Commission. However, he also said that that 'there is no difficulty about what"national security" means. It is the security of the United Kingdom and its people. Further, the question of whether something is "in the interests"of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive He rejected the Commissions argument that this line of reasoning would be such as to defeat the purpose for which the Commission was set up. It was 'important, he said, neither to blur nor to exaggerate the area of responsibility entrusted to the executive. Here he said that the factual basis for the executive 's opinion that deportation would be in the interests of national security must be established by evidence. And the limitations of the appellate process meant that the Commission was prevented from saying that although the Home Secretarys opinion that rehman was actively supporting terrorism in Kashmir had a proper factual basis, it did not accept that this was contrary to the interests of national security 7 Rebman HL, 139, 150. Hoffman had set the stage for his judgment in Rebman in "A Sense of Proportion"in M Andenas and F Jacobs(eds), European Commumity Law in the Englis Courts(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 149. See, especially, 153, the unjustified claim that"'In the hierarchy of values which the courts apply, the security of the State always wins,; and see also 158-9 8 Rehman Hl, 140, 54. He relied on lord Scarman's analysis ference to Chandler r DPP1962 3AllER 142,( 1964 AC 763)in Council of Ciril Serice Unions r Minister for tbe Cini/ Semice[1985 AC 374, 406; hereafter GCHQ. At 406-7, Scarman said that once the factual basis of a claim about national security is established by evidence, the courts will accept the opinion of the government as to what is required to meet it, unless the opinion is one which ' no reasonable minister advising the Crown could in the circumstances reasonably have held. He also claimed that this test did not demonstrate an abdication of the judicial function, but rather respected a limitation entirely consistent with the general development of the modern case Law of judicial review. Lord Steyn seemed a little ambivalent on this point in Rebman HL- see his oblique comment about Chandler at 134-5, 318 Commission’. However, he also said that that ‘there is no difficulty about what “national security” means. It is the security of the United Kingdom and its people.’ Further, the ‘question of whether something is “in the interests” of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive.’7 He rejected the Commission’s argument that this line of reasoning would be such as to ‘defeat the purpose for which the Commission was set up’. It was ‘important’, he said, ‘neither to blur nor to exaggerate the area of responsibility entrusted to the executive.’ Here he said that the factual basis for the executive’s opinion that deportation would be in the interests of national security must be established by evidence.8 And the limitations of the appellate process meant that the Commission was prevented from saying that although the Home Secretary’s opinion that Rehman was actively supporting terrorism in Kashmir had a proper factual basis, it did not accept that this was contrary to the interests of national security. 7 Rehman HL, 139, ¶ 50. Hoffman had set the stage for his judgment in Rehman in “A Sense of Proportion” in M Andenas and F Jacobs (eds), European Community Law in the English Courts (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 149. See, especially, 153, the unjustified claim that ‘In the hierarchy of values which the courts apply, the security of the State always wins’; and see also 158-9. 8 Rehman HL, 140, ¶ 54. He relied on Lord Scarman’s analysis (by reference to Chandler v DPP [1962] 3 All ER 142, [1964] AC 763) in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 406; hereafter GCHQ. At 406-7, Scarman said that once the factual basis of a claim about national security is established by evidence, the courts will accept the opinion of the government as to what is required to meet it, unless the opinion is one which ‘no reasonable minister advising the Crown could in the circumstances reasonably have held’. He also claimed that this test did not demonstrate an ‘abdication of the judicial function’, but rather respected a limitation entirely consistent with the general ‘development of the modern case law of judicial review’. Lord Steyn seemed a little ambivalent on this point in Rehman HL – see his oblique comment about Chandler at 134-5, ¶ 31