Office-Selling,Corruption,and Long-Term Development in Peru BACKGROUND-SALE OF PUBLIC OFFICES According to contemporaries,the office-selling episode proved "demoralizing"to longstanding of- The sale of public offices was a common practice in ficials and high-status individuals in the Americas settings as diverse as France,England,the Ottoman (benemeritos)who expected a position in the colonial Empire,and China(Swart 1980).In the case of Spain. administration after a lifetime of service (Moreno office-selling was used in the early sixteenth century to 1977,80 citing Cespedes del Castillo 1961).That is, allocate minor posts and nobility titles.Yet it only be- "deserving"individuals had to watch how positions came an important mechanism to select colonial gover- were granted to those lacking "merit"(Moreno 1977, nors in the late seventeenth century(Parry 1953)when the Hapsburg King Charles II began to exchange colo- 75),"competence and probity"(Lohman 1957,130), or the "preparation or vocation"to serve (Sanz nial governorships for money. Tapia 2009,43).Although certainly appointment by That is,prior to the 1670s,colonial governorships were generally allocated to individuals who fulfilled patronage(as opposed to sales)does not preclude low- quality individuals from entering office.the constraints certain requisites or who provided "services"to the imposed by social status and the potential for better Crown (Sanz Tapia 2009,50).According to the laws screening were less likely among those purchasing governing the Indies,ideal governors were those with positions. 'lineage,prudence and good manners."For instance, governors were not to be of"low social status,humble origins or come from manual occupations"(Lohmann Provincial Governors (Corregidores) 元 Villena 1957,98).While this preference for high so- cial status bureaucrats can be interpreted as classism,it Among all positions sold,that of provincial governor, actually served key functions in premodern bureaucra- or corregidor,was highly demanded(Sanz Tapia 2009. cies,such as inducing loyalty (Parry 1953,2)or con- 89).This,despite the fact that provincial governorships were not particularly prestigious,there were no guar- veying private information.In fact,among eighteenth century observers,patronage was preferable to sales antees of further appointments after the five-year term in office,and the task of governing the often unruly in- because it provided a reason for officials to behave with "reason and justice"whereas selling positions was akin digenous population of Peru could cost officials their lives.Moreover,wages paid to officials were a rather to the Crown "consenting"to the extorsion of the in- small.stagnant.and insufficient amount for the task at digenous population in the colonies (Ramos Gomez hand and the risks involved(Moreno 1977).6 It is telling 1985.174).The logic is similar to that of seventeenth that when the Crown tried to improve the performance century Britain where "..what policed the behavion of governors by the late eighteenth century,the main of the office-holder was the threat of expulsion from the aristocracy,loss of the benefits of office,and the loss proposals centered around increasing wages and cre- governors of social capital if caught or suspected of acting outside ating a career-based system so that“good” the interest of the patron"(Allen 2005,62). could be promoted to future posts (Moreno 1977.604). Despite these known concerns with office-selling,the These proposals never materialized. dire financial situation of the Crown circa 1670-during Two main avenues existed to purchase the position of provincial governor.?First,the Council of Indies the Franco-Dutch war-led to the systematic sale of made public available vacancies with a twenty-day limit colonial governorships.The decision was framed as an in the royal court in Madrid to receive files(Sanz Tapia emergency (and temporary)measure to face "pressing 2009.89).3 Interested candidates would send sealed let- needs"(urgencias presentes)from warfare.Although 8 the negative consequences from office-selling were ters with their qualifications and the price offered for well-known and legal scholars strongly condemned it the position.The King-through the Royal Chamber- would then assess the merits and bids of candidates and at the time(Parry 1953,1),the policy remained in place usually chose the highest bidder(Sanz Tapia 2009,93). due to a combination of persistent fiscal weakness and The second,and by far the most frequently taken av- direct benefits accruing to members of the court in enue.was the purchase of positions years in advance of volved in it (Sanz Tapia 1998).For example,once Philip potentially taking office (futuras).in which individuals V took office in 1701,he vowed to improve governance in the colonies and revoked all appointments sold in directly(or via intermediaries)approached the Crown and offered a payment for the position.In these cases. the last 10 years by his predecessor.Yet,these inten- the Crown decided whether or not to accept the offer tions proved short-lived,since as early as 1705-during the war of the Spanish succession-Philip himself be. yet,it was well known that interested candidates could gan to sell governorships citing the prospect of poten- greatly improve the likelihood of securing the appoint- tial military defeat in Europe and subsequent disinte- ment by offering higher prices(Moreno 1977,75 citing gration of the Spanish Empire(Burkholder and Chan- Castillo de Bobadilla 1759 I(I),48). dler 1977).The practice would only end definitely in 1751,during an Empire-wide effort to modernize gov- Wages were also subject to a one-time tax (media anata),and were ernment,known as the Bourbon Reforms. susceptible to be retained by the monarch for "emergency"reasons See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the wages prevailing during office- selling. 7 The sale process is different for nongovernor offices.See Parry 1953). In these cases,ownership of the office is not transferred to the pur- Those residing in the Americas relied on an agent with the power chaser in perpetuity. of attorney to purchase the position. 973Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru BACKGROUND—SALE OF PUBLIC OFFICES The sale of public offices was a common practice in settings as diverse as France, England, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Swart 1980). In the case of Spain, office-selling was used in the early sixteenth century to allocate minor posts and nobility titles. Yet it only be￾came an important mechanism to select colonial gover￾nors in the late seventeenth century (Parry 1953) when the Hapsburg King Charles II began to exchange colo￾nial governorships for money.5 That is, prior to the 1670s, colonial governorships were generally allocated to individuals who fulfilled certain requisites or who provided “services” to the Crown (Sanz Tapia 2009, 50). According to the laws governing the Indies, ideal governors were those with “lineage, prudence and good manners.” For instance, governors were not to be of “low social status, humble origins or come from manual occupations” (Lohmann Villena 1957, 98). While this preference for high so￾cial status bureaucrats can be interpreted as classism, it actually served key functions in premodern bureaucra￾cies, such as inducing loyalty (Parry 1953, 2) or con￾veying private information. In fact, among eighteenth century observers, patronage was preferable to sales because it provided a reason for officials to behave with “reason and justice” whereas selling positions was akin to the Crown “consenting” to the extorsion of the in￾digenous population in the colonies (Ramos Gomez 1985, 174). The logic is similar to that of seventeenth century Britain where “[...] what policed the behavior of the office-holder was the threat of expulsion from the aristocracy,loss of the benefits of office, and the loss of social capital if caught or suspected of acting outside the interest of the patron” (Allen 2005, 62). Despite these known concerns with office-selling, the dire financial situation of the Crown circa 1670—during the Franco-Dutch war—led to the systematic sale of colonial governorships. The decision was framed as an emergency (and temporary) measure to face “pressing needs” (urgencias presentes) from warfare. Although the negative consequences from office-selling were well-known and legal scholars strongly condemned it at the time (Parry 1953, 1), the policy remained in place due to a combination of persistent fiscal weakness and direct benefits accruing to members of the court in￾volved in it (Sanz Tapia 1998). For example, once Philip V took office in 1701, he vowed to improve governance in the colonies and revoked all appointments sold in the last 10 years by his predecessor. Yet, these inten￾tions proved short-lived, since as early as 1705—during the war of the Spanish succession—Philip himself be￾gan to sell governorships citing the prospect of poten￾tial military defeat in Europe and subsequent disinte￾gration of the Spanish Empire (Burkholder and Chan￾dler 1977). The practice would only end definitely in 1751, during an Empire-wide effort to modernize gov￾ernment, known as the Bourbon Reforms. 5 In these cases, ownership of the office is not transferred to the pur￾chaser in perpetuity. According to contemporaries, the office-selling episode proved “demoralizing” to longstanding of￾ficials and high-status individuals in the Americas (benemeritos) who expected a position in the colonial administration after a lifetime of service (Moreno 1977, 80 citing Cespedes del Castillo 1961). That is, “deserving” individuals had to watch how positions were granted to those lacking “merit” (Moreno 1977, 75), “competence and probity” (Lohman 1957, 130), or the “preparation or vocation” to serve (Sanz Tapia 2009, 43). Although certainly appointment by patronage (as opposed to sales) does not preclude low￾quality individuals from entering office, the constraints imposed by social status and the potential for better screening were less likely among those purchasing positions. Provincial Governors (Corregidores) Among all positions sold, that of provincial governor, or corregidor, was highly demanded (Sanz Tapia 2009, 89). This, despite the fact that provincial governorships were not particularly prestigious, there were no guar￾antees of further appointments after the five-year term in office, and the task of governing the often unruly in￾digenous population of Peru could cost officials their lives. Moreover, wages paid to officials were a rather small, stagnant, and insufficient amount for the task at hand and the risks involved (Moreno 1977).6 It is telling that when the Crown tried to improve the performance of governors by the late eighteenth century, the main proposals centered around increasing wages and cre￾ating a career-based system so that “good” governors could be promoted to future posts (Moreno 1977, 604). These proposals never materialized. Two main avenues existed to purchase the position of provincial governor.7 First, the Council of Indies made public available vacancies with a twenty-day limit in the royal court in Madrid to receive files (Sanz Tapia 2009, 89).8 Interested candidates would send sealed let￾ters with their qualifications and the price offered for the position.The King—through the Royal Chamber— would then assess the merits and bids of candidates and usually chose the highest bidder (Sanz Tapia 2009, 93). The second, and by far the most frequently taken av￾enue, was the purchase of positions years in advance of potentially taking office (futuras), in which individuals directly (or via intermediaries) approached the Crown and offered a payment for the position. In these cases, the Crown decided whether or not to accept the offer, yet, it was well known that interested candidates could greatly improve the likelihood of securing the appoint￾ment by offering higher prices (Moreno 1977, 75 citing Castillo de Bobadilla 1759 I(I), 48). 6 Wages were also subject to a one-time tax (media anata), and were susceptible to be retained by the monarch for “emergency” reasons. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the wages prevailing during office￾selling. 7 The sale process is different for nongovernor offices. See Parry (1953). 8 Those residing in the Americas relied on an agent with the power of attorney to purchase the position. 973 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800045X