AFRICA Narth SUDAN BASIN DEM.REP OF THE CONGO = Sourh Atlantic Oeea首 S×cae:54.400.000 qual-Area Indian Ocean 简5角 Source:Central Intelligence Agency,The World Factbook Washington,DC: Central Intelligence Agency,1997)
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997)
Introduction THIs BOOK examines state creation and consolidation in Africa over the last several hundred years.It docs so by examining the fundamental problem confronting leaders of almost all African states:how to broad- cast power over sparsely settled lands.The topic is casy to justify.As James Fessler wrote,"Distribution of governmental authority is onc of the oldest and most abiding problems of society.By our solutions of this distributive problem we determine whether the government will be stable or unstable;whether it will be a dictatorship...whether we shall have the rule of law,the rule of men,or the rule of men under law."The African experience is particularly important to developing a truly compar- ative perspective on state consolidation because a plurality of the world's states are in Africa.However,African states have been omitted from the developing scholarly literature on state creation and consolidation.In- stead,this literature is dominated by writing concerned with the small number of states on the European landmass.The failure to account for the African experience is unfortunate because state creation and consol- idation in Africa,and in many other parts of the world,proceeded in a radically different manner than it did in Europe.In particular,as chapter one makes clear,African political geography poses a completely different set of political challenges to state-builders compared to the problems Eu- ropean leaders faced. At the same time,the consolidation of states in Africa remains a central political issue.The fundamental assumption undergirding this study is that states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders.Control is assured by developing an infrastructure to broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens.The failure of many African states to consolidate their authority has resulted in civil wars in some countries,the presence of millions of refugees throughout the continent,and the adoption of highly dysfunctional policies by many leaders.Yet international society,by dint of the granting of sovereignty, still assumes that all African countries are able to control all of the terri- tory within their boundaries.The gap between how power is exercised in Africa and international assumptions about how states operate is signifi- cant and,in some cases,growing.State consolidation in Africa is not merely an academic issue but is,instead,critical to the future of tens of James Fessler,Area and Administration (Birmingham:University of Alabama Press, 1949),p.1
Introduction THIS BOOK examines state creation and consolidation in Africa over the last several hundred years. It does so by examining the fundamental problem confronting leaders of almost all African states: how to broadcast power over sparsely settled lands. The topic is easy to justify. As James Fessler wrote, “Distribution of governmental authority is one of the oldest and most abiding problems of society. By our solutions of this distributive problem we determine whether the government will be stable or unstable; whether it will be a dictatorship . . . whether we shall have the rule of law, the rule of men, or the rule of men under law.”1 The African experience is particularly important to developing a truly comparative perspective on state consolidation because a plurality of the world’s states are in Africa. However, African states have been omitted from the developing scholarly literature on state creation and consolidation. Instead, this literature is dominated by writing concerned with the small number of states on the European landmass. The failure to account for the African experience is unfortunate because state creation and consolidation in Africa, and in many other parts of the world, proceeded in a radically different manner than it did in Europe. In particular, as chapter one makes clear, African political geography poses a completely different set of political challenges to state-builders compared to the problems European leaders faced. At the same time, the consolidation of states in Africa remains a central political issue. The fundamental assumption undergirding this study is that states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders. Control is assured by developing an infrastructure to broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens. The failure of many African states to consolidate their authority has resulted in civil wars in some countries, the presence of millions of refugees throughout the continent, and the adoption of highly dysfunctional policies by many leaders. Yet international society, by dint of the granting of sovereignty, still assumes that all African countries are able to control all of the territory within their boundaries. The gap between how power is exercised in Africa and international assumptions about how states operate is signifi- cant and, in some cases, growing. State consolidation in Africa is not merely an academic issue but is, instead, critical to the future of tens of 1 James Fessler, Area and Administration (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 1
