《国际战略》课程教学资源：Grand Strategy and Power transition

NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION GRAND STRATEGY AND POWER TRANSITIONS What We Can Learn from Great Britain CHARLES A.KUPCHAN,GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JULY 20II This essay draws lessons for great-power grand strategy from the history of Great Britain and its effort to manage the hegemonic power transitions that spawned World War I and World War II.It focuses on two main issues.The first is the diplomacy of managing power transitions.At the turn of the twentieth century,Britain faced a rapidly changing strategic landscape.London had to deal with the simultaneous rise of three major powers-the United States,Germany,and Japan.The Boer uprising in South Africa meanwhile added to the difficulty of sustaining imperial commitments with limited resources.The essay examines what went right and what went wrong as Britain struggled to adjust its grand strategy to a rapidly changing strategic landscape.With the United States,Britain practiced a deft diplomacy that succeeded in replacing enmity with amity. With Japan,Britain struck an alliance that constrained Japanese ambition and protected British positions in the Pacific-but that then lapsed after two decades.As for its relationship with Germany,Britain adjusted with impressive alacrity to the growing size of the German battle fleet and its impact on the balance of power in Europe.Nonetheless,Britain was unable to convince Germany to rein in its ambition and soon found itself enmeshed in a great-power war.' The analysis in this essay underscores the central role found themselves at war two decades later.Engagement played by strategic restraint in facilitating rapprochement failed to avert war in the long run.And with Germany, between Britain and the United States.Britain's readiness Britain revamped its grand strategy in response to to engage the United States and accommodate its rise Germany's naval buildup,relying on a combination of fleet cleared the way for a peaceful transition of power.However, redistribution,naval building,and diplomacy to deter the essay also underscores the difficulties inherent in Germany.London was nevertheless unable to convince averting conflict during power transitions.Britain pursued Germany to give up its bid for hegemony in Europe.A rapprochement with Japan,and the Anglo-Japanese strategy of deterrence led to a mounting naval race,which Alliance was successfully tested during World War I.But triggered hegemonic war. the coupling ended soon thereafter-and Britain and Japan

Grand Strategy and Power Transitions What We Can Learn from Great Britain Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown University and Council on Foreign Relations July 2011 This essay draws lessons for great-power grand strategy from the history of Great Britain and its effort to manage the hegemonic power transitions that spawned World War I and World War II. It focuses on two main issues. The first is the diplomacy of managing power transitions. At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain faced a rapidly changing strategic landscape. London had to deal with the simultaneous rise of three major powers – the United States, Germany, and Japan. The Boer uprising in South Africa meanwhile added to the difficulty of sustaining imperial commitments with limited resources. The essay examines what went right and what went wrong as Britain struggled to adjust its grand strategy to a rapidly changing strategic landscape. With the United States, Britain practiced a deft diplomacy that succeeded in replacing enmity with amity. With Japan, Britain struck an alliance that constrained Japanese ambition and protected British positions in the Pacific – but that then lapsed after two decades. As for its relationship with Germany, Britain adjusted with impressive alacrity to the growing size of the German battle fleet and its impact on the balance of power in Europe. Nonetheless, Britain was unable to convince Germany to rein in its ambition and soon found itself enmeshed in a great-power war.1 The analysis in this essay underscores the central role played by strategic restraint in facilitating rapprochement between Britain and the United States. Britain’s readiness to engage the United States and accommodate its rise cleared the way for a peaceful transition of power. However, the essay also underscores the difficulties inherent in averting conflict during power transitions. Britain pursued rapprochement with Japan, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was successfully tested during World War I. But the coupling ended soon thereafter – and Britain and Japan found themselves at war two decades later. Engagement failed to avert war in the long run. And with Germany, Britain revamped its grand strategy in response to Germany’s naval buildup, relying on a combination of fleet redistribution, naval building, and diplomacy to deter Germany. London was nevertheless unable to convince Germany to give up its bid for hegemony in Europe. A strategy of deterrence led to a mounting naval race, which triggered hegemonic war. New America Foundation

The second major focus of this essay is the domestic transition in the global distribution of power can be politics of grand strategy.During the years prior to World handled with equal equanimity and tranquility.On the War I,the British government faced contradictory other hand,Great Britain's deft diplomacy did not succeed pressures on the home front -rising anti-German in preventing the outbreak of World War I,largely because sentiment on the one hand,but aversion to a continental Germany,for domestic reasons,was unwilling-or unable commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas -to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its imperial commitments on the other.Nonetheless,London geopolitical ambition.The result was a classic insecurity did an impressive job of managing these pressures, spiral that escalated to war.The inter-war era provides undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic the fleet,preparing for a continental commitment,and economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation,however,Britain Managing Power Transition: nonetheless found itself at war in 1914.The main cause was British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany,a factor the United States,Japan,and Germany over which Britain had little influence.The outbreak of By the end of the 18oos,Britain faced a power transition on World War I underscores the intimate connection between three fronts:the ascent of the United States in the Western policy and politics and the degree to which domestic Hemisphere;the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power;and pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound Germany's decision to draw on its mounting economic and strategic calculations. industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a During the years prior to World War II,domestic politics different way.It accommodated the United States, again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary strategy.The political consequences of the economic and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced has lasted to this day.London fashioned a formal alliance under-balancing in Great Britain;preoccupied with its with Japan,with the two powers combining their naval economic fragility,London refused to rearm until it was too assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific.The Anglo- late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Japanese alliance,however,ultimately proved hollow as Germany.Other status quo powers similarly turned inward each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for and avoided alliance commitments.At the same time, unilateral gain.With Germany,Britain practiced economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism deterrence,making clear to Berlin that it intended to do in both Germany and Japan.The combination of under- what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the balancing by status quo states and excessive ambition European theater.Germany saw Britain as seeking to block among revisionist states produced gross power its rise,not defend its legitimate security interests.A classic asymmetries-with disastrous consequences. spiral ensued.The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. This essay's historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in Anglo-American Rapprochement,1895-1906 the distribution of global power.On the one hand,Great The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United enemies.The American colonies revolted against British States,marking the only peaceful power transition in rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. history.Perhaps the rise of China and the coming Amid the U.S.Civil War,Britain came close to intervening NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 2

