24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger December 5 200 Particularism and virtue ethics I. Universalism and Particularism We've considered before some basic questions that we would expect a moral theory to answer i)Which acts are right and which are wrong? Which acts ought we to perform(understanding the"ought"as a moral ii)What makes a particular action right or wrong? What is it about the action that determines its moral status? iii) How do we know what is right and wrong? Both utilitarianism and Kantianism(and egoism) are what are sometimes called universalistic moral theories they pr a single general characterization of what makes an action right or wrong that determines for anyone at any time what is the right(or wrong) thing to do. a utilitarian holds that actions are right insofar as they maximize happiness [pleasure, utility a Kantian holds that actions are right insofar as they satisfy the categorical imperative. These views are universalistic because regardless of who you are, where you came from, what role you currently occupy, or what your own desires/preferences are, the same principle that determines what you ought to do, determines what everyone else ought to do. (Note that it doesn't follow that you can al ways tell what it is that you ought to do sometimes it is difficult to apply the principle to get a clear result because we don' t have enough information, etc. We've noted before that utilitarianism and Kantianism(and egoism) are also objectivist moral theories, i. e, they are committed to there being objective moral truth; morality is not just a matter of what a particular group or individual believes to be right or wrong. But not all objectivist moral theories are universalistic. According to some moral theories, what you ought to do in a particular situation may depend in part on particular facts about yourself, your culture, and your social role, that a universalistic theory would not regard as morally significant. Another way of putting it is that universalistic theories tend to view morality in terms of what our responsibilities are to each other as persons, where this might mean viewing us as individuals capable of happiness [pleasure, utility], or as individuals capable of rationality or freedom. What is morally significant about us, i. e, what is the proper subject of moral agency and the object of moral concern, is the same for all. From the universalistic perspective, arguably, the moral stance is a stance of impartiality: to act morally is to act, in a sense, with due respect to the equal personhood of al In contrast to universalistic theories, some moral theories are particularist. Particularist theories resist the idea that morality consists in universal principles that apply to all of us as persons. Although a particularist may allow that there are some universal principles, or that there are some moral requirements that apply to us as persons, this does not exhaust the moral domain. More specifically, the particularist is concerned to emphasize the way in which our actions are embedded in particular social roles and relationships that structure what is right and wrong for each of us. Note that this is not a return to a form of(cultural)relativism. The particularist is not saying that whether I ought to perform an action a is entirely a matter of what my culture says I ought to do. The particularist holds that there are objective facts about what I ought to do But what I ought to do is not determined simply by my personhood (and the personhood of those affected), but is at least partly determined by particular social and historical facts about me(and those around me).(Hopefully the contrast between particularism and relativism will become clearer as we proceed. IL. MacIntyres Virtue ethics There are different versions of particularism. We will look briefly at a form of virtue ethics espoused by alasdair MacIntyre that is plausibly particularist(note that there are many forms of virtue ethics too! ) Virtue ethics is often24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger December 5, 2001 Particularism and Virtue Ethics I. Universalism and Particularism We've considered before some basic questions that we would expect a moral theory to answer: i) Which acts are right and which are wrong? Which acts ought we to perform (understanding the "ought" as a moral "ought")? ii) What makes a particular action right or wrong? What is it about the action that determines its moral status? iii) How do we know what is right and wrong? Both utilitarianism and Kantianism (and egoism) are what are sometimes called universalistic moral theories: they provide a single general characterization of what makes an action right or wrong that determines for anyone at any time what is the right (or wrong) thing to do. A utilitarian holds that actions are right insofar as they maximize happiness [pleasure, utility]; a Kantian holds that actions are right insofar as they satisfy the categorical imperative. These views are universalistic because regardless of who you are, where you came from, what role you currently occupy, or what your own desires/preferences are, the same principle that determines what you ought to do, determines what everyone else ought to do. (Note that it doesn't follow that you can always tell what it is that you ought to do; sometimes it is difficult to apply the principle to get a clear result because we don't have enough information, etc.) We've noted before that utilitarianism and Kantianism (and egoism) are also objectivist moral theories, i.e., they are committed to there being objective moral truth; morality is not just a matter of what a particular group or individual believes to be right or wrong. But not all objectivist moral theories are universalistic. According to some moral theories, what you ought to do in a particular situation may depend in part on particular facts about yourself, your culture, and your social role, that a universalistic theory would not regard as morally significant. Another way of putting it is that universalistic theories tend to view morality in terms of what our responsibilities are to each other as persons, where this might mean viewing us as individuals capable of happiness [pleasure, utility], or as individuals capable of rationality or freedom. What is morally significant about us, i.e., what is the proper subject of moral agency and the object of moral concern, is the same for all. From the universalistic perspective, arguably, the moral stance is a stance of impartiality: to act morally is to act, in a sense, with due respect to the equal personhood of all. In contrast to universalistic theories, some moral theories are particularist. Particularist theories resist the idea that morality consists in universal principles that apply to all of us as persons. Although a particularist may allow that there are some universal principles, or that there are some moral requirements that apply to us as persons, this does not exhaust the moral domain. More specifically, the particularist is concerned to emphasize the way in which our actions are embedded in particular social roles and relationships that structure what is right and wrong for each of us. Note that this is not a return to a form of (cultural) relativism. The particularist is not saying that whether I ought to perform an action A is entirely a matter of what my culture says I ought to do. The particularist holds that there are objective facts about what I ought to do. But what I ought to do is not determined simply by my personhood (and the personhood of those affected), but is at least partly determined by particular social and historical facts about me (and those around me). (Hopefully the contrast between particularism and relativism will become clearer as we proceed.) II. MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics There are different versions of particularism. We will look briefly at a form of virtue ethics espoused by Alasdair MacIntyre that is plausibly particularist (note that there are many forms of virtue ethics too!). Virtue ethics is often