4 INTRODUCTION millions of people who are at risk from the insecurity that is the inevitable by-product of state decline and failure.Therefore,this book discusses not only the history of state creation and consolidation but also evaluates different policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges African states face today. The method adopted by this book is,by necessity,much more contro- versial than the topic.To answer the questions posed regarding the na- ture of state-making,it is important to examine the entire sub-Saharan region.Of course,this is a vast area that contains different peoples,re- gions,and states.However,sub-Saharan Africa has a large number of entities that still can be compared because they share similar,although by no means identical,population structures,levels of technological devel- opment,and stocks of material wealth.Sub-Saharan Africa also has been organized as a particular international regime for more than a century and the rules adopted by colonialists and independent African leaders have had a profound effect on how states have been consolidated.Thus,I am making what Charles Tilly has called "huge (but not stupendous) comparisons"within a particular state system.? At the same time,it is necessary to analyze the problems of state con- solidation in Africa over several hundred years:from the precolonial pe- riod,through the short but intense interlude of formal European colo- nialism,to the modern era of independent states.In particular,it is critical to understand the continuities in state consolidation over the cen- turies.Here I am responding to Harry Eckstein's challenge to return to historically grounded comparative politics.Of course,an argument in favor of historical depth would be banal if the subject was European state development given the obvious continuities over time in that region. However,a similar argument regarding Africa is unconventional because of the almost universal assumption that colonialism changed everything, for the better or worse,depending on the biases of the individual author. I argue that it was impossible for the Europeans to have changed "every- thing"in the few decades that they ruled Africa.They also had to take Africa's political geography as a given because they were unwilling and unable to change the landscape. Therefore,this book spans a vast geographical landmass and hundreds of years.Inevitably,it glosses over or misses the nuances that differentiate various regions,societies,and countries.Put another way,I ignore a vast number of trees in order to see the forest.I am aware of these costs.I have spent much of my career arguing for a greater appreciation of the Charles Tilly,Big Structures,Large Processes,Huge Comparisons (New York:Russell Sage Foundation,1984),p.74. Harry Eckstein,"Unfinished Business:Reflections on the Scope of Comparative Poli- tics,"Comparative Political Studies 31 (August 1998):p.520
4 INTRODUCTION millions of people who are at risk from the insecurity that is the inevitable by-product of state decline and failure. Therefore, this book discusses not only the history of state creation and consolidation but also evaluates different policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges African states face today. The method adopted by this book is, by necessity, much more controversial than the topic. To answer the questions posed regarding the nature of state-making, it is important to examine the entire sub-Saharan region. Of course, this is a vast area that contains different peoples, regions, and states. However, sub-Saharan Africa has a large number of entities that still can be compared because they share similar, although by no means identical, population structures, levels of technological development, and stocks of material wealth. Sub-Saharan Africa also has been organized as a particular international regime for more than a century and the rules adopted by colonialists and independent African leaders have had a profound effect on how states have been consolidated. Thus, I am making what Charles Tilly has called “huge (but not stupendous) comparisons” within a particular state system.2 At the same time, it is necessary to analyze the problems of state consolidation in Africa over several hundred years: from the precolonial period, through the short but intense interlude of formal European colonialism, to the modern era of independent states. In particular, it is critical to understand the continuities in state consolidation over the centuries. Here I am responding to Harry Eckstein’s challenge to return to historically grounded comparative politics.3 Of course, an argument in favor of historical depth would be banal if the subject was European state development given the obvious continuities over time in that region. However, a similar argument regarding Africa is unconventional because of the almost universal assumption that colonialism changed everything, for the better or worse, depending on the biases of the individual author. I argue that it was impossible for the Europeans to have changed “everything” in the few decades that they ruled Africa. They also had to take Africa’s political geography as a given because they were unwilling and unable to change the landscape. Therefore, this book spans a vast geographical landmass and hundreds of years. Inevitably, it glosses over or misses the nuances that differentiate various regions, societies, and countries. Put another way, I ignore a vast number of trees in order to see the forest. I am aware of these costs. I have spent much of my career arguing for a greater appreciation of the 2 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), p. 74. 3 Harry Eckstein, “Unfinished Business: Reflections on the Scope of Comparative Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 31 (August 1998): p. 520
