m PROJECT MUSE' Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?:New Data and Analysis Lars-Erik Cederman Andreas Wimmer Brian Min WORLD World Politics,Volume 62,Number 1,January 2010,pp.87-119(Article) POLITICS Published by Cambridge University Press DOl:10.1353/wp.0.0044 u6线Nm】37 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v062/62.1.cederman.html Access provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University(20 Apr 2013 13:12 GMT)
Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?: New Data and Analysis Lars-Erik Cederman Andreas Wimmer Brian Min World Politics, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2010, pp. 87-119 (Article) Published by Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.1353/wp.0.0044 For additional information about this article Access provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University (20 Apr 2013 13:12 GMT) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v062/62.1.cederman.html
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBELP New Data and Analysis By LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN,ANDREAS WIMMER,and BRIAN MIN* ESPITE its fundamental role in legitimizing the modern state system,nationalism has rarely been linked to the outbreak of po- litical violence in the recent literature on ethnic conflict and civil war. To a large extent,this is because the state is absent from many conven- tional theories of ethnic conflict.Indeed,some studies analyze confict between ethnic groups under conditions of state failure,thus making the absence of the state the very core of the causal argument.Others assume that the state is ethnically neutral and try to relate ethnodemo- graphic measures,such as fractionalization and polarization,to civil war.In contrast to these approaches,we analyze the state as an institu- tion that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic communities,and thus we conceive of ethnic wars as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. While our work relates to a rich research tradition that links the causes of such conflicts to the mobilization of ethnic minorities,it also goes beyond this tradition by introducing a new data set that addresses some of the shortcomings of this tradition.Our analysis is based on the Ethnic Power Relations data set(EPR),which covers all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power around the world from 1946 through 2005.This data set improves significantly on the widely used Minorities at Risk data set,which restricts its sample to mobilized 'Correspondence should be directed to Lars-Erik Cederman (lcederman@ethzch).We would like to thank the many individuals who helped assemble the data set on which this article relies.We cannot list all country experts who generously shared their knowledge,but we should like to mention Dennis Aviles,Yuval Feinstein,Dmitry Gorenburg,Wesley Hiers,Lutz Krebs,Patrick Kuhn,Anoop Sarbahi,James Scarritt,Manuel Vogt,Judith Vorrath,Jurg Weder,and Christoph Zurcher.Luc Girar- din implemented the software for the online expert survey.The authors acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation through Grant No.105511-116795,and from UCLA's International Institute.We are grateful for helpful comments by the editors and anonymous referees of this journal,Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,Simon Hug,and Idean Salehyan,as well as audiences at ETH Zurich,the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva,Hebrew University in Jerusa- lem,University of St.Gallen,and Princeton University. World Politics 62,no.1(January 2010),87-119 Copyright 2010 Trustees of Princeton University doi:10.1017/S0043887109990219
Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis By Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min* DESPITE its fundamental role in legitimizing the modern state system, nationalism has rarely been linked to the outbreak of political violence in the recent literature on ethnic conflict and civil war. To a large extent, this is because the state is absent from many conventional theories of ethnic conflict. Indeed, some studies analyze conflict between ethnic groups under conditions of state failure, thus making the absence of the state the very core of the causal argument. Others assume that the state is ethnically neutral and try to relate ethnodemographic measures, such as fractionalization and polarization, to civil war. In contrast to these approaches, we analyze the state as an institution that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic communities, and thus we conceive of ethnic wars as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. While our work relates to a rich research tradition that links the causes of such conflicts to the mobilization of ethnic minorities, it also goes beyond this tradition by introducing a new data set that addresses some of the shortcomings of this tradition. Our analysis is based on the Ethnic Power Relations data set (epr), which covers all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to power around the world from 1946 through 2005. This data set improves significantly on the widely used Minorities at Risk data set, which restricts its sample to mobilized *Correspondence should be directed to Lars-Erik Cederman (lcederman@ethz.ch). We would like to thank the many individuals who helped assemble the data set on which this article relies. We cannot list all country experts who generously shared their knowledge, but we should like to mention Dennis Avilés, Yuval Feinstein, Dmitry Gorenburg, Wesley Hiers, Lutz Krebs, Patrick Kuhn, Anoop Sarbahi, James Scarritt, Manuel Vogt, Judith Vorrath, Jürg Weder, and Christoph Zürcher. Luc Girardin implemented the software for the online expert survey. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation through Grant No. 105511-116795, and from UCLA’s International Institute. We are grateful for helpful comments by the editors and anonymous referees of this journal, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Simon Hug, and Idean Salehyan, as well as audiences at eth Zürich, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, University of St. Gallen, and Princeton University. World Politics 62, no. 1 ( January 2010), 87–119 Copyright © 2010 Trustees of Princeton University doi: 10.1017/S0043887109990219
