《国际战略》课程教学资源：The Hegemonic Illusion Traditional Strategic Studies In Context

SPECIAL SECTION ON THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES The Hegemonic Illusion?Traditional Strategic Studies In Context STEVEN E.MILLER* John F.Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, Cambridge,MA,UISA At the heart of Buzan Hansen's(2009)narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies,narrow and overly militarized but dominant,against a diverse set of challengers who aim to widen and deepen the field.Gradually,the challengers erode the hegemonic position of the traditionalists.This analysis reflects the assumptions, premises,and perceptions that Buzan Hansen bring to this proj- ect as protagonists in the camp of the challengers.The present article offers a traditionalist response to this narrative,suggesting that the evolution of the field looks very different when viewed through the lens of traditional strategic studies. Keywords insecurity·security·international security studies· Copenhagen School N THEIR IMPOSING INTELLECTUAL HISTORY of the field of inter- national security studies,Barry Buzan Lene Hansen (2009)attribute a singular role to the school of thought they call traditional strategic studies.It is,in the beginning of their story,the imperious hegemon,pre- occupied with bipolarity,obsessed with nuclear weapons,state-centric, policy-driven,force-oriented,and content to live within these narrow and unquestioned boundaries in its seemingly impregnable bastion at the top of the heap.But,gradually,challengers arise,new schools of thought that seek to widen and deepen'the conceptual basis of security studies-a burgeon- ing bevy of constructivists,post-structuralists,feminists,peace researchers, post-colonialists,critical analysts,all inclined to look beyond the state and to question the centrality of military security issues. Much of the narrative drive in Buzan Hansen's impressive book derives from this struggle between the dominant traditionalists and the upstart challengers.The authors'analysis emphasizes the inexorable erosion of the position of the traditionalists as the field is widened and deepened by the insti- tutionalization of other schools of thought.This is a clever way to conceive of the evolution of the field,and it enables Buzan Hansen to impose order on @The Author(s),2010.Reprints and permissions: SECURITY http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DIALOGUE SAGE Publications,http://sdi.sagepub.com Dowrloaded from sdi.sagepub al41k388RJ91Z7/%7010610388212

© The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav SAGE Publications, http://sdi.sagepub.com Vol. 41(6): 639–648, DOI: 10.1177/0967010610388212 The Hegemonic Illusion? Traditional Strategic Studies In Context STEVEN E. MILLER* John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA At the heart of Buzan & Hansen’s (2009) narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies, narrow and overly militarized but dominant, against a diverse set of challengers who aim to widen and deepen the field. Gradually, the challengers erode the hegemonic position of the traditionalists. This analysis reflects the assumptions, premises, and perceptions that Buzan & Hansen bring to this proj￾ect as protagonists in the camp of the challengers. The present article offers a traditionalist response to this narrative, suggesting that the evolution of the field looks very different when viewed through the lens of traditional strategic studies. Keywords    insecurity • security • international security studies • Copenhagen School I N THEIR IMPOSING INTELLECTUAL HISTORY of the field of inter￾national security studies, Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen (2009) attribute a singular role to the school of thought they call traditional strategic studies. It is, in the beginning of their story, the imperious hegemon, pre￾occupied with bipolarity, obsessed with nuclear weapons, state-centric, policy-driven, force-oriented, and content to live within these narrow and unquestioned boundaries in its seemingly impregnable bastion at the top of the heap. But, gradually, challengers arise, new schools of thought that seek to ‘widen and deepen’ the conceptual basis of security studies – a burgeon￾ing bevy of constructivists, post-structuralists, feminists, peace researchers, post-­colonialists, critical analysts, all inclined to look beyond the state and to question the centrality of military security issues. Much of the narrative drive in Buzan & Hansen’s impressive book derives from this struggle between the dominant traditionalists and the upstart challengers. The authors’ analysis emphasizes the inexorable erosion of the position of the traditionalists as the field is widened and deepened by the insti￾tutionalization of other schools of thought. This is a clever way to conceive of the evolution of the field, and it enables Buzan & Hansen to impose order on Special Section on The Evolution of International Security Studies Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

640 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers.Their characteriza- tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat- able.It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought.It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it.But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant,hegemonic position in the field of international security studies.This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists,who have tended to regard themselves within the aca- demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter- lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized.There is a striking disjunction between the self- image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan Hansen.An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu- tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings But,beyond this perceptual disconnect,what does it mean to say that strate- gic studies was dominant and hegemonic?Strategic studies',suggest Buzan Hansen(2009:263),'called the shots'.Who called what shots?'Strategic studies'was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues.Moreover,the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge- nous group but are themselves divided along political,ideological,disciplin- ary,methodological,and theoretical lines-whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement.There was no coherent organized movement,no governing body,no single dominant institution,no subfield policymaking apparatus,nothing anywhere that 'called the shots'or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif- ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives.There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form-as indeed happened,a point definitively demon- strated in Buzan Hansen's book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