INTRODUCTION 5 increasing heterogeneity of Africa and have suggested that more care be given to understanding the particular problems and opportunities that individual states must confront.Throughout this book,wherever possi- ble,I have tried to qualify the argument to take into account the enor- mous variations across both time and space in Africa.I have also tried to develop new sources of information and new ways of looking at African politics(c.g.,by mapping countries,by classifying relationships between states and chiefs,and by delincating citizenship regulations)in order to understand the variations within the processes I am analyzing. Further,in order to make the comparative work viable,"Africa"in this study refers to the countries south of the Sahara.While much of the analysis also applies to Egypt,Tunisia,Algeria,Libya,and Morocco, those countries have radically different precolonial and colonial historics, operate predominantly in the state system of the Middle East,and are significantly richer.'South Africa also does not feature in the sample of countries under study because of its different history,although I occa- sionally make reference to it.Finally,I exclude island Africa (Comoros, Madagascar,Mauritius,Sao Tome,and Seychelles)because an under- standing of the role of land boundaries in the consolidation of states is critical to the study. However,there is not enough space to make all of the qualifications necessary to completely describe every region,socicty,and country,and to do so would fatally distract from the central argument:that African leaders across time and space have faced certain similar issues when trying to rule and have often come to similar conclusions on how to solve the problems they have faced.I focus on "the forest"partly because I believe that the structural argument regarding state consolidation is both power- ful and relatively well defined.Finally,I believe that the benefits of such an approach outweigh the costs.I agree again with Tilly when he coun- sels against despairing that we will never have enough knowledge to ac- curately describe long-term social processes:"Historically grounded huge comparisons of big structures and large processes help establish what must be explained,attach the possible explanations to their context in time and space,and sometimes actually improve our understanding of those structures and processes."s The unwillingness of many Africanists to generalize has its origins in the need to differentiate countries on the continent in the face of racist perceptions that Africa is a homogenous region that is in constant tur- +Average per capita income for the five North African countries is approximately (there is considerable uncertainty concerning Libya's income)$1,827.Per capita income for sub- Saharan Africa averages $500.World Bank,World Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press,1998),pp.190-1,232. s Tilly,Big Structures,Large Processes,p.145
INTRODUCTION 5 increasing heterogeneity of Africa and have suggested that more care be given to understanding the particular problems and opportunities that individual states must confront. Throughout this book, wherever possible, I have tried to qualify the argument to take into account the enormous variations across both time and space in Africa. I have also tried to develop new sources of information and new ways of looking at African politics (e.g., by mapping countries, by classifying relationships between states and chiefs, and by delineating citizenship regulations) in order to understand the variations within the processes I am analyzing. Further, in order to make the comparative work viable, “Africa” in this study refers to the countries south of the Sahara. While much of the analysis also applies to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco, those countries have radically different precolonial and colonial histories, operate predominantly in the state system of the Middle East, and are significantly richer. 4 South Africa also does not feature in the sample of countries under study because of its different history, although I occasionally make reference to it. Finally, I exclude island Africa (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, S˜ao Tome, and Seychelles) because an under ´ - standing of the role of land boundaries in the consolidation of states is critical to the study. However, there is not enough space to make all of the qualifications necessary to completely describe every region, society, and country, and to do so would fatally distract from the central argument: that African leaders across time and space have faced certain similar issues when trying to rule and have often come to similar conclusions on how to solve the problems they have faced. I focus on “the forest” partly because I believe that the structural argument regarding state consolidation is both powerful and relatively well defined. Finally, I believe that the benefits of such an approach outweigh the costs. I agree again with Tilly when he counsels against despairing that we will never have enough knowledge to accurately describe long-term social processes: “Historically grounded huge comparisons of big structures and large processes help establish what must be explained, attach the possible explanations to their context in time and space, and sometimes actually improve our understanding of those structures and processes.”5 The unwillingness of many Africanists to generalize has its origins in the need to differentiate countries on the continent in the face of racist perceptions that Africa is a homogenous region that is in constant tur- 4 Average per capita income for the five North African countries is approximately (there is considerable uncertainty concerning Libya’s income) $1,827. Per capita income for subSaharan Africa averages $500. World Bank, World Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 190–1, 232. 5 Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, p. 145
