character of the good. the good life for [human beings] is the life spent in seeking for the good life for[human beings), and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for human beings] is.(p. 245) Each virtue enables one to perform well in a particular sphere of life, and the virtues together enable one to live a good life as a whole. For example, bravery enables one to perform well in situations of danger; justice enables one to carry out successfully one's dealings with the others in a community; having all of the virtues enables one to perform excellently in all aspects of life. Truly living well--achieving the good life--requires that one have all of the virtues; complete virtue is the key to happiness iiiVirtues and traditions: social identity and moral particularity The link between virtue and the good life provides a basis for an overarching set of human virtues common to us all However, remember MacIntyre is a particularist. So we still need to understand where the particularism is located in his view. As a particularist, MacIntyre needs to argue that what I ought to do in a situation is not necessarily what another ought to do; there are at least some cases in which no universal principle can adequately direct us. He says I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual. it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, someone's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity. (p 245) He goes on to emphasize that we need not be limited by the traditions and the history that give us our social identities; in fact we can go on to critique and repudiate the values implicit in them. However, one enters moral life already possessing a substantive identity(one is not born a moral"blank slate"), and even if one rejects this identity, this too is a move in a particular narrative and is possible only within certain traditions II. Impartiality and virtue According to a virtue ethics, one's moral obligations are derived, at least in part, from one's particular social identity, one's social roles, one's tradition. E.g., a wife has different obligations towards her husband than others have, and what obligations she has qua wife depend on the cultural meaning of the relationship between husband and wife. In cultures that lack the social role of wife, there are no specifically wifely obligations In his essay, "Impartiality, Beneficence, and Friendship, "Lawrence Blum argues that our duty to be impartial, insofar as there is one, is derived from particular social roles and does not apply to us generally. E.g, we are obligated to be impartial when in the role of judge, or teacher, but in our ordinary dealings with others we are entitled to be partial towards our friends and family. Although Blum does not endorse the full extent of MacIntyre' s virtue ethics, his argument compatible with MacIntyre's account, and with the basic strategies of virtue ethics. Very briefly, his argument is this(see especially p. 103) 1. There is no general moral requirement to be impartial regarding people's interests per se. I.e., one is not morally obligated to treat everyone's interests equally. (This is argued for in section II, pp. 101-2)character of the good....the good life for [human beings] is the life spent in seeking for the good life for [human beings], and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for [human beings] is. (p. 245) Each virtue enables one to perform well in a particular sphere of life, and the virtues together enable one to live a good life as a whole. For example, bravery enables one to perform well in situations of danger; justice enables one to carry out successfully one's dealings with the others in a community; having all of the virtues enables one to perform excellently in all aspects of life. Truly living well--achieving the good life--requires that one have all of the virtues; complete virtue is the key to happiness. iii) Virtues and traditions: social identity and moral particularity The link between virtue and the good life provides a basis for an overarching set of human virtues common to us all. However, remember MacIntyre is a particularist. So we still need to understand where the particularism is located in his view. As a particularist, MacIntyre needs to argue that what I ought to do in a situation is not necessarily what another ought to do; there are at least some cases in which no universal principle can adequately direct us. He says: I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual...it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, someone's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity. (p. 245) He goes on to emphasize that we need not be limited by the traditions and the history that give us our social identities; in fact we can go on to critique and repudiate the values implicit in them. However, one enters moral life already possessing a substantive identity (one is not born a moral "blank slate"), and even if one rejects this identity, this too is a move in a particular narrative and is possible only within certain traditions. III. Impartiality and Virtue According to a virtue ethics, one's moral obligations are derived, at least in part, from one's particular social identity, one's social roles, one's tradition. E.g., a wife has different obligations towards her husband than others have, and what obligations she has qua wife depend on the cultural meaning of the relationship between husband and wife. In cultures that lack the social role of wife, there are no specifically wifely obligations. In his essay, "Impartiality, Beneficence, and Friendship," Lawrence Blum argues that our duty to be impartial, insofar as there is one, is derived from particular social roles and does not apply to us generally. E.g., we are obligated to be impartial when in the role of judge, or teacher, but in our ordinary dealings with others we are entitled to be partial towards our friends and family. Although Blum does not endorse the full extent of MacIntyre's virtue ethics, his argument is compatible with MacIntyre's account, and with the basic strategies of virtue ethics. Very briefly, his argument is this (see especially p. 103): 1. There is no general moral requirement to be impartial regarding people's interests per se. I.e., one is not morally obligated to treat everyone's interests equally. (This is argued for in section II, pp. 101-2)