88 WORLD POLITICS minorities and thus largely overlooks the ethnopolitical constellation of power at the center. Improved theory and data allow us to show that,contrary to the expectations held by many scholars of civil wars,competing ethno- nationalist claims over the state constitute the driving force behind many internal conflicts in the post-World War II era.While we have analyzed this data set at the country level in another publication,we pursue a more disaggregated,group-level analysis here.We show that conflict with the government is more likely to erupt(1)the more repre- sentatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power,especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past,(2)the higher their mobilizational capacity is,and(3)the more they have experi- enced confict in the past.In view of these findings,we conclude that ethnonationalist struggles over access to state power are an important part of the dynamics leading to the outbreak of civil wars. The article is organized as follows.We first review the relevant con- flict literature and then develop the three main hypotheses that lie at the core of our theory.The following section introduces the EPR data set.The main results are presented in the next section,followed by a brief sensitivity analysis and a concluding section. EXISTING APPROACHES TO ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT: SECURITY DILEMMA,ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION,AND MINORITY MOBILIZATION In order to understand the conflicts that broke out in Yugoslav and Soviet successor states as well as in Rwanda during the 1990s,some researchers have utilized ideas developed to study interstate relations during the cold war.Most prominently,Posen conceived of ethnic con- flict as a struggle between ethnic groups in the wake of state collapse.2 According to neorealist theory,ethnic groups face a security dilemma when the Leviathan disappears and react with preemptive violence. These ideas were subsequently elaborated with the help of rational choice models.3 As a consequence of the assumption of state breakdown,however, this research tends to overlook the important role played by state actors Complementing the current study,Wimmer,Cederman,and Min 2009 show that ethic conflict results from specific ethnopolitical configurations of power,rather than from ethnic diversity per se. They identify three particularly conflict-prone configurations:ethnocracies,states with a high number of power-sharing ethnic elites,and incohesive states with a short history of direct rule by the center. 2 Posen 1993. 3 Hardin 1995;de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999
88 world politics 1 Complementing the current study, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009 show that ethic conflict results from specific ethnopolitical configurations of power, rather than from ethnic diversity per se. They identify three particularly conflict-prone configurations: ethnocracies, states with a high number of power-sharing ethnic elites, and incohesive states with a short history of direct rule by the center. 2 Posen 1993. 3 Hardin 1995; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999. minorities and thus largely overlooks the ethnopolitical constellation of power at the center. Improved theory and data allow us to show that, contrary to the expectations held by many scholars of civil wars, competing ethnonationalist claims over the state constitute the driving force behind many internal conflicts in the post–World War II era. While we have analyzed this data set at the country level in another publication,1 we pursue a more disaggregated, group-level analysis here. We show that conflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past. In view of these findings, we conclude that ethnonationalist struggles over access to state power are an important part of the dynamics leading to the outbreak of civil wars. The article is organized as follows. We first review the relevant conflict literature and then develop the three main hypotheses that lie at the core of our theory. The following section introduces the epr data set. The main results are presented in the next section, followed by a brief sensitivity analysis and a concluding section. Existing Approaches to Ethnicity and Conflict: Security Dilemma, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Minority Mobilization In order to understand the conflicts that broke out in Yugoslav and Soviet successor states as well as in Rwanda during the 1990s, some researchers have utilized ideas developed to study interstate relations during the cold war. Most prominently, Posen conceived of ethnic conflict as a struggle between ethnic groups in the wake of state collapse.2 According to neorealist theory, ethnic groups face a security dilemma when the Leviathan disappears and react with preemptive violence. These ideas were subsequently elaborated with the help of rational choice models.3 As a consequence of the assumption of state breakdown, however, this research tends to overlook the important role played by state actors
