Jenny Guardado Although,in theory,the Crown tried to select in- collecting payments were important in determining the dividuals of proven quality-originally from Spain extractive value of certain offices versus others and the of high social status,or military background-it was governor's willingness to pay. often willing to undermine its own standards in ex- Aside from repartimiento,governors were also change for money.For instance,some individuals liv- known to overtax the population when collecting the ing in the colonies were able to buy positions despite yearly head tax(tributo)that every indigenous person clear conflicts of interest,such as ruling the provinces owed to the Spanish Crown.Governors often extorted they resided in,considered inappropriate at the time amounts above the permitted legal amount,from those (Sanz Tapia 2009,89).Similarly,although governors exempted (e.g.,mestizos),and even forced families to were barred from ruling the same province more than pay for those who were absent due to death or migra- once-as a way to prevent corruption-the Crown tion.Moreover.funds from local taxes earmarked for was ready to make exceptions if rewarded accordingly. hospitals or other public works were often used for the Other regulations established that governorships were governors'own purposes (Andrien 1984.13-14). not to be transferred to a third party.However,dur- Finally,governors also benefited from mobilizing la- ing the office-selling period,the Crown agreed to such bor in their province for a profit.For instance,they exchanges.As a result,governor titles became little would"lease"workers to neighboring haciendas in ex- more than a commodity:appointments were purchased change for 2/3 of the wage owed to the workers(An- a number of years in advance and it was possible to drien 1984).Governors serving in provinces forced to bequest them or use them as a dowry for whomever provide labor to the mines (mita)were able to de- married their daughters or nieces.Not surprisingly,in- lay implementation of these regulations in exchange dividuals serving in the colonies would be more likely for greater gains from repartimiento(Mukherjee 2008) to be driven by profit than service (Moreno 1977,71; Or,they would allow individuals to forego the mita al- Sanz Tapia 2009;Lohmann Villena 1957). together in exchange for a fee.In sum,colonial offi- cials found numerous opportunities to profit from their 4 position. Rent Extraction The main attraction for occupying office was that gov- DATA ernors served as tax collectors and"justice administra- tors,"thus exerting considerable leverage among the The data used in this paper comes from several sources. population to engage in extractive activities.The most The time series for the prices of governor positions common of these activities-outlawed at the time of was coded from primary sources located at the Span- office-selling-was repartimiento,or the forced sales of ish Colonial Archives (Archivo General de Indias).I merchandise.The practice entailed the forced distri- collected information on sold and appointed colonial bution of goods and credit to the local population at governorships beginning 1673 until 1751,when the last inflated prices,which kept them in heavy and perma- sale was made.During this 78-year period,62 years or nent debt.Under this arrangement,governors allied 80%of the time saw the sale of at least one Peruvian themselves with merchants in Lima.or in Seville.to province for a total of 518 sales.In terms of appoint- obtain goods and resell them at inflated prices without ments,there were 107 governorships assigned this way. S5.501g the proper consent of locals(Andrien 1984,13).Debt Governor titles also provide information about the per- repayment was ensured by the fact that the governor sonal characteristics of the purchaser,such as social sta- was not only the executive,but also the judicial author- tus.An example of a title of governor can be found in ity in his province (Moreno 1977;Baskes 2000);debtors Figure A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix.All prices account could be flogged,jailed,or have their goods confiscated. for inflation,using changes in the price of silver(base The rents obtained via repartimiento are estimated to vear 1673)provided by Arroyo-Abad (2005).On be at least twice as large as those obtained from forced average,a Peruvian province was sold in 5,300 pesos, labor(mita)and head taxes (tributo)from the indige- which is around 20 times the yearly wage of a military nous population(Golte 1980). captain in the Spanish army at the time.1 Rumors about potential profits from repartimiento To match colonial and current districts,I use the guided the bids for a position.0 For example,in the geographic accounts of Cosme Bueno (1951 [1783]), case of Peru the province of Ica was considered"first- who wrote a detailed description of the parishes in class'”or“high utility”due to the ease in collecting pro- each province and its "annexes,"now districts.Out ceeds from illegal trade activities.while that of Cercado of around 1850 current districts today,it is possible (near the capital)was described as yielding "poor re- to match 967 to their colonial counterpart.Only cur- turns"(Cebrian 1977,78).Not surprisingly,Ica's aver- rent districts identified as being part of the province age price was twice that of Cercado.Hence,factors such in the eighteenth century are included to make sure as circulating currency,taxable markets,and the ease in there are no disparities in the presence of the colonial state at the time.Figure 1 provides a visual represen- L tation of the spatial distribution of office prices among While it is debatable whether repartimiento was a forced activity or not(Baskes 2000),it still entailed monopolistic practices and steep markups on prices for goods and credit. 0 Offices represented a sizeable investment at the time,it is not sur- 1 Prices for positions in what is now Mexico,Bolivia,and Colombia prising that buyers sought information about their value. had similar values. 