a low dispositional tendency to engage in deliberative analyses; see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). In a similar vein, a recent meta-analysis by Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, and Schmitt (2005) showed that correlations between the IAT and explicit measures significantly increased as a function of increasing spontaneity in the course of making a judgment. The APE model similarly posits that increased elaboration often reduces the correlation between explicit and implicit attitudes. However, the APE model differs from previous accounts with regard to its assumptions about the underlying processes. As we have noted, these earlier accounts argued that cognitive elaboration influences success in suppressing automatic evaluations (Fazio & Olson, 2003) or in retrieving explicit attitudes from memory (Wilson et al., 2000). In contrast to these models, the APE model assumes that cognitive elaboration affects the complexity of propositional thinking by influencing how many judgment-relevant propositions one considers in addition to one’s automatic affective reaction (see Albarracı´n & Wyer, 2000; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). More extensive elaboration generally implies considering a greater number of propositions about the attitude object. To the extent that any of these additional propositions is inconsistent with the automatic evaluative response, the extra elaboration is likely to reduce the correlation between automatic affective reactions and evaluative judgments (e.g., Florack et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2005; see also Shiv & Nowlis, 2004). It is important to note, however, that increased cognitive elaboration does not inevitably reduce the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes. According to the APE model, cognitive elaboration should reduce the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes only if additionally considered propositions question the validity of one’s automatic affective reaction as a basis for an evaluative judgment (see Judd & Lusk, 1984). However, if additionally considered propositions do not question the validity of one’s automatic affective reaction, the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes should be unaffected by cognitive elaboration. Moreover, if additionally considered propositions confirm the subjective validity of one’s automatic affective reaction, the rela- 6 The term logical consistency is intended to refer more broadly to subjective consistency resulting from any kind of inferential rule that is considered to be valid, rather than to strict logical consistency in terms of normative syllogistic rules. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 695
696 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN For exa ntiveCLaDoatiomidcntificsanadd h text in which it is e This "This Afr on behaved in that implicit don't like this highly sensitive the mencan person"o non ve proposit Schalle Park. &Mueller.2003:Wittenb ink.Judd.&Park d on the their vatio rather than dec rease as a function of cognitiv high level nd implicit attitudes inc c ac on tn amount of cognitive otten ege will likely produce a negative affective reaction reeard ment reeardine the momentarily considered set of propositions less of t which the nding egg i Attitudes as Online Constructions th this article. s are no c.g..Schwarz Bohn 2001Tc 1978:Wilson Unconscious Attitude plied bythe A final foundati question concems the potential unc and prop tonal pro evaluations of an attitu ucedintharthepmoposnioimpiCno ered to be Th roots in Greenwald and Banaji's (1995)definitiono The APE one's aut model deviatesfrom this ibility tha mined a prior.Rather.the 2005se so Cle Jimenez.2002).we assume that people ge nt.and thi nay char ents (Ga onski.Hofmann. .h pres cat deal of stability in ud have arg whe the texts.Thus. even thoug evaluative judgr ents sition on the f this ropositions that might be releva ings by LeB the construction the constru 10 aroue that a s on their feelings ward the attitude obie t in the course o ciative memory.N udgment (for simi ee Nie ting str e of associations in me tion instructions should leave correlations between explicit and As such.different sets of input stimuli may activate differen implicit attitudes unaffected
tion between explicit and implicit attitudes should actually increase (rather than decrease) as a function of cognitive elaboration. For example, if increased cognitive elaboration identifies an additional proposition (e.g., “This African American person behaved in a hostile manner”) that resolves the inconsistency among a propositionally transformed affective reaction (e.g., “I don’t like this African American person”); other, nonevaluative propositions (e.g., “African Americans are a disadvantaged minority group”); and propositional evaluations of other attitude objects (e.g., “It is bad to evaluate members of disadvantaged minority groups negatively”), the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes should actually increase rather than decrease as a function of cognitive elaboration. In other words, whether the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes increases or decreases as a function of cognitive elaboration does not depend on the amount of cognitive elaboration per se; rather, it is a function of a consistency assessment regarding the momentarily considered set of propositions. Attitudes as Online Constructions Although attitudes have traditionally been regarded as stable evaluative representations of an attitude object residing in longterm memory, some researchers have argued that attitudes are not merely retrieved from memory but rather are constructed on the spot (e.g., Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Tesser, 1978; Wilson & Hodges, 1992; see also Bassili & Brown, 2005). A similar assumption is also implied by the APE model. However, the notion of attitude construction has substantially different meanings for associative and propositional processes. For propositional processes, attitudes can be considered to be constructed in that the propositional implication of one’s automatic affective reaction can be regarded as either true or false, depending on the other propositions that one simultaneously considers in forming an evaluative judgment. That is, changes in the set of momentarily considered propositions can influence whether the propositional implication of one’s automatic affective reaction is considered valid or invalid. As such, evaluative judgments resulting from propositional processes can be regarded as constructed because they are not determined a priori. Rather, the truth value of a given propositional evaluation depends on its consistency with the set of other propositions that are currently considered to be relevant, and this set may change as a function of various factors (e.g., cognitive elaboration). Notwithstanding