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? 89 in generating these conflicts in the first place,as the wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda,and many other places clearly demonstrate.In the absence of state agency,political violence may take the form of communal conflict over land or local political dominance but not of full-fledged civil war. In recent statistical research on civil wars,many scholars argue that ethnic grievances are too widespread to explain the rare onset of con- flict.Wars are more likely,so the argument goes,in states that are too weak to suppress rebellions or where natural resources invite warlords to enrich themselves by looting.Research on the basis of this griev- ance hypothesis has undoubtedly helped to clarify the general condi- tions that are conducive to civil wars and insurgencies.However,the grievance hypothesis has not been tested with adequate data;rather, it has been tested with highly aggregated proxies that do not provide a direct measure of political inequality along ethnic lines and the re- sulting"grievances."Fearon and Laitin,for example,examine whether there is a statistical association between measures of a country's "ethnic fractionalization"and civil war onset.5 Some scholars have worked with measures of ethnic polarization that are loosely related to Horowitz's theory of ethnic conflict,again without explicit references to the state. Others seek to operationalize the concept of ethnic domination but use a demographic proxy as well.? We believe that efforts to grasp the propensity for ethnonationalist conflict with the help of macrolevel indices are problematic.s First,they implicitly assume that the ethnic groups listed in the work of anthro- pologists and linguists are politically relevant.Second,the macrolevel indices describe a country's demography,10 which may or may not be related to the actual constellation of power at the state center.Quali- tative studies of ethnic conflict show that in such cases the state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclu- sion that generates these conflicts in the first place.12 Collier and Hoeffler 2004;Fearon and Laitin 2003;for a review,see Kalyvas 2007. s Fearon and Laitin 2003.Using different model specifications,other quantitative studies report a positive impact ofethnic fractionalization on civil war onset,see Sambanis 2001;Hegre and Sambanis 2006;B1imes2006. s For example,Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005;cf.Horowitz 1985. 7 For example,Collier and Hoeffler 2004. A number of scholars have called for a more disaggregated approach that focuses on microlevel mechanisms,for example,Kalyvas 2006;for a review,see Tarrow 2007.Our own approach comple- ments these studies at a level of analysis that is less detailed yet offers global coverage. Posner 2004. 10 Chandra and Wilkinson 2008 Cederman and Girardin 2007. 12 Brass 1991;Breuilly 1994;Wimmer 2002
why do ethnic groups rebel? 89 4 Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; for a review, see Kalyvas 2007. 5 Fearon and Laitin 2003. Using different model specifications, other quantitative studies report a positive impact of ethnic fractionalization on civil war onset; see Sambanis 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Blimes 2006. 6 For example, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; cf. Horowitz 1985. 7 For example, Collier and Hoeffler 2004. 8 A number of scholars have called for a more disaggregated approach that focuses on microlevel mechanisms, for example, Kalyvas 2006; for a review, see Tarrow 2007. Our own approach complements these studies at a level of analysis that is less detailed yet offers global coverage. 9 Posner 2004. 10 Chandra and Wilkinson 2008. 11 Cederman and Girardin 2007. 12 Brass 1991; Breuilly 1994; Wimmer 2002. in generating these conflicts in the first place, as the wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and many other places clearly demonstrate. In the absence of state agency, political violence may take the form of communal conflict over land or local political dominance but not of full-fledged civil war. In recent statistical research on civil wars, many scholars argue that ethnic grievances are too widespread to explain the rare onset of conflict. Wars are more likely, so the argument goes, in states that are too weak to suppress rebellions or where natural resources invite warlords to enrich themselves by looting.4 Research on the basis of this grievance hypothesis has undoubtedly helped to clarify the general conditions that are conducive to civil wars and insurgencies. However, the grievance hypothesis has not been tested with adequate data; rather, it has been tested with highly aggregated proxies that do not provide a direct measure of political inequality along ethnic lines and the resulting “grievances.” Fearon and Laitin, for example, examine whether there is a statistical association between measures of a country’s “ethnic fractionalization” and civil war onset.5 Some scholars have worked with measures of ethnic polarization that are loosely related to Horowitz’s theory of ethnic conflict, again without explicit references to the state.6 Others seek to operationalize the concept of ethnic domination but use a demographic proxy as well.7 We believe that efforts to grasp the propensity for ethnonationalist conflict with the help of macrolevel indices are problematic.8 First, they implicitly assume that the ethnic groups listed in the work of anthropologists and linguists are politically relevant.9 Second, the macrolevel indices describe a country’s demography,10 which may or may not be related to the actual constellation of power at the state center.11 Qualitative studies of ethnic conflict show that in such cases the state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclusion that generates these conflicts in the first place.12
