《国际战略》课程教学资源：Power Transition and China–US conflicts.pdf_大学文库

Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55 doi:10.1093/cjip/pol003 Power Transition and China-US Conflicts Ronald L.Tammen*and Jacek Kugler The United States places at risk its opportunity to remain the world's pre- eminent nation by focusing all of its energy,time and capabilities on the war against terrorism and on its ancillary action in Iraq,despite compelling reasons otherwise.This myopia,conditioned by unambiguous security threats and the emotion of the moment,is abetted by a stubborn resistance to the maintenance of a long-term focus in foreign policy.Thus a combination of forces,imposed internally and externally,handicap American leadership and threaten the United States'strategic interests. The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent events in the Middle East have created a condition of immediacy in US foreign policy.The crisis de jure atmosphere dominates our attention and concentrates our intellectual resources.Short-term benefits do exist;for example,as a nation,America has been resilient in its response to the terrorist threat.However,the other pre-occupation,the debate over Iraq,has been notably near-term in its content.The strategic consequences of this action are being understood only now. Behind the facade of these all-consuming national priorities,American strategic thinking has grown stale.This is partly the result of the Cold War generation of policy makers failing to anticipate the new world,and finding their core concepts to be useless both in the war on terrorism and in the broader effort to maintain US leadership.It is also the fault of the supporting strategy-making community and its failure to provide fresh insight,continuity and focus. The potential consequences of this lapse in attention and intellectual insight could not be more severe.A great challenge for the United States and the world lies not in terrorism or even in regional conflict.Instead,it lies in the longer-term collision of interests between the US and an emerging,powerful China.Appreciation of that fact should force policy makers to recalculate and reanalyse current crises from a strategic perspective.Events in the Middle East,South Asia and East Asia are important not for what they are Jacek Kugler et al.,'Integrating Theory and Policy:Global Implications of the War in Iraq'. International Studies Review,Vol.6,No.4(2004).pp.163-79. Corresponding author.Email:tammen@pdx.edu Reproduced from the Science of Internationa/Politics,with kind permission of the authors and the Institute of International Studies,Tsinghua University

Power Transition and China–US Conflicts Ronald L. Tammen* and Jacek Kugler The United States places at risk its opportunity to remain the world’s preeminent nation by focusing all of its energy, time and capabilities on the war against terrorism and on its ancillary action in Iraq, despite compelling reasons otherwise. This myopia, conditioned by unambiguous security threats and the emotion of the moment, is abetted by a stubborn resistance to the maintenance of a long-term focus in foreign policy. Thus a combination of forces, imposed internally and externally, handicap American leadership and threaten the United States’ strategic interests. The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent events in the Middle East have created a condition of immediacy in US foreign policy. The crisis de jure atmosphere dominates our attention and concentrates our intellectual resources. Short-term benefits do exist; for example, as a nation, America has been resilient in its response to the terrorist threat. However, the other pre-occupation, the debate over Iraq, has been notably near-term in its content. The strategic consequences of this action are being understood only now.1 Behind the fac¸ade of these all-consuming national priorities, American strategic thinking has grown stale. This is partly the result of the Cold War generation of policy makers failing to anticipate the new world, and finding their core concepts to be useless both in the war on terrorism and in the broader effort to maintain US leadership. It is also the fault of the supporting strategy-making community and its failure to provide fresh insight, continuity and focus. The potential consequences of this lapse in attention and intellectual insight could not be more severe. A great challenge for the United States and the world lies not in terrorism or even in regional conflict. Instead, it lies in the longer-term collision of interests between the US and an emerging, powerful China. Appreciation of that fact should force policy makers to recalculate and reanalyse current crises from a strategic perspective. Events in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia are important not for what they are * Corresponding author. Email: tammen@pdx.edu 1 Jacek Kugler et al., ‘Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq’, International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2004), pp. 163–79. Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55 doi:10.1093/cjip/pol003 Reproduced from the Science of International Politics, with kind permission of the authors and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University

36 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler but for what they will demonstrate about American leadership in the ultimate contest to come,as Asia becomes the focal point of world politics.2 Theoretical Framework through a Policy Lens A snapshot of world power structures reveals a hierarchical structure implicitly recognized by national leaders.In the past,hierarchies were constructed around nation states,but in this global environment they also include powerful soft power non-national actors such as corporations, interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).This global hierarchy is constantly in flux,reflecting variations in relative power driven by differential nation-state growth rates and movements of capital and resources across frontiers.In today's hierarchy,the US dominance is unchallenged,but US pre-eminence is declining in relative terms,and will in two to four decades eventually dissipate.'This article focuses on the lack of a US long-range strategy;the absence of a plan to bring key nations and stakeholders into a US-led coalition of satisfied nations.It is a significant