640 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers. Their characteriza￾tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat￾able. It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought. It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it. But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan & Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant, hegemonic position in the field of international security studies. This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists, who have tended to regard themselves within the aca￾demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter￾lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized. There is a striking disjunction between the self￾image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan & Hansen. An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu￾tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings. But, beyond this perceptual disconnect, what does it mean to say that strate￾gic studies was dominant and hegemonic? ‘Strategic studies’, suggest Buzan & Hansen (2009: 263), ‘called the shots’. Who called what shots? ‘Strategic studies’ was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues. Moreover, the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge￾nous group but are themselves divided along political, ideological, disciplin￾ary, methodological, and theoretical lines – whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement. There was no coherent organized movement, no governing body, no single dominant institution, no subfield policymaking apparatus, nothing anywhere that ‘called the shots’ or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif￾ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives. There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form – as indeed happened, a point definitively demon￾strated in Buzan & Hansen’s book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 641 Buzan Hansen identify eleven schools of thought within international security studies.Only one-neorealism-resonates with traditional strate- gic studies.The other nine represent alternatives to the traditional approach and indeed are defined collectively as challengers to it (Buzan Hansen, 2009:101).As Buzan Hansen describe in detail,the challengers are well established and have long histories-some nearly as long as strategic studies itself.They are well populated with scholars,have extensive literatures,and along the way have collected their own set of journals and institutes and net- works.These alternative schools of thought appear to be particularly deeply entrenched in European universities and seem to have long been the preferred and prevalent approaches to the study of international security studies.After reading Buzan Hansen's account of these alternative approaches,it is not obvious why the traditionalists are regarded as dominant and hegemonic, because in the academic context they do not appear to warrant singular status or to possess any commanding comparative advantage. To Buzan Hansen,the hegemonic dominance of the traditionalists is obvious and unquestioned.There is no demonstration that it is true on the basis of some clear metric.What accounts for the authors'deeply rooted perception?There are at least four mutually reinforcing answers.First,tra- ditional strategic studies has always been linked to the world of power and policy,whereas the challengers to it generally stand apart from and offer a critique of that world.Hence,traditionalists look like,and often are, players in the policy process,prominent voices in the policy debate.Those who operate in alternative schools of thought are less policy-driven or more oppositional to structures of power.They are critics of the establishment, outsiders whose normative objections to the character of the system and the content of national policy can make them seem or cause them to be more distant from the policy action.The greater proximity of the traditionalists to power leads to an image of dominance,but this should not be confused with a position of intellectual hegemony.Within the academic realm,as Buzan Hansen's book shows,traditionalists share the terrain with many other schools of thought,the methods and substantive orientations of tradition- al security studies are much criticized and heavily contested,and in many scholarly settings it is not the most popular or influential approach to the field of international security studies. A second,related,point is that the security policymaking community that so dominates the public debate is generally viewed as operating in the tradi- tionalist mode.If one regards the national security bureaucracy of the state as part of the traditionalist coalition,then it will indeed seem vastly larger, vastly richer,vastly more powerful,and vastly more influential than any other scholarly tradition.However,studying the powerful does not make a scholarly grouping dominant or hegemonic in the intellectual life of the academy.As Buzan Hansen illustrate,the traditionalist orientation is often Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 641 Buzan & Hansen identify eleven schools of thought within international security studies. Only one – neorealism – resonates with traditional strate￾gic studies. The other nine represent alternatives to the traditional approach and indeed are defined collectively as challengers to it (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 101). As Buzan & Hansen describe in detail, the challengers are well established and have long histories – some nearly as long as strategic studies itself. They are well populated with scholars, have extensive literatures, and along the way have collected their own set of journals and institutes and net￾works. These alternative schools of thought appear to be particularly deeply entrenched in European universities and seem to have long been the preferred and prevalent approaches to the study of international security studies. After reading Buzan & Hansen’s account of these alternative approaches, it is not obvious why the traditionalists are regarded as dominant and hegemonic, because in the academic context they do not appear to warrant singular status or to possess any commanding comparative advantage. To Buzan & Hansen, the hegemonic dominance of the traditionalists is obvious and unquestioned. There is no demonstration that it is true on the basis of some clear metric. What accounts for the authors’ deeply rooted perception? There are at least four mutually reinforcing answers. First, tra￾ditional strategic studies has always been linked to the world of power and policy, whereas the challengers to it generally stand apart from and offer a critique of that world. Hence, traditionalists look like, and often are, players in the policy process, prominent voices in the policy debate. Those who operate in alternative schools of thought are less policy-driven or more opposi­tional to structures of power. They are critics of the establishment, outsiders whose normative objections to the character of the system and the content of national policy can make them seem or cause them to be more distant from the policy action. The greater proximity of the traditionalists to power leads to an image of dominance, but this should not be confused with a position of intellectual hegemony. Within the academic realm, as Buzan & Hansen’s book shows, traditionalists share the terrain with many other schools of thought, the methods and substantive orientations of tradition￾al security studies are much criticized and heavily contested, and in many scholarly settings it is not the most popular or influential approach to the field of international security studies. A second, related, point is that the security policymaking community that so dominates the public debate is generally viewed as operating in the tradi￾tionalist mode. If one regards the national security bureaucracy of the state as part of the traditionalist coalition, then it will indeed seem vastly larger, vastly richer, vastly more powerful, and vastly more influential than any other scholarly tradition. However, studying the powerful does not make a scholarly grouping dominant or hegemonic in the intellectual life of the academy. As Buzan & Hansen illustrate, the traditionalist orientation is often Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