90 WORLD POLITICS A third stream of research starts from this insight and studies the conditions under which minorities will mobilize against the state and also the conditions under which such mobilization will turn violent.3 Building on work in the relative deprivation tradition,the Minorities at Risk(MAR)data set established by Gurr and his colleagues remains the most prominent data source used to evaluate ethnic mobilizations and violence at the group level.4Scholars in this tradition have studied the consequences economic,political,and cultural discrimination(see below),the settlement patterns that enhance minority mobilization for conflict,15 domestic diversion mechanisms,16 the dynamics of seces- sionist bargaining,and third-party intervention,s as well as the role of country-level factors,such as government responses to autonomy claims by ethnic minorities'9 and broader international contextual fac- tors facilitating ethnic mobilization.20 While the MAR data set allows for empirical testing of mechanisms linking group characteristics to conflict propensity,it has its limita- tions.We note that the MAR-based literature has produced somewhat conflicting results regarding the question most relevant to this article: whether or not political disadvantage and discrimination increase the likelihood of ethnic rebellion.In fact,whereas some studies find that political disadvantage has an impact on the likelihood of armed rebel- lion and secession,21 others find that the degree of political exclusion has no effect on secessionism.22 The picture is even more mixed as re- gards the effect of political discrimination:while Regan and Norton, as well as Walter,find strong evidence that political discrimination in- creases rebellions and secessionist civil wars,25 Fox fails to find any clear relationship for the subset of ethnoreligious groups,2and Gurr's study of ethnonationalist rebellions in the 1980s even suggests that political discrimination is associated with less rather than more conflict.25 Olzak aggregates MAR data on the country level and arrives at the conclusion There is also a vast qualitative literature on minority mobilization and ethnonationalist violence; see Brubaker and Laitin 1998 14 Gurr 1993a;Gurr 2002. 15Toft2003. 16 Tir and Jasinski 2008. 17 Walter 2006a;Jenne 2007. Cetinyan 2002;Saideman 2002. Brancati 2006;Walter 2006b. 20Ozak2006. a For example,Gurr 1993b;Walter 2006b. 2 Saideman and Ayers 2000. Regan and Norton 2005;Walter 2006b. 24Fox2000. 25 Gurr 1993b
90 world politics A third stream of research starts from this insight and studies the conditions under which minorities will mobilize against the state and also the conditions under which such mobilization will turn violent.13 Building on work in the relative deprivation tradition, the Minorities at Risk (mar) data set established by Gurr and his colleagues remains the most prominent data source used to evaluate ethnic mobilizations and violence at the group level.14 Scholars in this tradition have studied the consequences economic, political, and cultural discrimination (see below), the settlement patterns that enhance minority mobilization for conflict,15 domestic diversion mechanisms,16 the dynamics of secessionist bargaining,17and third-party intervention,18 as well as the role of country-level factors, such as government responses to autonomy claims by ethnic minorities19 and broader international contextual factors facilitating ethnic mobilization.20 While the mar data set allows for empirical testing of mechanisms linking group characteristics to conflict propensity, it has its limitations. We note that the mar-based literature has produced somewhat conflicting results regarding the question most relevant to this article: whether or not political disadvantage and discrimination increase the likelihood of ethnic rebellion. In fact, whereas some studies find that political disadvantage has an impact on the likelihood of armed rebellion and secession,21 others find that the degree of political exclusion has no effect on secessionism.22 The picture is even more mixed as regards the effect of political discrimination: while Regan and Norton, as well as Walter, find strong evidence that political discrimination increases rebellions and secessionist civil wars,23 Fox fails to find any clear relationship for the subset of ethnoreligious groups,24 and Gurr’s study of ethnonationalist rebellions in the 1980s even suggests that political discrimination is associated with less rather than more conflict.25 Olzak aggregates mar data on the country level and arrives at the conclusion 13 There is also a vast qualitative literature on minority mobilization and ethnonationalist violence; see Brubaker and Laitin 1998. 14 Gurr 1993a; Gurr 2002. 15 Toft 2003. 16 Tir and Jasinski 2008. 17 Walter 2006a; Jenne 2007. 18 Cetinyan 2002; Saideman 2002. 19 Brancati 2006; Walter 2006b. 20 Olzak 2006. 21 For example, Gurr 1993b; Walter 2006b. 22 Saideman and Ayers 2000. 23 Regan and Norton 2005; Walter 2006b. 24 Fox 2000. 25 Gurr 1993b
