with the Chinese nation,which may provide a new common base for convergent self-identification in the future. In the same survey,interviewees were asked to make a choice among seven options: (1)instant independence,(2)maintaining the status quo and getting independence later,(3) maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to independence later,(4) maintaining the status quo forever,(5)maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to unification later,(6)maintaining the status quo and getting unification later, and(7)instant unification.The percentages were 19.1%,8.6%,19.4%,25.9%,8.2%,2.9% and 2.4%,respectively;25.9%of interviewees had no position on the issue of unification versus independence.For interviewees who were in the age above 20 and below 40,the inclination to independence and disinclination to unification were stronger than those in different age brackets (Figure 3).If we consider the first three options as more or less in favor of Taiwanese independence and the last three options as more or less in favor of unification,the sum of their percentages would be 47.1%versus 13.5%.But if options 3,4 and 5 could be interpreted as having no strong preference for unification or independence, then majority interviewees(53.5%)might still want to maintain the status quo.When the interviewees were asked whether or not to support unification if the mainland had the same political system as Taiwan,35.3%of them supported unification and 51.2%still rejected it.More KMT supporters (56.5%)supported conditional unification with the mainland,and fewer (34.9%)opposed.By contrast,most DPP supporters opposed conditional unification (62.1%)and only 28.9%supported it.Even so,conditional unification is acceptable to different portions of supporters in either party.The developmental trend of this attitude deserves further observation. Unification/Independence Positions 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Age 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 over70 Instant independence 20.0% 20.4% 13.2% 16.3% 22.4% 26.3% Independence late 18.3% 7.1% 9.9% 5.0% 2.6% 72% Maintaining status quo and deciding 36.0% 22.9% 20.1% 15.5% 6.3% 6.8% whether to move to independence Maintaining status quo forever 12.8% 27.1% 25.7% 34.5% 30.5% 25.3% Maintaining status quo and deciding 4.2% 12.5% 12.1% 6.2% 1.6% whether to move to unification 8.7% ●-Unification late 1.0% 1.6% 5.6% 3.0% 3.0% 3.5% Instant unification 1.2% 3.1% 3.7% 0.9% 2.1% 3.4% Figure 3 Unification/Independence Positions among People with Different Ages Source:Database of Center for Taiwan Studies,Shanghai Jiao Tong University 1313 with the Chinese nation, which may provide a new common base for convergent self-identification in the future. In the same survey, interviewees were asked to make a choice among seven options: (1) instant independence, (2) maintaining the status quo and getting independence later, (3) maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to independence later, (4) maintaining the status quo forever, (5) maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to unification later, (6) maintaining the status quo and getting unification later, and (7) instant unification. The percentages were 19.1%, 8.6%, 19.4%, 25.9%, 8.2%, 2.9% and 2.4%, respectively; 25.9% of interviewees had no position on the issue of unification versus independence. For interviewees who were in the age above 20 and below 40, the inclination to independence and disinclination to unification were stronger than those in different age brackets (Figure 3). If we consider the first three options as more or less in favor of Taiwanese independence and the last three options as more or less in favor of unification, the sum of their percentages would be 47.1% versus 13.5%. But if options 3, 4 and 5 could be interpreted as having no strong preference for unification or independence, then majority interviewees (53.5%) might still want to maintain the status quo. When the interviewees were asked whether or not to support unification if the mainland had the same political system as Taiwan, 35.3% of them supported unification and 51.2% still rejected it. More KMT supporters (56.5%) supported conditional unification with the mainland, and fewer (34.9%) opposed. By contrast, most DPP supporters opposed conditional unification (62.1%) and only 28.9% supported it. Even so, conditional unification is acceptable to different portions of supporters in either party. The developmental trend of this attitude deserves further observation. Figure 3 Unification/Independence Positions among People with Different Ages Source: Database of Center for Taiwan Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University