omission because such a coalition will be necessary when there are ominous challenges to US power. The United States,though the single largest military superpower,is not a global hegemon.It maintains dominance only by assembling and managing a coalition of nations with congruent preferences.Within their regional environments,Brazil,China or India play similar roles.Nations satisfied with the status quo accept the rules the pre-eminent nation creates,manages and defends,because they share the resulting stability,prosperity and peace. Some nations remain outside the leading coalition because they challenge or reject existing international rules and norms. Occasionally,these dissatisfied nations become powerful enough to challenge the pre-eminent nation for leadership of the global system.In such rare circumstances,world wars of massive devastation and scope reorder the global hierarchy.A similar process evolves in the periphery among members of regional hierarchies.Regional wars-evident in the Middle East today-alter the local distribution of power and reorder regional hierarchies but do not change the structure of world politics.This is where current strategic thinking has gone awry:the outcomes of the 2 This article gives recognition to various collaborative research efforts conducted by Ron Tammen,Jacek Kugler,Doug Lemke,Brian Efird and Siddarth Swamingthan including articles in Asian Perspective,International Studies Review and International Interactions, which published articles from the Power Transition Conference held in August 2003 in Carmel,CA.Analysis of the Taiwan situation is a continuation of the logic outlined in Power Transitions and an extension of an article and series of lectures given by Ron Tammen in Taiwan in 2004.See Ronald Tammen et al.,Power Transitions:Strategies for the 2/st Century (Chatham:Chatham House,2000). National Intelligence Council,Mapping the Global Future (Washington,DC:GPO,2004); Ronald Tammen et al.,Power Transitions. Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

but for what they will demonstrate about American leadership in the ultimate contest to come, as Asia becomes the focal point of world politics.2 Theoretical Framework through a Policy Lens A snapshot of world power structures reveals a hierarchical structure implicitly recognized by national leaders. In the past, hierarchies were constructed around nation states, but in this global environment they also include powerful soft power non-national actors such as corporations, interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This global hierarchy is constantly in flux, reflecting variations in relative power driven by differential nation-state growth rates and movements of capital and resources across frontiers. In today’s hierarchy, the US dominance is unchallenged, but US pre-eminence is declining in relative terms, and will in two to four decades eventually dissipate.3 This article focuses on the lack of a US long-range strategy; the absence of a plan to bring key nations and stakeholders into a US-led coalition of satisfied nations. It is a significant omission because such a coalition will be necessary when there are ominous challenges to US power. The United States, though the single largest military superpower, is not a global hegemon. It maintains dominance only by assembling and managing a coalition of nations with congruent preferences. Within their regional environments, Brazil, China or India play similar roles. Nations satisfied with the status quo accept the rules the pre-eminent nation creates, manages and defends, because they share the resulting stability, prosperity and peace. Some nations remain outside the leading coalition because they challenge or reject existing international rules and norms. Occasionally, these dissatisfied nations become powerful enough to challenge the pre-eminent nation for leadership of the global system. In such rare circumstances, world wars of massive devastation and scope reorder the global hierarchy. A similar process evolves in the periphery among members of regional hierarchies. Regional wars—evident in the Middle East today—alter the local distribution of power and reorder regional hierarchies but do not change the structure of world politics. This is where current strategic thinking has gone awry: the outcomes of the 2 This article gives recognition to various collaborative research efforts conducted by Ron Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Doug Lemke, Brian Efird and Siddarth Swamingthan including articles in Asian Perspective, International Studies Review and International Interactions, which published articles from the Power Transition Conference held in August 2003 in Carmel, CA. Analysis of the Taiwan situation is a continuation of the logic outlined in Power Transitions and an extension of an article and series of lectures given by Ron Tammen in Taiwan in 2004. See Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (Chatham: Chatham House, 2000). 3 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004); Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions. 36 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 37 Afghanistan and Irag conflicts may alter the face of terrorism and reshape the Middle East hierarchy,but will not fundamentally change the relations among contenders in the global hierarchy or ensure long-term stability for the United States.A new strategic vision must address these twin challenges.4 The sine qua non of the pre-eminent global power's foreign policy is global stability.Determined US stewardship over the last half century has forged a stable international political and economic system and a global regime that promotes,but does not absolutely insist upon,democracy,human rights, free press and open economic practices.These fundamental institutional structures tend to quell radical elements and help prevent tyranny by a minority or majority,regardless of ideological or religious preferences.The US liberal economic and political leadership is designed to utilize incentives (economic,financial and political)or,less often and less successfully. sanctions to align other nations'interests to those of our own.Where those interests cannot be aligned and a threat to global stability is evident,the United States exercises the use of force.Force tends to be the last resort as it is expensive. When force is used