642 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 criticized on moral and theoretical grounds;both its legitimacy and its ade- quacy as an academic subfield have been questioned. Third,as Buzan Hansen rightly indicate,some of the main substantive preoccupations of traditional strategic studies-notably nuclear-weapons issues and the superpower rivalry-were among the most compelling issues on the public policy agenda during the Cold War era.Hence,the traditional- ists tended to be deeply involved in the most visible,controversial,signifi- cant debates and the most prominent policy fights.Challengers are usually working in different substantive and conceptual contexts and must battle for attention,recognition,and policy focus.Alternative schools of thought gen- erally believe that more attention should be given to their concerns but find the actual public policy agenda preoccupied with military security and grand strategic issues that are the staple of traditional security studies.But,again,to note that traditionalists work on issues that generally get more public policy focus is not the same thing as establishing that within academe traditionalists have occupied a hegemonic place. Fourth,the perception that traditional security studies is dominant may derive in part from the fact that-apart from realism-the other schools of thought define themselves to a striking degree in reference to traditional strategic studies.As Buzan Hansen (2009:101)write,the alternatives are 'those approaches which in various ways challenged Strategic Studies.These approaches had one thing in common-namely their criticism of Strategic Studies'.In this framework,the traditionalists are in the center of the bull's eye,inevitably and inherently central to the world-view of scholars and schools of thought who define themselves as alternatives or contrasts to traditional strategic studies. Whatever the explanation,the assumption of unquestioned hegemonic dominance by traditional strategic studies is a central element in Buzan Hansen's understanding of the history and evolution of the field.It conveys a sense of the field as a contest involving nine plucky Davids taking on a single overweening Goliath.This may be an attractive notion for the challengers, but it is not how things look from a traditionalist perspective. A Narrow Substantive Agenda? A second fundamental plank in Buzan Hansen's telling of the story is that traditional strategic studies is marked by a narrow substantive ambit in need of the 'widening and deepening'advocated by the challengers.The tradition- alists were and are devoted to a military state-centric agenda and are wedded to assumptions of rationality.Alternative schools of thought arose 'to chal- lenge military-state centrism'(Buzan Hansen,2009:187). What is the substantive domain of traditional strategic studies?There is Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

642 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 criticized on moral and theoretical grounds; both its legitimacy and its ade￾quacy as an academic subfield have been questioned. Third, as Buzan & Hansen rightly indicate, some of the main substantive preoccupations of traditional strategic studies – notably nuclear-weapons issues and the superpower rivalry – were among the most compelling issues on the public policy agenda during the Cold War era. Hence, the traditional￾ists tended to be deeply involved in the most visible, controversial, signifi￾cant debates and the most prominent policy fights. Challengers are usually working in different substantive and conceptual contexts and must battle for attention, recognition, and policy focus. Alternative schools of thought gen￾erally believe that more attention should be given to their concerns but find the actual public policy agenda preoccupied with military security and grand strategic issues that are the staple of traditional security studies. But, again, to note that traditionalists work on issues that generally get more public policy focus is not the same thing as establishing that within academe traditionalists have occupied a hegemonic place. Fourth, the perception that traditional security studies is dominant may derive in part from the fact that – apart from realism – the other schools of thought define themselves to a striking degree in reference to traditional strategic studies. As Buzan & Hansen (2009: 101) write, the alternatives are ‘those approaches which in various ways challenged Strategic Studies. These approaches had one thing in common – namely their criticism of Strategic Studies’. In this framework, the traditionalists are in the center of the bull’s eye, inevitably and inherently central to the world-view of scholars and schools of thought who define themselves as alternatives or contrasts to traditional strategic studies. Whatever the explanation, the assumption of unquestioned hegemonic dominance by traditional strategic studies is a central element in Buzan & Hansen’s understanding of the history and evolution of the field. It conveys a sense of the field as a contest involving nine plucky Davids taking on a single overweening Goliath. This may be an attractive notion for the challengers, but it is not how things look from a traditionalist perspective. A Narrow Substantive Agenda? A second fundamental plank in Buzan & Hansen’s telling of the story is that traditional strategic studies is marked by a narrow substantive ambit in need of the ‘widening and deepening’ advocated by the challengers. The tradition￾alists were and are devoted to a military state-centric agenda and are wedded to assumptions of rationality. Alternative schools of thought arose ‘to chal￾lenge military-state centrism’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 187). What is the substantive domain of traditional strategic studies? There is Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 643 no single precise definition,but Buzan Hansen (2009:12)invoke the well- known formulation that the focus is on 'the use,threat,and control of force'. In their telling,during the formative Cold War years this translated into a preoccupation with superpower rivalry and nuclear technology.Security analysis during the Cold War',they write,'was almost synonymous with studying US-Soviet relations and a bipolar system with enmity between two superpowers whose direct and covert influence stretched around the globe'(Buzan Hansen,2009:50).It is certainly true that traditional strate- gic studies has focused heavily(though not exclusively)on the threat or use of force by states.The traditionalists did lavish attention on the superpower competition and on the nuclear postures embedded so dangerously at the center of the Soviet-American rivalry.Buzan Hansen's portrait is accurate as far as it goes. But this picture does not fully capture the range of interests of the tradition- alists.It reflects the state of the Cold