123swi02.gxd09/10/0114:48Page Five Strategies of Terrorism CHRISTOPHER C.HARMON Too often called 'mindless',terror groups are more often calculating.They set short term and longer aims related to power and political objectives,and then use terrorism the calibration of fear -to advance those aims.Evident terrorist strategies are numerous,and often several are combined in particular campaigns or acts.Five of the leading strategies are discussed here:(1)creation of societal dislocation or chaos;(2) discrediting or destroying a particular government;(3)rendering economic and property damage;(4)'bleeding'state security forces and doing other military damage; and (5)spreading fear for international effects.The author shows how the destructiveness of these strategies usually has a complementary 'positive'side for the group,such as filling its operating coffers or attracting overseas political support. 801:0u Strategy is the considered application of means to advance one's ends. Terrorists,far from being 'mindless'as American politicians often claim, are disturbingly calculating about the means they use.Military analysts often describe terrorism as less than a strategy and merely as a tactic,but depending upon circumstances and the terrorists'intentions,it can be either. In the post-1945 world terrorism has been a strategy central to a score of revolutionary movements.The groups'documents,communiques,and testimonials-given to the press or spoken in court-reveal choices made uojoe!f reysueyS]q papeoluMod to use terror.The many consequences of those choices range from the most general and ambiguous through the devastatingly inhumane,and the decidedly political. At least five terrorist strategies are so common around the globe that they deserve explicit enumeration.They are,or many of them are,self- consciously and commonly used in tandem,making their separation for analytical purposes slightly artificial.They all meld violence and propaganda in some form to gain public effect.Normally these strategies include both destruction and some forms of construction;that is,the actions yield not just damage to targets but some form of progress for the group in its drive for greater power. Introduction The first strategy is to create or further a sense of societal dislocation,fear, and even anarchy.As the Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu recognized, Small Wars and Insurgencies,Vol.12,No.3(Autumn 2001),pp.39-66 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS,LONDON
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.12, No.3 (Autumn 2001), pp.39–66 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON Five Strategies of Terrorism CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON Too often called ‘mindless’, terror groups are more often calculating. They set short term and longer aims related to power and political objectives, and then use terrorism – the calibration of fear – to advance those aims. Evident terrorist strategies are numerous, and often several are combined in particular campaigns or acts. Five of the leading strategies are discussed here: (1) creation of societal dislocation or chaos; (2) discrediting or destroying a particular government; (3) rendering economic and property damage; (4) ‘bleeding’ state security forces and doing other military damage; and (5) spreading fear for international effects. The author shows how the destructiveness of these strategies usually has a complementary ‘positive’ side for the group, such as filling its operating coffers or attracting overseas political support. Strategy is the considered application of means to advance one’s ends. Terrorists, far from being ‘mindless’ as American politicians often claim, are disturbingly calculating about the means they use. Military analysts often describe terrorism as less than a strategy and merely as a tactic, but depending upon circumstances and the terrorists’ intentions, it can be either. In the post-1945 world terrorism has been a strategy central to a score of revolutionary movements. The groups’ documents, communiqués, and testimonials – given to the press or spoken in court – reveal choices made to use terror. The many consequences of those choices range from the most general and ambiguous through the devastatingly inhumane, and the decidedly political. At least five terrorist strategies are so common around the globe that they deserve explicit enumeration. They are, or many of them are, selfconsciously and commonly used in tandem, making their separation for analytical purposes slightly artificial. They all meld violence and propaganda in some form to gain public effect. Normally these strategies include both destruction and some forms of construction; that is, the actions yield not just damage to targets but some form of progress for the group in its drive for greater power. Introduction The first strategy is to create or further a sense of societal dislocation, fear, and even anarchy. As the Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu recognized, 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 39 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 40 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES creating 'disorder'is as useful,or more useful,than the destruction of enemy forces.This strategy is most commonly used by revolutionaries.But it can also work for pro-state terrorists:bombings and other crimes provoke public fears and thus enhance public support for further law enforcement measures,or even dictatorship.Adolf Hitler is believed to have burned the Reichstag,or national government building,so that the act could be blamed on German communists,legitimating a planned crackdown against opponents of Hitler. The most original use of the strategy is a hybrid of the two above,and was sketched in print by the 1960s modern Brazilian terrorist and theoretician Carlos Marighella,whose Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has been found in a hundred safe houses in the last three decades and translated into a dozen foreign languages.Marighella realized that terrorism does not merely undermine public confidence in government;it forces government into a reactive posture,and as repression increases,the government angers its own populace.Marighella sees an inevitable sott.soetuiriann sequence in which terrorist chaos leads to intensified repression by the government,which fails to stop terrorism but begins a new cycle of decreasing public support for the status quo and the government and enhanced public support for the terrorists.'The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities,and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust,incapable of solving problems,and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.'In such ways is a normal political situation translated into a violent,chaotic,and then military one.' The 'crackdown'model has outlived its author.In the 1990s,some uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo analysts understood Italian right wing terrorism as an attempt to use fear to create greater authoritarian controls.In an altogether different setting,a 1993 Hamas leaflet listing several dozen political objectives demanded that loyalists embarrass Yasser Arafat's Palestine Authority (PA),which was arresting members of religiously motivated Palestinian organizations like Hamas.The 'program of confrontation'is to be so effective that it forces redeployment of Israeli forces into areas handed over to Arafat!The bald exhortation of the leaflet calls for:'Escalating operations in order to force the occupation to reoccupy other areas and impose a security siege on areas under the PA's control."2 Of course,not all terrorists aim at such a strange sequence of anarchy crackdown',and then revolution.There are groups with a more direct plan, and there are groups with more limited goals.What does seem nearly universal,and yet often goes ignored by analysts,is that the destruction by terror groups is in their minds a necessary part of their own effort at construction of sorts.Terrorists look to 'positive'dimensions of their actions.For example,violence is intended to forcefully draw the polity's