these factors, however, there can nevertheless be a great deal of stability in evaluative judgments, to the extent that the set of relevant propositions that one considers in forming an evaluative judgment is consistent across contexts. Thus, even though evaluative judgments resulting from propositional processes can be regarded as constructed, the APE model does not preclude the possibility of attitudinal stability or rigidity on the propositional level. For associative processes, attitudes might also be considered to be constructed. However, in contrast to the active notion implied for the construction of evaluative judgments, the construction process for associative evaluations is rather passive. As we have outlined, we argue that automatic affective reactions depend on processes of pattern activation in associative memory. Moreover, these processes of pattern activation depend on (a) external input stimuli and (b) the preexisting structure of associations in memory. As such, different sets of input stimuli may activate different associative patterns for a given attitude object. Accordingly, the same attitude object may be evaluated differently as a function of the particular context in which it is encountered. This assumption is consistent with research showing that implicit attitudes are highly sensitive to the particular context in which an attitude object is encountered (e.g., Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004; Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). From this perspective, implicit attitudes, or associative evaluations, can be regarded as constructed on the spot because their activation depends not only on the preexisting structure of associations in memory but also on the particular set of input stimuli. As with evaluative judgments, however, associative evaluations can also be quite stable, such that they show a high level of temporal consistency if the activation patterns elicited when one encounters the attitude object are themselves robustly stable. A rotten egg will likely produce a negative affective reaction regardless of the particular context within which the offending egg is encountered. From a general perspective, temporal consistency of associative evaluations reflects the chronic or dispositional aspect that is often attributed to attitudes. We consider the issue of temporal stability of attitudes in more detail in the remainder of this article. Unconscious Attitudes A final foundational question concerns the potential unconsciousness of implicit attitudes. Some researchers have argued that implicit attitudes reflect unconscious evaluations of an attitude object, whereas explicit attitudes reflect their conscious counterparts (e.g., Banaji, Lemm, & Carpenter, 2001). This assumption has its roots in Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) definition of implicit attitudes as “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience” (p. 5) that mediate overt responses. The APE model deviates from this contention. Although we do not rule out the possibility that certain affective reactions are below the threshold of experiential awareness (e.g., Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005; see also Cleeremans & Jime´nez, 2002), we assume that people generally do have some degree of conscious access to their automatic affective reactions and that they tend to rely on these affective reactions in making evaluative judgments (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, in press; Schimmack & Crites, 2005). To be sure, they also sometimes reject these automatic evaluations as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. As we have argued, whether people consider their automatic affective reaction to be a valid basis for an evaluative judgment depends on the consistency of this evaluation with other propositions that might be relevant for an evaluative judgment. These assumptions about the consciousness of implicit attitudes—or automatic affective reactions—are consistent with recent findings by LeBel and Gawronski (2006), who found that correlations between explicit and implicit attitudes significantly increased (from r .19 to r .51) when participants were asked to focus on their feelings toward the attitude object in the course of making an evaluative judgment (for similar findings, see Nier, 2005). If implicit attitudes are truly unconscious, such introspection instructions should leave correlations between explicit and implicit attitudes unaffected. 696 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 697 Summary atic depiction of ou ciation activa and p implicit attitude change.We start our rev w by disc reaomnencwatation,Wcareucharimplic when a pe Causes of Implicit Attitude Change ceived as evaluative judgm ents ahout an attitude obiect that have mthe perspective of model.changes in n th associative structure or(b)a te s the Tirs rega cse as ee8oa0 frets the配 The prototypical case for when the propositional implication of an automati implicit attitud ens.&Field.2005:De Ho tion is propositions that are con Tra 2005).Cons ings of ral factors that ca or nega provide an integra ive. xhaustive review of the availabl 200;Hermans ond,2003:M.A.Olson Fazio 200120022006pe。 al)M.A.d)for eample.dev ope model. ented words nd images were inte d ith critical pairing Implicit and Explicit Attitude Chang The implicit and explicit attitudes proposed ositive US exhibited a more pos sitive valenc n Implic an C M.A.Olson and individ als as CS →m with an Implicit positive word showed a more positive implicit valence than non ed tha plicit valence in an affective priming task than when these faces wccnotasocitedtihcectrcutla did not differ from EC effects resulting from p y prese awith acou propo rmipe the ant odo as USs which in tum in cted in explicit ation cit self-esteen
Summary Figure 1 provides a schematic depiction of our assumptions regarding the interplay of association activation and propositional reasoning in evaluation. We argue that implicit attitudes reflect automatic affective reactions resulting from the particular associations that are activated automatically when a person encounters a relevant stimulus. Explicit attitudes, in contrast, should be conceived as evaluative judgments about an attitude object that have their roots in processes of propositional reasoning. The crucial difference between associative and propositional processes is their dependency on truth values. Whereas the activation of associations can occur regardless of whether a person considers these associations as true or false, processes of propositional reasoning are generally concerned with the validation of propositions. Thus, even though evaluative judgments are usually based on automatic affective reactions, they can also be independent of associative evaluations when the propositional implication of an automatic affective reaction is considered invalid. Such rejections