new america foundation page 2 The second major focus of this essay is the domestic politics of grand strategy. During the years prior to World War I, the British government faced contradictory pressures on the home front – rising anti-German sentiment on the one hand, but aversion to a continental commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas imperial commitments on the other. Nonetheless, London did an impressive job of managing these pressures, undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of the fleet, preparing for a continental commitment, and relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation, however, Britain nonetheless found itself at war in 1914. The main cause was the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany, a factor over which Britain had little influence. The outbreak of World War I underscores the intimate connection between policy and politics and the degree to which domestic pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound strategic calculations. During the years prior to World War II, domestic politics again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand strategy. The political consequences of the economic dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced under-balancing in Great Britain; preoccupied with its economic fragility, London refused to rearm until it was too late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Other status quo powers similarly turned inward and avoided alliance commitments. At the same time, economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism in both Germany and Japan. The combination of under￾balancing by status quo states and excessive ambition among revisionist states produced gross power asymmetries – with disastrous consequences. This essay’s historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in the distribution of global power. On the one hand, Great Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United States, marking the only peaceful power transition in history. Perhaps the rise of China and the coming transition in the global distribution of power can be handled with equal equanimity and tranquility. On the other hand, Great Britain’s deft diplomacy did not succeed in preventing the outbreak of World War I, largely because Germany, for domestic reasons, was unwilling – or unable – to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its geopolitical ambition. The result was a classic insecurity spiral that escalated to war. The inter-war era provides equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. Managing Power Transition: British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany By the end of the 1800s, Britain faced a power transition on three fronts: the ascent of the United States in the Western Hemisphere; the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power; and Germany’s decision to draw on its mounting economic and industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a different way. It accommodated the United States, advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that has lasted to this day. London fashioned a formal alliance with Japan, with the two powers combining their naval assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific. The Anglo￾Japanese alliance, however, ultimately proved hollow as each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for unilateral gain. With Germany, Britain practiced deterrence, making clear to Berlin that it intended to do what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the European theater. Germany saw Britain as seeking to block its rise, not defend its legitimate security interests. A classic spiral ensued. The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. Anglo-American Rapprochement, 1895-1906 The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter enemies. The American colonies revolted against British rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. Amid the U.S. Civil War, Britain came close to intervening

on behalf of the Confederacy;London preferred a weak and the border between Alaska and Canada.Following divided America to one whose ascent might come at the settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in expense of British hegemony.After the Union's victory and 1903,President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the for decades thereafter,the United States and Great Britain dispute "was the last serious trouble between ourselves and remained watchful antagonists.Britain's naval superiority the British Empire."3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North writing that an Anglo-American war was "practically and South America stood in the way of the United States' impossible now"and "will grow entirely so as the years go growing interest in extending its sway throughout the by.In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into Western Hemisphere. account a war with England.I treat it as out of the question."4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London.In A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in A.H.Lee,the civil lord of the Admiralty,noted that "I Anglo-American relations.In the midst of growing cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to nationalist sentiment in the United States,President contemplate it under any circumstances."5 Grover Cleveland,backed by Congress,insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of States.London initially refused,rejecting Washington's high politics;at the outset,it was exclusively diplomats and claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that voice in the dispute.But after the prospect of war emerged, enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry.But by London promptly backed down,and agreed to submit its 1898,advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal.The main societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty's Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. resources to go to war with the United States.Accordingly, After an outpouring of British support for the U.S.victory London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to over Spain,the New York Chamber of Commerce held a accommodate Washington's demands.As Kenneth Bourne dinner meeting at which the British and American flags describes London's predicament,"Great Britain's resources were hanging side-by-side;the participants sang both"God were now stretched beyond their limit."Stephen Rock Save the Queen”and“The Star-Spangled Banner..” agrees that,"Britain's cultivation of American friendship Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation,a in London and New York to lobby for improved relations cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic and greater cooperation.6 position."2 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing London's conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an role in broadening and deepening societal support for explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen Anglo-American rapprochement.After the Spanish. geopolitical rivalry with the United States.It succeeded. American War,according to Robert George Neale,"Public During the next few years,London and Washington traded opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, unanimous in its support for United States action against including fishing rights in the Bering Sea,the Spanish- Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific....Leaders and American War and U.S.imperial expansion in the Pacific, articles from all the major newspapers and journals the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal,and practically without exception were in favour of America's NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 3

new america foundation page 3 on behalf of the Confederacy; London preferred a weak and divided America to one whose ascent might come at the expense of British hegemony. After the Union’s victory and for decades thereafter, the United States and Great Britain remained watchful antagonists. Britain’s naval superiority in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North and South America stood in the way of the United States’ growing interest in extending its sway throughout the Western Hemisphere. A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in Anglo-American relations. In the midst of growing nationalist sentiment in the United States, President Grover Cleveland, backed by Congress, insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United States. London initially refused, rejecting Washington’s claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a voice in the dispute. But after the prospect of war emerged, London promptly backed down, and agreed to submit its dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal. The main impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty’s insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval resources to go to war with the United States. Accordingly, London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to accommodate Washington’s demands. As Kenneth Bourne describes London’s predicament, “Great Britain’s resources were now stretched beyond their limit.” Stephen Rock agrees that, “Britain’s cultivation of American friendship was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation, a cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic position.”2 London’s conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen geopolitical rivalry with the United States. It succeeded. During the next few years, London and Washington traded concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, including fishing rights in the Bering Sea, the Spanish￾American War and U.S. imperial expansion in the Pacific, the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal, and the border between Alaska and Canada. Following settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the dispute “was the last serious trouble between ourselves and the British Empire.”3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, writing that an Anglo-American war was “practically impossible now” and “will grow entirely so as the years go by. In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into account a war with England. I treat it as out of the question.”4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London. In reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, A.H. Lee, the civil lord of the Admiralty, noted that “I cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to contemplate it under any circumstances.”5 Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of high politics; at the outset, it was exclusively diplomats and high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry. But by 1898, advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. After an outpouring of British support for the U.S. victory over Spain, the New York Chamber of Commerce held a dinner meeting at which the British and American flags were hanging side-by-side; the participants sang both “God Save the Queen” and “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded in London and New York to lobby for improved relations and greater cooperation.6 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing role in broadening and deepening societal support for Anglo-American rapprochement. After the Spanish￾American War, according to Robert George Neale, “Public opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost unanimous in its support for United States action against Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific. . . . Leaders and articles from all the major newspapers and journals practically without exception were in favour of America’s

