Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a"picture of a implicit order of hope,an aspect of his thought that has man pessimistic about politics"(Wills 1999,129),inter- gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine.Drawing on preters have added fuel(and sometimes brimstone)to sermons,letters,and treatises often overlooked by po- Augustine's fire. litical interpreters,I argue that Augustine allows hope Elsewhere,I analyze these passages and the method- for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes- ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor- simistic interpretations,focusing in particular on how der,namely,the vices of presumption and despair.The interpreters often abstract Augustine's texts from their fourth section considers whether distinctly political historical,rhetorical,and pedagogical contexts.Trained goods can be among hope's proper objects.Focusing in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses on Augustine's account of the commonwealth,I argue op//s excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas- that Augustine commends "civic peace"as a common ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens hopes to the heavenly city,even as he affirms the value with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli- Moreover,I contend this "civic peace"consists not tics(Lamb,forthcoming).While understanding Augus- merely in the absence of violence,as many interpreters tine's rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to assume,but in a more positive form of civic friendship complicating influential views of his pessimism,this ar- among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au- his "order of love,"which often fuels suspicions that gustine's hope for such a commonwealth can inform Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es- contemporary politics.First,Augustine's triad of pre- capist. sumption,hope,and despair provides a more nuanced Hannah Arendt,for example,complains that Augus- conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis- tine's otherworldly love makes a "desert out of this course that avoids the common binary between opti- world"and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, mism and pessimism.Second,his vision of the com 4r元 19;cf.93-7).Following Arendt,Martha Nussbaum ar- monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share gues that the"insistent otherworldly direction"of Au- common hopes without requiring either strict neutral- gustine's love encourages passivity in politics and com- ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition.Fi- & plicity in suffering (2001,551-6).Meanwhile,David nally,his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine's oth- entails an expansive view of the political that directs erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol- citizens'hopes to objects beyond elections or formal itics (2004,135-6)."Augustine cannot develop an institutions of government,which is especially impor- adequate view of politics,"Billings argues,"because tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec- might tempt despair. ular(worldly)events cannot attain true significance.In other words,while Augustine's eschatological ends do THE ORDER OF LOVE provide a kind of hope,they do not provide political hope-ie.,a hope that can sustain and enrich politi- In On Christian Teaching,Augustine analyzes the cal action"(2004.135-6).Because Augustine considers Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by love of the world to be"idolatry."these critics assume. developing his early and influential account of the "or- he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. der of love: Augustine's hope is not“for the world”but“against'”it Billings 2004.136:cf.Arendt 1996.106). The person who lives a just and holy life is one...who has ordered his love,so that he does not love what it is wrong to This article draws on neglected texts to challenge love,or fail to love what should be loved,or love too much influential interpretations of Augustine's political what should be loved less (or love too little what should pessimism and show how Augustine's hope for the be loved more),or love two things equally if one of them commonwealth can inform contemporary politics.To should be loved either less or more than the other.or love situate the discussion,the first section sets forth Augus things either more of less if they should be loved equally tine's controversial account of the "order of love"(ordo (1997a.1.2728). amoris)and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters-Arendt,Nussbaum,and Rein- To determine which objects to love and how to love hold Niebuhr-who worry that Augustine's order of them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between eys love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the “use”(usus/huti)and“enjoyment'”(fruitio/frui):There world of its value.The second section challenges the as- are some things which are to be enjoyed,some which are to be used.and some whose function is both to en- sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies and use.Those which are to be enjoyed make us to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian happy;those which are to be used assist us and give us hope because of anxieties about his "otherworldly' a boost,so to speak,as we press on towards our happi- ness,so that we may reach and hold fast to the things love.By highlighting how Augustine's order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics,I which make us happy"(1997a,1.3.3).2 Augustine goes show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered.The third section builds 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine's distinction between"use" and "enjoyment"in light of his pilgrimage motif,see Stewart- on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine's Kroeker(2014;2017,204-4). 