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? 91 that both formal recognition of ethnic group rights and political dis- crimination increase the likelihood of conflict.26 Clearly,some of these discrepancies can be attributed to differ- ent research designs and sample definitions,but we suspect that the data set's inherent problems might be responsible for these conflicting findings as well.The MAR data set "hardwires"the degree of power access into the sample definition by excluding groups in power from systematic consideration.This reduces the comparative horizon and thus makes it harder to capture the effects of political exclusions in un- ambiguous ways.Moreover,in many countries with dramatic shifts in power constellations(Chad,Afghanistan,Liberia),the political status of an ethnic group may change from discriminated minority to ruling elite from one period to the next.Indeed,studies of ethnonational- ism should treat ethnic groups'representation within government as a variable rather than as a constant.Finally,focusing on minorities con- flates the demographic concept of numerical domination with political exclusion.Accordingly,the MAR coding scheme does not fit countries with ruling minorities or complex coalitions of ethnically defined elites, as for example in Nigeria,India,or Chad,where ethnic conflict will be pursued in the name of excluded majorities(rather than minorities)or ethnic groups that share power(and are thus not"at risk").27 In sum,much of the recent literature on ethnic confict and civil wars fails to get the state's role right.Many approaches do not take ac- count of the state as an actor in conflict processes(as in the security di- lemma approach),fail to trace the ethnopolitical power constellations at the center of state power (as in the minority mobilization school),or try to capture ethnopolitical discontent through demographic proxies of diversity.These theoretical,sampling,and measurement problems hinder the development of precise and testable hypothesis about which mechanisms connect ethnonationalist politics to political violence.The following section addresses this task. THEORIZING ETHNONATIONALIST CONFLICT:ACTOR CONSTELLATIONS,MOTIVES,AND COLLECTIVE ACTION The classical sociological literature on nationalism offers a good start- ing point for understanding the logic of ethnonationalist conflict. 2 Olzak2006,124. The MAR data set tries to address these limitations by including five"advantaged"minorities that benefit from political discrimination.MAR also comprises a series of"communal contenders" mostly in Africa,that is,groups that share power with others while at the same time mobilizing in protest or rebellion
why do ethnic groups rebel? 91 that both formal recognition of ethnic group rights and political discrimination increase the likelihood of conflict.26 Clearly, some of these discrepancies can be attributed to different research designs and sample definitions, but we suspect that the data set’s inherent problems might be responsible for these conflicting findings as well. The mar data set “hardwires” the degree of power access into the sample definition by excluding groups in power from systematic consideration. This reduces the comparative horizon and thus makes it harder to capture the effects of political exclusions in unambiguous ways. Moreover, in many countries with dramatic shifts in power constellations (Chad, Afghanistan, Liberia), the political status of an ethnic group may change from discriminated minority to ruling elite from one period to the next. Indeed, studies of ethnonationalism should treat ethnic groups’ representation within government as a variable rather than as a constant. Finally, focusing on minorities conflates the demographic concept of numerical domination with political exclusion. Accordingly, the mar coding scheme does not fit countries with ruling minorities or complex coalitions of ethnically defined elites, as for example in Nigeria, India, or Chad, where ethnic conflict will be pursued in the name of excluded majorities (rather than minorities) or ethnic groups that share power (and are thus not “at risk”).27 In sum, much of the recent literature on ethnic conflict and civil wars fails to get the state’s role right. Many approaches do not take account of the state as an actor in conflict processes (as in the security dilemma approach), fail to trace the ethnopolitical power constellations at the center of state power (as in the minority mobilization school), or try to capture ethnopolitical discontent through demographic proxies of diversity. These theoretical, sampling, and measurement problems hinder the development of precise and testable hypothesis about which mechanisms connect ethnonationalist politics to political violence. The following section addresses this task. Theorizing Ethnonationalist Conflict: Actor Constellations, Motives, and Collective Action The classical sociological literature on nationalism offers a good starting point for understanding the logic of ethnonationalist conflict. 26 Olzak 2006,124. 27 The mar data set tries to address these limitations by including five “advantaged” minorities that benefit from political discrimination. mar also comprises a series of “communal contenders” mostly in Africa, that is, groups that share power with others while at the same time mobilizing in protest or rebellion