actions.Addresses were received by the government from The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,1902-1923 numerous political associations in support of Anglo- At the same time that the rise of the United States American friendship."7 The same was true of the media challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, and public in the United States.One diplomat in the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain's Washington observed that "unanimous,or almost naval position in the Pacific.As in the Atlantic,Britain unanimous support for England is now manifested by the turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval Press throughout the length and breadth of the country... deficiencies in the Pacific.It concluded an alliance with pass[ing]the bound of moderation in as great degree as the Japan in 1902,which lasted until 1923.During the bulk of dislike and distrust of yesterday."8 these two decades,the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers A shared sense of cultural commonality played an and for coordinating naval operations against shared important role in consolidating rapprochement.Indeed,a threats.After World War I,however,the alliance frayed. "cult of Anglo-Saxonism"was emerging in both Britain and Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States the United States by the turn of the century.British elites only deepened over time,Britain and Japan drifted apart in regularly spoke of a"common kinship of race"and "ties of the interwar era.The two powers were allies in World War blood,"and began referring to the prospect of war with the I,but direct adversaries in World War II. United States as a"civil war"or "fratricidal strife."9 On the other side of the Atlantic,Richard Olney,who had served as The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized secretary of state under President William McKinley, the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British referred to Britain as America's "best friend"and noted interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy,in “the close community·.·in origin,speech,thought,, combination with the Japanese fleet,sufficient strength to literature,institutions,ideals-in the kind and degree of retain superiority over Russia and France,allies since 1892. civilization enjoyed by both." In return,Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London's ostensible backing of Japan's These shifts in public discourse helped transform the territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula,which had identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into been fueled by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of the identities of friendship which consolidated 1984-1895.London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to rapprochement.By 1901,Britain had removed the United include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean,but States from the two-power standard,effectively Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer northeast Asia. contemplating operations against the United States.The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906.By Amid Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- the early 19oos,the U.S.General Staff concluded that war 1905,the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened.Tokyo with Britain was"the least of all possible conflicts." agreed to accede to London's request to extend the pact to include India,while London acquiesced to Tokyo's de facto It would not be until the 194os that Britain and the United occupation of Korea.The alliance was again revised and States fashioned the "special relationship"of today.But extended in 191,with Japan effectively winning Britain's rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910.Britain was for strategic partnership-and made possible the first motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over peaceful power transition in history. Japan and the imperative,given Britain's need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 4

new america foundation page 4 actions. Addresses were received by the government from numerous political associations in support of Anglo￾American friendship.”7 The same was true of the media and public in the United States. One diplomat in Washington observed that “unanimous, or almost unanimous support for England is now manifested by the Press throughout the length and breadth of the country . . . pass[ing] the bound of moderation in as great degree as the dislike and distrust of yesterday.”8 A shared sense of cultural commonality played an important role in consolidating rapprochement. Indeed, a “cult of Anglo-Saxonism” was emerging in both Britain and the United States by the turn of the century. British elites regularly spoke of a “common kinship of race” and “ties of blood,” and began referring to the prospect of war with the United States as a “civil war” or “fratricidal strife.”9 On the other side of the Atlantic, Richard Olney, who had served as secretary of state under President William McKinley, referred to Britain as America’s “best friend” and noted “the close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.”10 These shifts in public discourse helped transform the identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into the identities of friendship which consolidated rapprochement. By 1901, Britain had removed the United States from the two-power standard, effectively acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer contemplating operations against the United States. The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906. By the early 1900s, the U.S. General Staff concluded that war with Britain was “the least of all possible conflicts.”11 It would not be until the 1940s that Britain and the United States fashioned the “special relationship” of today. But rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation for strategic partnership – and made possible the first peaceful power transition in history. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923 At the same time that the rise of the United States challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain’s naval position in the Pacific. As in the Atlantic, Britain turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval deficiencies in the Pacific. It concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902, which lasted until 1923. During the bulk of these two decades, the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers and for coordinating naval operations against shared threats. After World War I, however, the alliance frayed. Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States only deepened over time, Britain and Japan drifted apart in the interwar era. The two powers were allies in World War I, but direct adversaries in World War II. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy, in combination with the Japanese fleet, sufficient strength to retain superiority over Russia and France, allies since 1892. In return, Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London’s ostensible backing of Japan’s territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula, which had been fueled by Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1984-1895. London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean, but Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to northeast Asia. Amid Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened. Tokyo agreed to accede to London’s request to extend the pact to include India, while London acquiesced to Tokyo’s de facto occupation of Korea. The alliance was again revised and extended in 1911, with Japan effectively winning Britain’s acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910. Britain was motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over Japan and the imperative, given Britain’s need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German

threat,of minimizing naval requirements in the Pacific. assistance in protecting Britain's potentially exposed According to the Committee of Imperial Defence,the imperial interests.Britain saw Japan as capitalizing on the alliance helped ensure that"the risk of attack by Japan [is] alliance to advance its territorial ambitions in the region; excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be London's ambassador characterized Japan as "a frankly provided against."The alliance was put to the test during opportunistic,not to say selfish,country."5 Rather than World War I,with impressive results.Japan attacked-and sending signals of benign intent through the practice of proceeded to occupy-German positions in the Far East strategic restraint,Britain and Japan appeared to each other and,although it declined requests to send ground troops to to be seeking unilateral advantage.The alliance was seen by the European theater,Tokyo did dispatch naval vessels to both parties as an instrumental pact of convenience,not a patrol and escort convoys in the Indian Ocean and diplomatic vehicle for advancing lasting rapprochement. Mediterranean. Second,a lack of transparency encouraged the parties- The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was again renewed in 1921. Britain in particular-to question Japanese intent.As a However,despite the concrete strategic cooperation that member of Parliament noted,"In making a treaty with the took place during World War I,the pact was effectively Japanese we were making a treaty with a people who were defunct by the close of World War I.It did not formally more or less an enigma to us."16 Admiral Cyprian Bridge, lapse until the Washington Naval Treaty came into effect in one of the British officers overseeing naval cooperation with 1923.But Britain decided to renew the alliance mainly his Japanese counterparts complained about "the innate because,according to the Foreign Office,"it affords us the suspiciousness of the Oriental."7 Although Japanese elites only means of exercising a restraining and moderating had a better sense of British intentions due to the influence on Japanese ambitions.In similar fashion, democratic nature of its government,they sensed British Japan saw the alliance principally as a means of ratifying its distrust and discomfort.The resulting resentment eroded territorial gains in the Far East and preventing its strategic Tokyo's confidence in the benign nature of British isolation among the major powers.By the time the alliance intentions. ended,both parties were well aware that it had lost much of its former political and strategic consequence.Britain and Finally,the absence of cultural commonality stood in the Japan remained on cordial terms throughout the 192os.But way of rapprochement.While rapprochement between the following decade was another matter altogether;absent Britain and the United States benefited from a shared sense the alliance with Britain,Japan soon found itself in direct of Anglo-Saxon heritage,the opposite was true of Britain geopolitical competition with the Western powers. and Japan.Of the naval prowess of the Japanese,Admiral According to David Steeds,the end of the alliance"was one Bridge admitted that,"I admire them greatly.""But,"he of the main causes of the breakdown of the 193os and the continued,"I feel no social or moral affinity with them and sequence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.4 I would rather live with any branch of the Caucasian race, even the Russian,than I would them."This type of overt Alliance between Britain and Japan failed to produce a racism appeared frequently in official and public discourse peaceful power transition for three main reasons.First, -and the Japanese were well aware of it.Indeed,Japan although British and Japanese elites concluded a formal pressed for a clause on racial equality to be included in the strategic pact,each party saw the other as pursuing founding documents of the League of Nations-but failed. individual gain,not pursuing common interests.Japan saw A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted Britain as taking advantage of the alliance to reduce its throughout the two decades of alliance-and stood in the naval presence in the Far East and to secure Japanese way of a deeper strategic partnership.As Ian Nish NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 5