War world more than the conceptual state of the subfield.Rather,traditionalists have been interested in the politi- cal uses of organized violence.There is a spectrum of force that ranges from the manipulation of threats,targeted killings,or very small applications of force at one end to major-power war or nuclear war at the other.In between are insurgencies and counterinsurgency,guerrilla campaigns,and varieties of limited war.There is also a spectrum of actors who might employ force for political ends,including terrorists,factions,secessionists or other substate actors,private contractors,states,coalitions,and even international institu- tions(for example,UN peacekeeping operations).Connecting the one spec- trum to the other produces a range of phenomena of interest to traditionalists: deterrent and compellent strategies that rely on the effective deployment of threats;terrorist attacks;discrete and limited uses of force(such as drone attacks intended to target specific human beings);intrastate conflict (often deriving from weak or failed states);interstate conflict (of which there have been a number since the end of the Cold War);and nuclear use or nuclear war (hence the concern about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.)There is no linear relationship between actors and the scale of force:great powers may use force in very limited ways;terrorists could use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.There is also a wide range of purposes for which force may be used.Some involve efforts to save lives and keep the peace.Some involve diplomatic signaling and the communication of threats. Some involve efforts to save or destroy friendly or hostile governments,to obtain power or to overturn those who are in power.Some involve gaining access to or control over important resources.Some involve old-fashioned self-defense.Some involve greed or revenge or conquest. This substantive framework has easily accommodated the evolving agenda of security issues after the Cold War.A prominent strand of work in the field over the past 20 years,for example,has focused on the problem of inter- Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 643 no single precise definition, but Buzan & Hansen (2009: 12) invoke the well￾known formulation that the focus is on ‘the use, threat, and control of force’. In their telling, during the formative Cold War years this translated into a preoccupation with superpower rivalry and nuclear technology. ‘Security analysis during the Cold War’, they write, ‘was almost synonymous with studying US–Soviet relations and a bipolar system with enmity between two superpowers whose direct and covert influence stretched around the globe’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 50). It is certainly true that traditional strate￾gic studies has focused heavily (though not exclusively) on the threat or use of force by states. The traditionalists did lavish attention on the superpower competition and on the nuclear postures embedded so dangerously at the center of the Soviet–American rivalry. Buzan & Hansen’s portrait is accurate as far as it goes. But this picture does not fully capture the range of interests of the tradition￾alists. It reflects the state of the Cold War world more than the conceptual state of the subfield. Rather, traditionalists have been interested in the politi￾cal uses of organized violence. There is a spectrum of force that ranges from the manipulation of threats, targeted killings, or very small applications of force at one end to major-power war or nuclear war at the other. In between are insurgencies and counterinsurgency, guerrilla campaigns, and varieties of limited war. There is also a spectrum of actors who might employ force for political ends, including terrorists, factions, secessionists or other substate actors, private contractors, states, coalitions, and even international institu￾tions (for example, UN peacekeeping operations). Connecting the one spec￾trum to the other produces a range of phenomena of interest to traditionalists: deterrent and compellent strategies that rely on the effective deployment of threats; terrorist attacks; discrete and limited uses of force (such as drone attacks intended to target specific human beings); intrastate conflict (often deriving from weak or failed states); interstate conflict (of which there have been a number since the end of the Cold War); and nuclear use or nuclear war (hence the concern about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.) There is no linear relationship between actors and the scale of force: great powers may use force in very limited ways; terrorists could use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. There is also a wide range of purposes for which force may be used. Some involve efforts to save lives and keep the peace. Some involve diplomatic signaling and the communication of threats. Some involve efforts to save or destroy friendly or hostile governments, to obtain power or to overturn those who are in power. Some involve gaining access to or control over important resources. Some involve old-fashioned self-defense. Some involve greed or revenge or conquest. This substantive framework has easily accommodated the evolving agenda of security issues after the Cold War. A prominent strand of work in the field over the past 20 years, for example, has focused on the problem of inter￾Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

644 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 nal conflict.Traditionalists have had no problem taking on this set of issues -but keep in mind also that from the late 1950s onwards Washington's Cold Warriors believed that the pivotal action in the Soviet-American competition involved conflict in the periphery,which is why there was deep superpower involvement in far-flung internal or regional conflicts (Vietnam,Nicaragua, Angola,Afghanistan,etc.).The global context is now different,but the issues associated with internal conflict are not entirely new.When the world changed,so did the agenda of traditional strategic studies,but this was a natural adaption and not some awkward reinvention'.As Buzan Hansen (2009:185)note,'there has been an impressive amount of continuity in the traditional agenda'. Traditionalists will surely argue that theirs is a coherent,significant,and durable intellectual agenda that has spawned a large body of interesting and occasionally influential literature.For Buzan Hansen,this agenda is inad- equate,contested,carried out 'without much conceptual reflection'(Buzan Hansen,2009:9),'unable to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era' (Buzan Hansen,2009:187),and in serious need of 'hard-won widening and deepening'(Buzan Hansen,2009:272).The Buzan Hansen formulation raises several basic questions. First,why it is objectionable or problematic to have one subfield that is centered on the role of force in human affairs?Indeed,in a world organized into a system of states,in which those states routinely mobilize the capacity for organized violence,and in which violence is all too commonly employed for political purposes,how could one have a field of international security studies that did not address this set of issues?Surely this is a legitimate and important area of scholarly inquiry,one that has enormous implications for the safety and well-being of enormous numbers of inhabitants