may occur when the propositional evaluation implied by an automatic affective reaction is inconsistent with other propositions that are considered relevant for the evaluative judgment. In the following sections, we discuss several factors that can influence association activation and propositional reasoning, thus leading to implicit or explicit attitude change. In this context, we also provide an integrative, exhaustive review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change, which is organized according to the various mechanisms implied by the APE model. Implicit and Explicit Attitude Change The conceptualization of implicit and explicit attitudes proposed by the APE model has a number of implications for attitude change. First, changes in each kind of evaluation can be due to several processes. Second, the particular interplay of associative and propositional processes may lead to various patterns of explicit and implicit attitude change. We start our review by discussing different causes of attitude change and then provide an overview of the potential interplay of implicit and explicit attitude changes. Causes of Implicit Attitude Change From the perspective of the APE model, changes in associative evaluations may reflect either (a) an incremental change in the associative structure or (b) a temporal change in the activation of preexisting patterns (Smith, 1996). Whereas the first case involves the learning of a new evaluation, the latter case reflects the differential activation of old evaluations that are already stored in associative memory. Changes in associative structure. The prototypical case for implicit attitude changes resulting from changes in associative structure is evaluative conditioning (EC; for reviews, see De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; De Houwer, Thomas, & Bayens, 2001; Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005). Consistent with this notion, several studies demonstrated changes in implicit attitudes resulting from repeated pairings of an attitude object with positive or negative stimuli (e.g., Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hermans, Baeyens, Lamote, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2005; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; C. J. Mitchell, Anderson, & Lovibond, 2003; M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002, 2006; Petty et al., 2006). M. A. Olson and Fazio (2001), for example, developed a conditioning paradigm in which several hundred randomly presented words and images were interspersed with critical pairings of positive or negative unconditioned stimuli (USs) with neutral conditioned stimuli (CSs). Results indicated that CSs paired with positive USs exhibited a more positive valence in an Implicit Association Test than CSs paired with negative USs. This finding was replicated in several follow-up studies that used a subliminal affective priming task as a dependent measure (M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2002) and pictures of Black and White individuals as CSs (M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2006). Similar results were obtained by C. J. Mitchell et al. (2003), who found that the ostensible evaluative meaning randomly assigned to meaningless nonwords was subsequently reflected in implicit evaluations of these nonwords assessed with an Implicit Association Test. That is, nonwords that were randomly associated with a positive word showed a more positive implicit valence than nonwords that were randomly associated with a negative word. With regard to social stimuli, Hermans et al. (2002) showed that formerly neutral faces (CS) that were associated with negative electrocutaneous stimulation (US) exhibited a more negative implicit valence in an affective priming task than when these faces were not associated with electrocutaneous stimulation. It is interesting to note that EC effects resulting from aversive stimulation did not differ from EC effects resulting from pairings with acoustically presented negative words. Hermans et al. (2005) obtained similar results using food stimuli as CSs and pleasant versus unpleasant odors as USs. With regard to implicit self-evaluations, Dijksterhuis (2004) demonstrated that subliminal EC of self-related words can change implicit evaluations of the self. In particular, Dijksterhuis found that participants exhibited a higher level of implicit self-esteem Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the interplay of association activation and propositional reasoning in explicit and implicit attitudes. Input stimuli are assumed to determine the pattern of associations that gets activated in memory (bold lines connecting dots), which in turn influences affective reactions reflected in implicit attitude measures. Processes of propositional reasoning are assumed to assess the validity of activated associations, which provides the basis for evaluative judgments reflected in explicit attitude measures. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 697
GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN however.that minimal group su effects were nt mea mplicit game that repeatedly paired self-relevant words (CS) Ote Wentura.:for a review,see Oten. 01) given that me sociation between self and in-groupmay be n-groups ove Changes in pattem.A ecnd cause for changes i vation Such changes sbould occur when simple co sincientoniuencg aired with mental changesin (c.g.by of EC aiitpresentedby u that with this (5) ntly argued that the sel a)that the attitude object is d in ann,&Pe 2000:Greenv 2000K00 ub en an attitude obje and the self sho ead to diffe attem activation is concerned with the effects of 2003.1i s of bject (e. 2001 nditioning proce volves a mere asso was I wer when partic were pr ed with pi attit whe Draw vine on studies by Gawrons and Becker (in press) associative structure related to Black and White peop ive pictures changed participants' ictures used in al as iative evaluations were m these pictures led to changes in the activation of ale tin postde en p er than to changes d the It is imporant nd Lee (20 who found that exp re to violent rap andom assi by the of Black pe ple In mere ap mu mayactivatea eads to an as ciative transfer of implicit self-evaluations to the of Black p oole me enhance implicit prejudice of EC may also ent with res lig.Bu were obtained by J.P.Mitchell.Nosek.and IV. are suffi ent to indu implicit prefere or i he r oth 2001:Caste mith Arcuri 2004.Da ation when .2004:Otten&Wentura.1999:Pratt gorized as an athlete but a negative associative evaluatio in obtained when c zatio may appear somewhat surprising.From the perspective of EC