new america foundation page 5 threat, of minimizing naval requirements in the Pacific. According to the Committee of Imperial Defence, the alliance helped ensure that “the risk of attack by Japan [is] excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be provided against.”12 The alliance was put to the test during World War I, with impressive results. Japan attacked – and proceeded to occupy – German positions in the Far East and, although it declined requests to send ground troops to the European theater, Tokyo did dispatch naval vessels to patrol and escort convoys in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was again renewed in 1921. However, despite the concrete strategic cooperation that took place during World War I, the pact was effectively defunct by the close of World War I. It did not formally lapse until the Washington Naval Treaty came into effect in 1923. But Britain decided to renew the alliance mainly because, according to the Foreign Office, “it affords us the only means of exercising a restraining and moderating influence on Japanese ambitions.”13 In similar fashion, Japan saw the alliance principally as a means of ratifying its territorial gains in the Far East and preventing its strategic isolation among the major powers. By the time the alliance ended, both parties were well aware that it had lost much of its former political and strategic consequence. Britain and Japan remained on cordial terms throughout the 1920s. But the following decade was another matter altogether; absent the alliance with Britain, Japan soon found itself in direct geopolitical competition with the Western powers. According to David Steeds, the end of the alliance “was one of the main causes of the breakdown of the 1930s and the sequence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.”14 Alliance between Britain and Japan failed to produce a peaceful power transition for three main reasons. First, although British and Japanese elites concluded a formal strategic pact, each party saw the other as pursuing individual gain, not pursuing common interests. Japan saw Britain as taking advantage of the alliance to reduce its naval presence in the Far East and to secure Japanese assistance in protecting Britain’s potentially exposed imperial interests. Britain saw Japan as capitalizing on the alliance to advance its territorial ambitions in the region; London’s ambassador characterized Japan as “a frankly opportunistic, not to say selfish, country.”15 Rather than sending signals of benign intent through the practice of strategic restraint, Britain and Japan appeared to each other to be seeking unilateral advantage. The alliance was seen by both parties as an instrumental pact of convenience, not a diplomatic vehicle for advancing lasting rapprochement. Second, a lack of transparency encouraged the parties – Britain in particular – to question Japanese intent. As a member of Parliament noted, “In making a treaty with the Japanese we were making a treaty with a people who were more or less an enigma to us.”16 Admiral Cyprian Bridge, one of the British officers overseeing naval cooperation with his Japanese counterparts complained about “the innate suspiciousness of the Oriental.”17 Although Japanese elites had a better sense of British intentions due to the democratic nature of its government, they sensed British distrust and discomfort. The resulting resentment eroded Tokyo’s confidence in the benign nature of British intentions. Finally, the absence of cultural commonality stood in the way of rapprochement. While rapprochement between Britain and the United States benefited from a shared sense of Anglo-Saxon heritage, the opposite was true of Britain and Japan. Of the naval prowess of the Japanese, Admiral Bridge admitted that, “I admire them greatly.” “But,” he continued, “I feel no social or moral affinity with them and I would rather live with any branch of the Caucasian race, even the Russian, than I would them.”18 This type of overt racism appeared frequently in official and public discourse – and the Japanese were well aware of it. Indeed, Japan pressed for a clause on racial equality to be included in the founding documents of the League of Nations – but failed. A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted throughout the two decades of alliance – and stood in the way of a deeper strategic partnership. As Ian Nish

concludes,"Racial equality had been an unspoken problem across the political spectrum that Britain,rather than of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning."9 accommodating Berlin,had to respond firmly to Germany's naval program. Anglo-German Naval Rivalry,1898-1914 With the Reichstag's passage of the First Naval Law in the Contrary to Tirpitz'expectations,Britain did not leave the spring of 1898,Germany began building a battle fleet, bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany's pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might building program proceeded.Instead,faced with a threat to into geopolitical sway.The Second Naval Law,passed two the home islands,London began pulling its battleships years later,set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Indeed,the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the Germany's building program would upset the stable United States were important diplomatic vehicles balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end facilitating this redistribution of the fleet.Moreover,Britain of the Napoleonic Wars.Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,the embarked on its own building program to ensure that the chief architect of Germany's buildup,did not intend on Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of overtaking Britain as the world's premier naval power. superiority over the German fleet.As Paul Kennedy Rather,he envisaged that the navy would serve as a"risk comments,"Tirpitz'calculations that Germany could fleet"-a means of compelling Britain and the other major develop a formidable naval force in home waters without powers to defer to German dominance in Europe.While the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it Britain's fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, was flawed from the start."22 Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain would accompany naval primacy in Europe.As Tirpitz that would ultimately culminate in World War I.Mounting wrote,"The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea;it antagonism between the two powers was driven principally influenced the entire globe without us needing to be by geopolitical interest;Germany's bid to expand its directly engaged in any other place." strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain's national interests.Nonetheless,a number of other The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany's naval considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly ambitions,uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings difficult to arrest.The British were coming to see Germany represented an opportunity or a threat.Britain and as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at Germany had strong economic ties and generally good the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural relations,prompting London to consider the possibility of and industrial sectors.As tensions mounted,ideological an Anglo-German alliance-a tempting option in the face differences -in particular,British discomfort with of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in Germany's illiberal politics-became part of the "mental 1892."From 1902 onwards,however,British attitudes furniture"that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. toward the growth of the German fleet hardened.German And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German London's distrust of Berlin.Influenced by the mainstream public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding press,anti-German sentiment also spread widely among eventually entrapped officials in Berlin,making it politically the public.And the scope of Tirpitz'program ensured that perilous for them to step back from competition with the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security Britain.Although Britain lacked Germany's "massive of the home islands.By 1903,a consensus had formed government-instigated propaganda,"officials in London NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 6