effectively,it has fundamental consequences for the global system.For example,following World War II,the United States recast the international system in a much more successful manner than the British did following the previous great war,solidifying the role of the United States in the world during the 20th century.Military occupation and the resulting change in political and economic systems,aided in the transitions of Germany,Italy and Japan into stable democratic members of the international community.Today,Germany is one of the leading nations of the European Union(EU),and Japan is a major economic player in Asia and beyond.The United States altered the political preferences and goals of populations in these countries to one more consistent with the international norms instituted for the global hierarchy led by the United States.The Cold War evidenced a similar end:the Soviet challenge was halted not because of ideological or military confrontation,but because the Soviet Union dissolved due to its internal bankruptcy and adopted an open market economy and an elementary democratic system.Experience demonstrates that changing preferences is the path to stability and prosperity. 4 The key concepts for strategic vision include variations in power,commitment to the stats quo,population,productivity and political capacity.Variation in the components of power-population.productivity and political capacity-are important to decision makers because they provide the preconditions to war.peace and integration.The propensity to engage in either war or policy integration is driven in part by the relative power among nations and in part by the degree of compliance or rejection of norms and rules that compose the status quo.Dominant nations cannot effectively control differential growth rates in the output of other nations,but their foreign policy can generate political satisfaction or dissatisfaction with existing rules in the hierarchy. Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts may alter the face of terrorism and reshape the Middle East hierarchy, but will not fundamentally change the relations among contenders in the global hierarchy or ensure long-term stability for the United States. A new strategic vision must address these twin challenges.4 The sine qua non of the pre-eminent global power’s foreign policy is global stability. Determined US stewardship over the last half century has forged a stable international political and economic system and a global regime that promotes, but does not absolutely insist upon, democracy, human rights, free press and open economic practices. These fundamental institutional structures tend to quell radical elements and help prevent tyranny by a minority or majority, regardless of ideological or religious preferences. The US liberal economic and political leadership is designed to utilize incentives (economic, financial and political) or, less often and less successfully, sanctions to align other nations’ interests to those of our own. Where those interests cannot be aligned and a threat to global stability is evident, the United States exercises the use of force. Force tends to be the last resort as it is expensive. When force is used effectively, it has fundamental consequences for the global system. For example, following World War II, the United States recast the international system in a much more successful manner than the British did following the previous great war, solidifying the role of the United States in the world during the 20th century. Military occupation and the resulting change in political and economic systems, aided in the transitions of Germany, Italy and Japan into stable democratic members of the international community. Today, Germany is one of the leading nations of the European Union (EU), and Japan is a major economic player in Asia and beyond. The United States altered the political preferences and goals of populations in these countries to one more consistent with the international norms instituted for the global hierarchy led by the United States. The Cold War evidenced a similar end: the Soviet challenge was halted not because of ideological or military confrontation, but because the Soviet Union dissolved due to its internal bankruptcy and adopted an open market economy and an elementary democratic system. Experience demonstrates that changing preferences is the path to stability and prosperity. 4 The key concepts for strategic vision include variations in power, commitment to the status quo, population, productivity and political capacity. Variation in the components of power—population, productivity and political capacity—are important to decision makers because they provide the preconditions to war, peace and integration. The propensity to engage in either war or policy integration is driven in part by the relative power among nations and in part by the degree of compliance or rejection of norms and rules that compose the status quo. Dominant nations cannot effectively control differential growth rates in the output of other nations, but their foreign policy can generate political satisfaction or dissatisfaction with existing rules in the hierarchy. Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 37 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

40 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler turns the balance of power concept on its head.In Figure 2,by comparison, the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded.This preponderant'view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who measure the probability of wars,and implicitly by many in the policy community. The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the international system challenge one another for dominance when they anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible An important new insight emerges from Figure 1.Conflict can still take place despite strong power asymmetry,but its severity will be much reduced. This deduction is supported by empirical evidence. When the global hierarchy was uniform,the United States and its allies were engaged in World War II.After 1945,the United States emerged as the preponderant power.It continued to wage wars in Korea,Vietnam, Kuwait and Iraq,but these wars produced limited casualties (compared to World Wars),as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda.Despite US