6 INTRODUCTION moil.I understand the regionalists'desire,after the analytic disasters caused by the homogenizing tendencies of both modernization and de- pendency theory,to hew closely to the empirical facts.However,failure to examine the broad continuities over space and time has meant that Africa has been excluded from the political science mainstream becausc overarching arguments about the trajectory of the continent do not exist to compare with the well developed models of how political order was constructed in Europe,Latin America,and other regions.By attempting to describe the African state-building experience,I hope to join the am- bitious academic project well described by Wong:"those of us who spend most of our time laboring on so-called non-Western parts of the world should make greater efforts to offer analyses that engage arguments about historical change in European history systematically...to generate the elements of well-grounded comparative history that can...create a new basis for building social theories to replace the great nineteenth-century efforts limited in large measure to European foundations."6 The failure to develop more powerful generalizations is also increas- ingly hurting the study of Africa itself.For instance,the effort that came to full life in the 1960s to study the history of Africa before the Euro- peans has not had the impact that it should have had because commen- tary almost always has been devoted to one polity or one region.Sim- ilarly,the study of relations between capitals and chiefs has,but with a very few exceptions,been developed on a country-by-country basis with no hint of a comparative effort.As a result,the study of African politics has sometimes been in accord with the critiques of area studies:more a jumble of accumulated facts than a clear scholarly project that has sought to continually test facts against hypotheses.It is possible to answer those critiques without abandoning the study of African states qua African states. To do so requires the development of an analytic perspective that allows the African experience to be understood in comparative perspective This book does not provide all of the answers to the big questions posed herein.However,I do hope that it initiates a debate that is long overdue about state consolidation in Africa and in other parts of the world.Such a debate should flourish if it is possible to recognize both the enormous variation within Africa and the possibilitics of overarching sim- ilarities.To understand,then,what is apparent to anyone who goes to Africa. Soon after taking power on 17 May 1997,Laurent Kabila changed the name of Zaire to Democratic Republic of the Congo.This book refers to .R.Bin Wong,China Transformed:Historical Change and the Limits of European Expe- rience(Ithaca:Comnell University Press,1997),p.ix
6 INTRODUCTION moil. I understand the regionalists’ desire, after the analytic disasters caused by the homogenizing tendencies of both modernization and dependency theory, to hew closely to the empirical facts. However, failure to examine the broad continuities over space and time has meant that Africa has been excluded from the political science mainstream because overarching arguments about the trajectory of the continent do not exist to compare with the well developed models of how political order was constructed in Europe, Latin America, and other regions. By attempting to describe the African state-building experience, I hope to join the ambitious academic project well described by Wong: “those of us who spend most of our time laboring on so-called non-Western parts of the world should make greater efforts to offer analyses that engage arguments about historical change in European history systematically . . . to generate the elements of well-grounded comparative history that can . . . create a new basis for building social theories to replace the great nineteenth-century efforts limited in large measure to European foundations.”6 The failure to develop more powerful generalizations is also increasingly hurting the study of Africa itself. For instance, the effort that came to full life in the 1960s to study the history of Africa before the Europeans has not had the impact that it should have had because commentary almost always has been devoted to one polity or one region. Similarly, the study of relations between capitals and chiefs has, but with a very few exceptions, been developed on a country-by-country basis with no hint of a comparative effort. As a result, the study of African politics has sometimes been in accord with the critiques of area studies: more a jumble of accumulated facts than a clear scholarly project that has sought to continually test facts against hypotheses. It