new america foundation page 6 concludes, “Racial equality had been an unspoken problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning.”19 Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1898-1914 With the Reichstag’s passage of the First Naval Law in the spring of 1898, Germany began building a battle fleet, pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might into geopolitical sway. The Second Naval Law, passed two years later, set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Germany’s building program would upset the stable balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the chief architect of Germany’s buildup, did not intend on overtaking Britain as the world’s premier naval power. Rather, he envisaged that the navy would serve as a “risk fleet” – a means of compelling Britain and the other major powers to defer to German dominance in Europe. While Britain’s fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that would accompany naval primacy in Europe. As Tirpitz wrote, “The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea; it influenced the entire globe without us needing to be directly engaged in any other place.”20 The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany’s naval ambitions, uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings represented an opportunity or a threat. Britain and Germany had strong economic ties and generally good relations, prompting London to consider the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance – a tempting option in the face of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in 1892.21 From 1902 onwards, however, British attitudes toward the growth of the German fleet hardened. German support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel London’s distrust of Berlin. Influenced by the mainstream press, anti-German sentiment also spread widely among the public. And the scope of Tirpitz’ program ensured that the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security of the home islands. By 1903, a consensus had formed across the political spectrum that Britain, rather than accommodating Berlin, had to respond firmly to Germany’s naval program. Contrary to Tirpitz’ expectations, Britain did not leave the bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany’s building program proceeded. Instead, faced with a threat to the home islands, London began pulling its battleships from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. Indeed, the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the United States were important diplomatic vehicles facilitating this redistribution of the fleet. Moreover, Britain embarked on its own building program to ensure that the Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of superiority over the German fleet. As Paul Kennedy comments, “Tirpitz’ calculations that Germany could develop a formidable naval force in home waters without the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it was flawed from the start.”22 So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain that would ultimately culminate in World War I. Mounting antagonism between the two powers was driven principally by geopolitical interest; Germany’s bid to expand its strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain’s national interests. Nonetheless, a number of other considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly difficult to arrest. The British were coming to see Germany as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural and industrial sectors. As tensions mounted, ideological differences – in particular, British discomfort with Germany’s illiberal politics – became part of the “mental furniture” that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding eventually entrapped officials in Berlin, making it politically perilous for them to step back from competition with Britain. Although Britain lacked Germany’s “massive government-instigated propaganda,” officials in London

faced considerable pressure from the public and the press -the border of Venezuela,fishing rights in the Barents Sea, to block Germany's rising ambition.23 the Panama Canal,the border between Alaska and Canada -dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. In 1907,Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the To be sure,Britain was motivated by necessity,not Triple Entente,a pact meant to hem in German ambition. altruism;it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in to reduce imperial commitments,prompting it to pursue Germany.Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, rapprochement with the United States.But it was London's which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente- practice of strategic restraint and Washington's readiness to and especially with Britain.Although the London and reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated relationship from enmity to amity.Britain was then able to agreement to end the spiraling naval race,such efforts were cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary.Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic Britain did not want war,but took prudent steps to balance retrenchment. against Germany's growing battle fleet.Germany also did not want war,but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval cooperation,even if it entails formal alliance,does not have buildup had itself triggered.To be sure,Germany began its the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway.But when it restraint.Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and took the decision for war in the summer of 1914,Berlin was naval operations,but each viewed the other side as motivated by an insecurity of its own making,not a boastful pursuing its own self-interest,not joint gains.Britain saw confidence in its ability to prevail.Germany from 1898 Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led strategic reach in East Asia.Japan saw Britain as using the to an unintended hegemonic war. alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean.Absent the concessions and mutual The Lessons of History accommodation that indicate benign intent,strategic As the twentieth century opened,Britain faced the cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States,Japan,and In the case of Britain and Germany,neither side practiced Germany.Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry strategic restraint;instead,a classic insecurity spiral set in, with the United States,but soon found itself at war with with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of Germany and,later,Japan.A number of important hostility.British and German elites both appreciated the historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the Britain's relations with these three rising powers. naval race.But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves.Once the naval race had Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation begun,a combination of strategic imperative and domestic The critical ingredient making possible lasting constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic.It was this rapprochement between the United States and Great dynamic that led to Germany's self-encirclement and, Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. ultimately,to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give Britain wanted or intended. ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 7

new america foundation page 7 faced considerable pressure from the public and the press to block Germany’s rising ambition.23 In 1907, Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the Triple Entente, a pact meant to hem in German ambition. This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in Germany. Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente – and especially with Britain. Although the London and Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated agreement to end the spiraling naval race, such efforts were repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. Britain did not want war, but took prudent steps to balance against Germany’s growing battle fleet. Germany also did not want war, but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval buildup had itself triggered. To be sure, Germany began its naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway. But when it took the decision for war in the summer of 1914, Berlin was motivated by an insecurity of its own making, not a boastful confidence in its ability to prevail. Germany from 1898 onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led to an unintended hegemonic war. The Lessons of History As the twentieth century opened, Britain faced the unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany. Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry with the United States, but soon found itself at war with Germany and, later, Japan. A number of important historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of Britain’s relations with these three rising powers. Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation The critical ingredient making possible lasting rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest – the border of Venezuela, fishing rights in the Barents Sea, the Panama Canal, the border between Alaska and Canada – dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. To be sure, Britain was motivated by necessity, not altruism; it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed to reduce imperial commitments, prompting it to pursue rapprochement with the United States. But it was London’s practice of strategic restraint and Washington’s readiness to reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American relationship from enmity to amity. Britain was then able to cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary. Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic retrenchment. The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic cooperation, even if it entails formal alliance, does not have the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal restraint. Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and naval operations, but each viewed the other side as pursuing its own self-interest, not joint gains. Britain saw Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its strategic reach in East Asia. Japan saw Britain as using the alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean. Absent the concessions and mutual accommodation that indicate benign intent, strategic cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. In the case of Britain and Germany, neither side practiced strategic restraint; instead, a classic insecurity spiral set in, with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of hostility. British and German elites both appreciated the potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the naval race. But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves. Once the naval race had begun, a combination of strategic imperative and domestic constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic. It was this dynamic that led to Germany’s self-encirclement and, ultimately, to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Britain wanted or intended