preponderance,these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced.This formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction;the Seven Weeks'War between Austria and Prussia occurred at parity,but both nations were jointly satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders. The probability of conflict under parity is high,thus the conflict,but the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited.8 This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from England to the United States.As Figure I indicates,the condition required for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on the rules that guide the hierarchy.It is not just power relations-as realists would argue-that lead nations to wage conflict.Agreement or 6 Under balance of power,relative power equilibrium insures the peace.Under power parity or power transition,relative power equilibrium increases the probability of war.Figure 2 is a graphical display of the balance of power concept for comparison with the preponderance model in Figure 1. A.F.K.Organski,World Politics 2nd Edition (New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1968):Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds.Parity and War:Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1996):Ronald Tammen et al.,Power Transitions. s Like in elections within a single party,two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity. but under similar circumstances,like in elections across parties,two dissatisfied nations will wage total war of high severity. Nazli Choucri and Robert North,Nations in Conflict:National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco:Freeeman,1983). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

turns the balance of power concept on its head.6 In Figure 2, by comparison, the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded. This ‘preponderant’ view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who measure the probability of wars, and implicitly by many in the policy community.7 The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the international system challenge one another for dominance when they anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible. An important new insight emerges from Figure 1. Conflict can still take place despite strong power asymmetry, but its severity will be much reduced. This deduction is supported by empirical evidence. When the global hierarchy was uniform, the United States and its allies were engaged in World War II. After 1945, the United States emerged as the preponderant power. It continued to wage wars in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait and Iraq, but these wars produced limited casualties (compared to World Wars), as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda. Despite US preponderance, these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced. This formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction; the Seven Weeks’ War between Austria and Prussia occurred at parity, but both nations were jointly satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders. The probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited.8 This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from England to the United States.9 As Figure 1 indicates, the condition required for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on the rules that guide the hierarchy. It is not just power relations—as realists would argue—that lead nations to wage conflict. Agreement or 6 Under balance of power, relative power equilibrium insures the peace. Under power parity or power transition, relative power equilibrium increases the probability of war. Figure 2 is a graphical display of the balance of power concept for comparison with the preponderance model in Figure 1. 7 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics 2nd Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions. 8 Like in elections within a single party, two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity, but under similar circumstances, like in elections across parties, two dissatisfied nations will wage total war of high severity. 9 Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeeman, 1983). 40 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 41 disagreement with preferences,in coordination with parity,leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy.At the bottom left corner,Figure I accounts for the process of integration.Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II.A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period.Deutsch et al.independently observed such a pattern in 1957.They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather,integration occurred around 'cores of strength'where a dominant nation provided the nucleus'for integration. A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration This produces a bias towards stability.The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo.As Keohane correctly infers,preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to 'free ride'because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.2 In a uniform hierarchy(Figure 2),the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases,while prospects for integrations are reduced.No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration,and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good.Thus,rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all,large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.3 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources,and effective alliance formation or neutralization,can be manipulated in response to policy changes.A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics,particularly for the United States,as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer.The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,(New York:W.Norton,2001). Karl Deutsch et al.,Political Community and the North Atlantic Area(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1957).pp.28-38.Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black's median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane.After Hegemony (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984). Feng Yi.Democracy.Governance,and Economic Performance:Theory.Data Analysis.and Case Studies (Boston:MIT Press,2003). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