creating ‘disorder’ is as useful, or more useful, than the destruction of enemy forces. This strategy is most commonly used by revolutionaries. But it can also work for pro-state terrorists: bombings and other crimes provoke public fears and thus enhance public support for further law enforcement measures, or even dictatorship. Adolf Hitler is believed to have burned the Reichstag, or national government building, so that the act could be blamed on German communists, legitimating a planned crackdown against opponents of Hitler. The most original use of the strategy is a hybrid of the two above, and was sketched in print by the 1960s modern Brazilian terrorist and theoretician Carlos Marighella, whose Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has been found in a hundred safe houses in the last three decades and translated into a dozen foreign languages. Marighella realized that terrorism does not merely undermine public confidence in government; it forces government into a reactive posture, and as repression increases, the government angers its own populace. Marighella sees an inevitable sequence in which terrorist chaos leads to intensified repression by the government, which fails to stop terrorism but begins a new cycle of decreasing public support for the status quo and the government and enhanced public support for the terrorists. ‘The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.’ In such ways is a normal political situation translated into a violent, chaotic, and then military one.1 The ‘crackdown’ model has outlived its author. In the 1990s, some analysts understood Italian right wing terrorism as an attempt to use fear to create greater authoritarian controls. In an altogether different setting, a 1993 Hamas leaflet listing several dozen political objectives demanded that loyalists embarrass Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Authority (PA), which was arresting members of religiously motivated Palestinian organizations like Hamas. The ‘program of confrontation’ is to be so effective that it forces redeployment of Israeli forces into areas handed over to Arafat! The bald exhortation of the leaflet calls for: ‘Escalating operations in order to force the occupation to reoccupy other areas and impose a security siege on areas under the PA’s control.’2 Of course, not all terrorists aim at such a strange sequence of anarchy, ‘crackdown’, and then revolution. There are groups with a more direct plan, and there are groups with more limited goals. What does seem nearly universal, and yet often goes ignored by analysts, is that the destruction by terror groups is in their minds a necessary part of their own effort at construction of sorts. Terrorists look to ‘positive’ dimensions of their actions. For example, violence is intended to forcefully draw the polity’s 40 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 40 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 41 attention to a neglected'issue.The hope,justified by terrorists'general success,is that a public shocked by a terrorist act or campaign will come to feel attention should be paid.The public often does respond,even if it does not fully believe the propaganda circulated at the time of the action by the terrorists.Recent public issues inflamed by terrorist acts include the environment,genocide against Armenians in pre-modern Turkey,and the 'immorality'and 'warmongering'of states constructing strategic defenses against missiles.Agitation and violence on such an issue can spread chaos while also building a terror group's profile in public eyes. The second terrorist strategy this article explores in depth is more focused than the creation of anarchy:it is to discredit,diminish,or destroy a particular government,and replace it with another.Attacks upon officials including tax collectors,judges,policemen,county or village officials,and persons responsible for elections undermine the prestige and efficiency of government.They can result in the reduction of services,or closure of regional or rural offices,or implicit acquiescence of 'no go'areas in the sortsotrtutiaiahn country where the government's writ no longer counts-'gray areas',as they are sometimes called. Government is ordinarily weakened by this process,but if it strikes back with harsh force,making inroads against terrorism,it may also discredit itself in national eyes.During the mid-1990s states engaged in rough counterinsurgency efforts-and targeted for it by influential critics and human rights monitors-were Peru,Egypt,India,Guatemala,Mexico,and Turkey,to mention but a few. The 'positive'effects of political strategies for the terror groups are uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo many and diverse.Political work lends legitimacy to a group or doctrine which is suspicious to the public because of its reliance on violence Political strategies are internally important to the group since,after all,it engages or claims to engage in terrorism because of its urgent political program.The terror group's prestige,size,and effectiveness are often enhanced proportionally to how the government is damaged.Each terrorist action creates a platform from which to appeal to the public about objectives.With time and effort,even an unusual ideology or foreign political conception can gain credibility. In the struggle,with all its sessions of planning,cooperation,and physical confrontations with enemies,new leaders with considered ideas about a revolutionary government may emerge.Thus,the long period of covert and overt revolutionary activity became for such leaders as Yasser Arafat and Daniel Ortega a sort of journeyman's years,in which they exercised authority over an ever-growing segment of the nation,gaining experience and credibility at the same time