when self-related words (CS) were subliminally paired with positive adjectives (US) than when self-related words were subliminally paired with neutral words. These effects were consistent across different measures of implicit self-esteem (e.g., IAT, name letter effect). Baccus et al. (2004) obtained similar effects using a computer game that repeatedly paired self-relevant words (CS) with smiling, frowning, or neutral faces (US). The notion of EC is also reflected in a study by Karpinski and Hilton (2001). These researchers found that implicit prejudice against older adults was influenced by repeated pairings of the words youth and elderly (CS) with positive and negative words (US). In particular, participants exhibited a lower level of implicit prejudice against older people in an Implicit Association Test when youth was repeatedly paired with negative words and elderly was repeatedly paired with positive words than when youth was repeatedly paired with positive words and elderly was repeatedly paired with negative words. A special case of EC is represented by the creation of new associations between an attitude object and the self. Consistent with this notion, Walther et al. (2005) recently argued that the self can function as a US when it is “paired” with a neutral CS. Given that most people show positive evaluations of themselves (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2001), the creation of a new association between an attitude object and the self should lead to more positive evaluations of the attitude object (e.g., Walther & Trasselli, 2003). It is important to note that, as the proposed conditioning process involves a mere associative transfer of selfevaluations to the attitude object, the resulting implicit attitude should depend on people’s implicit self-evaluation such that implicit positivity toward the attitude object should increase as a function of implicit positivity toward the self. Evidence for these assumptions can be found in a series of studies by Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (in press). Gawronski et al. found that choosing between two equally attractive pictures changed participants’ implicit evaluations of these pictures, such that they evaluated chosen pictures more positively after than before the decision (see Brehm, 1956). Moreover, postdecisional associative evaluations were moderated by implicit selfevaluations, such that postdecisional positivity toward chosen pictures increased as function of participants’ implicit positivity toward the self. It is important to note that this effect was independent of whether ownership resulted from participants’ decision or from random assignment by the experimenter. In terms of the APE model, these results suggest that mere ownership can create an association between the owned object and the self, which then leads to an associative transfer of implicit self-evaluations to the object. The notion of EC effects arising from new associations to the self is also consistent with research on implicit in-group favoritism. Using the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), several researchers have found that minimal group settings are sufficient to induce an implicit preference for ingroups over out-groups (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Castelli, Zogmeister, Smith, & Arcuri, 2004; DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Pratto & Shih, 2000). Given that participants usually have little or no declarative knowledge regarding such minimal groups, this finding may appear somewhat surprising. From the perspective of EC, however, one could argue that minimal group settings are sufficient to create an association between the new in-group and the self, which, in turn, should lead to an associative transfer of implicit self-evaluations to the new in-group (see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Otten & Wentura, 2001; for a review, see Otten, 2003). Thus, given that most people’s implicit self-evaluation is highly positive (Bosson et al., 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole et al., 2001), the association between self and in-group may be sufficient to produce an implicit preference for in-groups over out-groups in minimal group settings. Changes in pattern activation. A second cause for changes in associative evaluations is represented by changes in pattern activation. Such changes should occur when simple context cues are sufficient to influence which pattern of associations is activated for an already familiar attitude object. These cases differ from incremental changes in associative structure (e.g., by means of EC), such that no pairing with evaluative information is required to change implicit attitudes. Instead, changes in pattern activation presuppose (a) that the attitude object is already represented in a multifaceted manner and (b) that the presence of particular context cues activates different associative patterns reflecting different subsets of this representation. A first set of studies that is consistent with the notion of differential pattern activation is concerned with the effects of momentarily accessible group members. Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), for example, found that implicit prejudice against African Americans was lower when participants were presented with pictures of admired Blacks and disliked Whites before they completed an implicit prejudice task than when they were presented with pictures of disliked Blacks and admired Whites. Drawing on basic assumptions by the APE model, we argue that the presentation of familiar exemplars activates different patterns of the preexisting associative structure related to Black and White people, which, in turn, influences participants’ associative evaluation of Black and White people in general. Because the pictures used in Dasgupta and Greenwald’s studies generally depicted highly familiar individuals (e.g., Michael Jordan, Tom Cruise), it seems likely that these pictures led to changes in the activation of already existing patterns rather than to changes in the underlying associative structure. This interpretation can also be applied to findings by Rudman and Lee (2002), who found that exposure to violent rap music led White participants to show more negative associative evaluations of Black people. In terms of the APE model, exposure to violent rap music may activate a particular associative pattern of participants’ representation of Black people. If this pattern involves a more negative evaluation of Black people, mere exposure to violent rap music may be sufficient to enhance implicit prejudice against African Americans. Similar findings were obtained by J. P. Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). These researchers found that associative evaluations elicited by well-known individuals depended on whether these individuals were categorized in terms of their race or other applicable categories (e.g., occupation). For example, Michael Jordan elicited a positive associative evaluation when he was categorized as an athlete but a negative associative evaluation when he was categorized as African American. These effects were obtained when categorization was manipulated by the category labels in an IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) or by the salience of 698 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 699 ciation task( ereall highly familiar individ In oth ord particip different context cues influ will be the lied to t individ got ac such changes in patter arch sho that sim h ejudice (see Devine,1989 et al.