disagreement with preferences, in coordination with parity, leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy. At the bottom left corner, Figure 1 accounts for the process of integration. Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period. Deutsch et al. independently observed such a pattern in 1957. They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather, integration occurred around ‘cores of strength’ where a dominant nation provided the ‘nucleus’ for integration.11 A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration. This produces a bias towards stability. The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo. As Keohane correctly infers, preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to ‘free ride’ because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.12 In a uniform hierarchy (Figure 2), the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases, while prospects for integrations are reduced. No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration, and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good. Thus, rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all, large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.13 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources, and effective alliance formation or neutralization, can be manipulated in response to policy changes. A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics, particularly for the United States, as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. Norton, 2001). 11 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 28–38. Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black’s median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 13 Feng Yi, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory, Data Analysis, and Case Studies (Boston: MIT Press, 2003). Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 41 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

42 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler There is substantial empirical support for the power parity proposition throughout the conflict literature.4In other research environments,such formal and empirical evidence would have been sufficient to challenge the fundamental assertion that a parity or 'balance of power'preserves peace. However,given the widely held belief among practitioners and academics that the underlying logic of balance of power is correct,these two research directions continue to develop side by side.The collapse of the Soviet Union is one such critical test that has awakened the need to reformulate long-held beliefs. No one can argue today that Russia presents a direct threat to the Western world or that another challenger of a similar magnitude is already in place; yet stability increased after the decline of the Soviet Union.Further,the emergence of asymmetry in nuclear weapons combined with the re-targeting of such weapons by both the United States and Russia make it difficult to argue that Mutual Assured Destruction continues to preserve the existing stability in the international system. Probability of Conflict at the Global Level Power parity provides the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. While power is central to the deductions of balance of power and 14 Organski and Kugler,using the record of major wars among the main Western powers, show that power parity and transition set the necessary conditions for major wars waged between 1870 and 1970.See A.F.K.Organski and Jacek Kugler,The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1980).Likewise.Woosang Kim.Houweling and Siccama.and Bremer and Cusack show that in the last two centuries parity is a pre-condition for the most severe confrontation in the international system.Moreover.Werner and Kugler show that if one considers all protracted crises emerging from the presence of a festering dispute,parity accounts for almost all the incidences of major power war recorded in the last two centuries when a challenger manages to outspend the defender in military preparedness.See Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds,Parity and War. An important extension of the power parity perspective by Lemke demonstrates that the same principles that hold true among the major powers at the global level also hold true among regional leaders.Lemke's contribution is essential because he shows that severe conflicts of all types follow conditions of power parity.His empirical tests,based on very diverse regions of Latin America,the Middle East and Africa,demonstrate that the same conditions that lead to major confrontations among the largest nations in the international system hold true for major competitors in key regions.See Douglas Lemke,Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.2002). Finally,Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman use a sophisticated bounded rationality approach to show formally that while conditions for conflict and peace in the balance of power are inconsistent,the conditions identified by power parity are consistent with the prevailing evidence.See Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman,War and Reason:Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven:Yale University Press.1992).Extensions of this approach to nuclear deterrence demonstrate the consistency of the parity argument with post-war behaviour,but indicate that Mutual Assured Destruction is logically a tenuous strategy as deterrence may fail when risk propensity is high and prone to instability.see Jacek Kugler and Frank Zagare,The Stability of Deterrence (Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers,1987);Frank Zagare,Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence:A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory',Journal of Theoretical Politics,Vol.16,No.2.(2004). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