attention to a ‘neglected’ issue. The hope, justified by terrorists’ general success, is that a public shocked by a terrorist act or campaign will come to feel attention should be paid. The public often does respond, even if it does not fully believe the propaganda circulated at the time of the action by the terrorists. Recent public issues inflamed by terrorist acts include the environment, genocide against Armenians in pre-modern Turkey, and the ‘immorality’ and ‘warmongering’ of states constructing strategic defenses against missiles. Agitation and violence on such an issue can spread chaos while also building a terror group’s profile in public eyes. The second terrorist strategy this article explores in depth is more focused than the creation of anarchy: it is to discredit, diminish, or destroy a particular government, and replace it with another. Attacks upon officials including tax collectors, judges, policemen, county or village officials, and persons responsible for elections undermine the prestige and efficiency of government. They can result in the reduction of services, or closure of regional or rural offices, or implicit acquiescence of ‘no go’ areas in the country where the government’s writ no longer counts – ‘gray areas’, as they are sometimes called. Government is ordinarily weakened by this process, but if it strikes back with harsh force, making inroads against terrorism, it may also discredit itself in national eyes. During the mid-1990s states engaged in rough counterinsurgency efforts – and targeted for it by influential critics and human rights monitors – were Peru, Egypt, India, Guatemala, Mexico, and Turkey, to mention but a few. The ‘positive’ effects of political strategies for the terror groups are many and diverse. Political work lends legitimacy to a group or doctrine which is suspicious to the public because of its reliance on violence. Political strategies are internally important to the group since, after all, it engages or claims to engage in terrorism because of its urgent political program. The terror group’s prestige, size, and effectiveness are often enhanced proportionally to how the government is damaged. Each terrorist action creates a platform from which to appeal to the public about objectives. With time and effort, even an unusual ideology or foreign political conception can gain credibility. In the struggle, with all its sessions of planning, cooperation, and physical confrontations with enemies, new leaders with considered ideas about a revolutionary government may emerge. Thus, the long period of covert and overt revolutionary activity became for such leaders as Yasser Arafat and Daniel Ortega a sort of journeyman’s years, in which they exercised authority over an ever-growing segment of the nation, gaining experience and credibility at the same time. FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 41 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 41 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 42 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES Some contemporary terror-using groups opt not just for a sense of legitimacy but a direct role in overt political power;they use respected and pacific forums of debate,compete in local elections,or consider participation in a national coalition government.The IRA's political wing Sinn Fein and Lebanon's Hizballah have often won seats in the national parliaments,and many more in local or district electoral bodies.Under extreme conditions,a group may abandon violence altogether and chose to fold completely into the political process,as did Colombia's April 19 movement and El Salvador's left-wing guerrillas once Cuban and Soviet defeat in the Cold War became evident. Economic strategy,a third aspect of terrorism,has been much neglected by contemporary political science.General social effects of dislocation are dramatically enhanced by such common terrorist tactics as taking over public highways to'tax'commercial users;arson campaigns against large corporations;sabotage of oil pipelines;bombings and extortion which increase insurance prices and operating costs;protracted efforts to disrupt sott.soetulriann the export of manufactured goods or agricultural crops;bank robberies;and campaigns against tourist facilities which garner much of some nations' foreign incomes.Such efforts are intended to directly harm the property owner and perhaps also to harm the government,which immediately experiences losses in tax revenues,additional expenses for everything from fire trucks to police,and declines in foreign investment.In Peru,Sendero Luminoso's economic destruction up through 1992 was enormous;it helped provoke the autogolpe which greatly increased President Alberto Fujimori's power but cost Peru dearly in foreign confidence and foreign investment. uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo Only when the repression seemed to work to the marked disadvantage of Sendero and other terror groups did investment return to older levels. Economic strategies yield positive advantages to the terrorists themselves as well.Peruvian Shining Path ideology favors a return to pre- capitalistic farming practices which feature near-total self-reliance and little to no trade with surrounding communities.Dynamite attacks against the national power grids are intended to damage infrastructure and underscore Sendero propaganda,but also represent a small direct step in the affected area towards Sendero's economic program and the autarky of its 'liberated zones'.Bank thefts,systematized by such communists as Carlos Marighella,not only symbolically hurt international capitalism;they garner funds for underground operations.International narcotics exports by political groups undermine the health and productivity of capitalist countries where the drugs feed destructive personal habits.Such sales are also more lucrative than virtually any other known manner of feeding terrorists'coffers;one cannot understand the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)of the 1980s or Colombia's Revolutionary Armed
Some contemporary terror-using groups opt not just for a sense of legitimacy but a direct role in overt political power; they use respected and pacific forums of debate, compete in local elections, or consider participation in a national coalition government. The IRA’s political wing Sinn Fein and Lebanon’s Hizballah have often won seats in the national parliaments, and many more in local or district electoral bodies. Under extreme conditions, a group may abandon violence altogether and chose to fold completely into the political process, as did Colombia’s April 19 movement and El Salvador’s left-wing guerrillas once Cuban and Soviet defeat in the Cold War became evident. Economic strategy, a third aspect of terrorism, has been much neglected by contemporary political science. General social effects of dislocation are dramatically enhanced by such common terrorist tactics as taking over public highways to ‘tax’ commercial users; arson campaigns against large corporations; sabotage of oil pipelines; bombings and extortion which increase insurance prices and operating costs; protracted efforts to disrupt the export of manufactured goods or agricultural crops; bank robberies; and campaigns against tourist facilities which garner much of some nations’ foreign incomes. Such efforts are intended to directly harm the property owner and perhaps also to harm the government, which immediately experiences losses in tax revenues, additional expenses for everything from fire trucks to police, and declines in foreign investment. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso’s economic destruction up through 1992 was enormous; it helped provoke the autogolpe which greatly increased President Alberto Fujimori’s power but cost Peru dearly in foreign confidence and foreign investment. Only when the repression seemed to work to the marked disadvantage of Sendero and other terror groups did investment return to older levels. Economic strategies yield positive advantages to the terrorists themselves as well. Peruvian Shining Path ideology favors a return to precapitalistic farming practices which feature near-total self-reliance and little to no trade with surrounding communities. Dynamite attacks against the national power grids are intended to damage infrastructure and underscore Sendero propaganda, but also represent a small direct step in the affected area towards Sendero’s economic program and the autarky of its ‘liberated zones’. Bank thefts, systematized by such communists as Carlos Marighella, not only symbolically hurt international capitalism; they garner funds for underground operations. International narcotics exports by political groups undermine the health and productivity of capitalist countries where the drugs feed destructive personal habits. Such sales are also more lucrative than virtually any other known manner of feeding terrorists’ coffers; one cannot understand the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) of the 1980s or Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed 42 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 42 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 43 Forces of Colombia(FARC)in the new millennium without understanding the economic benefits of narcoterrorism. Military damage is a fourth way terrorists advance their overall object Depending on the group,the rendering of damage to the state's military forces or infrastructure is usually of secondary or tertiary interest;terrorists prefer undefended,nonmilitary targets.But as the various lethal bombings of American military personnel in the Middle East have indicated,terrorists have a marked impact on nations'armies.In peacetime terrorists undermine readiness and spread fear among military ranks,exactly the purpose of 20 years of bombings and murders at NATO installations in Western Europe, including barracks,weapons depots,and oil pipelines.Terrorists may thin the ranks of national police forces,which have or can have both peace and wartime roles,like the Spanish Guardia Civil so loathed by the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna(ETA). And if events do escalate into war,terrorists are in a prime position to act as proxy forces for an external power or an indigenous political 801:60 u organization.Indigenous revolutionaries in Lebanese militias naturally have their own intentions;but they also find themselves advancing Iranian state purposes by indirectly weakening the Lebanese state's armed forces,or fighting those forces directly in bloody street battles.Sikh militias and terrorists in northwestern India may or may not wish to serve the interests of Pakistan,but they do so by distracting and tying down innumerable Indian national police and military personnel,who are continuously bled with classic 'bite and flee'guerrilla tactics.This combination has made a continuous battleground of parts of a giant state,India. uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo The 'positive'effects for the movement using terrorism are many. Military-style operations by terrorists provide battle experience,draw recruits,capture weaponry,develop logistical infrastructure,and may lead to foreign support of various types.Depending upon dogma and doctrine, today's terrorist leaders may anticipate that terrorism can be combined with clandestine organization and guerrilla combat experience to develop from an underground into a truly national military capability.That is in fact the Maoist model of the development of protracted guerrilla war-from low- level violence and propaganda,to a second phase of mixed or 'mobile warfare featuring formal military units,and ultimately to a third rather conventional phase of operations by regular armies. This was the model generally followed by the Vietnamese communists. Today it serves contemporary groups including Tamil'Tigers'.Shining Path had its own five-phase variation on the approach.The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam(LTTE)and Sendero both did advance through formative stages of violence beginning with mere terrorism,move into tactically-impressive guerrilla attacks,and then conduct occasional conventional military
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the new millennium without understanding the economic benefits of narcoterrorism.3 Military damage is a fourth way terrorists advance their overall object. Depending on the group, the rendering of damage to the state’s military forces or infrastructure is usually of secondary or tertiary interest; terrorists prefer undefended, nonmilitary targets. But as the various lethal bombings of American military personnel in the Middle East have indicated, terrorists have a marked impact on nations’ armies. In peacetime terrorists undermine readiness and spread fear among military ranks, exactly the purpose of 20 years of bombings and murders at NATO installations in Western Europe, including barracks, weapons depots, and oil pipelines. Terrorists may thin the ranks of national police forces, which have or can have both peace and wartime roles, like the Spanish Guardia Civil so loathed by the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). And if events do escalate into war, terrorists are in a prime position to act as proxy forces for an external power or an indigenous political organization. Indigenous revolutionaries in Lebanese militias naturally have their own intentions; but they also find themselves advancing Iranian state purposes by indirectly weakening the Lebanese state’s armed forces, or fighting those forces directly in bloody street battles. Sikh militias and terrorists in northwestern India may or may not wish to serve the interests of Pakistan, but they do so by distracting and tying down innumerable Indian national police and military personnel, who are continuously bled with classic ‘bite and flee’4 guerrilla tactics. This combination has made a continuous battleground of parts of a giant state, India. The ‘positive’ effects for the movement using terrorism are many. Military-style operations by terrorists provide battle experience, draw recruits, capture weaponry, develop logistical infrastructure, and may lead to foreign support of various types. Depending upon dogma and doctrine, today’s terrorist leaders may anticipate that terrorism can be combined with clandestine organization and guerrilla combat experience to develop from an underground into a truly national military capability. That is in fact the Maoist model of the development of protracted guerrilla war – from lowlevel violence and propaganda, to a second phase of mixed or ‘mobile’ warfare featuring formal military units, and ultimately to a third rather conventional phase of operations by regular armies. This was the model generally followed by the Vietnamese communists. Today it serves contemporary groups including Tamil ‘Tigers’. Shining Path had its own five-phase variation on the approach. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and Sendero both did advance through formative stages of violence beginning with mere terrorism, move into tactically-impressive guerrilla attacks, and then conduct occasional conventional military FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 43 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 43 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 44 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES operations.3 The Tigers remain in the middle stage;Sendero has steadily fallen back since Abimael Guzman's capture in the fall of 1992. Fifth and finally,terrorism is often done for international effect. Consider examples of assassination.Killing a foreign arms broker may be one government's way to deter future arms sales to dissidents or enemies; this has been described as the reason Israeli hitmen allegedly went to Brussels in March 1990 and killed Gerald Bull,the expert in long-range supergun'development,who was building two fearsome tubes for the Iraqis.The tubes could have fired shells into Israel,Iran,etc.,which might explain the assassination of Bull.The killing could also have served as a warning,a form of political and military deterrence against any who would make international military sales to enemy states.This act of pro-state terror may have been effective. Another act of assassination affected Israel in a very different way:in October 1981 a large group of fundamentalist Muslims of the Al Jihad organization gunned down President Anwar Sadat on a reviewing stand in 80160 Egypt.They may not have expected revolution to result,but certainly they were striking a blow against a 'dreadful appeaser of Israel'who had dared to break ranks with the Arab world and make the Camp David treaty.?This act in Egypt was intended primarily against Sadat as President and, presumably,secondarily to harm Israel,and thirdly to threaten the entire Arab world lest it allow any further appeasement.The impact from these gunshots not only reached Sadat but an entire current in contemporary international relations.A veteran of the plot,Talaat Fouad Kassem,founder of the Pakistani-based journal Al Murabitoun,proclaimed in a headline in uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo his first issue:"Terror is a means to confront God's enemies.'s Since Sadat's death,there have been many Muslim-spawned assassinations and terror attacks in Egypt,Israel,Jordan,and other countries. Each such killing does more than destroy life.It is a 'positive'testament to the power of the killer's religion over concern for his liberty and life.It raises the flag of action and calls to others to follow and commit their own acts.It adds to the social polarization that occurs with terrorism,compelling citizens to declare themselves one way or the other on the issue of secular governance or life under the Sharia,law guided by the Koran.The perpetrator might also expect his acts to draw political support from persons in government,or pull in financial support from abroad.He may wish to prove himself so as to rise in the organization.He may wish to pay a debt, for training or schooling or cash payment,to a state such as Iran or Sudan for advancing Islamic revolutions. Having thus introduced the destructive and constructive dimensions of the five most common strategies employed by contemporary terrorism,it is now appropriate to further discuss each,and how they work together
operations.5 The Tigers remain in the middle stage; Sendero has steadily fallen back since Abimael Guzman’s capture in the fall of 1992. Fifth and finally, terrorism is often done for international effect. Consider examples of assassination. Killing a foreign arms broker may be one government’s way to deter future arms sales to dissidents or enemies; this has been described as the reason Israeli hitmen allegedly went to Brussels in March 1990 and killed Gerald Bull, the expert in long-range ‘supergun’ development, who was building two fearsome tubes for the Iraqis. The tubes could have fired shells into Israel, Iran, etc., which might explain the assassination of Bull. The killing could also have served as a warning, a form of political and military deterrence against any who would make international military sales to enemy states.6 This act of pro-state terror may have been effective. Another act of assassination affected Israel in a very different way: in October 1981 a large group of fundamentalist Muslims of the Al Jihad organization gunned down President Anwar Sadat on a reviewing stand in Egypt. They may not have expected revolution to result, but certainly they were striking a blow against a ‘dreadful appeaser of Israel’ who had dared to break ranks with the Arab world and make the Camp David treaty.7 This act in Egypt was intended primarily against Sadat as President and, presumably, secondarily to harm Israel, and thirdly to threaten the entire Arab world lest it allow any further appeasement. The impact from these gunshots not only reached Sadat but an entire current in contemporary international relations. A veteran of the plot, Talaat Fouad Kassem, founder of the Pakistani-based journal Al Murabitoun, proclaimed in a headline in his first issue: ‘Terror is a means to confront God’s enemies.’8 Since Sadat’s death, there have been many Muslim-spawned assassinations and terror attacks in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and other countries. Each such killing does more than destroy life. It is a ‘positive’ testament to the power of the killer’s religion over concern for his liberty and life. It raises the flag of action and calls to others to follow and commit their own acts. It adds to the social polarization that occurs with terrorism, compelling citizens to declare themselves one way or the other on the issue of secular governance or life under the Sharia, law guided by the Koran. The perpetrator might also expect his acts to draw political support from persons in government, or pull in financial support from abroad. He may wish to prove himself so as to rise in the organization. He may wish to pay a debt, for training or schooling or cash payment, to a state such as Iran or Sudan for advancing Islamic revolutions. Having thus introduced the destructive and constructive dimensions of the five most common strategies employed by contemporary terrorism, it is now appropriate to further discuss each, and how they work together. 44 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 44 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 45 Spreading Chaos The world's terrorist groups are enjoying successes in the first and most general way of their business -the spreading of chaos.Numbers of incidents world-wide are not rising,but each act is having an impact,and the destructiveness of many acts is greater than before.The world became habituated to the hijacking of passenger airliners in the 1970s but felt it had seen the passing of such terrorist theater in the 1980s.So terrorists turned to much deadlier means,blowing up airliners in flight to yield unprecedented fatality rates.A Canadian airliner disappeared beneath the surface of the North Atlantic at night in 1985,taking 328 unwitting victims,probably murdered to attract attention to the cause of Sikhs fighting in India.A UTA airliner was destroyed over Chad in September 1989;a French judge has indicted four Libyan officials for the act,which killed 171,including seven Americans.Pan Am 103 blew up over Scotland in December 1988, s10 qwadas 80:60u uoo yueys]q