48 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler from Taiwan.The Chinese are also purchasing and attempting to secure co- production rights for advanced weaponry from Russia.Such arrangements include the Sukhoi fighter,surface to air missiles and submarines with antiship missiles.Chinese shipyards are pumping out new Chinese design destroyers,and there is increasing evidence of an interest in and emphasis on precision-guided munitions,information warfare and other asymmetrical strategies. Does this constitute an arms buildup?Not necessarily.The vast majority of Chinese military units remain under-trained and ill-equipped.Without discounting recent advances,the Chinese strategy appears transparent-to design and deploy forces specifically to deter and defeat if necessary US forces in and around Taiwan. From the US side of the equation,defence expenditure is rising,but not as a result of an arms race with China.US military budgets have increased after a short-lived decline following the collapse of the USSR.Some of this new expenditure-specifically the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment-could be interpreted by China as an attempt to thwart their ability to achieve Mutual Assured Destruction.The majority of US arms buildups,however,have been in direct reaction to the 9/11 attacks and Iraq.Spending on homeland defence, Special Forces,intelligence gathering and conventional capabilities are targeted towards terrorism and nations that harbour such activities far more than they are targeted at China.Despite an increase in military spending,with the one exception of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems designed,the US claims,against limited and accidental attacks-there is little indication at this time that an arms race is looming.China's actions support the argument that there is no ongoing arms race.There is no doubt that China could,if it so desired,dramatically increase its defence budget.The cost would be several percentage points of economic growth and any associated worker unrest. The fact that large military increases have not been opted for by the potential challenger indicates a major opportunity for the United States to build trust and incorporate China further into the satisfied camp.Such cooperation must be built with a proactive and purposeful foreign policy. US efforts under the Clinton administration allowed China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO),perhaps,at bargain rates.This process established the principle that growing international economic transactions by China would be ruled by the norms of the international community.These promising initiatives have not proceeded evenly or with authority;before 9/11,the controversy over the US spy plane damaged diplomatic activities; after 9/11,while relations with China have been stabilized,and there are direct and indirect signs of quiet cooperation,there is no evidence of any long-term plan on the US side.Time is passing. Third,is China dissatisfied with the international rules of the road? Acknowledging the growing influence of China regionally and globally, Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55from Taiwan. The Chinese are also purchasing and attempting to secure co￾production rights for advanced weaponry from Russia. Such arrangements include the Sukhoi fighter, surface to air missiles and submarines with antiship missiles. Chinese shipyards are pumping out new Chinese design destroyers, and there is increasing evidence of an interest in and emphasis on precision-guided munitions, information warfare and other asymmetrical strategies. Does this constitute an arms buildup? Not necessarily. The vast majority of Chinese military units remain under-trained and ill-equipped. Without discounting recent advances, the Chinese strategy appears transparent—to design and deploy forces specifically to deter and defeat if necessary US forces in and around Taiwan. From the US side of the equation, defence expenditure is rising, but not as a result of an arms race with China. US military budgets have increased after a short-lived decline following the collapse of the USSR. Some of this new expenditure—specifically the Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment—could be interpreted by China as an attempt to thwart their ability to achieve Mutual Assured Destruction. The majority of US arms buildups, however, have been in direct reaction to the 9/11 attacks and Iraq. Spending on homeland defence, Special Forces, intelligence gathering and conventional capabilities are targeted towards terrorism and nations that harbour such activities far more than they are targeted at China. Despite an increase in military spending, with the one exception of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems designed, the US claims, against limited and accidental attacks—there is little indication at this time that an arms race is looming. China’s actions support the argument that there is no ongoing arms race. There is no doubt that China could, if it so desired, dramatically increase its defence budget. The cost would be several percentage points of economic growth and any associated worker unrest. The fact that large military increases have not been opted for by the potential challenger indicates a major opportunity for the United States to build trust and incorporate China further into the satisfied camp. Such cooperation must be built with a proactive and purposeful foreign policy. US efforts under the Clinton administration allowed China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), perhaps, at bargain rates. This process established the principle that growing international economic transactions by China would be ruled by the norms of the international community. These promising initiatives have not proceeded evenly or with authority; before 9/11, the controversy over the US spy plane damaged diplomatic activities; after 9/11, while relations with China have been stabilized, and there are direct and indirect signs of quiet cooperation, there is no evidence of any long-term plan on the US side. Time is passing. Third, is China dissatisfied with the international rules of the road? Acknowledging the growing influence of China regionally and globally, 48 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55