There is substantial empirical support for the power parity proposition throughout the conflict literature.14 In other research environments, such formal and empirical evidence would have been sufficient to challenge the fundamental assertion that a parity or ‘balance of power’ preserves peace. However, given the widely held belief among practitioners and academics that the underlying logic of balance of power is correct, these two research directions continue to develop side by side. The collapse of the Soviet Union is one such critical test that has awakened the need to reformulate long-held beliefs. No one can argue today that Russia presents a direct threat to the Western world or that another challenger of a similar magnitude is already in place; yet stability increased after the decline of the Soviet Union. Further, the emergence of asymmetry in nuclear weapons combined with the re-targeting of such weapons by both the United States and Russia make it difficult to argue that Mutual Assured Destruction continues to preserve the existing stability in the international system. Probability of Conflict at the Global Level Power parity provides the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. While power is central to the deductions of balance of power and 14 Organski and Kugler, using the record of major wars among the main Western powers, show that power parity and transition set the necessary conditions for major wars waged between 1870 and 1970. See A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980). Likewise, Woosang Kim, Houweling and Siccama, and Bremer and Cusack show that in the last two centuries parity is a pre-condition for the most severe confrontation in the international system. Moreover, Werner and Kugler show that if one considers all protracted crises emerging from the presence of a festering dispute, parity accounts for almost all the incidences of major power war recorded in the last two centuries when a challenger manages to outspend the defender in military preparedness. See Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War. An important extension of the power parity perspective by Lemke demonstrates that the same principles that hold true among the major powers at the global level also hold true among regional leaders. Lemke’s contribution is essential because he shows that severe conflicts of all types follow conditions of power parity. His empirical tests, based on very diverse regions of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, demonstrate that the same conditions that lead to major confrontations among the largest nations in the international system hold true for major competitors in key regions. See Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman use a sophisticated bounded rationality approach to show formally that while conditions for conflict and peace in the balance of power are inconsistent, the conditions identified by power parity are consistent with the prevailing evidence. See Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Extensions of this approach to nuclear deterrence demonstrate the consistency of the parity argument with post-war behaviour, but indicate that Mutual Assured Destruction is logically a tenuous strategy as deterrence may fail when risk propensity is high and prone to instability, see Jacek Kugler and Frank Zagare, The Stability of Deterrence (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); Frank Zagare, ‘Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.16, No. 2. (2004). 42 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 43 power parity,the conditions that lead to war and peace are very distinct. Moreover,each perspective provides different substantive policy advice.The parity approach allows contenders to anticipate the choice of peace or war. When there is an extended dispute-in particular,a lasting territorial dispute-that creates the underlying condition required for a serious confrontation.Military buildups and arms races are predictors of the willingness of contenders to choose war over peace when both parity and an extended dispute are present.Werner and Kugler show that these conditions are associated historically with the overwhelming number of choices to wage major war.is Empirical Implications:The Asian Challenge Applying the power parity logic to the Asian region permits us to determine which interactions have the potential to escalate to a serious confronta- tion and possibly a major war.These interactions,while being potentially dangerous,are not deterministically conflictual and can be resolved peacefully even though they appear threatening at this time. Figure 3 presents the relative power and income of the main international competitors compared with that of the United States from 1950 extrapolated to 2070.The conditions for parity are met when a challenger has over 80% of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease when the challenger has exceeded the dominant nation's capability by 20%-when it becomes the dominant nation.Previous research strongly suggests that the period of greatest danger is when the challenger manages to overtake the dominant nation and traverses the region between 100 and 120%.6 In order to address the Asian region,first we will detail the global context in terms of structural power relations.17 At the global level,the lack of an open confrontation between the United States and Russia,so feared by most analysts during the Cold War,is completely consistent with the power parity perspective.The Cold War did not become 'hot'because the USSR never approached parity with the United States.Between 1945 and 1989,despite arms buildups and ideological confrontations,the USSR did not approach or overcome US preponderance.Furthermore,following the breakup of the Soviet Union the prospects for such an overtaking are remote.This means the probability is Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler.'Power Transitions and Military Buildups:Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War',in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds,Pariry and War,pp.187-207. 16 See A.F.K.Organski and Jacek Kugler,The War Ledger:Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds,Parity and War. National Intelligence Council,Mapping the Global Future. Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