974Jenny Guardado Although, in theory, the Crown tried to select in￾dividuals of proven quality—originally from Spain, of high social status, or military background—it was often willing to undermine its own standards in ex￾change for money. For instance, some individuals liv￾ing in the colonies were able to buy positions despite clear conflicts of interest, such as ruling the provinces they resided in, considered inappropriate at the time (Sanz Tapia 2009, 89). Similarly, although governors were barred from ruling the same province more than once—as a way to prevent corruption—the Crown was ready to make exceptions if rewarded accordingly. Other regulations established that governorships were not to be transferred to a third party. However, dur￾ing the office-selling period, the Crown agreed to such exchanges. As a result, governor titles became little more than a commodity: appointments were purchased a number of years in advance and it was possible to bequest them or use them as a dowry for whomever married their daughters or nieces. Not surprisingly, in￾dividuals serving in the colonies would be more likely to be driven by profit than service (Moreno 1977, 71; Sanz Tapia 2009; Lohmann Villena 1957). Rent Extraction The main attraction for occupying office was that gov￾ernors served as tax collectors and “justice administra￾tors,” thus exerting considerable leverage among the population to engage in extractive activities. The most common of these activities—outlawed at the time of office-selling—was repartimiento, or the forced sales of merchandise. The practice entailed the forced distri￾bution of goods and credit to the local population at inflated prices, which kept them in heavy and perma￾nent debt.9 Under this arrangement, governors allied themselves with merchants in Lima, or in Seville, to obtain goods and resell them at inflated prices without the proper consent of locals (Andrien 1984, 13). Debt repayment was ensured by the fact that the governor was not only the executive, but also the judicial author￾ity in his province (Moreno 1977; Baskes 2000); debtors could be flogged,jailed, or have their goods confiscated. The rents obtained via repartimiento are estimated to be at least twice as large as those obtained from forced labor (mita) and head taxes (tributo) from the indige￾nous population (Golte 1980). Rumors about potential profits from repartimiento guided the bids for a position.10 For example, in the case of Peru the province of Ica was considered “first￾class” or “high utility” due to the ease in collecting pro￾ceeds from illegal trade activities, while that of Cercado (near the capital) was described as yielding “poor re￾turns” (Cebrian 1977, 78). Not surprisingly, Ica’s aver￾age price was twice that of Cercado.Hence, factors such as circulating currency, taxable markets, and the ease in 9 While it is debatable whether repartimiento was a forced activity or not (Baskes 2000), it still entailed monopolistic practices and steep markups on prices for goods and credit. 10 Offices represented a sizeable investment at the time, it is not sur￾prising that buyers sought information about their value. collecting payments were important in determining the extractive value of certain offices versus others and the governor’s willingness to pay. Aside from repartimiento, governors were also known to overtax the population when collecting the yearly head tax (tributo) that every indigenous person owed to the Spanish Crown. Governors often extorted amounts above the permitted legal amount, from those exempted (e.g., mestizos), and even forced families to pay for those who were absent due to death or migra￾tion. Moreover, funds from local taxes earmarked for hospitals or other public works were often used for the governors’ own purposes (Andrien 1984, 13–14). Finally, governors also benefited from mobilizing la￾bor in their province for a profit. For instance, they would “lease” workers to neighboring haciendas in ex￾change for 2/3 of the wage owed to the workers (An￾drien 1984). Governors serving in provinces forced to provide labor to the mines (mita) were able to de￾lay implementation of these regulations in exchange for greater gains from repartimiento (Mukherjee 2008). Or, they would allow individuals to forego the mita al￾together in exchange for a fee. In sum, colonial offi￾cials found numerous opportunities to profit from their position. DATA The data used in this paper comes from several sources. The time series for the prices of governor positions was coded from primary sources located at the Span￾ish Colonial Archives (Archivo General de Indias). I collected information on sold and appointed colonial governorships beginning 1673 until 1751, when the last sale was made. During this 78-year period, 62 years or 80% of the time saw the sale of at least one Peruvian province for a total of 518 sales. In terms of appoint￾ments, there were 107 governorships assigned this way. Governor titles also provide information about the per￾sonal characteristics of the purchaser, such as social sta￾tus. An example of a title of governor can be found in Figure A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix.All prices account for inflation, using changes in the price of silver (base year = 1673) provided by Arroyo-Abad (2005). On average, a Peruvian province was sold in 5,300 pesos, which is around 20 times the yearly wage of a military captain in the Spanish army at the time.11 To match colonial and current districts, I use the geographic accounts of Cosme Bueno (1951 [1783]), who wrote a detailed description of the parishes in each province and its “annexes,” now districts. Out of around 1850 current districts today, it is possible to match 967 to their colonial counterpart. Only cur￾rent districts identified as being part of the province in the eighteenth century are included to make sure there are no disparities in the presence of the colonial state at the time. Figure 1 provides a visual represen￾tation of the spatial distribution of office prices among 11 Prices for positions in what is now Mexico, Bolivia, and Colombia had similar values. 974 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800045X