Transparency balanced against Germany largely for reasons of Britain and the United States were able to move from geopolitical interest-and elites then appropriated critiques mutual suspicion to a shared sense of trust in part because of the German regime in building support for the transparency afforded by democracy afforded each party confrontational policies,increases in defense spending,and the ability to discern the broader motives of the other.The preparations for a continental commitment.As Ido Oren motives behind changes in British policy toward the United has argued,Britain attributed malign character to German States were on show in Parliament and in the lively British institutions as a product of the country's foreign policy press.British elites had similarly unchecked access to policy behavior,not vice versa.24 debates in the United States.Such transparency enabled both sides to be confident of the benign intentions of the Managing Domestic Politics other;concessions were correctly interpreted as Managing the domestic politics of relations between investments in amity rather than as ruses or idiosyncratic reigning hegemon and rising challenger is critical to aberrations in policy.Accordingly,over time,the attribution orchestrating a peaceful power transition.In the Anglo- of benign intent became dispositional,not situational, American case,elites in both Britain and the United States clearing the way for the onset of rapprochement. laid the domestic foundations for rapprochement through explicit efforts to shape public discourse.As rapprochement The lack of transparency was a major impediment to advanced and moved from the realm of high politics to managing relations between Britain and Japan.British broader societal engagement,officials in both countries elites consistently complained about the closed nature of propagated narratives of friendship,shared heritage,and decision making in Tokyo and their inability to discern cultural commonality.Leaders and opinion makers started Japanese intentions.As mentioned above,the British to refer to the prospect of Anglo-American conflict as tended to see the Japanese as an "enigma."Absent a clearer tantamount to a civil war or "fratricide."These changes in sense of Japanese intentions,the British tended to interpret discourse were important steps in building domestic Japanese behavior as motivated by self-interest,not shared support for rapprochement and undercutting domestic strategic objectives.The lack of transparency helped ensure opposition to ongoing efforts to reach out to the adversary. that the alliance did not develop beyond a marriage of Even so,the British government hid from the public certain convenience. moves-such as the dropping of the United States from the two-power standard used to set the size of the battle fleet- Regime type and transparency had a mixed impact on to avoid a nationalist backlash.And the U.S.Senate shot Anglo-German relations.Although Germany was not a down a general arbitration treaty signed by the United liberal democracy,British elites did not complain about States and Britain early in 1897-a sign of domestic insufficient access to German politics and the opposition to reconciliation and of the need to move slowly considerations shaping policy.Indeed,the aggressive in pursuing Anglo-American rapprochement. strains of nationalism affecting debates in the Reichstag and shaping public attitudes were on full display-one of The Anglo-Japanese alliance enjoyed much less the reasons London was worried about German intentions. prominence in both British and Japanese politics;there was In addition,the illiberal nature of the German government little effort by either government to engage domestic did ultimately come to influence Britain's decision to react constituencies or broader publics.In the words of Ian Nish, firmly to the rise of German power.However,the British the Anglo-Japanese pact remained a "secretariat alliance."25 were not basing their reaction to Germany's growing power In Britain,elites deliberately gave the alliance a low profile, on the nature of its domestic institutions.Rather,Britain fearing parliamentary and public opposition to British NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 8

new america foundation page 8 Transparency Britain and the United States were able to move from mutual suspicion to a shared sense of trust in part because the transparency afforded by democracy afforded each party the ability to discern the broader motives of the other. The motives behind changes in British policy toward the United States were on show in Parliament and in the lively British press. British elites had similarly unchecked access to policy debates in the United States. Such transparency enabled both sides to be confident of the benign intentions of the other; concessions were correctly interpreted as investments in amity rather than as ruses or idiosyncratic aberrations in policy. Accordingly, over time, the attribution of benign intent became dispositional, not situational, clearing the way for the onset of rapprochement. The lack of transparency was a major impediment to managing relations between Britain and Japan. British elites consistently complained about the closed nature of decision making in Tokyo and their inability to discern Japanese intentions. As mentioned above, the British tended to see the Japanese as an “enigma.” Absent a clearer sense of Japanese intentions, the British tended to interpret Japanese behavior as motivated by self-interest, not shared strategic objectives. The lack of transparency helped ensure that the alliance did not develop beyond a marriage of convenience. Regime type and transparency had a mixed impact on Anglo-German relations. Although Germany was not a liberal democracy, British elites did not complain about insufficient access to German politics and the considerations shaping policy. Indeed, the aggressive strains of nationalism affecting debates in the Reichstag and shaping public attitudes were on full display – one of the reasons London was worried about German intentions. In addition, the illiberal nature of the German government did ultimately come to influence Britain’s decision to react firmly to the rise of German power. However, the British were not basing their reaction to Germany’s growing power on the nature of its domestic institutions. Rather, Britain balanced against Germany largely for reasons of geopolitical interest – and elites then appropriated critiques of the German regime in building support for confrontational policies, increases in defense spending, and preparations for a continental commitment. As Ido Oren has argued, Britain attributed malign character to German institutions as a product of the country’s foreign policy behavior, not vice versa.24 Managing Domestic Politics Managing the domestic politics of relations between reigning hegemon and rising challenger is critical to orchestrating a peaceful power transition. In the Anglo￾American case, elites in both Britain and the United States laid the domestic foundations for rapprochement through explicit efforts to shape public discourse. As rapprochement advanced and moved from the realm of high politics to broader societal engagement, officials in both countries propagated narratives of friendship, shared heritage, and cultural commonality. Leaders and opinion makers started to refer to the prospect of Anglo-American conflict as tantamount to a civil war or “fratricide.” These changes in discourse were important steps in building domestic support for rapprochement and undercutting domestic opposition to ongoing efforts to reach out to the adversary. Even so, the British government hid from the public certain moves – such as the dropping of the United States from the two-power standard used to set the size of the battle fleet – to avoid a nationalist backlash. And the U.S. Senate shot down a general arbitration treaty signed by the United States and Britain early in 1897 – a sign of domestic opposition to reconciliation and of the need to move slowly in pursuing Anglo-American rapprochement. The Anglo-Japanese alliance enjoyed much less prominence in both British and Japanese politics; there was little effort by either government to engage domestic constituencies or broader publics. In the words of Ian Nish, the Anglo-Japanese pact remained a “secretariat alliance.”25 In Britain, elites deliberately gave the alliance a low profile, fearing parliamentary and public opposition to British