is possible to answer those critiques without abandoning the study of African states qua African states. To do so requires the development of an analytic perspective that allows the African experience to be understood in comparative perspective. This book does not provide all of the answers to the big questions posed herein. However, I do hope that it initiates a debate that is long overdue about state consolidation in Africa and in other parts of the world. Such a debate should flourish if it is possible to recognize both the enormous variation within Africa and the possibilities of overarching similarities. To understand, then, what is apparent to anyone who goes to Africa. Soon after taking power on 17 May 1997, Laurent Kabila changed the name of Zaire to Democratic Republic of the Congo. This book refers to 6 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. ix
INTRODUCTION 7 the country as "Zaire"while it was ruled by former President Mobutu Sese Seko and as "Democratic Republic of the Congo(D.R.O.C.)"for the post-May 1997 era. This book has its origins in 1982 when I went to Nigeria to research my senior thesis as an undergraduate in Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School.I woke up in the morning when my plane was over West Africa,looked out the window and remarked to myself that there ap- peared to be very few people on the land.That observation has,to one degree or another,haunted me for the last fifteen years and is the original impetus for this book.As a student,I was fortunate to have as teachers Henry Bicnen,Michacl Doyle,and Robert Tignor,among others,who cultivated my growing interest in African politics. While teaching at Princeton,I have been thinking about this book's central argument for over a decade and writing it for the last two years. While writing,I have incurred many debts as I exposed numerous col- leagues to iterated versions of the manuscript.Robert Tignor continues to tutor me in African history and Michacl Doyle is still teaching me the intricacics of international relations theory.Sheri Berman and Gidcon Rose provided me with an especially searching and comprehensive cri- tique of the draft manuscript.I also received helpful comments from Robert Bates,Christopher Clapham,Kent Eaton,Antoinette Handley, John Harbeson,Tony Hopkins,Atul Kohli,Emmanucl Kreike,Donald Rothchild,Martin Stcin,Kathryn Stoner-Weiss,John Waterbury,Deb- orah Yashar,and Crawford Young.Research assistance for the book was ably provided by Elizabeth Bloodgood and Amanda Dickins. Research for this book was supported by Princeton University's Center of International Studies and the University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. John Bruce of the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center was kind enough to give me permission to quote from the country profiles the LTC had produced for Africa. My greatest thanks goes,as always,to my wife Sharon,who manages the roles of partner,friend,and constructive critic with love and good cheer. Maps 3.1,3.2,and 3.3 are reprinted from Ieuan L.L.Griffiths,The Atlas of African Affairs,2nd ed.(London:Routledge Press,1994).1994 by Routledge Press.Used with permission of the publisher.Parts of chapter nine originally appeared in Jeffrey Herbst,"Responding to State Failure in Africa,"International Security 21(Winter 1996/7).Used with permis- sion of the president and fellows of Harvard College and the Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology
INTRODUCTION 7 the country as “Zaire” while it was ruled by former President Mobutu Sese Seko and as “Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.O.C.)” for the post-May 1997 era. This book has its origins in 1982 when I went to Nigeria to research my senior thesis as an undergraduate in Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. I woke up in the morning when my plane was over West Africa, looked out the window and remarked to myself that there appeared to be very few people on the land. That observation has, to one degree or another, haunted me for the last fifteen years and is the original impetus for this book. As a student, I was fortunate to have as teachers Henry Bienen, Michael Doyle, and Robert Tignor, among others, who cultivated my growing interest in African politics. While teaching at Princeton, I have been thinking about this book’s central argument for over a decade and writing it for the last two years. While writing, I have incurred many debts as I exposed numerous colleagues to iterated versions of the manuscript. Robert Tignor continues to tutor me in African history and Michael Doyle is still teaching me the intricacies of international relations theory. Sheri Berman and Gideon Rose provided me with an especially searching and comprehensive critique of the draft manuscript. I also received helpful comments from Robert Bates, Christopher Clapham, Kent Eaton, Antoinette Handley, John Harbeson, Tony Hopkins, Atul Kohli, Emmanuel Kreike, Donald Rothchild, Martin Stein, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, John Waterbury, Deborah Yashar, and Crawford Young. Research assistance for the book was ably provided by Elizabeth Bloodgood and Amanda Dickins. Research for this book was supported by Princeton University’s Center of International Studies and the University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. John Bruce of the University of Wisconsin’s Land Tenure Center was kind enough to give me permission to quote from the country profiles the LTC had produced for Africa. My greatest thanks goes, as always, to my wife Sharon, who manages the roles of partner, friend, and constructive critic with love and good cheer. Maps 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are reprinted from Ieuan L. L. Griffiths, The Atlas of African Affairs, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge Press, 1994). q 1994 by Routledge Press. Used with permission of the publisher. Parts of chapter nine originally appeared in Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security 21(Winter 1996/7). Used with permission of the president and fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Part One THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA
Part One THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING IN AFRICA
One The Challenge of State-Building in Africa The history of every continent is written clearly in its geographical features,but of no continent is this more true than of Africa. Lord Hailey,An African Survey THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM facing state-builders in Africa-be they pre- colonial kings,colonial governors,or presidents in the independent era- has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.Sub-Saharan Africa,with roughly 18 percent of the world's surface area,has always been sparsely settled.Af- rica had only 6 to 11 percent of the world's population in 1750,5 to 7 percent in 1900,and only 11 percent in 1997.'Rclatively low population densities in Africa have automatically meant that it always has been more expensive for states to exert control over a given number of people com- pared to Europe and other densely settled areas.As John Iliffe wrote,"In the West African savannah,underpopulation was the chief obstacle to state formation."2 In only a few places in Africa,including the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands,are there ccologies that have supported relatively high densities of people.Not surprisingly,these areas,with the longest traditions of relatively centralized state structures,have been periodically able to exercise direct control over their peripheries.However,ccologi- cal conditions throughout most of the continent do not allow high densi- ties of people to be easily supported.More than 50 percent of Africa has Calculated from John D.Durand,"Historical Estimates of World Population:An Eval- uation,"Population and Development Review 3 (September 1977):p.259 and World Bank, World Development Report 1998,p 191. John Iliffe,Africans The History of a Continent(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,.1995),P.70. 3 While hampered by very poor data,Robert Bates found that,in the African polities he was able to code,"the higher the population density,the greater the level of political centralization."See his Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press,1983),p.35.See also Robert F.Stevenson,Population and Politi- cal Systems in Tropical Africa (New York:Columbia University Press,1968)
One The Challenge of State-Building in Africa The history of every continent is written clearly in its geographical features, but of no continent is this more true than of Africa. Lord Hailey, An African Survey THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM facing state-builders in Africa—be they precolonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era— has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people. Sub-Saharan Africa, with roughly 18 percent of the world’s surface area, has always been sparsely settled. Africa had only 6 to 11 percent of the world’s population in 1750, 5 to 7 percent in 1900, and only 11 percent in 1997.1 Relatively low population densities in Africa have automatically meant that it always has been more expensive for states to exert control over a given number of people compared to Europe and other densely settled areas. As John Iliffe wrote, “In the West African savannah, underpopulation was the chief obstacle to state formation.”2 In only a few places in Africa, including the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands, are there ecologies that have supported relatively high densities of people. Not surprisingly, these areas, with the longest traditions of relatively centralized state structures, have been periodically able to exercise direct control over their peripheries.3 However, ecological conditions throughout most of the continent do not allow high densities of people to be easily supported. More than 50 percent of Africa has 1 Calculated from John D. Durand, “Historical Estimates of World Population: An Evaluation,” Population and Development Review 3 (September 1977): p. 259 and World Bank, World Development Report 1998, p 191. 2 John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 70. 3 While hampered by very poor data, Robert Bates found that, in the African polities he was able to code, “the higher the population density, the greater the level of political centralization.” See his Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 35. See also Robert F. Stevenson, Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968)