papeojumod apparently to satisfy Libya,or both Libya and Iran(which had itself lost a passenger liner that flew too near a US warship in the Persian Gulf).A Colombian airliner was apparently downed by narcotraffickers in order to kill one passenger.Suicide bombers of the Algerian and Islamic Groupe Islamique Armee(GIA)nearly succeeded during 1995 with a plan to load an Air France liner with fuel and detonate explosives in the cockpit as it passed over Paris;they expected to kill hundreds inside and outside the plane.Most of these incidents killed many times more people than some states lost soldiers in the fighting in the 1991 Gulf War,even if each act was less disruptive than such a war.All these acts had occurred before the now- infamous date of 11 September 2001. The personal and political damage is indeed widespread.Ill effects radiate out like spokes from the hub,and include general fear of travel, disinclination to attend public events,distrust of one's own government because of its inability to protect citizens,and even racialist dread of foreign peoples who support or are alleged to support international terrorists Hijackings,complete with lists of political demands read over the media, yielded one sort of disorientation and despair.When explosions go entirely unclaimed,this yields another kind of fear.Some cases involve multiple claims,furthering confusion and making talk of retaliation rather empty. Finally,there have been bombings-of airliners,and the truck bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina in 1994-never accompanied by a claim of credit.Instead of distress over the presence of a known but loose lethal enemy,the public thus faces the fear of knowing only that terrorists have struck,and may do so again,for reasons that are utterly unknown.As terror attacks grow more lethal,and employ new and hideous means such as gas and possibly biological weapons,the general fears they cause may increase. X
Spreading Chaos The world’s terrorist groups are enjoying successes in the first and most general way of their business – the spreading of chaos. Numbers of incidents world-wide are not rising, but each act is having an impact, and the destructiveness of many acts is greater than before. The world became habituated to the hijacking of passenger airliners in the 1970s but felt it had seen the passing of such terrorist theater in the 1980s. So terrorists turned to much deadlier means, blowing up airliners in flight to yield unprecedented fatality rates. A Canadian airliner disappeared beneath the surface of the North Atlantic at night in 1985, taking 328 unwitting victims, probably murdered to attract attention to the cause of Sikhs fighting in India. A UTA airliner was destroyed over Chad in September 1989; a French judge has indicted four Libyan officials for the act, which killed 171, including seven Americans. Pan Am 103 blew up over Scotland in December 1988, apparently to satisfy Libya, or both Libya and Iran (which had itself lost a passenger liner that flew too near a US warship in the Persian Gulf). A Colombian airliner was apparently downed by narcotraffickers in order to kill one passenger. Suicide bombers of the Algerian and Islamic Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) nearly succeeded during 1995 with a plan to load an Air France liner with fuel and detonate explosives in the cockpit as it passed over Paris; they expected to kill hundreds inside and outside the plane. Most of these incidents killed many times more people than some states lost soldiers in the fighting in the 1991 Gulf War, even if each act was less disruptive than such a war. All these acts had occurred before the nowinfamous date of 11 September 2001. The personal and political damage is indeed widespread. Ill effects radiate out like spokes from the hub, and include general fear of travel, disinclination to attend public events, distrust of one’s own government because of its inability to protect citizens, and even racialist dread of foreign peoples who support or are alleged to support international terrorists. Hijackings, complete with lists of political demands read over the media, yielded one sort of disorientation and despair. When explosions go entirely unclaimed, this yields another kind of fear. Some cases involve multiple claims, furthering confusion and making talk of retaliation rather empty. Finally, there have been bombings – of airliners, and the truck bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina in 1994 – never accompanied by a claim of credit.9 Instead of distress over the presence of a known but loose lethal enemy, the public thus faces the fear of knowing only that terrorists have struck, and may do so again, for reasons that are utterly unknown. As terror attacks grow more lethal, and employ new and hideous means such as gas and possibly biological weapons, the general fears they cause may increase. FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 45 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 45 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 46 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES It is occasionally argued that terrorism does not ultimately succeed.A better argument would be that terrorism alone does not achieve power-and that argument offers but a limited truth."Terrorism is rarely employed by itself,without other accompanying strategies for gaining power.Calculating militants usually have other means as well.The Bolshevik,Castroite, Sandinista,and Palestinian revolutions are among the many that used terrorism to help create fundamental change and place new persons in power:Lenin,Castro,Ortega,and Arafat.In an interview marking the 25th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre,terrorist principal Abu Daoud boasted of the success of his operation:Munich put the Palestinian cause inside every house',he correctly declared.Today there is a 'statelet' for the Palestinians. While terrorism functions as a strategy for gaining power it serves still better for something far easier -destroying the power of others.2 Terrorism's role in unsuccessful but devastating revolutions and in other political crises has been,and will be,immense.The life of central Paris was rent by bombing campaigns tied to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction and its links to Syria and the East bloc services in 1986.3 The city reknitted itself,and even seemed fully restored,until another campaign,by Algerians,shattered Paris again during 1995 with one bloody public bombing after another.Scores of similar examples in the mid-1990s are at hand in other countries.Contemporary terrorism has a very high capacity for achieving its broadest and most typical first strategic objective,the wrecking of normalcy and political order. uojoe!f reysueyS]q papeoluMod Discrediting and Destroying Existing Government A second strategy of most terror groups is related but less wide:it is to discredit,diminish,or destroy a particular government,ruining its legitimacy and authority so as to replace it with a revolutionary government, whether left,right,religious,or other.This strategy is worked out with diverse kinds of effort.Two of the most commonplace are use of political propaganda,and use of political front groups. A skilled propagandist,Lenin believed that operating a newspaper was a multifaceted way of making inroads.'A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator,it is also a collective organizer',he noted in What Is To Be Done.Today his newspaper Iskra ('Spark')is forgotten;even its famous successor Pravda ('Truth')went broke in 1996 But Lenin's point was sound.As one infiltrator in the 1960s US terrorist group Weathermen discovered,selling their paper Prairie Fire on the streets was a way for a cadre to prove commitment,make contacts with prospective recruits,and also make a little money for the Weathermen.It is for such