cooperation with an "inferior"power.In Japan,diplomacy persisted throughout the two decades of alliance.This sense still remained the provenance primarily of a small circle of of difference limited the scope of the partnership,with the elites.Moreover,the alliance enjoyed natural support in British expressing none of the cultural or political affinity Japanese society since a formal pact with a European power that they demonstrated toward the United States.The elevated the country's prominence and prestige.The Japanese were well aware of Britain's racial condescension absence of domestic engagement on either side meant that and regularly worried that Western fear of the "yellow the alliance had shallow societal roots,contributing to its peril,"which was particularly prominent in the dominions atrophy after the close of World War I. and the United States,would ultimately compromise the alliance-which it did.7 In the Anglo-German case,domestic politics had exactly the opposite effect than it did in the Anglo-American case. In the Anglo-German case,a sense of cultural difference Rather than propagating narratives of amity,elites in both grew in step with the naval race and mounting hostility. Germany and Britain whipped up patriotic zeal-in part to The change in narrative was most pronounced in Britain, garner support for the increases in defense spending that where elites constructed a narrative of an autocratic resulted from the mounting rivalry.In Germany,elites also Germany that was bent on geopolitical conquest and used nationalist propaganda as a means of disarming the opposed to the advance of liberalism and democracy. growing political power of the left and the threat it posed to Differences in regime type did little to impair Anglo- the domestic alliance between the Junkers and the German relations prior to 1902.But once embedded in the industrialists.German elites found themselves entrapped context of geopolitical rivalry,they became politically salient in their own rhetoric,unable to reverse course even when and contributed to the mounting estrangement. they recognized the perils to national security resulting from their pursuit of Weltpolitik. The Domestic Politics of Grand Strategy:Intended and Unintended Culture Consequences Culture matters.In the Anglo-American case, The Onset of World War I rapprochement was facilitated by a shared sense of Anglo- Between 1898 and 1914,Britain undertook one of the most Saxon heritage.That heritage alone was hardly sufficient to impressive strategic adjustments in history.It used a ensure stability,as made clear by two Anglo-American wars combination of diplomacy,rearmament,and naval and over a century of animosity.But once peace began to redistribution to dramatically reduce its strategic presence break out,officials,lobby groups,and the media readily in the imperial periphery and concentrate its military picked up on cultural commonalities to make the case for a capability in the European theater.Although the British lasting partnership.Richard Olney,who was U.S.secretary government,as outlined above,faced domestic pressures of state from 1895 to 1897,declared soon after leaving office that contributed to the intensification of Anglo-German that the United States and Britain constituted a "close naval rivalry,British strategy was generally reasoned and community...in origin,speech,thought,literature, reasonable;the home islands faced a rising threat from institutions,ideals-in the kind and degree of civilization Germany and London took the steps necessary to provide enjoyed by both."26 for deterrence and defense.What is remarkable is that deterrence failed despite Britain's timely strategic If culture facilitated rapprochement between Britain and adjustment-and despite the fact that it faced in Germany a the United States,it did exactly the opposite for Britain and rising power,but not one that was intent on predatory Japan.A profound sense of cultural and racial difference aggression.The great powers should have been able to NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 9

new america foundation page 9 cooperation with an “inferior” power. In Japan, diplomacy still remained the provenance primarily of a small circle of elites. Moreover, the alliance enjoyed natural support in Japanese society since a formal pact with a European power elevated the country’s prominence and prestige. The absence of domestic engagement on either side meant that the alliance had shallow societal roots, contributing to its atrophy after the close of World War I. In the Anglo-German case, domestic politics had exactly the opposite effect than it did in the Anglo-American case. Rather than propagating narratives of amity, elites in both Germany and Britain whipped up patriotic zeal – in part to garner support for the increases in defense spending that resulted from the mounting rivalry. In Germany, elites also used nationalist propaganda as a means of disarming the growing political power of the left and the threat it posed to the domestic alliance between the Junkers and the industrialists. German elites found themselves entrapped in their own rhetoric, unable to reverse course even when they recognized the perils to national security resulting from their pursuit of Weltpolitik. Culture Culture matters. In the Anglo-American case, rapprochement was facilitated by a shared sense of Anglo￾Saxon heritage. That heritage alone was hardly sufficient to ensure stability, as made clear by two Anglo-American wars and over a century of animosity. But once peace began to break out, officials, lobby groups, and the media readily picked up on cultural commonalities to make the case for a lasting partnership. Richard Olney, who was U.S. secretary of state from 1895 to 1897, declared soon after leaving office that the United States and Britain constituted a “close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.”26 If culture facilitated rapprochement between Britain and the United States, it did exactly the opposite for Britain and Japan. A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted throughout the two decades of alliance. This sense of difference limited the scope of the partnership, with the British expressing none of the cultural or political affinity that they demonstrated toward the United States. The Japanese were well aware of Britain’s racial condescension and regularly worried that Western fear of the “yellow peril,” which was particularly prominent in the dominions and the United States, would ultimately compromise the alliance – which it did.27 In the Anglo-German case, a sense of cultural difference grew in step with the naval race and mounting hostility. The change in narrative was most pronounced in Britain, where elites constructed a narrative of an autocratic Germany that was bent on geopolitical conquest and opposed to the advance of liberalism and democracy. Differences in regime type did little to impair Anglo￾German relations prior to 1902. But once embedded in the context of geopolitical rivalry, they became politically salient and contributed to the mounting estrangement. The Domestic Politics of Grand Strategy: Intended and Unintended Consequences The Onset of World War I Between 1898 and 1914, Britain undertook one of the most impressive strategic adjustments in history. It used a combination of diplomacy, rearmament, and naval redistribution to dramatically reduce its strategic presence in the imperial periphery and concentrate its military capability in the European theater. Although the British government, as outlined above, faced domestic pressures that contributed to the intensification of Anglo-German naval rivalry, British strategy was generally reasoned and reasonable; the home islands faced a rising threat from Germany and London took the steps necessary to provide for deterrence and defense. What is remarkable is that deterrence failed despite Britain’s timely strategic adjustment – and despite the fact that it faced in Germany a rising power, but not one that was intent on predatory aggression. The great powers should have been able to