12 CHAPTER ONE inadequate rainfall;indeed,contrary to the popular imagination,only 8 percent of the continent has a tropical climate.Approximately one-third of the world's arid land is in Africa. In Africa,two other factors have aggravated the cost of extending power in the face of low population densities.First,African countries have quite varied environmental conditions.Ecological differences across provinces of a country in West Africa,which can be coastal,forest,savan- nah,or near-desert,are greater than in any European country.s Therefore, the models of control an African state must develop for these highly differentiated zones are more varied,and thus more costly,than what a government in Europe or Asia must implement in order to rule over their more homogenous rural areas.Second,it is expensive to project power over distance in Africa because of the combination of a peculiar set of geographical features.As Ralph Austen notes, The geography of Africa also presents serious barriers to long-distance trans- port.Water travel is limited by the small amount of indented shoreline relative to the size of the interior surface of the continent,as well as the disrupted navigability of most rivers,due to rapids and seasonal shallows.The wheel was introduced into northern Africa for overland travel during ancient times but then abandoned because the terrain and distances to be covered could not feasibly be provided with the necessary roads." The daunting nature of Africa's geography is one of the reasons the re- gion was only colonized in the late 1800s despite its proximity to Eu- rope.The Europeans found it easier to colonize Latin America hundreds of years before despite the much greater distances involved. Why the particular pattern of population density occurred,given Af- rica's geography,is not within my competence to explain.?Rather,this book examines how successive sets of leaders in Africa responded to a political geography they were forced to take as a given.This is not an argument for the kind of gcographical determinism that has captivated scholars from Ibn Khaldun to Montesquicu to Jeffrey Sachs.3 A variety of paths were open to African leaders as they confronted their environ- W.Bediako Lamouse-Smith and Joseph School,Africa Interactive Maps,CD-ROM, (Odenton,Md.:Africa Interactive Maps,1998). s W.Arthur Lewis,Politics in West Africa (London:George Allen and Unwin,1965),p. 24. Ralph Austen,African Economic History (London:James Currey,1987),p.20. For a provocative thesis,see Jared Diamond,Guns Germs and Steel:The Fate of Hu- man Societies (New York:W.W.Norton,1997),chapter 19. See Ibn Khaldun,The Mugaddimab,trans.Franz Rosenthal (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1967),p.63;Montesquicu,The Spirit of the Laws,vol.I (Cincinnati:Robert Clarke,1873),p.255;and Jeffrey Sachs,"Nature,Nurture,and Growth,"The Economist, 14Junc1997,Pp.19-23
12 CHAPTER ONE inadequate rainfall; indeed, contrary to the popular imagination, only 8 percent of the continent has a tropical climate. Approximately one-third of the world’s arid land is in Africa.4 In Africa, two other factors have aggravated the cost of extending power in the face of low population densities. First, African countries have quite varied environmental conditions. Ecological differences across provinces of a country in West Africa, which can be coastal, forest, savannah, or near-desert, are greater than in any European country. 5 Therefore, the models of control an African state must develop for these highly differentiated zones are more varied, and thus more costly, than what a government in Europe or Asia must implement in order to rule over their more homogenous rural areas. Second, it is expensive to project power over distance in Africa because of the combination of a peculiar set of geographical features. As Ralph Austen notes, The geography of Africa also presents serious barriers to long-distance transport. Water travel is limited by the small amount of indented shoreline relative to the size of the interior surface of the continent, as well as the disrupted navigability of most rivers, due to rapids and seasonal shallows. The wheel was introduced into northern Africa for overland travel during ancient times but then abandoned because the terrain and distances to be covered could not feasibly be provided with the necessary roads.6 The daunting nature of Africa’s geography is one of the reasons the region was only colonized in the late 1800s despite its proximity to Europe. The Europeans found it easier to colonize Latin America hundreds of years before despite the much greater distances involved. Why the particular pattern of population density occurred, given Africa’s geography, is not within my competence to explain.7 Rather, this book examines how successive sets of leaders in Africa responded to a political geography they were forced to take as a given. This is not an argument for the kind of geographical determinism that has captivated scholars from Ibn Khaldun to Montesquieu to Jef ˆ frey Sachs.8 A variety of paths were open to African leaders as they confronted their environ- 4 W. Bediako Lamouse-Smith and Joseph School, ´ Africa Interactive Maps, CD-ROM, (Odenton, Md.: Africa Interactive Maps, 1998). 5 W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 24.6 Ralph Austen, African Economic History (London: James Currey, 1987), p. 20. 7 For a provocative thesis, see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), chapter 19. 8 See Ibn Khaldun, ˆ The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 63; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, vol. 1 (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1873), p. 255; and Jeffrey Sachs, “Nature, Nurture, and Growth,” The Economist, 14 June 1997, pp. 19–23