It is occasionally argued that terrorism does not ultimately succeed.10 A better argument would be that terrorism alone does not achieve power – and that argument offers but a limited truth.11 Terrorism is rarely employed by itself, without other accompanying strategies for gaining power. Calculating militants usually have other means as well. The Bolshevik, Castroite, Sandinista, and Palestinian revolutions are among the many that used terrorism to help create fundamental change and place new persons in power: Lenin, Castro, Ortega, and Arafat. In an interview marking the 25th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, terrorist principal Abu Daoud boasted of the success of his operation: ‘Munich put the Palestinian cause inside every house’, he correctly declared. Today there is a ‘statelet’ for the Palestinians. While terrorism functions as a strategy for gaining power it serves still better for something far easier – destroying the power of others.12 Terrorism’s role in unsuccessful but devastating revolutions and in other political crises has been, and will be, immense. The life of central Paris was rent by bombing campaigns tied to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction and its links to Syria and the East bloc services in 1986.13 The city reknitted itself, and even seemed fully restored, until another campaign, by Algerians, shattered Paris again during 1995 with one bloody public bombing after another. Scores of similar examples in the mid-1990s are at hand in other countries. Contemporary terrorism has a very high capacity for achieving its broadest and most typical first strategic objective, the wrecking of normalcy and political order. Discrediting and Destroying Existing Government A second strategy of most terror groups is related but less wide: it is to discredit, diminish, or destroy a particular government, ruining its legitimacy and authority so as to replace it with a revolutionary government, whether left, right, religious, or other. This strategy is worked out with diverse kinds of effort. Two of the most commonplace are use of political propaganda, and use of political front groups. A skilled propagandist, Lenin believed that operating a newspaper was a multifaceted way of making inroads. ‘A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer’, he noted in What Is To Be Done. Today his newspaper Iskra (‘Spark’) is forgotten; even its famous successor Pravda (‘Truth’) went broke in 1996. But Lenin’s point was sound. As one infiltrator in the 1960s US terrorist group Weathermen discovered, selling their paper Prairie Fire on the streets was a way for a cadre to prove commitment, make contacts with prospective recruits, and also make a little money for the Weathermen. It is for such 46 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 46 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 47 reasons,as well as for the content of the newspaper,that dozens of terrorist groups today publish.The IRA's An Phoblacht ('Republican News')is available from 58 Parnell Square in Dublin;it sells throughout Europe,can be purchased in New York,and is available on the Internet.Its stories,in turn,are picked up by editors of sympathetic news organs like The Irish People,the New York City-based weekly,or more mainstream newspapers. The American 'Unabomber,'in paragraph 96 of his famous 1995 manifesto,explained the powerful combination of violence and the printed word with explicitness: ..freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual...If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher,they probably would not have been accepted.If they had been accepted and published,they probably would not have attracted many readers,because it's more s10 Jaqwadas 80:60uoo eyaueys]q papeoluod fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay.Even if these writings had had many readers,most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them.In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression,we've had to kill people Where security is tight,or where the climate of opinion or laws circumscribe overt activism,terror groups may be restricted to quiet distribution of leaflets and press releases.This has been an activity of Hizballah activists in the United States.14 There should be no underestimating the powers of such small missives.Some personalities are readily swung on the cord of a single idea.'5 Here for example is an admission of malleability and shallowness from a Swede in the teaching profession who became a hardcore anti-Semite: First I belonged to a leftist group.I have always been committed to some cause.Then one day someone gave me a leaflet.That leaflet changed my life,even if it was only three pages long.When I had read it I understood that it all was a lie,the Holocaust had never happened, it was a dizzy feeling...At first I was ashamed,I did not dare to tell anyone that I had these thoughts,these doubts...I had become an anti- Semite...At my work as a teacher in a public school I had to pretend that nothing had happened,but now...when I have met others who feel like I do,I dare to come out more and more as an open anti- Semite.16 In Palestine,printed propaganda handouts helped further the 1987-93 intifada from its beginning.That movement is today sometimes represented
reasons, as well as for the content of the newspaper, that dozens of terrorist groups today publish. The IRA’s An Phoblacht (‘Republican News’) is available from 58 Parnell Square in Dublin; it sells throughout Europe, can be purchased in New York, and is available on the Internet. Its stories, in turn, are picked up by editors of sympathetic news organs like The Irish People, the New York City-based weekly, or more mainstream newspapers. The American ‘Unabomber,’ in paragraph 96 of his famous 1995 manifesto, explained the powerful combination of violence and the printed word with explicitness: … freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual … If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they had been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because it’s more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we’ve had to kill people. Where security is tight, or where the climate of opinion or laws circumscribe overt activism, terror groups may be restricted to quiet distribution of leaflets and press releases. This has been an activity of Hizballah activists in the United States.14 There should be no underestimating the powers of such small missives. Some personalities are readily swung on the cord of a single idea.15 Here for example is an admission of malleability and shallowness from a Swede in the teaching profession who became a hardcore anti-Semite: First I belonged to a leftist group. I have always been committed to some cause. Then one day someone gave me a leaflet. That leaflet changed my life, even if it was only three pages long. When I had read it I understood that it all was a lie, the Holocaust had never happened, it was a dizzy feeling… At first I was ashamed, I did not dare to tell anyone that I had these thoughts, these doubts… I had become an antiSemite… At my work as a teacher in a public school I had to pretend that nothing had happened, but now…when I have met others who feel like I do, I dare to come out more and more as an open antiSemite.16 In Palestine, printed propaganda handouts helped further the 1987–93 intifada from its beginning. That movement is today sometimes represented FIVE STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM 47 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 47 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015
