balance of probabilities, and it suggested that this failure occurred whether one adopted the Secretary of States wide or its own narrow definition of national securit In the Court of Appeal, Lord Woolf took the position on the first issue that the Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the wide definition of national security, which regards the promotion of terrorism against any state as capable of being a threat to national security. On the second, he reasoned that because the Commission had viewed the facts through the lens of its narrower definition, its approach was so different from the Secretary of State's correct' approach that the Commissions decision was flawed. The question of the danger posed to national security had to be treated not only as a matter of proof of individual allegations, but against the backdrop of the executives policy with regard to national security.Hence he remitted the matter to the Commission for redetermination following the approach he had ndicated to be correct The House of lords rejected Rehman's appeal against this decision, and in so doing made more explicit the normative structure of lord WoolS approach. In particular, Lord Hoffman reasoned that the Commissions approach was wrong both on constitutional grounds-the Commission had not understood what is entailed by the doctrine of the separation of powers-and because it did not understand what is involved in review of a primary decision-maker's findings of fact. On the separation of powers, Lord Hoffman said that what is meant by ' national security' is a question of construction and therefore a question of law within the jurisdiction of the 6 Rehman AC, 7917 balance of probabilities’, and it suggested that this failure occurred whether one adopted the Secretary of State’s wide or its own narrow definition of national security. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Woolf took the position on the first issue that the Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the wide definition of national security, which regards the promotion of terrorism against any state as capable of being a threat to national security. On the second, he reasoned that because the Commission had viewed the facts through the lens of its narrower definition, its approach was so different from the Secretary of State’s ‘correct’ approach that the Commission’s decision was flawed. The question of the danger posed to national security had to be treated not only as a matter of proof of individual allegations, but against the backdrop of the ‘executive’s policy with regard to national security’.6 Hence he remitted the matter to the Commission for redetermination following the approach he had indicated to be correct. The House of Lords rejected Rehman’s appeal against this decision, and in so doing made more explicit the normative structure of Lord Woolf’s approach. In particular, Lord Hoffman reasoned that the Commission’s approach was wrong both on constitutional grounds - the Commission had not understood what is entailed by the doctrine of the separation of powers – and because it did not understand what is involved in review of a primary decision-maker’s findings of fact. On the separation of powers, Lord Hoffman said that what is meant by ‘national security’ ‘is a question of construction and therefore a question of law within the jurisdiction of the 6 Rehman AC, 791