inspired by the ancient Greek approach to ethics found in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. For the ancient Greeks, the notion of virtue is tied to the notion of function. The virtues of something are what enable it to perform excellently its proper function. Virtue extends beyond the realm of morality; it concerns the excellent performance of any function. For example the function of a paring knife is to cut fruits and vegetables. A paring knife"has virtues"relative to that function, e.g,a good paring knife is sharp, strong, easy to handle, etc. From this it appears that our own broad idea of virtue retains the Greek suggestion that virtue is excellence in performing one's proper function MacIntyre argues that there are three stages in his account of the virtues. In the first stage he links virtue with practices; in the second stage he links virtue with the good life for humans; in the third stage he links virtue with traditions. (See, e. g p. 245)Let's consider each in turn 1 Virtues and practices Begin with the idea of a role. Typically for professional roles there are specific tasks one is expected to perform and a particular function one is supposed to serve. So, e. g, the function of a doctor is to heal, of a professor is to teach, of a cab driver to deliver people to their destinations. Being a good doctor, professor, or cab driver, will involve particular"virtue specific to the role. MacIntyre calls these"professional skills", they are virtues in the narrowest sense.(. 239)Virtues are broader than this, however, for they concern our dispositions to act across a wider range of situations. But still, MacIntyre suggests, virtues are grounded in narratives that provide unity to our lives In asking, "What should I do? one must first situate oneself in a narrative that gives the context for one's intentions and the expected consequences. Example of man working in the garden. p. 240-1]The answer, then, will depend on one's role in this broad narrative. For example, in acting in the context in question is one acting as a wife or a husband? a parent or a child? an eldest son? a black sheep of the family? an unruly daughter? Just as there are"virtues"for a professional role, there are virtues for such narrative roles, i.e there are better and worse ways of"playing the part". In order to make sense of ourselves and others we construct structure Internal to these narratives we will be able to achieve certain goods; the relationships of parent/chil ative narratives, situate each other in parts, and evaluate our options(and each other )against the backdrop of the narrative teacher/student, etc. involve a set of practices that enable us to obtain things that are good, and in some cases unique to the practice(e.g, the pride in getting an"A"). But we're not yet talking about moral virtue ii Virtues and"the good life Continuing with the Greek conception of virtue, human virtue is that which enables a human being to perform well or excellently the proper function of a human being. A virtuous person is one who has the ability to live excellently, i.e,to live a full, productive, and happy human life. Moral goodness(moral virtue)is a kind of functional goodness: goodness elative to our proper purpose or function. We may find it odd to speak of the proper goal or function of a human being, what is the function of human beings? The function of something is linked to what it can do especially well, or what only it can do. For humans, to put the point broadly, this is to live a distinctively human life; of course what constitutes a distinctively human life, and distinctively human excellence is controversial Here an extended quote from MacIntyre will be helpful in fleshing out his view of the human good, and his version of virtue ethi The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and kind of political communities in which men and women can seek the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about theinspired by the ancient Greek approach to ethics found in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. For the ancient Greeks, the notion of virtue is tied to the notion of function. The virtues of something are what enable it to perform excellently its proper function. Virtue extends beyond the realm of morality; it concerns the excellent performance of any function. For example the function of a paring knife is to cut fruits and vegetables. A paring knife "has virtues" relative to that function, e.g., a good paring knife is sharp, strong, easy to handle, etc. From this it appears that our own broad idea of virtue retains the Greek suggestion that virtue is excellence in performing one's proper function. MacIntyre argues that there are three stages in his account of the virtues. In the first stage he links virtue with practices; in the second stage he links virtue with the good life for humans; in the third stage he links virtue with traditions. (See, e.g., p. 245) Let's consider each in turn: i) Virtues and practices Begin with the idea of a role. Typically for professional roles there are specific tasks one is expected to perform and a particular function one is supposed to serve. So, e.g., the function of a doctor is to heal, of a professor is to teach, of a cab driver to deliver people to their destinations. Being a good doctor, professor, or cab driver, will involve particular "virtues" specific to the role. MacIntyre calls these "professional skills"; they are virtues in the narrowest sense. (p. 239) Virtues are broader than this, however, for they concern our dispositions to act across a wider range of situations. But still, MacIntyre suggests, virtues are grounded in narratives that provide unity to our lives. In asking, "What should I do?" one must first situate oneself in a narrative that gives the context for one's intentions and the expected consequences. [Example of man working in the garden. p. 240-1] The answer, then, will depend on one's role in this broad narrative. For example, in acting in the context in question is one acting as a wife or a husband? a parent or a child? an eldest son? a black sheep of the family? an unruly daughter? Just as there are "virtues" for a professional role, there are virtues for such narrative roles, i.e., there are better and worse ways of "playing the part". In order to make sense of ourselves and others we construct narratives, situate each other in parts, and evaluate our options (and each other) against the backdrop of the narrative structure. Internal to these narratives we will be able to achieve certain goods; the relationships of parent/child, teacher/student, etc. involve a set of practices that enable us to obtain things that are good, and in some cases unique to the practice (e.g., the pride in getting an "A"). But we're not yet talking about moral virtue. ii) Virtues and "the good life" Continuing with the Greek conception of virtue, human virtue is that which enables a human being to perform well or excellently the proper function of a human being. A virtuous person is one who has the ability to live excellently, i.e., to live a full, productive, and happy human life. Moral goodness (moral virtue) is a kind of functional goodness: goodness relative to our proper purpose or function. We may find it odd to speak of the proper goal or function of a human being; what is the function of human beings? The function of something is linked to what it can do especially well, or what only it can do. For humans, to put the point broadly, this is to live a distinctively human life; of course what constitutes a distinctively human life, and distinctively human excellence is controversial. Here an extended quote from MacIntyre will be helpful in fleshing out his view of the human good, and his version of virtue ethics: The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and kind of political communities in which men and women can seek the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the