92 WORLD POLITICS Nationalism can be defined as a political principle that demands that the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent.It replaces the principle of dynastic sovereignty on which agrarian empires were based.28 Whereas the unit of governance is usually understood to be the sovereign state,the nation is imagined as a community of common origin and shared historical destiny.29 In the modern era the introduction of the principles of national- ism-that ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes-has led to waves of political mobilizations and a subsequent transformation of the state system.30 The ensuing ethnonationalist struggles have taken on a va- riety of forms:conflict over access to state power between the leaders of competing ethnic communities,31 secession from existing states in order to establish a new state ruled in the name of a particular ethnic group32 or to join another state controlled by ethnic kin,33 and competi- tion between new states over mixed territories inhabited by members of their respective ethnic core groups. While this literature helps to explain the broad historical and po- litical circumstances under which we can expect ethnonationalist mo- bilization and conflict,it is much less concerned with identifying the precise mechanisms through which such ethnonationalist mobilization turns violent.Only recently have a number of scholars turned to study- ing nationalist mobilization and conflict in greater detail.35 We selec- tively draw on this scholarship in order to develop our own model of ethnonationalist conflict. Our analytical point of departure is Tilly's polity model,which fea- tures a political system comprising a government and a number of con- tenders seeking to maximize their access to executive power.s6 Members of the polity enjoy a privileged position,while those excluded from direct access to government represent potential challengers(see Figure 1).Adapting Tilly's model along the lines proposed by Cederman and Girardin,we assume that polity members and challengers consist of ethnic groups and their leaders(including politically irrelevant groups 28 Gellner 1983. 2 Anderson 1991. 30 Kedourie 1960;Breuilly 1994;Brubaker 1996;Cederman 1997;Wimmer and Min 2006. For example,Brass 1991;Wimmer 2002. 32For example,Hechter 2001. 3 For example,Weiner 1971. 3For example,Brubaker 1996. 3For example,Beissinger 2002;Cederman 1997,chaps.7,8;Hechter 2000;Olzak 2006;Wim- mer 2002,chap.3. 36Ty1978
92 world politics Nationalism can be defined as a political principle that demands that the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent. It replaces the principle of dynastic sovereignty on which agrarian empires were based.28 Whereas the unit of governance is usually understood to be the sovereign state, the nation is imagined as a community of common origin and shared historical destiny.29 In the modern era the introduction of the principles of nationalism—that ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes—has led to waves of political mobilizations and a subsequent transformation of the state system.30 The ensuing ethnonationalist struggles have taken on a variety of forms: conflict over access to state power between the leaders of competing ethnic communities,31 secession from existing states in order to establish a new state ruled in the name of a particular ethnic group32 or to join another state controlled by ethnic kin,33 and competition between new states over mixed territories inhabited by members of their respective ethnic core groups.34 While this literature helps to explain the broad historical and political circumstances under which we can expect ethnonationalist mobilization and conflict, it is much less concerned with identifying the precise mechanisms through which such ethnonationalist mobilization turns violent. Only recently have a number of scholars turned to studying nationalist mobilization and conflict in greater detail.35 We selectively draw on this scholarship in order to develop our own model of ethnonationalist conflict. Our analytical point of departure is Tilly’s polity model, which features a political system comprising a government and a number of contenders seeking to maximize their access to executive power.36 Members of the polity enjoy a privileged position, while those excluded from direct access to government represent potential challengers (see Figure 1). Adapting Tilly’s model along the lines proposed by Cederman and Girardin, we assume that polity members and challengers consist of ethnic groups and their leaders (including politically irrelevant groups 28 Gellner 1983. 29 Anderson 1991. 30 Kedourie 1960; Breuilly 1994; Brubaker 1996; Cederman 1997; Wimmer and Min 2006. 31 For example, Brass 1991; Wimmer 2002. 32 For example, Hechter 2001. 33 For example, Weiner 1971. 34 For example, Brubaker 1996. 35 For example, Beissinger 2002; Cederman 1997, chaps. 7, 8; Hechter 2000; Olzak 2006; Wimmer 2002, chap. 3. 36 Tilly 1978
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? 93 State Polity Government Included Group 3 Included Group 1 Included Group 2 Excluded Excluded Group 1 Group 4 Excluded Group 3 Excluded Group 2 FIGURE 1 THE POLITY MODEL WITH INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED ETHNIC GROUPS such as group 4).37 Given the principle of ethnonational representa- tivity embodied by the modern nation-state,it can be expected that challengers seek to avoid the rule of ethnic others by gaining access to the polity or leaving it in favor of a new polity or an already exist- ing kin state.Power holders should want to maximize their share of state power-thus opening the possibility of infighting among power- sharing partners. Civil wars confront incumbent governments with political and mili- tary organizations that challenge the governments'claim to sovereign rule.This situation corresponds to standard definitions of civil war3s but excludes communal conflicts or pogroms in which the state plays less of an active role.In conflicts that are fought in the name of excluded groups,rebel movements are composed of mobilized and militarized Cederman and Girardin 2007 refer to"Ethnic Groups in Power"(EGIPs)and "Marginalized Ethnic Groups"(MEGs). Sambanis 2004;Kalyvas 2007