(2001).for with the tv ted an IAT d mplicit preferen for Wes nteraction with ar with the two subcate ies than when they were not primed with that ositive interactions with an African An esting that this effec of EC).it a of the in-gr and out-group categories led to mo ot fo evaluat o the n-roup deper et al.'s priming pr dure invo egory prim ion in terms of the p s tha ent with the notion of diffe tation re t Eu f the tw categon ry priming should lea African rican e to pical implici math (i al int ges in A s elicited by yAfrican American individuals were less neg n particular. hite participants sh family barbeque)tha were p ed in a role th n that i nciden s a function of the context in which his individual is encountere when partic e cted to i with a Whi d with both positive and ar aspects of particip American individual i 2003)parti ants only antici ated rather than interaction 2001 enly pr d by B aL.2004 Maddu of the p ithi ic e for examp of abs cat Bar tha a Bl in a h change ffeci ound that the ented with dress ng the role of a prisoner over ins he same Bla person elicite d implic e for fl the
categories in a go/no-go association task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). It is important to note that the targets used by J. P. Mitchell et al. were all highly familiar individuals. In other words, participants already had a representation of these individuals in their associative memory, but the particular category applied to these individuals influenced which of the associative patterns got activated. Particularly interesting with regard to the present question is research showing that simply increasing the salience of group categories can influence subsequent associative evaluations (e.g., Ku¨hnen et al., 2001; Pratto & Shih, 2000; J. R. Steele & Ambady, 2006). In a study by Ku¨hnen et al. (2001), for example, German participants were primed with the two subcategories East German and West German and then completed an IAT designed to assess implicit preference for West Germans over East Germans. Overall, the social stereotype of East Germans tends to be negative, whereas the social stereotype of West Germans tends to be positive. Results indicate that participants exhibited a stronger preference for West Germans over East Germans when they were primed with the two subcategories than when they were not primed with the two subcategories. It is interesting that this effect emerged for both East German and West German participants. Hence, activation of the in-group and out-group categories led to more or less favorable associative evaluations of the in-group, depending on the particular valence of in-group-related associations. Because Ku¨hnen et al.’s priming procedure involved a neutral category prime rather than direct priming of positive or negative stereotypes, these results are consistent with the notion of differential pattern activation. If the two subcategories were not already associated with positive or negative stereotypes in associative memory, simple category priming should leave associative evaluations unaffected. This interpretation is also applicable to a finding by J. R. Steele and Ambady (2006), who found that women showed more genderstereotypical implicit attitudes toward arts versus math (i.e., stronger preference for arts over math) when they were primed with gender categories than when they were primed with gender-neutral categories. Additional evidence for changes in pattern activation comes from Wittenbrink et al. (2001), who found that automatic affective reactions elicited by African American individuals were less negative when the individuals were presented in a positive context (e.g., family barbeque) than when they were presented in a negative context (e.g., gang incident). These results indicate that the associative pattern that is activated by a given individual can differ as a function of the context in which this individual is encountered. In the present case, one could ague that the associative representation of African Americans is ambivalent, such that African Americans are associated with both positive and negative aspects. However, which of these aspects gets activated depends on the particular context in which an African American individual is encountered. An interesting extension of Wittenbrink et al.’s (2001) research was recently presented by Barden et al. (2004; see also Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005). These researchers showed that not the context per se but the social role within a particular context led to changes in automatic evaluations. In one study, for example, Barden et al. found that a Black person presented in a prison context elicited automatic negative reactions when this person was presented with dress suggesting the role of a prisoner. However, the same Black person elicited automatic positive reactions when presented with dress suggesting the role of a lawyer. As with Wittenbrink et al.’s (2001) findings, these results indicate that different context cues influence which associative pattern will be activated for a particular attitude object and that such differences in pattern activation can lead to different associative evaluations of the same attitude object. Most important, such changes in pattern activation seem to be capable of reversing the automatic activation commonly attributed to implicit prejudice (see Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998), such that the same Black person may activate either a negative or a positive associative evaluation depending on the social role in which this person is encountered. Another study that can be interpreted in terms of differences in pattern activation was conducted by Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001). These researchers found that mere interaction with an African American experimenter was sufficient to reduce negative associative evaluations of African Americans. It is interesting to note that this effect emerged for European Americans but not for Asian Americans. Even though we cannot rule out the possibility that positive interactions with an African American experimenter may be sufficient to change participants’ associative structure (e.g., by means of EC), it is quite difficult to explain why this effect should emerge only for European Americans, not for Asian Americans (given that the affective quality of the interaction was equal across the two groups of participants). An alternative explanation in terms of the present model is that European Americans and Asian Americans