2. We have a duty to be impartial between legitimate claims on us, i. e, we must attempt"with equal care" to satisfy all legitimate claims. (And a legitimate claim is not generated automatically by having interests. 3. Legitimate claims on us are derived from our particular social relationships to others, e.g., being a parent, a friend, a lawyer, an employer 4. So insofar as impartiality is a duty, it derives from particular social relationships to others. (1, 2, 3) 5. So, we are not required to be impartial between those we have an established relationship with and those we do not. ( 4) From this we can conclude that we have no obligation, then, to give significant amounts to aid distant others with whom One strategy would be to note that the argument as it stands is not conclusive. Blum argues that we don, t have a genel d? we have no relationship. It would appear that this provides a way out of Singer's conclusions. How would Singer respo moral obligation to respond impartially to people's interests per se, and we do have an obligation to respond to legitimate claims on us derived from particular relationships. But these options are not necessarily exhaustive. Perhaps we also have a duty to respond impartially to extreme human need; or perhaps those in danger of extreme suffering and death do have legitimate claims on us even if they do not have an established relationship with us. And Blum seems to grant this latter point(p. 102) So although virtue ethics provides a strategy for responding to Singer, it has not offered a conclusive rebuttal Questions: 1. Is there a real difference between MacIntyre's particularism and universalism? Isn,'t there a way to formulate a general moral requirement that he himself suggests, e.g., " Iwe need] to recognize the existence of an additional virtue.. the virtue of having an adequate sense of traditions to which one belongs or which confront one. "(p. 248)? 2. Why should we think that individuals"inherit"the moral obligations, etc, of their history and tradition? Aren,'t we each free to make our own path in life? Isn 't what's good for me a matter of my choices and preferences? what reasons does MacIntyre give for denying this?2. We have a duty to be impartial between legitimate claims on us, i.e., we must attempt "with equal care" to satisfy all legitimate claims. (And a legitimate claim is not generated automatically by having interests.) 3. Legitimate claims on us are derived from our particular social relationships to others, e.g., being a parent, a friend, a lawyer, an employer. 4. So insofar as impartiality is a duty, it derives from particular social relationships to others. (1, 2, 3) 5. So, we are not required to be impartial between those we have an established relationship with and those we do not. (4) From this we can conclude that we have no obligation, then, to give significant amounts to aid distant others with whom we have no relationship. It would appear that this provides a way out of Singer's conclusions. How would Singer respond? One strategy would be to note that the argument as it stands is not conclusive. Blum argues that we don't have a general moral obligation to respond impartially to people's interests per se, and we do have an obligation to respond to legitimate claims on us derived from particular relationships. But these options are not necessarily exhaustive. Perhaps we also have a duty to respond impartially to extreme human need; or perhaps those in danger of extreme suffering and death do have legitimate claims on us even if they do not have an established relationship with us. And Blum seems to grant this latter point. (p. 102) So although virtue ethics provides a strategy for responding to Singer, it has not offered a conclusive rebuttal. Questions: 1. Is there a real difference between MacIntyre's particularism and universalism? Isn't there a way to formulate a general moral requirement that he himself suggests, e.g., "[we need] to recognize the existence of an additional virtue...the virtue of having an adequate sense of traditions to which one belongs or which confront one..." (p. 248)? 2. Why should we think that individuals "inherit" the moral obligations, etc., of their history and tradition? Aren't we each free to make our own path in life? Isn't what's good for me a matter of my choices and preferences? What reasons does MacIntyre give for denying this?