why do ethnic groups rebel? 93 such as group 4).37 Given the principle of ethnonational representativity embodied by the modern nation-state, it can be expected that challengers seek to avoid the rule of ethnic others by gaining access to the polity or leaving it in favor of a new polity or an already existing kin state. Power holders should want to maximize their share of state power—thus opening the possibility of infighting among powersharing partners. Civil wars confront incumbent governments with political and military organizations that challenge the governments’ claim to sovereign rule. This situation corresponds to standard definitions of civil war38 but excludes communal conflicts or pogroms in which the state plays less of an active role. In conflicts that are fought in the name of excluded groups, rebel movements are composed of mobilized and militarized 37 Cederman and Girardin 2007 refer to “Ethnic Groups in Power” (egips) and “Marginalized Ethnic Groups” (megs). 38 Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2007. Figure 1 The Polity Model with Included and Excluded Ethnic Groups Excluded Group 1 Excluded Group 3 Excluded Group 2 Excluded Group 4 Included Group 2 Included Group 1 Included Group 3 Government Polity State
94 WORLD POLITICS organizations that challenge the government.In the case of challenges launched in the name of groups that are already represented within government,other actors such as a faction within the army or newly created political organizations and militias might instigate a violent confrontation. Having identified the main actors and the types of conflicts they may provoke,we now consider the conditions under which violence is most likely to erupt.We first study which groups will be more motivated to support a rebellion against ethnic domination by others.Indeed,many aggrieved groups have not produced militant rebel organizations.We therefore have to identify those groups that perceive the government as particularly illegitimate and are therefore more inclined to support re- bellions.Second,we consider a group's organizational capacity to chal- lenge incumbent state power because high levels of motivation alone will not suffice to produce an armed organization willing to take on the government army.Finally,rather than constituting historical singulari- ties,political violence often leaves traces that put nationalist politics on a contentious track.We therefore need to identify such potential effects of path dependency.In the following,we consider the causal mechanisms associated with each of these three mechanisms in turn. MOST MOTIVATED GROUPS:EXCLUDED,DOWNGRADED, AND UNDERREPRESENTED To specify motives and identify the most motivated actors,we draw on Wimmer's institutionalist approach to nationalism and ethnic poli- tics,which assumes that rulers in modern nation-states are no longer legitimized by the principles of dynastic succession,God's grace,or civilizational progress but that they are expected to care for their own, ethnically defined people.39 Political officeholders thus have institu- tional incentives to gain legitimacy by favoring coethnics over others when it comes to the distribution of public goods and government jobs. The expectation of ethnic preference works in the other direction as well,as voters prefer parties led by coethnics,delinquents hope for co- ethnic judges,and citizens prefer to be policed by coethnics. Under the conditions of pervasive ethnic favoritism,political lead- ers and followers are driven by the strategic motive to avoid or even to overturn dominance by ethnic "others."This motive is simultane- ously material,political,and symbolic:“adequate'”or“just”representa- tion in a central government offers material advantages such as access 3 Wimmer 2002
94 world politics organizations that challenge the government. In the case of challenges launched in the name of groups that are already represented within government, other actors such as a faction within the army or newly created political organizations and militias might instigate a violent confrontation. Having identified the main actors and the types of conflicts they may provoke, we now consider the conditions under which violence is most likely to erupt. We first study which groups will be more motivated to support a rebellion against ethnic domination by others. Indeed, many aggrieved groups have not produced militant rebel organizations. We therefore have to identify those groups that perceive the government as particularly illegitimate and are therefore more inclined to support rebellions. Second, we consider a group’s organizational capacity to challenge incumbent state power because high levels of motivation alone will not suffice to produce an armed organization willing to take on the government army. Finally, rather than constituting historical singularities, political violence often leaves traces that put nationalist politics on a contentious track. We therefore need to identify such potential effects of path dependency. In the following, we consider the causal mechanisms associated with each of these three mechanisms in turn. Most Motivated Groups: Excluded, Downgraded, and Underrepresented To specify motives and identify the most motivated actors, we draw on Wimmer’s institutionalist approach to nationalism and ethnic politics, which assumes that rulers in modern nation-states are no longer legitimized by the principles of dynastic succession, God’s grace, or civilizational progress but that they are expected to care for their own, ethnically defined people.39 Political officeholders thus have institutional incentives to gain legitimacy by favoring coethnics over others when it comes to the distribution of public goods and government jobs. The expectation of ethnic preference works in the other direction as well, as voters prefer parties led by coethnics, delinquents hope for coethnic judges, and citizens prefer to be policed by coethnics. Under the conditions of pervasive ethnic favoritism, political leaders and followers are driven by the strategic motive to avoid or even to overturn dominance by ethnic “others.” This motive is simultaneously material, political, and symbolic: “adequate” or “just” representation in a central government offers material advantages such as access 39 Wimmer 2002
WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? 95 to government jobs and services,legal advantages such as the benefits of full citizenship rights,a fair trial,and protection from arbitrary vio- lence,and symbolic advantages such as the prestige of belonging to a "state-owning"ethnic group.In brief,this approach conceives of ethnic politics as the struggle over control of the state between various ethni- cally defined organizations and their constituencies.Especially in weak states with weakly developed civil societies,the state may be captured by particular ethnic elites and their constituencies,thus giving rise to one among other variants of the "weak state-strong society"constella- tion analyzed by Midgal and others.40 It follows that groups that lose out in this struggle for state power are more fertile breeding grounds for organizations that challenge the government.We postulate a direct relationship between the degree of state power and the likelihood that an armed rebellion will be instigated in the name of that particular group.The most excluded groups will thus be most likely to support armed organizations that challenge the gov- ernment.Given nationalist principles of political legitimacy,feelings of resentment will be widespread and can be channeled into successful col- lective action.We summarize this reasoning in a first hypothesis: -H1a.The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from central executive power. The exclusion mechanism also alerts us to the consequences of changes in power hierarchies.Sociological theories of emotions sug- gest that negative emotions are especially likely to be aroused following loss of power and prestige.42 When the subjects blame others for their downgrading,anger and resentment increase the readiness to fight in order to change the situation.We postulate a similar mechanism at the level of collective organizations:leaders of ethnonationalist orga- nizations will be most likely to resort to violence if they have recently experienced a loss of relative power.They can channel the resentment of their constituencies and mobilize to"reverse a reversal."4 This rea- soning leads to the following hypothesis: 4 Migdal 1988;see also Jackman 1993. 4Petersen 2002. 4Kemper 1978. Turner and Stets 2005,217. 4 Petersen 2002,173.The MAR data set includes an indicator for"lost autonomy"that is associ- ated with rebellions;see Gurr 2000,230;Saideman and Ayres 2000;Walter 2006b.Note,however, that our hypothesis concerns all types of status reversals,including exclusion or demotion that were not preceded by autonomous status
why do ethnic groups rebel? 95 to government jobs and services, legal advantages such as the benefits of full citizenship rights, a fair trial, and protection from arbitrary violence, and symbolic advantages such as the prestige of belonging to a “state-owning” ethnic group. In brief, this approach conceives of ethnic politics as the struggle over control of the state between various ethnically defined organizations and their constituencies. Especially in weak states with weakly developed civil societies, the state may be captured by particular ethnic elites and their constituencies, thus giving rise to one among other variants of the “weak state–strong society” constellation analyzed by Midgal and others. 40 It follows that groups that lose out in this struggle for state power are more fertile breeding grounds for organizations that challenge the government. We postulate a direct relationship between the degree of state power and the likelihood that an armed rebellion will be instigated in the name of that particular group. The most excluded groups will thus be most likely to support armed organizations that challenge the government. Given nationalist principles of political legitimacy, feelings of resentment will be widespread and can be channeled into successful collective action.41 We summarize this reasoning in a first hypothesis: —H1a. The probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases the more representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from central executive power. The exclusion mechanism also alerts us to the consequences of changes in power hierarchies. Sociological theories of emotions suggest that negative emotions are especially likely to be aroused following loss of power and prestige.42 When the subjects blame others for their downgrading, anger and resentment increase the readiness to fight in order to change the situation.43 We postulate a similar mechanism at the level of collective organizations: leaders of ethnonationalist organizations will be most likely to resort to violence if they have recently experienced a loss of relative power. They can channel the resentment of their constituencies and mobilize to “reverse a reversal.”44 This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 40 Migdal 1988; see also Jackman 1993. 41 Petersen 2002. 42 Kemper 1978. 43 Turner and Stets 2005, 217. 44 Petersen 2002, 173. The mar data set includes an indicator for “lost autonomy” that is associated with rebellions; see Gurr 2000, 230; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Walter 2006b. Note, however, that our hypothesis concerns all types of status reversals, including exclusion or demotion that were not preceded by autonomous status