differ with regard to their preexisting associative representation regarding African Americans, such that European Americans’ associative representation is more heterogeneous than Asian Americans’ associative representation. Hence, interacting with an African American experimenter may activate an evaluatively different pattern of associations for European Americans, whereas the patterns activated in Asian Americans may be less affected by individual interactions. Additional evidence for changes in pattern activation comes from research on social roles. Richeson and Ambady (2003) demonstrated that anticipated superior and subordinate roles in dyadic interactions with an African American individual influenced participants’ associative evaluations of African Americans in general. In particular, White participants showed more negative associative evaluations of African Americans when they anticipated being in a superior role than when they anticipated a subordinate role (see also Richeson & Ambady, 2001). However, situational roles had no influence on associative evaluations of African Americans when participants expected to interact with a White person. From the perspective of the APE model, one could argue that anticipated social roles in interactions with African Americans increased the salience of particular aspects of participants’ associative representation of African Americans. Because Richeson and Ambady’s (2003) participants only anticipated, rather than actually engaged in, social interaction, it seems unlikely that participants formed completely new associative evaluations. Instead, anticipated roles might have activated those patterns of the preexisting associative representation that provided the best fit to the anticipated role. Several studies have also shown that differences in the interpretation of abstract category labels can change affective responses on the IAT (e.g., Foroni & Mayr, 2005; Govan & Williams, 2004). Govan and Williams (2004), for example, found that the often demonstrated implicit preference for flowers over insects could be reversed when the stimuli in the IAT were unpleasant flowers (e.g., IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 699
700 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN that incre ondents inte aret the tive c thus inf ose (e g I ambert et al ing their affectiv eactions to n rs and in n gene 2005) reove sed by Frantz e (2005).who found that the preference for fl which typically incre ses arousal.This aro usal,in tum.may en ler d by plying a re this cas apost-n tio appreher or arous response (e.g..implicit preference for flowers over insects) cient to activate different ociative Causes of Explicit Attitude Change As with changes in implicit attitudes rch on motivational states Fer on and Bargh tudes can be due to a number of p ording to the APE (a)a of th efor goal pursui Obiec ts were evaluated mo the set of propositions that are consi se in the Rose Koc The first kind of explici ative in beav the ass ociative structure or temporal ch es in the activation o pos d to a change of ive ev were der ve the ts on their automatic affective rea ions. such chango ative evalual nay, in tum, to corresponding With regard to change in ass ciative structure.a number c esting line of res earch con iewed extensively else where (De Houwer e (2004)for exam r but not sadr on of the relevant evidence from the perspectiv 0 APE that er.in contrast to sadn onflict. rh nte the influe e of EC on evaluative judgments should be mec by ed that wh d a et al with ber of important impic which we discu erplay expli mnlicit attitude ch Segal agrati.and K who four that As with changes in associative temporal changes in iative self-evaluations under ed with at is one could in uggest that ive evaluatio which.in tumn. further inf As w wever. in patte ivatio than from senuine diffe ir ct inf uenc of context stimuli judgments eis a finding b luat;such ddy,Bur Evidence for explicit attitude changes resulting fror higher when the task was int ed as a diagr tic instrument fo ntered members of a social nts abor the assessment of racism.This finding is consistent with the claim the group in general (e.gBless. warz.Bodenhausen,Thie
skunkweed) and pleasant insects (e.g., butterfly). According to Govan and Williams, the particular stimuli in the IAT determine how respondents interpret the respective categories, thus influencing their affective reactions to flowers and insects in general. This interpretation is also consistent with research by Foroni and Mayr (2005), who found that the preference for flowers over insects could be attenuated by a fictional scenario implying a reversal of the typical category evaluations. In their study, participants were asked to imagine a post–nuclear war scenario in which flowers were generally contaminated and insects were the only kind of harmless food available. From the perspective of the APE model, these results suggest that different exemplars (Govan & Williams, 2004) or fictional scenarios (Foroni & Mayr, 2005) may be sufficient to activate different associative patterns, thus leading to different associative evaluations of flowers and insects. A particularly interesting case of changes in pattern activation comes from research on motivational states. Ferguson and Bargh (2004), for example, demonstrated that automatic associative evaluations of an attitude object differed as a function of the object’s relevance for goal pursuit. Objects were evaluated more positively when they were relevant than when they were irrelevant for goal pursuit (see also Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003). Similar findings were reported by Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, and Chassin (2003), who showed that nicotine deprivation led to more positive associative evaluations of cigarettes in heavy smokers. However, light smokers showed more positive associative evaluations of cigarettes when they had just smoked a cigarette than when they were deprived. Taken together, these results indicate that associative evaluations depend not only on external input stimuli but also on internal motivational states. Moreover, given the transient nature of motivational states, these influences are likely to result from differences in pattern activation rather than from genuine differences in the underlying associative structure. Another interesting line of research concerns the effect of emotional states on automatic associative evaluations. In a study by DeSteno et al. (2004), for example, anger but not sadness enhanced automatic negative evaluations of out-groups. According to DeSteno et al., these differences were due to the functional relevance of anger, in contrast to sadness, to intergroup conflict. This interpretation is also consistent with findings by Schaller et al. (2003), who showed that ambient darkness enhanced automatic negative evaluations of African Americans for participants