power parity, the conditions that lead to war and peace are very distinct. Moreover, each perspective provides different substantive policy advice. The parity approach allows contenders to anticipate the choice of peace or war. When there is an extended dispute—in particular, a lasting territorial dispute—that creates the underlying condition required for a serious confrontation. Military buildups and arms races are predictors of the willingness of contenders to choose war over peace when both parity and an extended dispute are present. Werner and Kugler show that these conditions are associated historically with the overwhelming number of choices to wage major war.15 Empirical Implications: The Asian Challenge Applying the power parity logic to the Asian region permits us to determine which interactions have the potential to escalate to a serious confrontation and possibly a major war. These interactions, while being potentially dangerous, are not deterministically conflictual and can be resolved peacefully even though they appear threatening at this time. Figure 3 presents the relative power and income of the main international competitors compared with that of the United States from 1950 extrapolated to 2070. The conditions for parity are met when a challenger has over 80% of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease when the challenger has exceeded the dominant nation’s capability by 20%—when it becomes the dominant nation. Previous research strongly suggests that the period of greatest danger is when the challenger manages to overtake the dominant nation and traverses the region between 100 and 120%.16 In order to address the Asian region, first we will detail the global context in terms of structural power relations.17 At the global level, the lack of an open confrontation between the United States and Russia, so feared by most analysts during the Cold War, is completely consistent with the power parity perspective. The Cold War did not become ‘hot’ because the USSR never approached parity with the United States. Between 1945 and 1989, despite arms buildups and ideological confrontations, the USSR did not approach or overcome US preponderance. Furthermore, following the breakup of the Soviet Union the prospects for such an overtaking are remote. This means the probability 15 Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, ‘Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War’, in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War, pp. 187–207. 16 See A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War. 17 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future. Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 43 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55

44 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler 70 60 50 40 OEU ●US China 20 OIndia 0 0 19301945196019751990200520202035205020652080 Year Fig.3 Relative power and incomes of major contenders(1950-2070). of war between the US and Russia well into the future is quite remote even if they have significant policy disputes. Next consider the US-European relationship.No challenger to the US is expected to arise here.No single nation in Europe-Germany,UK,Italy or France-has sufficient resources to become a contender.The largest,Germany, even after re-unification only approaches the size of Japan.Again,given the population base of major European nations,none can overcome the United States in the foreseeable future,or challenge China or India.Thus,the probability of a confrontation between any European country and the United States is very small and such a conflict would not be severe. The same can be said of the EU.The EU is not yet a united political unit capable of action at the global level,but if a major drift away from the United States takes place,NATO collapses and the EU moves towards a federated state,the possibility of conflict will increase.If all these very unlikely events take place,the conflict between the United States and the EU could be severe. From our strategic perspective,therefore,the outcome of the Iraq war is far less important for American security than the resulting impact on relations with Europe.If this conflict continues to divide the Western Allies and affects the working of NATO and the expansion of the EU,a fundamental challenge to American security could follow. If differences are patched up,the major loss is an opportunity to help accelerate the integration of Europe,in particular the incorporation of Russia into the Western Alliance.Building a strong coalition between Japan, Russia and the EU is necessary for the maintenance of United States as the dominant nation among the main contenders in the next half century.The Asian challenge may not be avoidable,but it can be postponed and more Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55

of war between the US and Russia well into the future is quite remote even if they have significant policy disputes. Next consider the US–European relationship. No challenger to the US is expected to arise here. No single nation in Europe—Germany, UK, Italy or France—has sufficient resources to become a contender. The largest, Germany, even after re-unification only approaches the size of Japan. Again, given the population base of major European nations, none can overcome the United States in the foreseeable future, or challenge China or India. Thus, the probability of a confrontation between any European country and the United States is very small and such a conflict would not be severe. The same can be said of the EU. The EU is not yet a united political unit capable of action at the global level, but if a major drift away from the United States takes place, NATO collapses and the EU moves towards a federated state, the possibility of conflict will increase. If all these very unlikely events take place, the conflict between the United States and the EU could be severe. From our strategic perspective, therefore, the outcome of the Iraq war is far less important for American security than the resulting impact on relations with Europe. If this conflict continues to divide the Western Allies and affects the working of NATO and the expansion of the EU, a fundamental challenge to American security could follow. If differences are patched up, the major loss is an opportunity to help accelerate the integration of Europe, in particular the incorporation of Russia into the Western Alliance. Building a strong coalition between Japan, Russia and the EU is necessary for the maintenance of United States as the dominant nation among the main contenders in the next half century. The Asian challenge may not be avoidable, but it can be postponed and more 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 Year Relative GDP (%) EU US China India Fig. 3 Relative power and incomes of major contenders (1950–2070). 44 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55