123sw102.gxd09/10/0114:48 Page 48 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES as 'the success of the barefoot soldier'and even as a symbol of the transformation of contemporary politics."The leaflet flourishes there still. In a March 1994 incident,Fatah Hawks loyal to Yasser Arafat were distributing propaganda by car in a Gaza refugee camp when they became embroiled in a firefight with undercover Israeli troops that left six Hawks dead.Others distributing leaflets in the region include Kach and Kahane Lives,the right-wing Jewish organizations founded-respectively -by an American rabbi and by his son,so recently assassinated.Kach press releases that threatened Arabs with expulsion and promoted violence had also appeared in the months prior to the 1994 Hebron rampage by Kach activist Baruch Goldstein,who murdered no fewer than 39 worshippers in a few moments with a Galil automatic rifle.At one time,the elder Kahane had run for parliament,in addition to his other political activities;later,stained by terrorism,both Kahane groups were banned in Israel,and remain so. Radio and television are efficient ways of transmitting news and propaganda,given their almost instantaneous impact and their ability to sott.soetulriann shape public perceptions.the news.One mark of terror group sophistication and financial strength is the move into such media.While Hizballah publishes a daily and a weekly newspaper,it also has a television station, and radio 'Voice of the Oppressed'which beams out of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.An Israeli air raid took it down for three months during 1995.20 But few states are as willing as Israel to take such countermeasures against propaganda outlets.In past years,the communist Czech government allowed Red Brigadists who had slipped behind the Iron Curtain to make propaganda broadcasts back into Italy;Rome mounted no violent response, uojoelf leysueys]q papeoluMo and rarely even complained in public.In the 1990s,the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)broadcast from secure facilities in Syria.The little notice such Syrian support received in the West was an inadequate measure of its significance;an official sponsor like Damascus lends immense credibility to any organization like the PKK. A second form of political action,more complex than propaganda but highly effective when successful,is the use of front groups.This has been one of many strategies of a group in Chile,the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front(MRPF).Founded as an arm of Chile's Communist Party,and named for a former Chilean fighter for independence from Spain,the Front lingered into the latter 1990s as the only important active terror group in Chile,which is democratic and economically successful.The MRPF was buffeted by that party's internal divisions,as well as vigorous Chilean counterterrorist work.It came to marshal no more than a hundred members, down from a thousand or more in 1990.The Front's policy,stated frankly by defector 'Commandante Miguel'in mid-1992,was to fight against the government of Chile 'until power is completely achieved
as ‘the success of the barefoot soldier’ and even as a symbol of the transformation of contemporary politics.17 The leaflet flourishes there still. In a March 1994 incident, Fatah Hawks loyal to Yasser Arafat were distributing propaganda by car in a Gaza refugee camp when they became embroiled in a firefight with undercover Israeli troops that left six Hawks dead.18 Others distributing leaflets in the region include Kach and Kahane Lives, the right-wing Jewish organizations founded – respectively – by an American rabbi and by his son, so recently assassinated. Kach press releases that threatened Arabs with expulsion and promoted violence had also appeared in the months prior to the 1994 Hebron rampage by Kach activist Baruch Goldstein, who murdered no fewer than 39 worshippers in a few moments with a Galil automatic rifle.19 At one time, the elder Kahane had run for parliament, in addition to his other political activities; later, stained by terrorism, both Kahane groups were banned in Israel, and remain so. Radio and television are efficient ways of transmitting news and propaganda, given their almost instantaneous impact and their ability to shape public perceptions. the news. One mark of terror group sophistication and financial strength is the move into such media. While Hizballah publishes a daily and a weekly newspaper, it also has a television station, and radio ‘Voice of the Oppressed’ which beams out of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. An Israeli air raid took it down for three months during 1995.20 But few states are as willing as Israel to take such countermeasures against propaganda outlets. In past years, the communist Czech government allowed Red Brigadists who had slipped behind the Iron Curtain to make propaganda broadcasts back into Italy; Rome mounted no violent response, and rarely even complained in public. In the 1990s, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) broadcast from secure facilities in Syria. The little notice such Syrian support received in the West was an inadequate measure of its significance; an official sponsor like Damascus lends immense credibility to any organization like the PKK. A second form of political action, more complex than propaganda but highly effective when successful, is the use of front groups. This has been one of many strategies of a group in Chile, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (MRPF). Founded as an arm of Chile’s Communist Party, and named for a former Chilean fighter for independence from Spain, the Front lingered into the latter 1990s as the only important active terror group in Chile, which is democratic and economically successful. The MRPF was buffeted by that party’s internal divisions, as well as vigorous Chilean counterterrorist work. It came to marshal no more than a hundred members, down from a thousand or more in 1990. The Front’s policy, stated frankly by defector ‘Commandante Miguel’ in mid-1992, was to fight against the government of Chile ‘until power is completely achieved’.21 48 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 123swi02.qxd 09/10/01 14:48 Page 48 Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 09:14 08 September 2015