with chronic beliefs in a dangerous world but not for participants who did not believe in a dangerous world. Similar differences were reported by Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, and Kennedy (2001), who found that recently recovered depressed patients showed more negative associative self-evaluations under sad mood as compared with control conditions. For never-depressed control participants, in contrast, mood had no effect on associative self-evaluations. Taken together, these results suggest that associative evaluations depend on emotional as well as motivational states. Moreover, as with transient motivational states, these influences are likely to result from differences in pattern activation rather than from genuine differences in the underlying associative structure. Directly related to the notion of emotional states is a finding by Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, and Hart (2004). These researchers found that implicit prejudice scores on the IAT were generally higher when the task was introduced as a diagnostic instrument for the assessment of racism. This finding is consistent with the claim that increased arousal enhances dominant responses (Hull, 1943; Zajonc, 1965). That is, one could argue that automatic associations reflect a particular kind of dominant response (e.g., Lambert et al., 2003). Moreover, the diagnosticity instructions used by Frantz et al. (2004) are quite likely to result in evaluation apprehension, which typically increases arousal. This arousal, in turn, may enhance dominant responses, in this case the activation level of automatic associations. If this interpretation is correct, any kind of evaluation apprehension or arousal should enhance IAT effects, and this increase should emerge irrespective of whether the task is designed to assess implicit prejudice or any other kind of dominant response (e.g., implicit preference for flowers over insects). Causes of Explicit Attitude Change As with changes in implicit attitudes, changes in explicit attitudes can be due to a number of processes. According to the APE model, changes in evaluative judgments can be due to (a) a change of the associative evaluation of the attitude object, (b) a change in the set of propositions that are considered to be relevant for an evaluative judgment, or (c) a change in the strategy used to achieve consistency within a given set of propositions. Changes in associative evaluation. The first kind of explicit attitude change involves instances in which incremental changes in the associative structure or temporal changes in the activation of associative patterns lead to a change of the associative evaluation of the attitude object. Because people tend to base their evaluative judgments on their automatic affective reactions, such changes in associative evaluations may, in turn, lead to corresponding changes in evaluative judgments. With regard to changes in associative structure, a number of studies on EC have demonstrated that repeated pairings of CSs and USs influence subsequent evaluative judgments of the CSs. This research has been reviewed extensively elsewhere (De Houwer et al., 2001, 2005; Walther et al., 2005), and thus we refrain from an elaborate discussion of the relevant evidence. From the perspective of the APE model, however, it is important to note that processes of EC should not directly influence evaluative judgments. Rather, the influence of EC on evaluative judgments should be mediated by associative evaluations, which, in turn, influence evaluative judgments (see also De Houwer et al., 2001, 2005). This assumption has a number of important implications, which we discuss in more detail in the context of the interplay between explicit and implicit attitude changes. As with changes in associative structure, temporal changes in the activation of preexisting associative patterns can lead to corresponding changes in evaluative judgments. That is, one could argue that any context stimulus that leads to a change in pattern activation should influence the associative evaluation of an attitude object, which, in turn, may further influence corresponding evaluative judgments. As with the case of EC, however, it is important to note that such changes in evaluative judgments do not reflect a direct influence of context stimuli on evaluative judgments. Rather, such influences should also be mediated by associative evaluations. Evidence for explicit attitude changes resulting from differences in pattern activation comes from studies showing that recently encountered members of a social group influence judgments about the group in general (e.g., Bless, Schwarz, Bodenhausen, & Thiel, 700 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE sum,Thomas,Lepper.1999 Wilder.Simon. nt for an evaluative j ted tha pection should n.bout the vely when they ha cently encountered a negati attitud tude object should leave evaluative judgm ts unaffected lead plar.Fi such a ese are cor o at 978. assumptio s in evalu of activ should i ce the k Tesser Changes in the strategy to achieve consistency. The third kind s in the set of cousidered or The second kindofinnuenceomcvalatirejutermc selves.one of them follows from the op osite of the othe the amiliar propositions implies a change in the evaluation of an o icalimplicatiol ed in this definition ch o nce can be with thi Chen Chaiker 999:Petty m.Gav and Strack (2004)r strono or weak ttitude object and diffe kinds cognitive dissonanc ski and Strack argued that cognitiv information. tha ded as true and one follo from the nd thus cogntive disson of the ine prop or b enc asive Theatter process of the inconsistency betw sitions is particularly relevant for the present question of explic uasive smay add new to the by ng t prop mply a different evaluation of a given attitude object.x udgments de object when they find concplici to aradigm. in wh explic ack to this question in more detail when we con are the APE ion for their nodel with pe miliar with sit (i.e.,when the find an addition an object (se 10g io aght (Te .1978 or introspection (Wils ive e er,these processes of achieving cy ma by var 19962、m0 for an evaluation can change Baron.1997;C ecle Lui.1983:Stone& object.From the perspective of the these m