1037Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a “picture of a man pessimistic about politics” (Wills 1999, 129), inter￾preters have added fuel (and sometimes brimstone) to Augustine’s fire. Elsewhere, I analyze these passages and the method￾ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes￾simistic interpretations, focusing in particular on how interpreters often abstract Augustine’s texts from their historical, rhetorical, and pedagogical contexts.Trained in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas￾ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their hopes to the heavenly city, even as he affirms the value of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli￾tics (Lamb, forthcoming).While understanding Augus￾tine’s rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to complicating influential views of his pessimism, this ar￾ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about his “order of love,” which often fuels suspicions that Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es￾capist. Hannah Arendt, for example, complains that Augus￾tine’s otherworldly love makes a “desert out of this world” and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, 19; cf. 93–7). Following Arendt, Martha Nussbaum ar￾gues that the “insistent otherworldly direction” of Au￾gustine’s love encourages passivity in politics and com￾plicity in suffering (2001, 551–6). Meanwhile, David Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine’s oth￾erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol￾itics (2004, 135–6). “Augustine cannot develop an adequate view of politics,” Billings argues, “because loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec￾ular (worldly) events cannot attain true significance. In other words, while Augustine’s eschatological ends do provide a kind of hope, they do not provide political hope—i.e., a hope that can sustain and enrich politi￾cal action” (2004, 135–6). Because Augustine considers love of the world to be “idolatry,” these critics assume, he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. Augustine’s hope is not “for the world” but “against” it (Billings 2004, 136; cf. Arendt 1996, 106). This article draws on neglected texts to challenge influential interpretations of Augustine’s political pessimism and show how Augustine’s hope for the commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. To situate the discussion, the first section sets forth Augus￾tine’s controversial account of the “order of love” (ordo amoris) and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters—Arendt, Nussbaum, and Rein￾hold Niebuhr—who worry that Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the world of its value.The second section challenges the as￾sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian hope because of anxieties about his “otherworldly” love. By highlighting how Augustine’s order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics, I show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered. The third section builds on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine’s implicit order of hope, an aspect of his thought that has gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine. Drawing on sermons, letters, and treatises often overlooked by po￾litical interpreters, I argue that Augustine allows hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor￾der, namely, the vices of presumption and despair. The fourth section considers whether distinctly political goods can be among hope’s proper objects. Focusing on Augustine’s account of the commonwealth, I argue that Augustine commends “civic peace” as a common object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. Moreover, I contend this “civic peace” consists not merely in the absence of violence, as many interpreters assume, but in a more positive form of civic friendship among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au￾gustine’s hope for such a commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. First, Augustine’s triad of pre￾sumption, hope, and despair provides a more nuanced conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis￾course that avoids the common binary between opti￾mism and pessimism. Second, his vision of the com￾monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share common hopes without requiring either strict neutral￾ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition. Fi￾nally, his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship entails an expansive view of the political that directs citizens’ hopes to objects beyond elections or formal institutions of government, which is especially impor￾tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions might tempt despair. THE ORDER OF LOVE In On Christian Teaching, Augustine analyzes the Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by developing his early and influential account of the “or￾der of love:” The person who lives a just and holy life is one . . . who has ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to love, or fail to love what should be loved, or love too much what should be loved less (or love too little what should be loved more), or love two things equally if one of them should be loved either less or more than the other, or love things either more of less if they should be loved equally (1997a, 1.27.28). To determine which objects to love and how to love them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between “use” (usus/uti) and “enjoyment” (fruitio/frui): “There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose function is both to en￾joy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy; those which are to be used assist us and give us a boost, so to speak, as we press on towards our happi￾ness, so that we may reach and hold fast to the things which make us happy” (1997a, 1.3.3).2 Augustine goes 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment” in light of his pilgrimage motif, see Stewart￾Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–4). 1037 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345