avoid war.That they could not provide a sobering lesson policies fail to produce the desired results.Germany failed about the potential for great-power war to break out even dramatically in this respect.Two developments made amply when the reigning hegemon is reasoned and reasonable clear the failure of Tirpitz's risk-fleet strategy.First,instead and the rising challenger not a predatory aggressor. of leaving their battleships on foreign station and deferring to Germany's new-found power,London brought most of Drilling down into this case points to domestic dysfunction the fleet to home waters and built new battleships.Second, in Germany as tipping the balance and ensuring that a instead of winning Germany greater diplomatic latitude,its containable episode of great-power rivalry turned into an buildup triggered the formation of the Triple Entente, unstoppable march to hegemonic war.Confronted with making it clear to German leaders that their strategy had political stalemate and a rising threat to the old order from backfired.Nonetheless,due to the deep domestic roots of the working class,Germany's leaders embraced Weltpolitik Germany's building program,they found it impossible to as a means of both consolidating the alliance between iron reverse course.Instead,Germany responded to its self- and rye-ships for the industrialists and tariffs for the encirclement by intensifying the arms race,only tightening landed gentry-and using patriotism to isolate the left. the noose. From the start,German grand strategy was deeply intertwined with domestic politics and,in particular, Creating Conflicts of Interest popular nationalism-precisely why the naval program was At the turn of the twentieth century,Britain and Germany attached to "massive government-instigated propaganda." enjoyed strong political and economic ties and were not The intimate connection between policy and politics meant plagued by ongoing conflicts of interest.On the contrary, that German elites were unable to reverse course and back Germany was profiting from the free trade regime and away from rivalry with Britain even when they recognized open sea lanes of communication provided by Britain; the need to do so;they were cornered by their own Berlin benefited from the existing international order.The nationalist propaganda.Especially after the breakdown of same was true in reverse.Despite minor forays into the the logroll between iron and rye,political paralysis meant imperial periphery,Germany in no way threatened Britain's that Berlin was pushed along by strong currents of imperial interests or its control over key naval choke points. nationalism toward a war it did not want. Berlin established a small number of colonies in Africa and the Pacific,but not on a scale that was detrimental to the World War I was not an accidental war;the great powers British Empire. headed toward it with eyes wide open.But it was an unnecessary war,launched by a modernizing power that Conflicts of interest developed only as the unintended succeeded in exacerbating its own vulnerability and consequence of policy initiatives-actions and reactions launching a self-destructive war.The episode makes clear that fueled the security dilemma.Moreover,Germany that great-power war can emerge as the unintended ultimately sought to change the European balance of power consequence of an interaction between international not because the existing order worked to its disadvantage, conditions and domestic pathologies-one that has the but primarily for reasons of prestige and nationalism-to potential to produce self-reinforcing spirals of hostility. recast the pecking order in a manner consistent with Germany's rising power position.From this perspective, The Lessons of History even two powers with no direct conflicts of interests can Unintended Consequences find themselves at war when disputes over the balance of Strategic moves often do not play as intended,making it power remain unchecked. important for leaders to leave open exit strategies if their NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE IO

new america foundation page 10 avoid war. That they could not provide a sobering lesson about the potential for great-power war to break out even when the reigning hegemon is reasoned and reasonable and the rising challenger not a predatory aggressor. Drilling down into this case points to domestic dysfunction in Germany as tipping the balance and ensuring that a containable episode of great-power rivalry turned into an unstoppable march to hegemonic war. Confronted with political stalemate and a rising threat to the old order from the working class, Germany’s leaders embraced Weltpolitik as a means of both consolidating the alliance between iron and rye – ships for the industrialists and tariffs for the landed gentry – and using patriotism to isolate the left. From the start, German grand strategy was deeply intertwined with domestic politics and, in particular, popular nationalism – precisely why the naval program was attached to “massive government-instigated propaganda.” The intimate connection between policy and politics meant that German elites were unable to reverse course and back away from rivalry with Britain even when they recognized the need to do so; they were cornered by their own nationalist propaganda. Especially after the breakdown of the logroll between iron and rye, political paralysis meant that Berlin was pushed along by strong currents of nationalism toward a war it did not want. World War I was not an accidental war; the great powers headed toward it with eyes wide open. But it was an unnecessary war, launched by a modernizing power that succeeded in exacerbating its own vulnerability and launching a self-destructive war. The episode makes clear that great-power war can emerge as the unintended consequence of an interaction between international conditions and domestic pathologies – one that has the potential to produce self-reinforcing spirals of hostility. The Lessons of History Unintended Consequences Strategic moves often do not play as intended, making it important for leaders to leave open exit strategies if their policies fail to produce the desired results. Germany failed dramatically in this respect. Two developments made amply clear the failure of Tirpitz’s risk-fleet strategy. First, instead of leaving their battleships on foreign station and deferring to Germany’s new-found power, London brought most of the fleet to home waters and built new battleships. Second, instead of winning Germany greater diplomatic latitude, its buildup triggered the formation of the Triple Entente, making it clear to German leaders that their strategy had backfired. Nonetheless, due to the deep domestic roots of Germany’s building program, they found it impossible to reverse course. Instead, Germany responded to its self￾encirclement by intensifying the arms race, only tightening the noose. Creating Conflicts of Interest At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain and Germany enjoyed strong political and economic ties and were not plagued by ongoing conflicts of interest. On the contrary, Germany was profiting from the free trade regime and open sea lanes of communication provided by Britain; Berlin benefited from the existing international order. The same was true in reverse. Despite minor forays into the imperial periphery, Germany in no way threatened Britain’s imperial interests or its control over key naval choke points. Berlin established a small number of colonies in Africa and the Pacific, but not on a scale that was detrimental to the British Empire. Conflicts of interest developed only as the unintended consequence of policy initiatives – actions and reactions that fueled the security dilemma. Moreover, Germany ultimately sought to change the European balance of power not because the existing order worked to its disadvantage, but primarily for reasons of prestige and nationalism – to recast the pecking order in a manner consistent with Germany’s rising power position. From this perspective, even two powers with no direct conflicts of interests can find themselves at war when disputes over the balance of power remain unchecked