2001; Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wa¨nke, 1995; Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Banse, 2005; Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996; Sia, Lord, Blessum, Thomas, & Lepper, 1999; Wilder, Simon, & Faith, 1996). From a general perspective, this research has demonstrated that participants evaluated a social group more negatively when they had recently encountered a negatively evaluated exemplar of the group. In contrast, participants evaluated the same group more positively when they had recently encountered a positively evaluated exemplar. Findings such as these are consistent with the assumption that recently encountered group members influence the associative pattern that gets activated for the group. Such changes in pattern activation should influence the associative evaluation of the group (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001), which, in turn, may serve as a basis for evaluation judgments about the group. Changes in the set of considered propositions. The second kind of influence on evaluative judgments involves changes in the set of propositions that are considered to be relevant for an evaluative judgment. According to the APE model, this may be the case when either (a) the acquisition of new propositional beliefs about the world or (b) the additional consideration of already familiar propositions implies a change in the evaluation of an attitude object. The first case is probably best reflected in research on persuasion (for reviews, see Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). In studies of persuasion, participants are usually exposed to a persuasive message containing either strong or weak arguments about an attitude object and different kinds of peripheral or heuristic cues, such as the expertise of the source, the likability of the source, or consensus information. A well-replicated finding is that under conditions of low cognitive elaboration, attitudes are more likely to be influenced by peripheral or heuristic cues rather than by the quality of the arguments (but see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Under conditions of high elaboration, in contrast, attitudes are more likely to be influenced by the quality of arguments, whereas the influence of peripheral or heuristic cues is often (but not always) attenuated. From the perspective of the APE model, persuasive arguments are—by definition—propositional statements and thus should influence attitudes primarily by processes of propositional reasoning. In other words, exposing participants to persuasive arguments may add new propositions to the set of propositions that are considered to be relevant for an evaluative judgment. If such changes in the set of considered propositions imply a different evaluation of a given attitude object, exposure to persuasive arguments is quite likely to lead to explicit attitude change. However, if the changes in the set of considered propositions do not imply a different evaluation, exposure to persuasive arguments should not lead to explicit attitude change. We come back to this question in more detail when we compare the APE model with persuasion models of attitude change. The second case is represented by instances in which the additional consideration of already familiar propositions implies a change in evaluative judgments about an attitude object (see Judd & Lusk, 1984). Evidence for this kind of influence comes from research on mere thought (Tesser, 1978) or introspection (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). Studies in these areas have demonstrated that merely thinking about an attitude object or introspecting about the reasons for an evaluation can change evaluative judgments about the object. From the perspective of the APE model, mere thought or introspection about reasons is likely to add new propositions to the set of propositions that are considered to be relevant for an evaluative judgment. If such additionally considered propositions imply a different evaluation, mere thought and introspection should change evaluative judgments about the attitude object. If, however, additionally considered propositions confirm the original evaluation, enhanced thinking about an attitude object should leave evaluative judgments unaffected (or lead to attitude polarization; see Tesser, 1978). These assumptions are consistent with research showing that introspection about the reasons, but not introspection on feelings, leads to changes in evaluative judgments about an attitude object (e.g., Millar & Tesser, 1986; Wilson & Dunn, 1986). Changes in the strategy to achieve consistency. The third kind of change in evaluative judgments involves changes in the strategy to achieve consistency. This kind of influence is prototypically reflected in research on cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger (1957), two cognitions are dissonant when, considered by themselves, one of them follows from the opposite of the other. Conversely, two cognitions are consonant when one of them does not follow from the opposite of the other. Because the notion of logical implication presupposed in this definition requires an assignment of truth values, cognitive dissonance can be regarded as an inherently propositional phenomenon. Consistent with this claim, Gawronski and Strack (2004) recently argued that both the causes of cognitive dissonance and the process of dissonance reduction are inherently propositional. With regard to the causes of cognitive dissonance, Gawronski and Strack argued that cognitive inconsistency—and thus cognitive dissonance—arises when two propositions are regarded as true and one follows from the opposite of the other. With regard to the process of dissonance reduction, Gawronski and Strack argued that people resolve cognitive inconsistency—and thus cognitive dissonance—either by explicitly rejecting one of the inconsistent propositions as false or by finding an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (see also Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press; Kruglanski, 1989). The latter process of resolving the inconsistency between propositions is particularly relevant for the present question of explicit attitude change. Changes in evaluative judgments may occur when people resolve the inconsistency within a set of relevant propositions by rejecting the propositional implications of an associative evaluation. However, people may not change their evaluative judgments about an attitude object when they find an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency. These cases are well reflected in Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) induced compliance paradigm, in which counterattitudinal behavior leads to explicit attitude change only when participants do not have a situational explanation for their counterattitudinal behavior (i.e., when they reject the propositional implications of their associative evaluations), not when they can justify their counterattitudinal behavior with situational factors (i.e., when they find an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency between their counterattitudinal behavior and the propositional implication of their associative evaluations). Moreover, these processes of achieving consistency may be affected by various moderators (e.g., HarmonJones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996; Stalder & Baron, 1997; C. M. Steele & Lui, 1983; Stone & Cooper, 2003; for a review, see J. M. Olson & Stone, 2005), such that these moderIMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 701