of this planet. To be sure,this is not the only important subject that should be addressed, but,as Buzan Hansen demonstrate,this emphasis has not precluded others from working on other issues. Second,why must subfields within the field of international security studies be regarded as antagonists struggling against one another to estab- lish claims about the scope and value of their respective agendas?Buzan Hansen's contrapuntal vision sees the evolution of the field as an ongoing conflict between traditionalists on the defense and challengers on the attack. In Buzan Hansen's(2009:43)description,scholars-like states in a real- ist world-seek to establish hegemony for their own approaches.The battle involves a 'struggle for the soul of security'(Buzan Hansen,2009:260).In a revealing passage,Buzan Hansen(2009:59)worry that scholars may 'exile or ignore opponents'.Why 'opponents'?This one word says a lot about the conflictual conception of the field that lies at the heart of Buzan Hansen's analysis.But in what sense is someone who works on,for example,the role of women in structures of power an opponent of someone who is working Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

644 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 nal conflict. Traditionalists have had no problem taking on this set of issues – but keep in mind also that from the late 1950s onwards Washington’s Cold Warriors believed that the pivotal action in the Soviet–American competition involved conflict in the periphery, which is why there was deep superpower involvement in far-flung internal or regional conflicts (Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, etc.). The global context is now different, but the issues associated with internal conflict are not entirely new. When the world changed, so did the agenda of traditional strategic studies, but this was a natural adaption and not some awkward ‘reinvention’. As Buzan & Hansen (2009: 185) note, ‘there has been an impressive amount of continuity in the traditional agenda’. Traditionalists will surely argue that theirs is a coherent, significant, and durable intellectual agenda that has spawned a large body of interesting and occasionally influential literature. For Buzan & Hansen, this agenda is inad￾equate, contested, carried out ‘without much conceptual reflection’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 9), ‘unable to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 187), and in serious need of ‘hard-won widening and deepening’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 272). The Buzan & Hansen formulation raises several basic questions. First, why it is objectionable or problematic to have one subfield that is centered on the role of force in human affairs? Indeed, in a world organized into a system of states, in which those states routinely mobilize the capacity for organized violence, and in which violence is all too commonly employed for political purposes, how could one have a field of international security studies that did not address this set of issues? Surely this is a legitimate and important area of scholarly inquiry, one that has enormous implications for the safety and well-being of enormous numbers of inhabitants of this planet. To be sure, this is not the only important subject that should be addressed, but, as Buzan & Hansen demonstrate, this emphasis has not precluded others from working on other issues. Second, why must subfields within the field of international security studies be regarded as antagonists struggling against one another to estab￾lish claims about the scope and value of their respective agendas? Buzan & Hansen’s contrapuntal vision sees the evolution of the field as an ongoing conflict between traditionalists on the defense and challengers on the attack. In Buzan & Hansen’s (2009: 43) description, scholars – like states in a real￾ist world – seek to establish hegemony for their own approaches. The battle involves a ‘struggle for the soul of security’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 260). In a revealing passage, Buzan & Hansen (2009: 59) worry that scholars may ‘exile or ignore opponents’. Why ‘opponents’? This one word says a lot about the conflictual conception of the field that lies at the heart of Buzan & Hansen’s analysis. But in what sense is someone who works on, for example, the role of women in structures of power an opponent of someone who is working Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 645 on nuclear-weapons issues or the role of war in the policies of states?These are both important subjects.There is nothing in the study of the one that precludes the study of the other.I am unaware of any inclination among the traditionalists that other scholars should be prevented from working on their own agendas.The so-called challengers to the traditionalists apparently see themselves as intellectual insurgents engaged in a protracted campaign against the hardened'defenses of the traditionalists(Buzan Hansen,2009: 162).But the history of the field would unfold quite differently if the devel- opment of multiple schools of thought were regarded as a natural evolution involving a healthy and desirable intellectual division of labor rather than an ongoing mortal struggle for the soul of security. Third,at what point does the 'widening and deepening'process go so far that it begins to exceed sensible boundaries for the field or to encompass domains of scholarly inquiry so far afield from the traditionalist agenda that they appear to be different realms altogether?With the rise of challeng- ers,say Buzan Hansen (2009:200),'came also a widening of the sectors or areas to which security analysis should be applied,adding development, the environment,economics and social-welfare issues'.Each of these subjects is,obviously,a field in its own right,and together they encompass much of human political experience.While there can be dimensions within each that have implications for the traditionalist agenda,people working in these areas are experts in completely different spheres from those working on questions relating to the political uses of force.Why cannot this simply be work done in a different way on very different,very important topics? Buzan Hansen,however,are averse to drawing a clear and tight bound- ary around the field.Thus they quote Stephen Walt's(1991)argument that international security studies should retain its focus on the role of force and not be regarded as so elastic as to encompass everything under the sun.Walt acknowledges the importance of other issues and respects the need for seri- ous work on them but suggests that no single field can tackle a sweeping agenda while retaining coherence.This Buzan Hansen(2009:163)regard as a 'repudiation of widening approaches'.They insist,instead,that the cacophony created by these eleven diverse schools of thought constitutes a single conversation within the confines of the field of international security studies.One of the influential concepts to arise from the Copenhagen School is the notion of securitization,defined as 'the process of presenting an issue in security terms'(Buzan Hansen,2009:214).One might say that Buzan, Hansen,and the other challengers they identify are engaged in the securitiz- ing of whole vast realms of academic inquiry. Traditionalists and challengers have a different attitude toward the location of boundaries for the field and hence have different judgments about what is in and what is outside the field.This may account for the sense among chal- lengers that they are assaulting defined and defended territory. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 645 on nuclear-weapons issues or the role of war in the policies of states? These are both important subjects. There is nothing in the study of the one that precludes the study of the other. I am unaware of any inclination among the traditionalists that other scholars should be prevented from working on their own agendas. The so-called challengers to the traditionalists apparently see themselves as intellectual insurgents engaged in a protracted campaign against the ‘hardened’ defenses of the traditionalists (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 162). But the history of the field would unfold quite differently if the devel￾opment of multiple schools of thought were regarded as a natural evolution involving a healthy and desirable intellectual division of labor rather than an ongoing mortal struggle for the soul of security. Third, at what point does the ‘widening and deepening’ process go so far that it begins to exceed sensible boundaries for the field or to encompass domains of scholarly inquiry so far afield from the traditionalist agenda that they appear to be different realms altogether? With the rise of challeng￾ers, say Buzan & Hansen (2009: 200), ‘came also a widening of the sectors or areas to which security analysis should be applied, adding development, the environment, economics and social-welfare issues’. Each of these subjects is, obviously, a field in its own right, and together they encompass much of human political experience. While there can be dimensions within each that have implications for the traditionalist agenda, people working in these areas are experts in completely different spheres from those working on questions relating to the political uses of force. Why cannot this simply be work done in a different way on very different, very important topics? Buzan & Hansen, however, are averse to drawing a clear and tight bound￾ary around the field. Thus they quote Stephen Walt’s (1991) argument that international security studies should retain its focus on the role of force and not be regarded as so elastic as to encompass everything under the sun. Walt acknowledges the importance of other issues and respects the need for seri￾ous work on them but suggests that no single field can tackle a sweeping agenda while retaining coherence. This Buzan & Hansen (2009: 163) regard as a ‘repudiation of widening approaches’. They insist, instead, that the cacophony created by these eleven diverse schools of thought constitutes a single conversation within the confines of the field of international security studies. One of the influential concepts to arise from the Copenhagen School is the notion of securitization, defined as ‘the process of presenting an issue in security terms’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 214). One might say that Buzan, Hansen, and the other challengers they identify are engaged in the securitiz￾ing of whole vast realms of academic inquiry. Traditionalists and challengers have a different attitude toward the location of boundaries for the field and hence have different judgments about what is in and what is outside the field. This may account for the sense among chal￾lengers that they are assaulting defined and defended territory. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

646 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 Strategic Studies as a Cold War Artifact? The third broad element in Buzan Hansen's analysis of traditional stra- tegic studies is that they see it very much as a creature of the Cold War.It was born and institutionalized during the Cold War and was preoccupied with Cold War topics.However,war and other politically motivated violence did not begin with the Cold War,and nothing in the modern history of the international system suggests that it would end with the Cold War.To be pre- occupied with the particular problems of war and peace in the Cold War era did not mean that problems of war and peace were confined to the Cold War -as events of the subsequent two decades have vividly demonstrated. In Buzan Hansen's analysis,however,the end of the Cold War should have represented a stunning blow to the traditionalists.With the Cold War now history',they explain,'the traditional core of international security stud- ies faced the simple and potentially devastating question of how to survive in the face of the peaceful and voluntary dismantling of the bipolar order'(Buzan Hansen,2009:159;emphasis in original).The disintegration from inter- nal weaknesses of a failed challenger to the leading state in the system is somehow construed as a possible death-blow to the traditionalists,as though traditional strategic studies required that the Cold War end violently.Further, the very conceptual foundations of the traditionalists were called into ques- tion by the end of the Cold War:key normative and political assumptions at the heart of Strategic Studies were thrown into potentially unsalvageable doubt'(Buzan Hansen,2009:160).As Buzan Hansen see it,the tradition- alists faced a seemingly 'inevitable'institutional crisis(Buzan Hansen,2009: 186),their agenda harmed',their subfield confronting a 'crisis of relevance (Buzan Hansen,2009:91). This mortal crisis should have happened but did not,as Buzan Hansen, with commendable integrity,acknowledge.Perhaps surprisingly,'they write, traditional strategic studies 'underwent no major existential crisis'(Buzan Hansen,2009:158).The'traditionalist wing',they note,'showed considerable continuity and noteworthy robustness'(Buzan Hansen,2009:184).The tra- ditionalists displayed a good deal of adaptation to the new realities of the post-Cold War world'(Buzan Hansen,2009:185).Writing about traditional strategic studies in the post-Cold War era,they conclude:The institutional crisis for international security studies that seemed inevitable at the end of the Cold War largely did not happen'(Buzan Hansen,2009:186). How did Buzan Hansen get their diagnosis so wrong?They offer an explanation (Buzan Hansen,2009:185)that emphasizes the institution- alization of the traditionalists and dynamics of internal academic debates. To these points I would add several others.First,the authors underestimate the extent to which the emergence of the field of international security stud- ies was a response not only to the nuclear revolution and the onset of the Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