THE CHALLENGE OF STATE-BUILDING 13 ments.However,the challenges posed by political geography,especially low population densities,could not be ignored by any leader.Such an approach offers a tremendous methodological advantage:by holding the physical environment "constant,"I can focus on the precise political cal- culations of different African leaders over time as they sought to design their states. In this book,I argue that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states:the cost of expanding the domestic power infra- structure;the nature of national boundaries;and the design of state sys- tems.Understanding the decisions made regarding each is critical,and there are profound trade-offs inherent to different approaches.Africa's political geography helped structure the responses that leaders adopted to each set of issues just as European decisions were influenced by the struc- tural features of that region.The following two sections provide a com- parison of Europe and Africa's political geographies.I then develop the analytic tools that are central to this study. The European Experience of State Consolidation The African experience of politics amid large supplies of land and low popu- lation densities while confronting an inhospitable physical setting is in dra- matic contrast to the European experience of state-building.In Europe, through the fourteenth century,population densities were not high enough to put immediate pressure on land and compel territorial competition.As Mattingly notes,"In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,the continental space of Western Europe still impeded any degree of political organization efficient enough to create a system of continuous diplomatic pressures. However,starting in the fifteenth century in Italy and later elsewhere, population densitics increased.As a result,European nations began to compete for territory,a tendency that only makes sense if population densities are relatively high and vacant land is limited or nonexistent,so that the valuc of conquering land is higher than the price to be paid in wealth and men.In turn,there was significant pressure to strengthen states in order to fight wars.Charles Tilly notes that one of the central reasons for the creation of relatively centralized state apparatuses in Eu- rope was the "continuous aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing states of unequal size,which made war a driving force in European history.Wars of territorial conquest,as chapter four notes in much greater detail,have been central to the formation of particular Garrett Mattingly,Renaissance Diplomacy (London:Jonathan Cape,1955),p.60. Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital,and European States,A.D.990-1992 (Cambridge, MA:Blackwell,1990),p.54
THE CHALLENGE OF ST A TE-BUILDING 13 ments. However, the challenges posed by political geography, especially low population densities, could not be ignored by any leader. Such an approach offers a tremendous methodological advantage: by holding the physical environment “constant,” I can focus on the precise political calculations of different African leaders over time as they sought to design their states. In this book, I argue that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states: the cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure; the nature of national boundaries; and the design of state systems. Understanding the decisions made regarding each is critical, and there are profound trade-offs inherent to different approaches. Africa’s political geography helped structure the responses that leaders adopted to each set of issues just as European decisions were influenced by the structural features of that region. The following two sections provide a comparison of Europe and Africa’s political geographies. I then develop the analytic tools that are central to this study. The European Experience of State Consolidation The African experience of politics amid large supplies of land and low population densities while confronting an inhospitable physical setting is in dramatic contrast to the European experience of state-building. In Europe, through the fourteenth century, population densities were not high enough to put immediate pressure on land and compel territorial competition. As Mattingly notes, “In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the continental space of Western Europe still impeded any degree of political organization efficient enough to create a system of continuous diplomatic pressures.”9 However, starting in the fifteenth century in Italy and later elsewhere, population densities increased. As a result, European nations began to compete for territory, a tendency that only makes sense if population densities are relatively high and vacant land is limited or nonexistent, so that the value of conquering land is higher than the price to be paid in wealth and men. In turn, there was significant pressure to strengthen states in order to fight wars. Charles Tilly notes that one of the central reasons for the creation of relatively centralized state apparatuses in Europe was the “continuous aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing states of unequal size, which made war a driving force in European history.”10 Wars of territorial conquest, as chapter four notes in much greater detail, have been central to the formation of particular 9 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 60. 10 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), p. 54