646 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 Strategic Studies as a Cold War Artifact? The third broad element in Buzan & Hansen’s analysis of traditional stra￾tegic studies is that they see it very much as a creature of the Cold War. It was born and institutionalized during the Cold War and was preoccupied with Cold War topics. However, war and other politically motivated violence did not begin with the Cold War, and nothing in the modern history of the international system suggests that it would end with the Cold War. To be pre￾occupied with the particular problems of war and peace in the Cold War era did not mean that problems of war and peace were confined to the Cold War – as events of the subsequent two decades have vividly demonstrated. In Buzan & Hansen’s analysis, however, the end of the Cold War should have represented a stunning blow to the traditionalists. ‘With the Cold War now history’, they explain, ‘the traditional core of international security stud￾ies faced the simple and potentially devastating question of how to survive in the face of the peaceful and voluntary dismantling of the bipolar order’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 159; emphasis in original). The disintegration from inter￾nal weaknesses of a failed challenger to the leading state in the system is somehow construed as a possible death-blow to the traditionalists, as though traditional strategic studies required that the Cold War end violently. Further, the very conceptual foundations of the traditionalists were called into ques￾tion by the end of the Cold War: ‘key normative and political assumptions at the heart of Strategic Studies were thrown into potentially unsalvageable doubt’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 160). As Buzan & Hansen see it, the tradition￾alists faced a seemingly ‘inevitable’ institutional crisis (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 186), their agenda ‘harmed’, their subfield confronting a ‘crisis of relevance’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 91). This mortal crisis should have happened but did not, as Buzan & Hansen, with commendable integrity, acknowledge. ‘Perhaps surprisingly,’ they write, traditional strategic studies ‘underwent no major existential crisis’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 158). The ‘traditionalist wing’, they note, ‘showed considerable continuity and noteworthy robustness’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 184). The tra￾ditionalists displayed ‘a good deal of adaptation to the new realities of the post-Cold War world’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 185). Writing about traditional strategic studies in the post-Cold War era, they conclude: ‘The institutional crisis for international security studies that seemed inevitable at the end of the Cold War largely did not happen’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 186). How did Buzan & Hansen get their diagnosis so wrong? They offer an explanation (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 185) that emphasizes the institution￾alization of the traditionalists and dynamics of internal academic debates. To these points I would add several others. First, the authors underestimate the extent to which the emergence of the field of international security stud￾ies was a response not only to the nuclear revolution and the onset of the Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 647 Cold War,but also to the great convulsion of state-generated violence that occurred during the first half of the 20th century.Tens of millions perished, cities were reduced to ruins,countries were laid waste,relocated,partitioned, empires were undermined,governments were overturned,the distribution of power was dramatically altered,and the international system was shaken to its core and restructured.This great violence was a catalyst in provoking more serious and systematic thought about security issues. Second,the traditionalists were never purely Cold War-centric.Indeed, within the academic scene much of the influential work that propelled the field forward and fueled some of its theoretical debates was focused on pre- Cold War history.There is much work that addresses interwar military policy. There has been a veritable cottage industry preoccupied with World War I. Studies of the sources of grand strategy have drawn on late 19th-and early 20th-century cases.And so on.It is certainly fair to say that Cold War issues occupied a central role on the agenda of the traditionalists,but the substantial streams of work that transcended the Cold War should not be overlooked. Finally,the post-Cold War era is already two decades old-that is,it is already half the length of the Cold War.Its birth coincided with the first Gulf War in 1991,in which the United States deployed forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands half way around the globe and engaged in the largest armored combat operations since World War II.There followed a distressing series of interstate wars(the Balkans,Afghanistan,Iraq 2003,Lebanon,Georgia),ghast- ly civil wars (Chechnya,Sri Lanka,Sudan,the Congo),genocides (Rwanda, Darfur),severe nuclear-proliferation crises (North Korea,Iran),and countless terrorist attacks (above all,9/11).Since the September 2001 attacks,the most powerful state in the system has been on a national security rampage:it has invaded two countries and overthrown their governments;it has used force (notably air strikes and drone attacks)in many other countries;it has enor- mous air,sea,and land forces deployed in distant locales(particularly in the greater Middle East);it has aggressively confronted and attempts to coerce other states it regards as hostile and dangerous(notably Iran and North Korea); it has engaged in what the Bush administration called the great global man- hunt,seeking out and assassinating alleged terrorists around the planet;and under its new,more moderate president it is planning to spend well over $700 billion on defense and the drone attacks and assassinations have increased. Meanwhile,the US policy elite is increasingly worried about a rising China and a rejuvenated Russia.What is it in this picture that suggests a crisis of relevance for traditional strategic studies?Is this the sort of environment in which the traditionalists are likely to experience an existential collapse? In short,the Cold War had its own distinctive features,and these com- manded great attention within traditional strategic studies.However,the 50 years before the Cold War and the 20 years after it provide ample evidence of the enduring character of the traditionalist agenda. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 647 Cold War, but also to the great convulsion of state-generated violence that occurred during the first half of the 20th century. Tens of millions perished, cities were reduced to ruins, countries were laid waste, relocated, partitioned, empires were undermined, governments were overturned, the distribution of power was dramatically altered, and the international system was shaken to its core and restructured. This great violence was a catalyst in provoking more serious and systematic thought about security issues. Second, the traditionalists were never purely Cold War-centric. Indeed, within the academic scene much of the influential work that propelled the field forward and fueled some of its theoretical debates was focused on pre￾Cold War history. There is much work that addresses interwar military policy. There has been a veritable cottage industry preoccupied with World War I. Studies of the sources of grand strategy have drawn on late 19th- and early 20th-century cases. And so on. It is certainly fair to say that Cold War issues occupied a central role on the agenda of the traditionalists, but the substantial streams of work that transcended the Cold War should not be overlooked. Finally, the post-Cold War era is already two decades old – that is, it is already half the length of the Cold War. Its birth coincided with the first Gulf War in 1991, in which the United States deployed forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands half way around the globe and engaged in the largest armored combat operations since World War II. There followed a distressing series of interstate wars (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq 2003, Lebanon, Georgia), ghast￾ly civil wars (Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Congo), genocides (Rwanda, Darfur), severe nuclear-proliferation crises (North Korea, Iran), and countless terrorist attacks (above all, 9/11). Since the September 2001 attacks, the most powerful state in the system has been on a national security rampage: it has invaded two countries and overthrown their governments; it has used force (notably air strikes and drone attacks) in many other countries; it has enor￾mous air, sea, and land forces deployed in distant locales (particularly in the greater Middle East); it has aggressively confronted and attempts to coerce other states it regards as hostile and dangerous (notably Iran and North Korea); it has engaged in what the Bush administration called the great global man￾hunt, seeking out and assassinating alleged terrorists around the planet; and under its new, more moderate president it is planning to spend well over $700 billion on defense and the drone attacks and assassinations have increased. Meanwhile, the US policy elite is increasingly worried about a rising China and a rejuvenated Russia. What is it in this picture that suggests a crisis of relevance for traditional strategic studies? Is this the sort of environment in which the traditionalists are likely to experience an existential collapse? In short, the Cold War had its own distinctive features, and these com￾manded great attention within traditional strategic studies. However, the 50 years before the Cold War and the 20 years after it provide ample evidence of the enduring character of the traditionalist agenda. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

648 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 Conclusion The Evolution of International Security Studies is a monumental accomplish- ment.Barry Buzan Lene Hansen have done a remarkable job of imposing order on a mountain of material and a tangle of intellectual history and then weaving it into a coherent,illuminating,and interesting narrative about how the field has evolved.At the heart of their narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies against a diverse set of challengers who struggle against one another to shape the direction and content of the field. The structure of this analysis reflects the assumptions,premises,and per- ceptions that Buzan Hansen bring to this project as protagonists in the melodrama they are describing.They are not disinterested observers of this intellectual jousting but major(European)figures on the challenger side of the equation.What they have provided,accordingly,is an exceptionally learned and undoubtedly accurate account of what this intellectual history looks like through the lens of the challengers.That account includes a portrait of tra- ditional strategic studies as it seems to those who are in schools of thought that are contesting its role and challenging its substantive inclinations.It is certainly not surprising that this portrait does not match perfectly with how traditionalists see themselves.Buzan Hansen have done their work and planted their flag.Now we need the companion volume that tells the story from the traditionalist perspective.We can only hope that the counterpart history is done with equal skill and authority. Steven E.Miller is Director of the International Security Program in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the scholarly journal International Security,and co-editor of the International Security Program's book series,BCSIA Studies in International Security (published by the MIT Press).He is Co-Chair of the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,and Chair of the Executive Committee of International Pugwash.Miller is the author,co-author,editor or co-editor of more than two dozen books,including,most recently,Primacy and Its Discontents: American Power and International Stability(2009)and Going Nuclear:Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21*Century (2010),both of which were co-edited with Michael E.Brown,Owen R.Cote,Jr Sean M.Lynn-Jones and published by the MIT Press. References Buzan,Barry Lene Hansen,2009.The Evolution ofInternational Security Studies.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walt,Stephen,1991.The Renaissance of Security Studies',International Studies Quarterly 35(2:211-239. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

648 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 Conclusion The Evolution of International Security Studies is a monumental accomplish￾ment. Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen have done a remarkable job of imposing order on a mountain of material and a tangle of intellectual history and then weaving it into a coherent, illuminating, and interesting narrative about how the field has evolved. At the heart of their narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies against a diverse set of challengers who struggle against one another to shape the direction and content of the field. The structure of this analysis reflects the assumptions, premises, and per￾ceptions that Buzan & Hansen bring to this project as protagonists in the melodrama they are describing. They are not disinterested observers of this intellectual jousting but major (European) figures on the challenger side of the equation. What they have provided, accordingly, is an exceptionally learned and undoubtedly accurate account of what this intellectual history looks like through the lens of the challengers. That account includes a portrait of tra￾ditional strategic studies as it seems to those who are in schools of thought that are contesting its role and challenging its substantive inclinations. It is certainly not surprising that this portrait does not match perfectly with how traditionalists see themselves. Buzan & Hansen have done their work and planted their flag. Now we need the companion volume that tells the story from the traditionalist perspective. We can only hope that the counterpart history is done with equal skill and authority. * Steven E. Miller is Director of the International Security Program in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the scholarly journal International Security, and co-­editor of the International Security Program’s book series, BCSIA Studies in International Security (published by the MIT Press). He is Co-Chair of the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Chair of the Executive Committee of International Pugwash. Miller is the author, co-author, editor or co-­editor of more than two dozen books, including, most recently, Primacy and Its Discontents: American Power and International Stability (2009) and Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century (2010), both of which were co-edited with Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr & Sean M. Lynn-Jones and published by the MIT Press. References Buzan, Barry & Lene Hansen, 2009. The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walt, Stephen, 1991. ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35(2): 211–239. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012